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Abstract 
 
This thesis concerns the correspondence between relations of social class and 
relations of social status. Dating back to the early days of the social sciences, the 
debate about class and status has been revitalised in the wake of the initial advances 
made by the late French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1930-2002), who firmly 
asserted that class relations express themselves through socially structured, and 
symbolically significant, lifestyle differences in contemporary societies. As a point of 
departure this thesis takes the debate about the applicability of Bourdieu’s theoretical-
methodological framework and his substantial claims about what I call the class-
status nexus to investigate processes of social closure based on lifestyle differences; 
in particular differences in people’s consumption preferences and aesthetical tastes. It 
addresses the question of whether, and if so in which ways, such lifestyle differences 
lead to social boundaries being formed between more or less exclusive groups of 
people. Empirically investigating an urban community located on the south-west 
coast of Norway – the city of Stavanger – the study is based on qualitative interviews 
with forty-six individuals located in different classes and class fractions. 
 
Three substantial claims are forwarded. First, the analysis points to structural 
affinities between class positions and different cultural tastes. In particular, the thesis 
makes the point that how people appreciate cultural and material goods is at least as 
significant as what they prefer, consume or engage in. Based on the assumption that 
the ways in which people classify various goods are indicative of their modes of 
perceiving, appropriating and appreciating these goods, four main modes of 
consumption corresponding to different class positions are identified. These findings 
indicate that the social distribution of different consumption preferences and 
aesthetical tastes is clearly linked to the local class structure. Second, the analysis 
supports the idea that this classed distribution of lifestyles amounts to the formation 
of more or less exclusive status groups. It is argued that the interviewees’ expressed 
aversions to others indicate more or less explicit lifestyle-related antagonisms 
between social actors located in different class positions.  More specifically, it is 
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shown that entwinements of aesthetical and moral criteria of evaluation are used by 
interviewees to systematically demarcate ‘us’ from ‘them’. These findings indicate 
that the local class structure not only corresponds to a differential distribution of 
lifestyles; they also manifest themselves in socially differentiated judgements of 
lifestyle differences, indicating elective affinities and taste-related status hierarchies. 
Finally, the analysis suggests that socially recognised lifestyle differences express 
relations of domination and subordination, in the sense that privileged groups have 
power over less privileged groups. While the analysis certainly points to an extensive 
mobilisation of egalitarian sentiments against the perceived ‘elitism’ implied in 
certain lifestyles, such classifications are exclusively directed against people who are 
regarded as ‘showing off’ in ways deemed to be morally dubious. The unequal 
distribution of privileges and advantages tied to lifestyle differentials is, however, 
rarely problematised. On the contrary, if privileged others are perceived as acting in 
morally acceptable ways, it seems they are provided with an extraordinary 
endorsement in the eyes of the non-privileged. Thus, the analysis suggests that 
closure processes are largely misrecognised, because the privileged act under the 
‘moral radar’ of egalitarian sentiments. 
 
The thesis contributes to contemporary sociological debates on class, status and social 
closure, both on a substantial and on a theoretical-methodological level. Substantially, 
it expands on a body of research on class and cultural life, in particular the work of 
Professor Lennart Rosenlund, who has analysed correspondences between class and 
status relations in Stavanger on the basis of survey data. More generally, the present 
analysis points to an enduring significance of class in the structuring of social 
inequalities, in the sense that the social and economic conditions entailed by different 
class positions fundamentally affect the ways in which people perceive, think and act 
in the social world. Furthermore, the analysis indicates that these classed modes of 
conduct amount to social closure, meaning that groups of social actors, intentionally 
or otherwise, monopolise advantages and privileges by restricting opportunities to 
outsiders. While the structuring of subjectivities and cultural identities might not 
always be expressed in class terms by social actors themselves, the expressed 
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demarcations and symbolic value production nevertheless seem to be systematically 
structured by underlying class relations. 
  
On a theoretical-methodological level, this thesis explores the applicability of 
Bourdieu’s conceptual framework, employing it to comprehend a different research 
object than it was originally designed for. It is argued that an extended Bourdieu-
inspired analytical framework applied in a relational manner can contribute to a 
further development of what has come to be known as cultural class analysis, i.e. a 
type of class analysis which encompasses the cultural sphere of society. While the 
application of Bourdieu’s work is already at the forefront of this development, the 
present study can be seen as contributing new theoretical-methodological 
clarifications and elaborations regarding (1) the social distribution of lifestyle 
properties; (2) the formation of status groups on the basis of lifestyle differentials; 
and (3) how the unequal distribution of advantages and privileges come to be seen as 
legitimate in the eyes of the non-privileged. 
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1.1 Setting the scene 
This thesis investigates social inequalities in terms of lifestyle differences and focuses 
particularly on consumption preferences and aesthetical tastes. It addresses the 
question of whether, and if so in which ways, such differences lead to boundaries 
being formed between more or less exclusive groups of people. As its point of 
departure it takes two related thematics reflected in contemporary sociological 
debates. The first concerns the notion of ‘class’ and its usefulness in understanding 
the structuring of societal inequalities. The second concerns the notion of ‘status’ and 
the socially conditioned ways in which people may perceive, estimate and classify 
other people’s ways of life (e.g. consumption choices, aesthetical tastes and moral-
political attitudes). On a theoretical-methodological level this thesis draws insights 
from, expands on, and in certain respects challenges, already existing conceptual and 
analytical frameworks designed to comprehend social inequalities in terms of class 
and status. On an empirical level it contributes to an existing body of research by 
focusing on a specific urban community located on the south-west coast of Norway – 
Stavanger, Norway’s fourth largest city by population. In this regard, the empirical 
analysis expands on a series of studies conducted by the Swedish-Norwegian scholar 
Lennart Rosenlund, and it is based on data generated by qualitative, in-depth 
interviews with forty-six natives of Stavanger from different walks of life.1 
 
In this introductory chapter I shall sketch out the basic tenets of the relevant 
theoretical-methodological debates from the research field. I shall then outline the 
main research questions guiding the thesis and clarify the rationale for choosing 
Stavanger as an object for empirical study. Finally, I briefly outline the contents of 
the subsequent chapters.  
 
                                              
1 See authorization from Norwegian Social Science Data Service in Appendix 1. 
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1.1.1 The death of class? 
Notwithstanding important differences between countries, all contemporary 
industrialised societies seem characterised by inequalities in terms of resources, 
rewards, outcomes, opportunities and privileges. The causal explanations for such 
inequalities are, however, highly contested. One fundamental question raised in the 
early days of the social sciences was whether inequalities are determined by ‘natural’ 
circumstances, i.e. by the innate capabilities of society’s members, or whether they 
could be better explained by the ‘man-made’ attributes of society, i.e. the ways in 
which society is organised. Adhering to the latter mode of explanation, scholars such 
as Karl Marx and Max Weber asserted that the differential distribution of rewards is 
fundamentally affected by the ways in which the economic and productive spheres of 
society are organised. The notion of ‘class’ was pivotal. According to Marx and 
Engels (1967), the ultimate divisions in society are economic in character, i.e. related 
to the ownership of private property. In this view, inequalities can be traced back 
primarily to the antagonistic relation between two classes – the ‘bourgeoisie’ and the 
‘proletariat’, the former being owners and controllers of society’s material means of 
production, with the latter owning only their labour-power which they are forced to 
sell to the bourgeoisie to survive. Weber’s notion of class, by contrast, is somewhat 
more complex. Weber (1946, 1978) highlighted that ‘class situations’ reflect market-
determined ‘life chances’ and not just the ownership or non-ownership of the material 
means of production; this entails a more fine-grained depiction of class relations 
compared to that of Marx. Moreover, Weber identified other bases of social 
inequalities, most notably relations of ‘social status’, which reflect the differential 
distribution of honour, prestige and esteem within a given society. Nevertheless, 
despite apparent disagreements about the nature of class itself, both Marx and Weber 
asserted that class is a key notion through which to understand societal inequalities, 
an assertion they share with many sociologists today. 
 
Within contemporary sociological debates, however, the significance of class is 
increasingly questioned. While few scholars champion the view that societal 
inequalities may be attributed solely to the innate excellences or deficiencies of 
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society’s members, whether class is a useful or appropriate concept in analysing 
societal inequalities is heatedly debated. According to Crompton (2008: 73), three 
main points of contention can be identified. First, an extensive body of research 
points to epochal changes in the structure of work and employment and in the 
domains of lifestyles and leisure, which, it is argued, fundamentally challenge 
previously held assumptions about class relations (e.g. Bell, 1976; Lash and Urry, 
1987; Giddens, 1990, 1991; Beck, 1992; Bauman, 2001). Second, it has been asserted 
that traditional class analysis fails to address the question of other stratifying 
processes – in particular ‘the gender question’ – either by neglecting such concerns 
entirely, or by erroneously subsuming all other stratifying processes to class relations 
(e.g. Stanworth, 1984; Thrift and Williams, 1987; Birkelund, 1992). Third, scholars 
have pointed to the decreasing relevance of ‘class politics’ and have argued that, 
insofar as the strength of the relationship between class and voting is declining, 
and/or there are few apparent endeavours to rouse ‘class consciousness’, the 
significance of class itself is accordingly diminishing (e.g. Clark and Lipset, 1991; 
Evans, 1999). Based on one or a combination of these contentious arguments, class 
has been declared ‘dead’ (Pakulski and Waters, 1996), and the recurrent use of the 
term in analyses of contemporary societies has been lamented as the deployment of a 
‘zombie category’ which is ‘dead but still alive’ (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002: 
204). However, the declaration of its death, to paraphrase Mark Twain, might be an 
exaggeration. It seems class analysis is still alive and kicking, and in some respects it 
has even been rejuvenated, despite the fact that the death of class has been repeatedly 
predicted (see for instance Crompton et al, 2000; Savage, 2000; Bottero, 2005; 
Devine et al, 2005; Wright, 2005).  
 
The soundness of the antagonistic stances in debates about class and its alleged 
declining relevance depends, of course, on the meaning the adherents of the various 
stances attribute to the term. As several commentators have pointed out, debates on 
class are often characterised by deploying fundamentally different notions of class; 
this has resulted in rather fruitless debates in which opponents talk past, rather than 
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to, each other. To clarify the debate and to avoid unfortunate misunderstandings, 
Crompton (2008: 15) identifies three different meanings of the class concept: 
 
1. Class as prestige, status, culture or lifestyles. 
2. Class as structured social and economic inequality related to the possession of 
economic and power resources. 
3. Class as actual or potential social and political actors. 
 
In this thesis I shall employ class in the first sense as a point of departure. This does 
not mean that I adhere to the view that class should be equated with or subsumed to 
notions of prestige, status, culture or lifestyles; nor does it imply that debates about 
class in the last two senses are insignificant. Instead, it means that I shall apply the 
debate about status, culture and lifestyles as a point of entry through which to discuss 
class, both on a theoretical-methodological and on an empirical level. While an 
extensive account of relevant debates will be provided in the next chapter, some 
preliminary assumptions should be explained at this point.  
 
1.1.2 ‘Classed’ lifestyles pertaining to social closure? 
According to Crompton and Scott (2005), sociological debates about class have been 
crucially affected by what is known as the ‘cultural turn’ in the social sciences. This 
has most notably entailed an increasing emphasis on the significance of ‘cultural 
factors’, over and above the ‘economic’ or ‘material’, in sociological explanation. 
More specifically, it is repeatedly asserted that people’s consumption choices and 
lifestyles are becoming more significant than production in the structuring of societal 
inequalities. True though this may be, the general mode of analysis employed to 
arrive at such conclusions is, according to Crompton and Scott, highly questionable. 
Unlike the concept of class developed by classical scholars such as Marx and Weber, 
who, albeit in somewhat different ways, recognised a dual focus in their work and 
explored both the ‘economic’ and the ‘cultural’ as elements in sociological 
explanation, adherents of the ‘cultural turn’ collapse the two by treating them as one 
and the same phenomenon. In distinguishing between a ‘dual systems’ and a ‘unitary’ 
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approach to the culture-economy question, Crompton and Scott convincingly argue 
that the former should be favoured over the latter: 
 
In terms of strict logic, if economy and culture are seen to be fused, then the unitary 
approach cannot even raise the question of whether economic or cultural factors are 
more significant in social explanation. The economic and the cultural are one and the 
same thing, and they cannot even be analytically separated. Indeed, it may be 
suggested that one limitation of a strict application of this totalising ‘cultural 
economy’ approach is precisely that the possibilities for causal explanation are 
significantly restricted. (Crompton and Scott, 2005: 194)  
 
While they welcome ‘cultural issues’ to sociological debates on class, Crompton and 
Scott are suspicious of the tendency to omit class per se from the agenda of social 
theory and research by replacing it with ‘discussions of culture, consumption, and 
identity alone’ (2005: 199). In this thesis I shall follow their insistence on deploying a 
dual systems approach to the question of the structuring of societal inequalities. The 
assumption that economic and cultural dimensions of social stratification can be 
separated analytically has important consequences for the ways in which I shall 
analyse the relationship between what Weberians refer to as relations of ‘class’ and 
‘status’. 
 
For contemporary scholars who more or less explicitly deploy a dual systems 
approach in mapping out the relationship between class and status relations, the work 
of Pierre Bourdieu (e.g. Bourdieu, 1984; Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990; Bourdieu and 
Darbel, 1990; Bourdieu et al, 1996) often serves as a point of departure.2 In his 
analyses of French society in the 1960s and 1970s, Bourdieu suggests that 
differentiated lifestyles (i.e. more or less unified sets of cultural practices such as 
dress, speech, bodily dispositions, aesthetical preferences, outlook and moral-political 
stances) are unevenly distributed among different social classes and class fractions. 
As the ways in which social actors perceive, think and act in the social world are 
                                              
2 The work of Bourdieu has also influenced, and in some respects even facilitated, the ‘cultural turn’ 
in the social sciences (e.g. Skeggs, 2004; Featherstone, 2007). The various appropriations of 
Bourdieu’s theoretical-methodological approach by such ‘unitarily’ oriented scholars are, however, 
quite different from those who endeavour to investigate the dialectics between different systems of 
structural relations.  
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socially conditioned or ‘classed’ (or, according to Bourdieu’s jargon, structured by 
the social and material ‘conditions of existence’ implied in different class positions), 
observable lifestyle differences are in fact a ‘retranslation’ of class relations. 
Furthermore, Bourdieu maintains that mastering certain lifestyles and modes of 
conduct may lead to such lifestyles and modes of conduct functioning as important 
assets or ‘capitals’ in the structuring of class relations, for instance by facilitating 
success in the education system. In other words, lifestyle differentials – or more 
generally, status relations – are not only structured by class relations (i.e. a one-way 
causal explanation), but they also feed back into them, thus constituting a dialectical 
relationship between what Bourdieu refers to as a ‘social space’ and a ‘symbolic 
space’ respectively. Bourdieu accordingly posits that lifestyle differentials reinforce 
the stratifying impact of class relations rather than rendering them obsolete, even 
though the underlying class relations are not perceived as power relations by the 
social actors themselves. 
  
In the wake of Bourdieu’s work, an expanding body of research has investigated the 
nature of lifestyle differentials in other contexts. Three main thematics may be 
identified in the contemporary debate. First, the most heatedly debated question 
concerns the social distribution of lifestyle differentials, particularly those related to 
aesthetical tastes and cultural consumption. The crucial question here is whether 
lifestyles vary by class, or whether this distributional principle is diminishing and/or 
being replaced by other principles. Second, scholars have debated processes 
pertaining to group formation, i.e. the ways in which more or less exclusive social 
collectives are formed on the basis of perceived lifestyle differences. One of the main 
concerns here is whether, and if so in which ways, social actors’ evaluations and 
estimations of others constitute barriers or boundaries between groups of social 
actors. Third, scholars have debated whether mastering certain lifestyles may be 
consolidated into assets producing advantage or privilege, and further, how power 
relations arising from this differential distribution of advantages come to be perceived 
as legitimate or justifiable in the eyes of subordinates.   
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These three thematics – lifestyle distribution, group formation and power relations – 
constitute the basic focal points of this thesis. More generally, this thesis investigates 
processes of social closure based on lifestyle differentials. The notion of social 
closure originally stems from the work of Weber, in particular his discussion of 
‘open’ and ‘closed’ social relationships: 
 
A social relationship, regardless of whether it is communal or associative in 
character, will be spoken of as “open” to outsiders if and insofar as its system of 
order does not deny participation to anyone who wishes to join and is actually in a 
position to do so. A relationship will, on the other hand, be called “closed” against 
outsiders so far as, according to its subjective meaning and its binding rules, 
participation of certain persons is excluded, limited, or subjected to conditions. 
(Weber, 1978: 43) 
 
The notion of social closure has been further developed by scholars expanding on a 
Weberian analytical framework (Parkin, 1979; Murphy, 1988; Brubaker, 1992), and it 
has also been discussed in relation to the work of Bourdieu, although he did not use 
the term himself (Manza, 1992; Hansen, 1995). It generally refers to the process 
through which groups of social actors, intentionally or otherwise, monopolise 
advantages and privileges by closing off opportunities to other groups of outsiders.  
 
Deploying social closure as an overarching concept in this thesis is consequential in 
two main respects. First, it implies that lifestyle differentiation is viewed as one of 
several ways in which processes of social closure can be operative in the social 
world, meaning that I would not suggest that the structuring of societal inequalities 
can be conceptually reduced to lifestyle differentiation. By expanding on a crucial 
conceptual distinction between ‘formalised’ and ‘non-formalised’ closure alluded to 
by Murphy (1988) and Manza (1992), the former can be tentatively defined as 
structured social boundaries arising from the exclusive possession of scarce resources 
legally and institutionally sanctioned by the state, and the latter as structured social 
boundaries arising from subjective evaluations of esteem, honour and prestige, which, 
in turn, are crystallised into more or less exclusive social collectives that control 
access to scarce resources, both material and symbolic. This is an analytical 
distinction highlighting that closure processes may take several forms. On an 
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empirical level, by contrast, these ideal types of social closure may of course be 
entwined. In this thesis I shall nevertheless accentuate the structuring of social 
inequalities in terms of non-formalised closure. More specifically, I shall assess the 
ways in which lifestyle differentiations pertain to such processes, in particular how 
they are related to relations of class and status. 
 
Second, focusing on social closure implies that other potential ways of studying 
lifestyles are less relevant to the objectives of this study. These include: thematics 
related to ‘the culture industry’ and its means of ‘mass deception’ and ‘commodity 
fetishism’ (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1972; Marcuse, 1966); the role of consumption 
in the coming of a new historical epoch, often denoted by terms such as ‘post-
modernity’, ‘post-industrial society’, ‘risk society’ and ‘consumer society’ (Bell, 
1976; Lash and Urry, 1987; Beck, 1992; Baudrillard, 1998); the rise of 
‘postmodernist aesthetics’ as a consequence of developments within the ‘capitalist 
economy’ (Harvey, 1990; Jameson, 1991); the role of lifestyles in the constitution of 
‘reflexive self-identities’ (Giddens, 1991); the ideological aspects of ‘consumerism’ 
and its negative impact on the human psyche (Bauman, 2001, 2004); the positive 
‘use-value’ goods of various kinds can imply for consumers (Sayer, 2005); and, 
finally, ‘subcultures’ and the significance of ‘style’ in constituting youthful ‘acts of 
revolt’ (Hall and Jefferson, 1976; Hebdige, 1979). In other words, I will not 
endeavour to provide a general account of lifestyles and their multi-faceted meanings 
and functions in social life; instead, I analytically accentuate the ways in which 
lifestyle differences pertain to social closure, a manoeuvre that is not necessarily 
incompatible with the assertions forwarded by other bodies of research.  
 
1.2 Research questions 
Based on these preliminary clarifications and delimitations, three main research 
questions can be singled out for further empirical assessment: 
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1. In what ways are people’s lifestyles differentiated, and in what ways is the 
social distribution of different lifestyles pertinent to class relations? 
 
This question relates directly to contemporary scholarly debates about class and 
status. Despite differences in the theoretical-methodological frameworks employed in 
empirical analyses, most scholars concerned with the class-status nexus view the 
question of lifestyle differentials and their social distribution as fundamental. If it is 
the case that concurrences between class relations and status relations exist, one 
would expect people’s ways of life (e.g. aesthetical tastes, consumption patterns and 
moral-political attitudes) to be conditioned by the material and social conditions 
implied in different class positions. Conversely, if there are no such concurrences, 
one would expect a distribution of lifestyle differences that does not follow class-
lines.  
 
2. In what ways do people perceive, evaluate and classify others in terms of their 
lifestyles, and in what ways do lifestyle differences amount to the formation of 
more or less exclusive status groups? 
 
Although the question of distribution has attracted the most scholarly attention in 
contemporary debates of the class-status nexus, this second question is of equal 
importance. Even if one based on empirical investigations can point to a ‘classed’ 
distribution of lifestyles within a given society, it is not necessarily the case that this 
distribution is consequential in terms of social closure. Moreover, while the mastery 
of certain lifestyles and modes of conduct may amount to formalised closure – for 
instance in facilitating success within the education system and thus constituting 
‘objective’ boundaries between possessors and non-possessors of educational 
qualifications – they do not necessarily amount to non-formalised closure. For 
instance, person A might prefer drinking vintage wine, listening to classical music 
and spending her holidays climbing mountains in Peru, while person B might prefer 
drinking beer, listening to country and western music and spending her holidays 
sunbathing in Mallorca; yet, the two of them might be the best of friends. Indeed, as 
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noted by Bourdieu (1985: 730), lifestyle differences exist for a social subject only 
insofar as they are perceived and recognised as significant. Thus, only insofar as 
social actors are endowed with the capacity and inclination to make distinctions 
between practitioners of different lifestyles do such differences lead to the formation 
of more or less exclusive communal groups.  
 
3. In what ways do lifestyle differences and social estimations thereof constitute 
relations of domination and subordination between groups of social actors, 
and in what ways is the legitimacy of such power relations bestowed?  
 
Insofar as lifestyle differentials are (1) socially distributed according to a society’s 
class structure, and (2) amount to the formation of more or less exclusive status 
groups, it is likely, but not necessarily the case, that these circumstances imply 
relations of domination and subordination. Following Lukes’ (2005: 83ff) general 
definition of domination as a special instance of power that involves individuals’ or 
groups’ power over others, this implies that groups of subordinate social actors, 
consciously or otherwise, accept or comply with a differential distribution of power 
which does not benefit their life chances; indeed, they even contribute to the 
structuring of asymmetrical power relations.3 However, if it is the case that this 
unequal distribution is recognised, perceived as unjust and/or challenged by those 
who do not benefit from the order of things, power relations cannot be described as 
domination in any meaningful way. Thus, issues related to social actors’ perceptions 
of the differential distribution of privileges and advantages within a society are 
crucial in order to attain sociological insights about power relations. 
 
In sum, these research questions constitute an analytical focus on three facets that are 
mutually interrelated, but not reducible to each other. These questions will thus be 
                                              
3 According to Lukes (2005: 85), power as domination is ‘the ability to constrain the choices of 
others, coercing them or securing their compliance, by impeding them from living as their own 
nature and judgement dictate.’ 
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treated as relatively autonomous on an analytical level, even though this implies 
accentuating aspects of a social world in which these aspects are tightly entwined.   
 
1.3 Stavanger as an empirical case 
I focus on a particular urban community – the city of Stavanger, Norway – and the 
social relations within it. The choice of Stavanger as an empirical case for this study 
is motivated by three interrelated reasons. First of all, Stavanger makes for an 
interesting case in terms of its ‘structural history’. As previous studies indicate (e.g. 
Hjellbrekke, 1999b; Rosenlund, 2009a), the advent and expanding presence of a 
booming offshore oil industry from the late 1960s and onwards has brought with it 
tremendous changes for the city in population growth, occupational structure, 
educational level, as well as the average income of the population. Stavanger’s 
economy was long characterised by small-scale fishing and canning industries, but as 
of today, Stavanger is widely referred to as the ‘oil capital of Norway’, as several oil 
companies are headquartered there. Partly due to the presence of oil companies and 
the influx of well-paid residents, the city features on various lists of the most 
expensive cities in the world. In 2011, the unemployment rate was less than 2%, 
significantly lower than the Norwegian and European average.4 Stavanger also has 
several higher educational institutions, such as the University of Stavanger, BI 
Norwegian Business School and MHS School of Mission and Theology. These 
changes have also brought with them profound changes in Stavanger’s cultural life. 
Initially marked by a high degree of teetotalism and more or less ‘temperate’ ways of 
life, Stavangerians have increasingly embraced ‘hedonistic’ lifestyles associated with 
increased wealth and prosperity, typically reflected in increased spending on material 
goods, as well as a higher demand for cultural forms such as theatre, music and 
literature. Yet, far from all residents have embraced this, and lifestyle-related tensions 
exist between different demographical segments of the population. Indeed, the 
appointment of Stavanger as the ‘European Capital of Culture’ in 2008 revealed 
                                              
4 http://statistikk.stavanger.kommune.no/#arbeidsloshet 
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explicit lines of conflict in Stavanger’s cultural life, for instance manifested in heated 
debates in the local newspapers, and in diverging opinions on the form and content of 
cultural events (Berg and Rommetvedt, 2009; Bergsgard and Vassenden, 2009, 
2011).5 For these reasons, Stavanger makes for an interesting case in terms of 
lifestyle differentiation and its potential relatedness to processes of social closure. 
 
Second, as a main aspect of this study concerns social actors’ classifications and 
estimations of other people’s way of life, an analytical focus on a limited 
geographical area has methodological advantages. More specifically, interviewing 
people and inviting them to talk about ‘the local’ (i.e. something they presumably are 
familiar with, such as cultural institutions, enterprises, urban areas, social milieux and 
cliques) arguably constitutes advantages compared to inviting people to talk about 
others in general, i.e. in an abstract and perhaps unfamiliar way. Indeed, as previous 
studies have indicated that Norwegians are particularly reluctant to denigrate others 
on the basis of lifestyle differences due to ‘egalitarian sentiments’, which, it is 
argued, somewhat paradoxically conceal and even help to maintain the hierarchical 
structures of Norwegian society (Gullestad, 1992; Daloz, 2007; cf. Skarpenes, 2007), 
the endeavour to invite people to talk about specific people and places in a local 
context is presumably a vantage point in order to investigate such tensions. 
 
Finally, the choice of Stavanger as an empirical case is also motivated by pragmatic 
concerns. As already alluded to, this study expands on a series of studies conducted 
by Lennart Rosenlund (e.g. 1996, 2000a, 2000b, 2000c, 2009a). Besides functioning 
as an important historical-structural contextual backdrop for the present empirical 
inquiry, Rosenlund’s empirical findings also serve as an analytical point of departure 
in two main respects. First, his construction of a ‘local social space’ by means of 
Multiple Correspondence Analysis (Hjellbrekke, 1999a; Le Roux and Rouanet, 2010) 
constitutes the basis for the rationale guiding the sampling of forty-six individuals 
                                              
5 The European Capital of Culture is a city designated by the European Union for a period of one 
calendar year during which it organises a series of cultural events. 
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subjected to qualitative interviews, in the sense that these are recruited in order to 
ensure a sample of cases according to the composition of the local class structure. 
Second, the findings concerning the ‘classed’ distribution of lifestyles constitute a 
basis for further empirical scrutiny of such matters. As Rosenlund’s inquiries are 
exclusively based on census and survey data, they imply certain limitations. Thus, by 
applying qualitative in-depth interviews I shall endeavour to expand on Rosenlund’s 
studies, and, insofar as the empirical findings call for it, challenge them. 
 
1.4 An outline of contents  
In Chapter 2 I elaborate on the scholarly debates related to class, status and social 
closure alluded to above. As the subsequent empirical analysis primarily draws on 
Bourdieu’s theoretical-methodological framework, a rather extensive account of his 
work and his critics will be provided.  
 
In Chapter 3 I use the sociological insights discussed in the preceding chapter to 
construct the current research object. I discuss the epistemological rationale for the 
deployment of research methods and analytical strategies to map out lifestyle 
differentials and processes of social closure in present day Stavanger. Here I 
elaborate on Rosenlund’s work and provide an extensive account of how the rationale 
guiding the sampling of cases draws upon it. In particular, I discuss his construction 
of a ‘local social space’, which depicts the local class structure in terms of 
Stavangerians’ possession of various types of capital. I also discuss the advantages 
and limitations of employing in-depth qualitative interviews in empirical studies of 
the class-status nexus.  
 
The empirical analysis proceeds in a three-step manner corresponding to the three 
focal concerns outlined above – the social distribution of lifestyles, processes of 
group formation and relations of domination and subordination. In Chapter 4 I map 
out lifestyle differences in terms of aesthetical tastes and consumption preferences. 
By focusing on the ways in which the interviewees classify and evaluate various 
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cultural goods and leisure activities, I extract and categorise four ‘modes of 
consumption’ from the interview data. The social distribution of these modes is in 
turn assessed by analysing the interviewees’ classificatory practices in light of their 
positions in the local social space.  
 
In Chapters 5 and 6 the question of social closure and the formation of more or less 
exclusive status groups on the basis of subjective evaluations of esteem will be 
assessed. By examining the ways in which the interviewees classify, evaluate and 
estimate other people’s lifestyles, I identify two main types of boundary drawing. The 
first concerns what I refer to as ‘horizontal boundary drawing’, meaning mutual 
classifications of disapproval between interviewees located in different fractions of 
the upper sectors of the local social space. The second concerns ‘vertical boundary 
drawing’, which refers to mutual classifications of disapproval between interviewees 
located in the upper and lower sectors of the space respectively. Further, I discuss the 
ways in which these types of boundary drawing may be viewed as strategies to 
(de)monopolise the power to define the principles governing the social distribution of 
esteem and prestige. 
  
Chapter 7 focuses on perceptions of hierarchical social relations, and addresses the 
question of how egalitarian values have consequences for the legitimacy of power 
relations linked to lifestyle differentials and closure processes. More specifically I ask 
whether, and if so in which ways, differences in tastes and lifestyles may amount to 
relations of legitimate domination, despite the explicit mobilisation of moral 
sentiments against ‘elitism’, ‘pageantry’, ‘snobbery’ and so forth. In order to 
comprehend the apparent contradiction between egalitarian values on the one hand, 
and hierarchical relations of power, status and prestige on the other, I map out the 
ways in which a reluctance to explicitly express condescending classifications of 
others are manifested in the interview data. Moreover, I discuss how the mastery of 
certain lifestyles may function as what Bourdieu has referred to as ‘symbolic capital’ 
in lieu of deference and endorsement on the part of non-practitioners.  
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In the concluding Chapter 8 I synthesise the empirical findings presented in the 
preceding chapters, and return to the overarching questions related to class, status and 
social closure. I discuss the ways in which sociological insights generated in this 
study can contribute to various bodies of research, and I also point to limitations. In 
doing so, I point to future challenges facing class analysis and the endeavour to 
account for structured societal inequalities related to lifestyle differentiation. 
 
 
 
   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
PRELIMINARY  
THEORETICAL DISCUSSIONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
  
  21
2.1 Introduction 
Scrutinising social stratification in terms of ‘class’ and ‘status’ dates long back in the 
history of sociology (Turner, 1988; Scott, 1996). The analysis of the relationship 
between the two is perhaps best known through the work of Weber (1946, 1978), who 
asserted that class and status refer to two analytically distinct forms of social 
stratification. According to Weber, the notion of class refers to social relations as 
regards ownership of society’s means of production as well as labour market-
determined ‘life chances’, whereas the notion of status relations refers to the social 
distribution of esteem, prestige, and honour – typically reflected in different ‘styles of 
life’ among more or less amorphous ‘status groups’. Moreover, Weber asserted that 
the entwinement of class and status relations is contingent, meaning that the two may 
or may not concur in a given context. While most sociologists informed by the work 
of Weber would agree to this assertion, how one ought to scrutinise the empirical 
entwinement of class and status relations in contemporary societies has been subject 
to scholarly debates. As noted by Turner:  
 
While this analytical distinction is useful, it is empirically and historically the case 
that class and status as axes of inequality and stratification are usually mixed within 
social systems. The character of this mixture can only be ascertained by empirical, 
historical and comparative analyses; it is not a question of a priori theoretical 
stipulation alone, although of course the analytical relationship between class and 
status will depend on the particular definitions we ascribe to these terms. (Turner, 
1988: 14) 
 
Indeed, as scholars have deployed highly different notions of both class and status 
relations in empirical inquiries, claims about their entwinement differ substantially. In 
this regard we can identify three distinct positions within the research field. First, 
there are those who have merged the Weberian notions of class and status in and 
through the notion of ‘socioeconomic status’. Dating back to the work of Warner and 
his colleagues (e.g. Warner and Lunt, 1941; Warner, 1949, 1963), this body of 
research primarily focuses on self-perceptions of prestige. Initially based on 
anthropological community studies, the notion of socioeconomic status has more 
recently been associated with attempts to construct scales that reflect the hierarchical 
structure of society by way of various statistical techniques. Particularly focusing on 
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the occupational structure, Blau and Duncan have studied processes of social 
stratification through the deployment of a unidimensional, continuous measure of 
occupational prestige – the Socio-Economic Index (SEI) (Duncan, 1961; Blau and 
Duncan, 1967). More recently, Bottero and Prandy (2003; Prandy, 1990) have 
developed the Cambridge occupational scale, a mapping of networks of social 
interaction (i.e. patterns of friendships and partnerships), which are thought to give 
rise to relations of social closeness and distance. Notwithstanding important 
differences between these approaches, they all share the propensity to treat class and 
status as one and the same thing, or at least betray an unsettled account of the 
relationship between the two, in constructing hierarchically ordered scales which are 
held to reflect the primary bases for the structuring of social inequalities. 
 
Second, there are those who insist on a clear conceptual distinction between class and 
status, not just on an analytical level, but also by pointing to empirical patterns that, 
according to this view, warrant a multidimensional depiction of social stratification. 
This view is forwarded by Chan and Goldthorpe (2004, 2007a; Chan, 2010b) who 
assert that class (defined in terms of the social relations of labour markets and 
productions units) and status (defined in terms of hierarchical social relations that 
express perceived and typically accepted social superiority, equality or inferiority) 
have distinct explanatory power when it comes to studying various domains of social 
life. Economic security and prospects, they argue, are stratified more by class than by 
status, while the opposite is true for outcomes in the domain of cultural consumption 
and lifestyles. While their depiction of status is quite similar to that of the conceptual 
mergers discussed above (in fact, their status scale is almost identical to the 
Cambridge scale), Chan and Goldthorpe deploy class as an additional independent 
variable in empirical analyses using regression based techniques. Thus, they maintain 
that their clear-cut conceptual distinction is empirically founded. 
 
Finally, there are those who, following the leads of Bourdieu (1984; Bourdieu and de 
Saint Martin, 1976; Bourdieu and Darbel, 1990; Bourdieu et al, 1996), adhere to the 
view that while class relations and status relations can be separated on an analytical 
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level, they are tightly entwined on an empirical level. Indeed, it is held that class 
relations (defined as a multidimensional ‘social space’, i.e. a social topography 
reflecting the differential distribution of various forms of scarce resources or 
‘capitals’) express themselves symbolically through status relations (defined as a 
‘symbolic space’, i.e. a social topography of differentiated cultural tastes and 
lifestyles). Moreover, as the mastery of certain lifestyles can itself be converted into 
scarce resources productive of advantages and privileges, they are thought to feed 
back into the social space as time goes by, thus constituting a dialectical relationship 
between class and status. So while Bourdieu shares Chan and Goldthorpe’s view that 
class and status should be regarded as analytically separate, his view of the ways in 
which the two are empirical entwined fundamentally differs from theirs.  
 
Returning to the point put forward by Turner, claims about the empirical character of 
the class-status nexus depend on the particular definitions ascribed to the terms. As 
the three positions sketched out above employ rather divergent notions of both terms, 
some overlapping and some fundamentally different, it is, perhaps, no surprise that 
scholars end up advancing quite contradictory claims about processes pertaining to 
social stratification. As asserted in the previous chapter, the current empirical scrutiny 
of the relationship between class and status in Stavanger deploys a ‘dual systems’ 
approach, meaning that it is a based on a fundamental assumption that economic and 
cultural dimensions of social stratification can be separated on an analytical level. 
This view implies that the conceptual merging of the notions of class and status 
evident in endeavours to construct unidimensional prestige scales does not concern 
the present study directly. While such ‘unitary’ approaches might be fruitful for other 
research purposes, this would, following Crompton and Scott’s (2005) line of 
reasoning, imply an unnecessary limiting on the scrutiny of the contingent 
relationship between economy and culture, or more specifically, between class 
relations and status relations (see also Trimberger, 1984; Parkin, 1978). A discussion 
of the discrepancies between Bourdieu’s approach to the class-status question and 
that of Chan and Goldthorpe is, however, more pressing. 
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I shall start with a fairly extensive outline of Bourdieu’s approach. I do this for three 
reasons. First of all, as the following empirical analysis of class and status relations in 
Stavanger draws on his works, a clarification of the theoretical-methodological 
underpinnings of the analysis is necessary. Second, as there exist several 
contradictory readings of Bourdieu’s account of the class-status nexus within the 
research field, a ‘reflexive’ appropriation of a Bourdieusian approach is all the more 
pressing. Finally, a thorough discussion of Bourdieu’s work is relevant because of his 
persistent influence on the research field. Bourdieu’s work on the subject has 
subsequently helped to create a vast stream of empirical research that has expanded 
enormously in recent decades. Even though the reception of Bourdieu’s work ranges 
from uncritical praise to outright dismissal, most scholars concerned with issues 
related to class, status and lifestyles take it as a point of departure for discussing their 
own empirical findings. To put it somewhat crudely, whichever theoretical-
methodological framework one chooses to work within, it seems there is no escaping 
Bourdieu. 
 
In the subsequent section I shall critically assess different aspects of Bourdieu’s 
model by comparing it to approaches that have challenged it in some way. In this 
section I shall put forward the argument that although there are certain weaknesses 
and unclear aspects in Bourdieu’s framework, there is no need to disregard it. On the 
contrary, I aim to show that the frameworks employed in alternative accounts of the 
relationship between class and status are either highly problematical, or that they are 
not as ‘heretical’ towards a Bourdieusian framework as they set out to be. In the case 
of the latter, I shall argue that these frameworks may be better viewed as 
complementary, and not as alternative, frameworks of sociological analysis and that 
they thus may provide additional insights into matters that have hitherto been 
insufficiently scrutinised empirically by Bourdieu and his followers. It should, 
however, be noted that this is by no means an endeavour to provide an exhaustive 
account of the objections that have been raised to Bourdieu’s inquiries, but it is 
nevertheless an attempt to discuss what I consider to be the most pressing theoretical 
issues with regards to the comprehension of the present empirical case of Stavanger. 
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2.2 Bourdieu’s account of the class-status nexus 
In recent developments in class analysis, Bourdieu’s work has been highly influential. 
As noted by Flemmen (forthcoming), Bourdieu’s influence can in part be attributed to 
two sets of problems facing conventional class analysis. Externally, class analysis has 
been challenged by scholars heralding the coming of a new phase of modernity which 
supposedly renders ‘class’ an obsolete concept. Internally, the sociology of class has 
faced at least two challenges regarding the seemingly insurmountable problems 
connected to the Marxist labour theory of value, as well as what has been perceived 
as a narrowing of class analysis, associated with the endeavours of both Marxists and 
Weberians to develop class schemes based on employment relations and conflicting 
economic interests on the labour market. In this context, many have turned to the 
work of Bourdieu. In recent times, the Bourdieusian influence has perhaps been most 
marked within British sociology (e.g. Crompton et al, 2000; Savage, 2000; Savage et 
al, 2005a; Savage et al, 2005b; Robbins, 2000, 2006; Devine et al, 2005; Le Roux et 
al, 2008; Bennett et al, 2009; Atkinson, 2009, 2010), but Bourdieu’s work on class 
has also made its mark on Norwegian scholars (e.g. Hansen, 1995; Hjellbrekke, 
1999b; Hjellbrekke et al, 2007; Gripsrud and Hovden, 2000; Gripsrud et al, 2011; 
Rosenlund, 2000c, 2009a; Hovden, 2008; Flemmen, 2009, 2012b; Denord et al, 
2011; Andersen and Hansen, 2012; Mangset, 2012). 
 
Notwithstanding Bourdieu’s influence, there seems to be considerable disagreement 
about what Bourdieu ‘really meant’ as regards the class-status question, both among 
adherents and detractors (e.g. Brubaker, 1985; Swartz, 1997; Chan and Goldthorpe, 
2004, 2007a; Weininger, 2005; Savage, 2012). Considering his dense writing style 
and continuous refusal to spell out simplified axioms of his position, this confusion is 
perhaps not surprising. Indeed, as noted by Weininger, 
 
Bourdieu was deeply opposed to the separation of theory and research – to such an 
extent that nearly all of his conceptual innovations were developed only in the 
context of concrete empirical analyses. This creates numerous difficulties for any 
discussion charged with providing a “foundational” account of this approach to class 
or any other sociological object. Analytic propositions must be extracted from 
instances if their application with as little distortion as possible. Furthermore, it is 
necessary, particularly when undertaking such an account in a place or time different 
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from that in which Bourdieu wrote, to untangle the substance of these propositions 
from the peculiarities of the context to which they were applied. (Weininger, 2005: 
82ff) 
 
Despite such difficulties I shall nevertheless attempt to ‘untangle’ or ‘distil’ the 
various facets of Bourdieu’s argument. While I certainly do not aim to provide an 
exhaustive exegesis of what Bourdieu ‘really meant’, a clarification of some 
ambiguous aspects of his account of the class-status nexus seems pertinent. In this 
regard, a few comments on Bourdieu’s relationship to Weber are necessary.  
 
Weber (1946: 187) held that ‘status situations’ are ‘every typical component of the 
life fate of men that is determined by a specific, positive or negative, social 
estimation of honour,’ and that ‘status honour’ is ‘normally expressed by the fact that 
above all else a specific style of life can be expected from all those who wish to 
belong to the circle.’ Moreover, Weber asserted that status honour is linked to class 
situations ‘in the most varied ways’, but that there is no inevitable link between the 
two, as social esteem and prestige do not necessarily follow from property, wealth, 
high income, occupational titles, etc. In line with Weber’s work, Bourdieu (1984) 
suggests that social esteem is expressed in a range of cultural practices and lifestyles, 
such as dress, speech, outlook and bodily dispositions. As regards the link between 
class and status, his relationship to Weber is more uneasy. Indeed, in the preface to 
Distinction (1984: xiff), Bourdieu asserts that his model of the relationship between 
the ‘universe of economic and social conditions’ (the social space) and the ‘universe 
of life-styles’ (the symbolic space) is based on ‘an endeavour to rethink Max Weber’s 
opposition between class and Stand [status].’ Unfortunately, he does not provide an 
elaborate account of his reading of Weber, nor does he state in what ways this 
‘rethinking’ departs from Weber’s model. In a 1966 article – when he had not fully 
developed his notions of the social space and the symbolic space – he does, however, 
assert that  
 
everything seems to indicate that Weber opposes class and status group as two types 
of real entities which would come together more or less frequently according to the 
type of society […]; [however,] to give Weberian analyses all of their force and 
impact, it is necessary to see them instead as nominal unities […] which are always 
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the result of a choice to accent the economic aspect or the symbolic aspect – aspects 
which always coexist in the same reality. (Bourdieu, cited in Weininger, 2005: 84) 
 
Although one could object to Bourdieu’s reading of Weber,6 the above nevertheless 
highlights his insistence on treating both class and status as ‘nominal’ rather than 
‘real’ entities, thus rendering possible the view that people may belong to certain 
distributional groupings on an analytical level, without this necessarily implying that 
there exist ‘mobilised’ or ‘realised’ social collectives on the basis of either economic 
interests or affiliations as regards lifestyles. Moreover, in a later work Bourdieu 
upholds that 
 
‘Status groups’ based on a ‘life-style’ and a ‘stylisation of life’ are not as Weber 
thought, a different kind of group from classes, but dominant classes that have denied 
or, so to speak, sublimated themselves and so legitimated themselves. (Bourdieu, 
1990b: 139) 
 
 
Thus, Bourdieu maintains that class relations and status relations are not only tightly 
entwined on an empirical level, but that the latter is a ‘misrecognised’, symbolic 
expression of the former. However, this does not, as some detractors seem to believe 
(e.g. Chan and Goldthorpe, 2004, 2007a, 2010; Rose, 2006) that the notion of status 
is left ‘empirically outmoded’ and ‘conceptually redundant’ within Bourdieu’s 
framework. On the contrary, the notion of status is pivotal in at least three aspects of 
his model of social stratification, albeit enwrapped in a conceptual framework that 
differs from that of Weberians. First, it is apparent in the notion of ‘symbolic space’, 
which reflects the social distribution of different cultural tastes and lifestyles. Second, 
it is apparent in the notion of ‘elective affinities’, which points to the formation of 
actual social collectives. Third, it is apparent in the notion of ‘symbolic capital’, 
which depicts the social distribution of honour, esteem and prestige, albeit in a 
‘misrecognised’ form. In what follows, I shall elaborate on these points. 
 
                                              
6 Weber did in fact distinguish between status as nominal entities through the notion of Ständische 
Lage, referring to a ‘status order’ depicting a hierarchy of different ‘status situations’, and status as 
real entities through the notion of Stände, referring to more or less amorphous ‘status groups’ or 
‘estates’. For a further account of this reading of Weber, see Scott (1996). 
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2.2.1 The social distribution of cultural tastes and lifestyles 
Bourdieu’s (1984, 1985, 1989, 1991a) account of the correspondence between class 
relations and a differential distribution of lifestyles rests upon three key concepts: the 
social space, the symbolic space and (class) habitus. The multidimensional social 
space objectifies the system of relationships between different social positions. 
Translated into the language of conventional stratification theory, it reflects a 
society’s class structure. The structure of the social space is shaped by the distribution 
of various scarce resources (or ‘capitals’ in the Bourdieusian vocabulary) and the 
relative strength between them. Thus, it reflects the main lines of division in society 
in terms of the relations between individuals’ capital profiles. In the case of France in 
the 1960s and 1970s, Bourdieu (1984: ch. 2) constructs the social space by way of 
Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) (Hjellbrekke, 1999a; Le Roux and 
Rouanet, 2010) of survey data which include a wide variety of indicators of the 
‘economic capital’ and ‘cultural capital’ possessed by individuals. The model 
provided may be understood as a factorial space constituted by three orthogonal axes, 
which are interpreted as representing three sets of distributional ‘oppositions’. 
Individuals are located in this space in such a way that the closer they are to one 
another, the more they have in common in terms of possession of capitals; and the 
more remote they are from one another, the less they have in common (Bourdieu, 
1989: 16). 
 
The first axis represents the differential distribution of the overall volume of capital 
(i.e. both economic capital and cultural capital) possessed by individuals, and 
differentiates between high and low overall volumes of capital. Translated into the 
language of conventional class analysis, the volume axis represents the social 
positions of three main classes of social actors. Bourdieu depicts the ‘dominated 
class’ (sometimes referred to as the ‘working classes’ and the ‘popular classes’) as 
positioned in the lower sectors of the social space; the ‘petite bourgeoisie’ as 
positioned in the middle sectors of the space; and finally, the ‘dominant class’ 
(sometimes referred to as the ‘bourgeoisie’) as positioned in the upper sectors of the 
space. The second axis represents an opposition related to the composition of capital, 
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i.e. the relative weight of economic and cultural capital possessed by individuals. 
When the two axes are viewed together, the distributional opposition related to the 
composition of capital crosscuts the distributional opposition related to capital 
volume, thus constituting different class fractions within each of the main classes. 
Bourdieu thus separates between class fractions comprised of individuals endowed 
with a preponderance of cultural capital, class fractions comprised of individuals with 
a preponderance of economic capital and class fractions comprised of individuals 
with balanced capital profiles. The third axis represents an opposition related to 
changes in the volume and composition of capitals for individuals or groups over 
time, and is thus interpreted as an analytical dimension that differentiates between 
different ‘trajectories’. Generated from indicators of the capital possessed by the 
individuals’ family of the origin, this axis differentiates between inherited and 
achieved affiliations with a given social position. 
 
As regards Bourdieu’s depiction of class, five points should be highlighted. First, 
different sectors in the social space represent objective classes, or as Bourdieu (1998: 
10) depicts it, ‘theoretical classes’ or ‘classes on paper’. Translated into a Marxist 
vocabulary, the social space represents ‘class-in-itself’ and not ‘class-for-itself’. 
Classes as represented in the social space are in other words nominal categories 
whose construction is independent of the existence of subjective ‘class awareness’ or 
‘class consciousness’. Second, the axes constituting the multidimensional social 
space are continuous; there are no clear breaks or cleavages separating categories of 
individuals. Bourdieu thus sidesteps the so-called boundary problem of where to draw 
the line between classes and class fractions – a problem which has puzzled scholars 
who have attempted to construct class schemes.7 Third, class positions in the 
Bourdieusian sense are not derived from the occupation of individuals as is usually 
done in conventional class analysis. Rather, they are defined in terms of individuals’ 
positions in the relative distribution of various forms of capital. While Bourdieu 
                                              
7 For an interesting comment on Bourdieu’s account of class vis-à-vis conventional class analysis, 
see Flemmen (forthcoming). 
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provides a depiction of the mean modality points of a variety of occupations within 
the social space, these are usually projected onto the space as ‘supplementary 
variables’, meaning that they do not affect the construction of the space. Thus, 
individuals in similar occupations may in principle be located in different sectors of 
the social space, depending on the make-up of their capital portfolios. Fourth, the 
social space is not a fixed structure, but is better viewed as a ‘snapshot’ of the relative 
distribution of capitals at the time and place at which the empirical scrutiny is 
conducted. This means that it is an empirical question whether the structure of the 
social space takes on similar forms in contexts different from those of Bourdieu’s 
inquiries, although he puts forward the hypothesis that the basic structure of the social 
space as depicted in the case of France is transferable to other contexts (Bourdieu, 
1991a). Finally, Bourdieu’s notion of class is broader than conventional notions of 
class, in that it is not exclusively tied to economic resources and relations on the 
labour market, but encompasses ‘cultural’ and ‘symbolic’ resources as well. 
 
The second key concept in Bourdieu’s model is the symbolic space, which depicts the 
social distribution of differentiated lifestyles, or a ‘system of stylistic possibles’. Just 
as with the social space, Bourdieu (1984: 128ff, 262, 340) constructs the symbolic 
space (alternately referred to as the ‘space of lifestyles’) by way of Multiple 
Correspondence Analysis of survey data. Deploying a variety of lifestyle variables 
(e.g. preferences for goods such as musical works, visual art, literature, motor 
vehicles, interior decor, clothing, food, beverages and sports), the multidimensional 
symbolic space reflects distributional oppositions between individuals’ properties in 
terms of preferences for certain goods and inclinations to indulge in certain practices 
and activities. Bourdieu asserts that the symbolic space is ‘homologous’ to the social 
space, meaning that positions in the social space correspond to distinct cultural tastes 
and preferences. However, as regards the deployment of the model in other empirical 
contexts, Bourdieu warns against what he calls a ‘substantialist’ or ‘naively realist’ 
reading of his analyses:  
 
Some would […] consider the fact that, for example, tennis or even golf is not 
nowadays as exclusively associated with dominant positions as in the past, or that the 
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noble sports, such as riding or fencing […], are no longer specific to nobility as they 
originally were, as a refutation of the proposed model. […] An initially aristocratic 
practice can be given up by aristocracy – and this occurs quite frequently – when it is 
adopted by a growing fraction of the bourgeoisie or the petit-bourgeoisie, or even the 
lower classes (this is what happened in France to boxing, which was enthusiastically 
practiced by aristocrats at the end of the century). Conversely, an initially lower-class 
practice can sometimes be taken up by the nobles. In short, one has to avoid turning 
into necessary and intrinsic properties of some groups […] the properties which 
belong to this group at a given moment in time because of its position in the 
determinate social space and in a determinate state of the supply of possible goods 
and practices. Thus at every moment of each society, one has to deal with a set of 
social positions which is bound by a relation of homology to a set of activities (the 
practice of golf or piano) or of goods (a second home or an old master painting) that 
are themselves characterised relationally. (Bourdieu, 1998: 4) 
 
Thus, he insists on a ‘relational’ or ‘structural’ reading which he asserts is only 
possible by comparing ‘system to system’. In other words, homologies between the 
social space and the symbolic space may be quite similar in different contexts, even 
though the particular goods and activities which constitute the distributional 
oppositions in the symbolic space may vary considerably. Thus, Bourdieu’s notion of 
homology does not imply, as some scholars would have it, that people located in the 
upper sectors of the social space exclusively appropriate a fixed set of ‘high-brow 
culture’ (e.g. classical music, ballet and opera) while shunning all things ‘low-brow’ 
(e.g. country and western music, blues and gospel). What it does imply is that more 
or less unitary sets of preferences and tastes correspond to different positions of the 
social space. Thus, lifestyles and consumption choices are viewed by Bourdieu as 
‘position-takings’ in a game of cultural distinctions; the distinctiveness of a given 
practice is derived from its difference from other practices in the system of stylistic 
possibles.  
 
The third component of Bourdieu’s model is the notion of habitus, which is held to be 
the mediating factor between the social space and the symbolic space (Bourdieu, 
1984: ch. 3; 1990b: ch. 3). Habitus refers to individuals’ generative schemes of 
perception and appreciation guiding practice and thought, and is thought of as durable 
dispositions inscribed in body and mind. While each of society’s members has his/her 
own unique characteristics in this regard, Bourdieu holds that there are remarkable 
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dispositional similarities between social actors located in proximity in the social 
space. Following his Durkheimian heritage, Bourdieu (1996b: 1) asserts that there 
exists a correspondence between the ‘objective divisions of the social world’ and the 
‘principles of vision and divisions that agents apply to it’, i.e. between the structures 
of the social space and the mental structures inscribed in the habitus. Moreover, he 
holds that the two are structurally homologous because they are genetically linked, 
implying that the latter is an ‘embodiment’ of the former: ‘Cumulative exposure to 
certain social and economic conditions instils in individuals an ensemble of durable 
and transposable dispositions that internalize the necessities of the extant social 
environment, inscribing the organism the patterned inertia and constraints of external 
reality’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 13). The social space thus represents the 
social and economic conditions under which the propensity to act in certain ways is 
constituted, for instance the capacity to differentiate between and appreciate cultural 
goods. As Bourdieu finds empirical evidence for more or less unitary sets of 
preferences and tastes which correspond to different sectors of the social space, he 
asserts that there exists a limited set of ‘class habitus’ structured by the conditions of 
existence as represented by the social space: 
 
To each class of positions there corresponds a class of habitus (or tastes) produced by 
the social conditioning associated with the corresponding condition and, through the 
mediation of the habitus and its generative capability, a systematic set of goods and 
properties, which are united by affinity of style. […] The habitus is [the] generative 
and unifying principle which retranslates the intrinsic and relational characteristics of 
a position into a unitary lifestyle, that is, a unitary set of choices of persons, goods, 
practices. (Bourdieu, 1998: 7ff) 
 
The notion of class habitus does not, however, mean that social actors located in 
proximity in the social space are endowed with the exact same schemes of perception 
and appreciation, but rather that each individual system of dispositions is a structural 
variant of the others in the same class, thus expressing the singularity of its position 
within a sector of the social space (Bourdieu, 1990b: 60). Nor does it necessarily 
imply that social actors consciously adjust their subjective aspirations according to 
their objective chances of obtaining certain cultural goods. Rather, it suggests that the 
possibilities and impossibilities are already inscribed in the objective social and 
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economic conditions associated with different positions in the social space. As 
Bourdieu (1990b: 54) points out, the most improbable practices are already excluded 
as unthinkable by an ‘immediate submission to order that inclines agents to make a 
virtue of necessity’. Thus, social actors reject what is anyway denied to them and, by 
the same token, they betray a striking ‘will to the inevitable’. Moreover, Bourdieu 
(1984: 466ff) asserts that the habitus work beneath the level of consciousness, and 
first and foremost as a pre-reflexive ‘practical sense’. Thus, the notion of habitus 
implies a break with sociological depictions of human conduct as stemming from an 
unreflexive practice of rituals or a vacuous adherence to rules, as well as the assertion 
that it can be understood solely in terms of conscious pursuits of goals (Prieur et al, 
2006: 26).  
 
It is also important to highlight what Bourdieu (1984: 170; 1990b: 62) refers to as the 
diachronic aspect of the conditioning of class habitus. While exposure to social and 
economic conditions of existence in a social actor’s early years continue to structure 
its conduct later in life, this does not mean that the structures of the habitus are not 
malleable. Indeed, exposure to different conditions in the course of a social actor’s 
trajectory (i.e. intra-generational social mobility) may imply a secondary conditioning 
of the habitus which produces structures somewhat at odds with those produced early 
in life, thus constituting what Bourdieu (2004a) in his later writings refers to as 
habitus clivé – a cleft or divided set of embodied dispositions. 
 
The notion of habitus also implies a further break with ‘substantialist’ mode of 
sociological analysis alluded to above. In this regard, Bourdieu distinguishes between 
‘modus operandi’ and ‘opus operatum’, that is, between different modes of practices 
on the one hand, and the observable outcomes of these practices on the other: 
 
In contrast to the atomistic approach […] which breaks the unity of practice to 
establish partial ‘laws’ claiming to account for the products of practice, the opus 
operatum, the aim is to establish general laws reproducing the laws of production, the 
modus operandi. (Bourdieu, 1984: 573; see also 1990b: 12).  
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However, as a social actor’s modus operandi (i.e. his/her mode of practice as 
generated by the habitus) cannot be directly observed, it must be apprehended 
interpretively. Thus, much of Bourdieu’s analyses are devoted to the qualitative 
scrutiny of the various preferences and practices which cluster in each sector of the 
social space in order to identify the particular ‘mode of appropriation’ that underlies 
them (Weininger, 2005: 93).8 In this regard, Bourdieu suggests that a given cultural 
good may be perceived, appreciated and appropriated in qualitatively different ways 
or manners, implying that there ought to be an analytical de-coupling of the ‘whats’ 
and ‘hows’ of cultural consumption. In the case of France in the 1960s and 1970s, 
Bourdieu portrays three main modes of consumption corresponding to the three main 
classes as defined in terms of positions in the social space, each with its own internal 
variants. Members of the dominant class are, according to Bourdieu (1984: ch. 5), 
endowed with an ‘aesthetical disposition’ which generates ‘a sense of distinction’, i.e. 
an aesthetic orientation implying a valorisation of ‘form over function’, evident for 
instance in the celebration of ‘art for art’s sake’. Members of the petite bourgeoisie 
are, by contrast, held to exhibit a combination of aspiring to the lifestyle of the 
dominant class on the one hand, and the insufficient means to attain it on the other. 
Thus, they are held to betray a ‘cultural goodwill’, implying a ‘gap between 
acknowledgement and knowledge’ (1984: ch. 6). Finally, the members of the 
dominated class are inclined to assign an absolute priority to function over form, 
subsuming all consumption choices to practical and moral concerns and, hence, 
demonstrating a ‘taste for necessity’ (1984: ch. 7). The explanatory principle 
underlying this tri-partite model of cultural consumption is that the further away from 
‘necessity’ social actors are situated (i.e. the more capital they are endowed with), the 
more likely they are to exhibit an embodied ‘feel for the game’ of cultural 
distinctions. 
 
                                              
8 Bourdieu alternately employs the terms ’mode of appropriation’ (1984: 1), ’mode of perception’ 
(1984: 50), ‘mode of acquisition’ (1984: 68), ‘mode of utilization’ (1984: 65), ‘mode of 
apprehension’ (1990b: 88) and ’mode of consumption’ (1990b: 54). 
  35
To summarise, Bourdieu’s model of the correspondence between class relations and a 
differential distribution of lifestyles rests upon the dialectic interrelation between 
three main structures: the social space reflects the conditions for the structuring of 
different class habitus which, in turn, structure more or less unified sets of lifestyles 
evident in the symbolic space. The mastery of certain lifestyles may in turn be 
converted into assets productive of advantage and privilege, thus influencing a given 
actor’s position in the social space over time. Translated into a Weberian vocabulary, 
Bourdieu’s model depicts a tight empirical entwinement of class and status, where the 
former is understood as a system of differences depicting the social distribution of 
scarce resources/capitals, and the latter is understood as a system of differences 
depicting the social distribution of cultural tastes and lifestyles. Insofar as Bourdieu 
can be said to yoke together class and status in this regard, this is, I would argue, 
empirically justified, and not due to an unfortunate analytical confounding, as the 
social space and the symbolic space are separate constructs, and have been shown by 
statistical assessment to be tightly entwined. 
 
2.2.2 Elective affinities and the formation of social collectives 
Notwithstanding Bourdieu’s insistence on treating both classes and status groups as 
nominal entities in and through the notions of the social space and the symbolic 
space, he also points to the formation of ‘real’ social collectives. While he explicitly 
opposes scholars he depicts as confusing ‘classes on paper’ with ‘real classes’ and 
thus erroneously presuming that actual groups automatically emerge from, for 
instance, conflicting interests on the labour market, he nevertheless holds that 
proximate positions in the social space constitute ‘probable classes’ (Bourdieu, 1985: 
725ff; 1998: 10ff). Through affinities in the structures of the habitus, people are 
viewed as ‘disposed to get closer, as well as being easier to bring together, to 
mobilize’. However, Bourdieu holds that the existence of real classes depends on 
symbolic (and political) labour. For ‘classes on paper’ to become ‘realised classes’ 
they have to be constructed as unified collectives through symbolic representation. In 
other words, they have to be spoken on behalf of by representatives who endeavour to 
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impose their views of the world on others. Class struggles are, according to Bourdieu, 
in fact ‘classification struggles’ between opposing groups of social actors about the 
categories of perception of the social world.  
 
Open class struggles are, however, a rarity. Instead, Bourdieu argues, class relations 
tend to express themselves symbolically as status relations: ‘The social space […] 
tends to function symbolically as a space of life-styles or as a set of Stände, of groups 
characterised by different life-styles.’ (Bourdieu, 1985: 730). While he, as noted 
above, considers such groups as nominal entities, he also points to the formation of 
‘real’ status groups in and through the notion of ‘elective affinities’:  
 
Taste is a match-maker, it marries colours and also people, who make ‘well-matched 
couples’, initially in regard to taste. All the acts of co-option which underlie ‘primary 
groups’ are acts of knowledge of others qua subjects of acts of knowledge or, in less 
intellectualist terms, sign-reading operations (particularly visible in first encounters) 
through which a habitus confirms its affinity with other habitus. Hence the 
astonishing harmony of ordinary couples who, often matched initially, progressively 
match each other by mutual acculturation. This spontaneous decoding of one habitus 
by another is the basis of the immediate affinities which orient social encounters, 
discouraging socially discordant relationships, encouraging well-matched 
relationships, without these operations ever having to be formulated other than in the 
socially innocent language of likes and dislikes. The extreme improbability of the 
particular encounter between particular people, which masks the probability of 
interchangeable chance events, induces couples to experience their mutual election as 
a happy accident, a coincidence which mimics transcendent design (‘made for each 
other’) and intensifies the sense of the miraculous. (Bourdieu, 1984: 243)  
 
 
The notion of elective affinities points to a concurrence between preferences for types 
of cultural goods and preferences for types of people. In Goffmanian terms, Bourdieu 
(1984: 471; 1985: 728; 1990a: 128) depicts social actors as endowed with a social 
‘sense of one’s place’, as well as a ‘sense of other people’s place’, meaning that they 
are endowed with a sense of belonging to certain social groups, and by the same 
token, a sense of not belonging to other social groups. The notion of elective affinities 
thus resembles what other scholars refer to as ‘homophily’ (McPherson et al, 2001) 
and ‘differential association’ (Bottero, 2005), meaning the clustering of individuals 
into communal groups through, for instance, ‘classed’ marital endogamy and 
residential segregation.  
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However, Bourdieu (1985: 730) notes that differences in cultural tastes and lifestyles 
exist for a social subject only insofar as they are perceived and recognised as 
significant. Thus, only social actors endowed with the capacity and inclination to 
make distinctions – not only between cultural goods, but also between practitioners 
of different lifestyles – form actual social collectives based on cultural tastes. 
Different cultural tastes – revealed though social actors’ consumption choices – are 
thus subject to evaluation and estimation by other social actors:  
 
Taste classifies, and it classifies the classifier. Social subjects, classified by their 
classifications, distinguish themselves by the distinctions they make, between the 
beautiful and the ugly, the distinguished and the vulgar, in which their position in the 
objective classifications is expressed or betrayed. (Bourdieu, 1984: 6) 
 
Insofar as lifestyle differences are recognised, the consumption of a given cultural 
good functions as a sign or a ‘classifier’. In this regard, the influence from Saussurian 
structuralism is apparent (Dosse, 1997: ch. 6; Robbins, 2011: ch. 5). The system of 
lifestyle differences as depicted in the symbolic space is taken to represent a system 
of semantic signs or, as it were, a language. This system of signs constitutes a 
structural whole from which each individual sign derives its semantic meaning. Just 
as the letter ‘A’ derives its meaning by virtue of not being letter ‘B’ through to ‘Z’, a 
given cultural good – say, red wine – derives its meaning by virtue of not being other 
cultural goods, for instance white wine, rosé, vin jaune and so forth. While the 
consumption of a given good by no means has to be ‘conspicuous’ (cf. Veblen, 1967) 
or intended as a pursuit of social distinction by the cultural consumer him/herself for 
it to convey a semantic meaning, Bourdieu nevertheless presupposes that social actors 
are endowed with the competence to decode, read and in turn classify other people in 
terms of their lifestyles and consumption choices. Such competence is apparent, he 
argues, in social actors’ aversions to other people’s tastes:   
 
Tastes (i.e., manifested preferences) are the practical affirmation of an inevitable 
difference. It is no accident that, when they have to be justified, they are asserted 
purely negatively, by the refusal of other tastes. In matters of taste, more than 
anywhere else, all determination is negation; and tastes are perhaps first and foremost 
distaste, disgust provoked by horror or visceral intolerance (sick-making) of the 
tastes of others. […] Aesthetic intolerance can be terribly violent. Aversion to 
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different life-styles is perhaps one of the strongest barriers between the classes; class 
endogamy is evidence of this. (Bourdieu, 1984: 56) 
 
Bourdieu holds that through social actors’ perceptions and recognitions of lifestyle 
differences, the distributional taste oppositions apparent in the symbolic space 
manifest themselves as ‘real’ barriers between groups of social actors. The notion of 
elective affinities may thus be thought of as constituting an additional component in 
Bourdieu’s model: the differential life conditions as depicted in the social space 
structure different class habitus which not only generate limited sets of preferences as 
regards cultural goods, but also limited sets of preferences as regards other people. 
 
While the formation of actual social collectives or status groups on the basis of the 
social estimation of lifestyles is not a primary concern in his empirical inquiries (see 
Bourdieu, 2008 for a notable exception), the notion of elective affinities and his 
recurrent insistence on separating between ‘theoretical’ and ‘real’ groups further the 
argument that Bourdieu has not rendered the notion of status ‘redundant’ or 
‘outmoded’. Indeed, as noted by several scholars (e.g., Honneth, 1986: 59; Manza, 
1992: 279), Bourdieu’s model bears important resemblances to the Weberian notion 
of ‘social closure’, which refers to processes whereby one group of social actors 
monopolises advantages by closing off opportunities to another group of outsiders 
which it defines as inferior and ineligible (Parkin, 1979; Murphy, 1988). I shall return 
to this notion below. 
 
2.2.3 Symbolic capital, power and legitimacy 
So far I have argued that the notion of status is apparent in Bourdieu’s depiction of 
the social distribution of lifestyles, as well as in his depiction of the ways in which 
social actors form more or less amorphous social collectives on the basis of lifestyle 
differentials. The third aspect in which the notion of status is apparent within the 
Bourdieusian framework is the notion of ‘symbolic capital’, which depicts the social 
distribution of esteem, prestige and honour (Bourdieu, 1977: ch. 4; 1990b: ch. 7). In 
order to appreciate the full extent of the quasi-economistic conceptual framework 
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implied in the notion of ‘capital’, a few initial points should be highlighted. First of 
all, capital is thought of as scarce resources that constitute advantages in social life 
for their possessors. Scarce resources function as capital by virtue of being 
constituted, differentially distributed and fought over within distinct social ‘fields’, or 
hierarchically stratified ‘microcosms’ within which individuals struggle for and over 
unequally distributed material and/or symbolic resources (Bourdieu, 1993a). For 
instance, for scholastic skills to function as capital it is a necessary for there to exist a 
relatively autonomous field where such skills are valued, where the definition of the 
form and content of such skills may be fought over, and where such definitions 
constitute a stake in the on-going struggles. Second, the notion of capital presupposes 
that a scarce resource is sought after by non-possessors of the resource in question. 
Following the logic of basic economics, Bourdieu holds that the value of a scarce 
resource is determined by both supply and demand. If supply is low and demand is 
high, the value of the resource will increase. Conversely, if supply is high and 
demand is low, the value of the resource will decrease. Third, scarce resources 
become ‘capital’ only insofar as they can be accumulated and invested for the further 
accumulation of profit. The notion of convertibility is highly important in this regard. 
The prime example here is the ways in which educational credentials under certain 
conditions provide access to higher positions in the labour market, and thus higher 
wages. Finally, Bourdieu (1986) singles out three main forms of capital (although he 
alludes to several sub-types): ‘economic capital’, ‘cultural capital’ and ‘social 
capital’. The notion of ‘symbolic capital’ is a different analytical category than these 
three basic species of capital, in that it is taken to denote the form assumed by the 
basic forms of capital when these are ‘misrecognised’ as sources of power, meaning 
that they are not perceived as such by social actors (Bourdieu, 1989: 21). 
Nevertheless, the production of the value of symbolic capital follows the same logic 
as alluded to above.  
 
While Bourdieu adds another layer of meaning in that symbolic capital represents a 
‘guise’ of the basic forms of capital, its functioning is basically the same. Thus, the 
notion of symbolic capital presupposes that certain properties (e.g. practices, 
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capabilities and possessions) function as capitals in various (semi)autonomous fields. 
Tangent to for instance Willis’ (1977) classical study of how working-class boys 
reject the ‘rules of the game’ in the school system and thereby exclude themselves 
from trajectories which require education, Bourdieu holds that in various social 
contexts, structural constraints (i.e. the principles for the distribution of rewards as 
constituted though the outcomes of previous battles within the fields) partly 
determine which properties facilitate pay-offs and which do not. Moreover, in cases 
in which the ‘rules of the game’ within the fields are perceived as ‘natural’ or ‘given’, 
Bourdieu argues that power relations are misapprehended and thus take on 
‘misrecognised’ or ‘symbolic’ forms. Thus, Bourdieu’s notion of misrecognition does 
not mean ‘deeming someone unworthy of esteem’, or a ‘refusal of recognition’, as 
Sayer (2005: 60) for instance depicts the term. Rather, it means to misapprehend an 
asymmetric power relation. 
 
As the basic forms of capital are scarce resources that are valued and fought over, 
they constitute power relations between possessors and non-possessors, in the sense 
that the former are endowed with privileges and advantages the latter do not have. 
Thus, the basic forms of capital active within a field denote what Murphy (1988: 136) 
refers to as ‘power to profit from’, meaning that possessors are endowed with the 
capacity to convert their properties into other forms of resources (e.g. money, 
educational credentials, advantages in the labour market and membership in exclusive 
social networks). Symbolic capital, on the other hand, denotes ‘power over’ in the 
sense that non-possessors misapprehend, and thus tacitly accept, the rules of the game 
within the field, and the differential distribution of rewards stemming from these 
rules. Insofar as this is the case, Bourdieu depicts the relation between possessors and 
non-possessors as a relation of ‘domination’. The notions of ‘symbolic power’ and 
‘symbolic violence’ are important in this regard. According to Bourdieu (1991b: 
154), symbolic power is ‘that invisible power which can be exercised only with the 
complicity of those who do not want to know that they are subject to it or even that 
they themselves exercise it.’ Moreover, it is a ‘transformed, i.e. misrecognizable, 
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transfigured and legitimated form of the other forms of power’ (Bourdieu, 1991b: 
170).  
 
Bourdieu seems to imply that in situations in which power relations are not perceived 
by social actors as power relations, the original power relation is transformed into 
another form. The notion of symbolic violence thus implies ‘concealment’ or 
‘misrecognition’, meaning ‘the process whereby power relations are perceived not for 
what they objectively are but in a form which renders them legitimate in the eyes of 
the beholder’ (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990: xxii). Thus, Bourdieu’s notion of 
domination presupposes a certain degree of legitimacy. The ultimate form of 
legitimacy, Bourdieu holds, is a state of ‘doxa’: 
 
The adherence expressed in the doxic relation to the social world is the absolute form 
of recognition of legitimacy through misrecognition of arbitrariness, since it is 
unaware of the very question of legitimacy, which arises from competition for 
legitimacy, and hence from conflict between groups claiming to possess it. 
(Bourdieu, 1977: 168) 
 
By contrast, the ‘field of opinion’ – or the locus of the confrontation of competing 
discourses – is characterised by critiques and position-takings which bring ‘the 
undiscussed into discussion’ (ibid.). Moreover, according to Bourdieu, a fundamental 
objective at stake in this field of opinion is the imposition of the ‘dominant systems 
of classification’. Groups of dominated actors have an objective interest in pushing 
back the limits of doxa and exposing the arbitrariness of the taken-for-granted by 
putting forward ‘heterodoxic’ opinions. Groups of dominant actors, on the other 
hand, have an interest in defending the integrity of doxa, or establishing in its place 
the necessarily imperfect substitute, ‘orthodoxy’. Thus, Bourdieu proposes two ideal-
typical scenarios of power relations: one in which domination occurs through the 
doxic naturalisation of common sense acceptance, and one in which the legitimacy of 
power relations is questioned and thereby challenged.  
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Bourdieu’s depiction of doxic power relations between those who gain profits from 
their properties and those who do not resembles what Scott (2001: 12ff) has referred 
to as ‘domination through persuasive influence’.9 Unlike power relations in which 
dominant actors actively use coercion or repression to bring about causal effects, 
domination through persuasive influence implies that dominant actors have secured 
the compliance or consent of those whom they dominate, which results in a kind of 
legitimacy, or a moral grounding, that it would not otherwise have (see also 
Thompson, 1991; Lukes, 2005). Legitimacy in this sense does not imply that the 
power relations are acknowledged, or even perceived as such, by dominant and 
dominated actors alike. On the contrary, it results from a misconception of the ‘real’ 
causes of the asymmetric power relation, which according to Bourdieu is the unequal 
distribution of resources or capitals active within the field in question. In such cases, 
resources of different kinds take on the appearance of symbolic capital. 
 
Symbolic capital can, in principle, be based on a wide range of properties. In the case 
of France in the 1960s and 1970s, Bourdieu (1984) asserts that certain lifestyles and 
tastes assume the form of symbolic capital in the sense that the mastery of such is 
unequally distributed and that such lifestyles and tastes are sought after by those who 
do not master them. In other words, such mastery constitutes esteem and prestige in 
the eyes of non-possessors. Moreover, he argues that members of the dominant class 
are endowed with the power to both define and profit from the mastery of ‘legitimate 
culture’, and thereby have the power to determine the symbolic ‘exchange value’ of 
different kinds of cultural practices. Accordingly, the dominant class is wittingly or 
not in a position to impose its views on the dominated classes. Through the process of 
symbolic violence this ability is misrecognised as an arbitrary source of power, and 
                                              
9 Scott refers to ‘persuasive influence’ as an ‘elementary form of power’, and not as ‘domination’ in 
the sense of a ‘developed form of power’, meaning that power is structured into stable and enduring 
social relations that make up large-scale social structures. However, in Bourdieu’s argument 
persuasive influence in the guise of symbolic capital is tightly connected to the structures of the 
social space, and it might thus be argued that it is, indeed, a central component of stable and enduring 
power relations in Scott’s sense. 
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through the ‘cultural goodwill’ of dominated actors (i.e. the perception of the 
dominant class’ definitions of good taste as universal truths) it reinforces and 
legitimises the power of the dominant class. Dominated actors are drawn into the 
dominant actors’ interpretive frames of reference, and the mastery of legitimate 
culture thus assumes the form of symbolic capital. However, this process does not 
imply that the dominant perform a cynical calculation to deceive the dominated: 
 
Culture is the site, par excellence, of misrecognition, because, in generating strategies 
objectively adapted to the objective chances of profit of which it is the product, the 
sense of investment secures profits which do not need to be pursued as profits; and so 
it brings to those who have legitimate culture as a second nature the supplementary 
profit of being seen (and seeing themselves) as perfectly disinterested, unblemished 
by any cynical or mercenary use of culture. This means that the term ‘investment’, 
for example, must be understood in the dual sense of economic investment – which it 
objectively always is, though misrecognized – and the sense of affective investment 
which it has in psychoanalysis, or, more exactly, in the sense of illusio, belief, an 
involvement in the game which produces the game. The art-lover knows no other 
guide than his love of art, and when he moves, as if by instinct, towards what is, at 
each moment, the thing to be loved, like some businessmen who make money even 
when they are not trying to, he is not pursuing a cynical calculation, but his own 
pleasure, the sincere enthusiasm which in such matters, is one of the preconditions of 
successful investment. (Bourdieu, 1984: 86) 
 
The rationale of Bourdieu’s argument is that if the understanding of ‘good taste’ is 
widely recognised as ‘natural’ or ‘given’ – and not as an arbitrary social construction 
which serves the interests of some groups more than others – no further legitimising 
is necessary. The argument nevertheless presupposes that the mastery of legitimate 
culture functions as an asset (i.e. an ‘embodied’ or ‘incorporated’ form of cultural 
capital) within certain fields, for instance the field of education or the field of cultural 
production. Indeed, a key explanatory factor in Bourdieu’s studies of processes of 
social reproduction within the French school system is the ‘ease and grace’ by which 
the culturally privileged children master the scholastic culture of the school system, 
as opposed to the ‘vulgar mark of effort’ common among ambitious children hailing 
from non-privileged backgrounds (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1979, 1990).  
 
The ways in which Bourdieu depicts such doxic power relations may at first sight 
seem quite at odds with how power and legitimacy are usually depicted in the 
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literature. Weber, for instance, argued that for relations of domination to be effective, 
they must somehow be recognised as legitimate; or more specifically, dominant 
actors must make successful claims to legitimacy to exert power effectively (Weber, 
1997: 328ff). In other words, some form of obedience or compliance on the part of 
the subordinate is built into Weber’s definition of domination (Parkin, 1982: 74). In 
line with his ideal type approach, Weber pointed out three bases for claims to 
legitimacy, namely ‘traditional’, ‘legal-rational’ and ‘charismatic’ authority. For 
present purposes, these need not be elaborated further. The important thing to note, 
however, is that whereas Weber seems to imply that dominant actors must 
consciously make efforts to legitimise their power, which, in turn, must be endorsed 
or accepted by dominated actors in some way, Bourdieu holds that such efforts are 
often not required. What is more, power is all the more effective when the power 
relations are not seen for what they really are. Thus, Bourdieu places less emphasis 
on the dominant actors’ conscious efforts to exercise influence and persuasion, as 
domination through symbolic violence can occur relatively independently of the 
dominant actors’ actions. As long as the categories of perception are deployed in 
favour of the dominant, efforts at social control are unnecessary: ‘Legitimation of the 
social world is not, as some believe, the product of deliberate and purposive action of 
propaganda or symbolic imposition’ (Bourdieu, 1989: 21).10 Bourdieu’s depiction of 
the differential distribution of symbolic capital and its relatedness to processes of 
misrecognition thus implies that the principles for this distribution do not have to be 
consciously agreed upon by all for such power relations to appear as legitimate. 
 
2.3 (Re)assessments 
At the beginning of the previous section I highlighted the need to ‘distil’ a 
Bourdieusian theoretical model of the class-status nexus from his empirical work. 
Accordingly, I have attempted to outline its basic tenets in terms of the social 
distribution of lifestyle differentials, the formation of actual collectives and the 
                                              
10 The point could also be made that Bourdieu’s notion of misrecognition bears certain resemblances 
to Weber’s notion of charismatic authority. 
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erection of ‘real’ boundaries on the basis of positive or negative evaluations of 
lifestyles and cultural tastes, as well as the symbolic rewards accruing to the 
practitioners of certain lifestyles. However, there are certain ambiguities in 
Bourdieu’s theoretical-methodological framework. In what follows I shall discuss 
these by comparing them to other perspectives that have challenged Bourdieu’s work 
in some way.  
 
2.3.1 Class and status 
In the introduction I alluded to a fundamental discrepancy between Bourdieu’s 
account of the class-status nexus, and that of Chan and Goldthorpe (2004, 2007a; 
Chan, 2010b).While both approaches can be contrasted to an unfortunate tendency 
within the research field to merge class and status through endeavours to construct 
unidimensional prestige scales (e.g. Duncan, 1961; Blau and Duncan, 1967; Prandy, 
1990; Bottero and Prandy, 2003), there are nevertheless important differences in the 
ways in which they depict the relationship between the two. Whereas Chan and 
Goldthorpe insist on keeping class and status as separate analytical entities, 
maintaining that these entities represent two distinct stratifying processes manifesting 
themselves in different ways in the empirical reality, Bourdieu, by contrast, asserts 
that while the notions of class and status represent an analytical distinction, the ways 
in which the two are empirically entwined imply that the latter is a ‘symbolic 
expression’ of the former. In the previous section I have attempted to sketch out 
Bourdieu’s model at some length, partly in order to contradict the erroneous view put 
forward by Chan and Goldthorpe that status is rendered ‘conceptually redundant’ and 
‘empirically outmoded’ within his model. However, while both approaches can be 
said to incorporate notions of status in their frameworks, the fact remains that 
Bourdieu’s model is fundamentally different from that of Chan and Goldthorpe.      
 
By analytically distinguishing between a ‘status order’ and a ‘class structure’, Chan 
and Goldthorpe claim that their own approach is in line with Weber’s original ideas. 
In several empirical analyses of cultural consumption and lifestyles in the UK, they 
 46
hold that class and status have distinct explanatory power and that status is more 
closely associated with different forms of cultural consumption than is class. This 
finding, they argue, is not compatible with a Bourdieusian framework, as it does not 
properly consider the effects of what they refer to as a ‘status order’. By applying 
multi-dimensional scaling (Kruskal and Wish, 1978) to contingency tables that cross-
classify people’s occupations with that of their best friends, they claim they are able 
to extract a dimension that could reasonably be interpreted as a ‘hierarchy of status’.11 
Moreover, by employing this status order in a multinomial logistic regression model 
alongside their (economic) class scheme, their analyses of cinema, theatre and dance 
performance attendance (Chan and Goldthorpe, 2005), newspaper readership 
(2007b), musical taste (2007c), as well as consumption patterns as regards the visual 
arts (2007d), are held to confirm their claims.  
 
There is, however, a peculiar view of status implied by Chan and Goldthorpe’s 
explanatory model. While they claim adherence to Weber’s view in this regard, their 
model is in fact far removed from it. While Weber (1946) distinguishes between the 
notion of Ständische Lage (referring to a ‘status order’ or a hierarchical structure of 
differentiated ‘status situations’) on the one hand, and the notion of Stände (referring 
to actual, though more or less amorphous ‘status groups’ based on affinities in 
lifestyles) on the other, he does not establish a causal link between the two, in the 
sense that the former ‘structures’ or to some extent determines the latter. On the 
contrary, the two notions of status refer to two different aspects of the same thing: the 
actual status groups on the one hand, and the structure of the hierarchical relations 
between them on the other. More specifically, the hierarchical structure of status 
situations is, according to Weber, constituted in and through ‘social estimations of 
honour’ related to lifestyles differentials. In other words, Weber does not put forward 
an explanatory model in which an order of status situations is held to be a primary 
                                              
11 In the case of Norway, Chan et al (2011) employ a slightly different approach in that they apply 
multi-dimensional scaling to contingency tables that cross-classify the occupation of spouses and 
cohabiting partners. 
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structuring factor for the differential distribution of lifestyles alongside, or in 
opposition to, other structuring factors which are held to be less significant. To the 
extent that Weber points to such causal links, he holds that  
 
[status] honor may be connected with any quality shared by a plurality, and, of course 
it can be knit to a class situation: class distinctions are linked in the most varied ways 
with status distinctions. Property as such is not always recognized as a status 
qualification, but in the long run it is, and with extraordinary regularity. In the 
subsistence economy of the organized neighborhood, very often the richest man is 
simply the chieftain. […] But status honor need not necessarily be linked with a 
‘class situation.’ On the contrary, it normally stands in sharp opposition to the 
pretensions of sheer property. (Weber, 1946: 187) 
    
Thus, he points to a contingent relationship between status situations and class 
situations, meaning that they may overlap in certain contexts, but that this 
relationship is not a necessary one. However, this assertion is quite different from the 
model proposed by Chan and Goldthorpe, who depict status order as something 
different from, and even as something that explains the social distribution of lifestyle 
differentials. Insofar as their explanatory model can be read according to a Weberian 
conceptual framework (as they assert themselves), it is in a sense both circular and 
logically incoherent, as they endeavour to explain one aspect of status (lifestyle 
differentials) with another aspect of it (a status order derived from social estimations 
of these lifestyle differentials). While their empirical analyses can certainly be read as 
an affirmation that lifestyle differentials matter as regards the formation of social 
collectives, they can hardly be read as a sound endeavour to map out ‘the most varied 
ways’ in which class relations and status relations are empirically interrelated. In 
other words, the disregard of Bourdieu’s model of structural homologies between the 
social space and the symbolic space is not by any means justified by pointing to 
empirical analyses which show that ‘status’ has better explanatory power than ‘class’ 
as regards lifestyle differentials. 
 
However, the fact that Chan and Goldthorpe’s own conceptions of status are 
somewhat misguided does not, of course, mean that there are not problems inherent 
in Bourdieu’s model. First of all, in order to avoid conceptual confusion, I believe it 
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is useful to follow Weberians in conceptually distinguishing between class and status, 
first of all according to the nominal/real distinction (i.e. class should refer to objective 
positions in different sectors of the social space, while status groups should refer to 
the more or less amorphous social groupings based on affinities in lifestyles); and 
second, to properly denote an analytical distinction between different types of 
‘realised’ communal groups (status groups based on lifestyle affinities being one of 
several other conceivable possibilities). However, to point to a conceptual fuzziness 
within the Bourdieusian framework does not by any means imply a need to disregard 
it, as this problem can easily be remedied by increased conceptual stringency. 
Nevertheless, far more serious objections have been raised to Bourdieu’s work than 
conceptual ambiguities. These include allegations of an outdated model of lifestyle 
differentiation, an erroneous assumption that lifestyle differentials directly lead to 
status hierarchisation, as well as a neglect of moral issues. I shall start with a 
discussion of the former allegation.  
 
2.3.2 The cultural omnivore 
Although still immensely influential within the research field, Bourdieu’s inquiries 
have caused controversy regarding the role of cultural tastes in processes pertaining 
to social stratification. Adherents of what has come to be known as the ‘omnivore 
thesis’ represent the most persistent challengers in this regard. The term ‘cultural 
omnivore’ was originally coined by Peterson and his colleagues (Peterson, 1992; 
Peterson and Simkus, 1992; Peterson and Kern, 1996) and refers to a tendency for 
‘high-status people’, contrary to previously held assumptions about the cultural tastes 
of this social stratum, to engage in activities associated with ‘popular culture’. Unlike 
‘cultural univores’, who strictly adhere to either ‘high-brow’ or ‘low-brow’ cultural 
goods, ‘cultural omnivores’ develop a ‘taste for everything’. This, Peterson argues, 
indicates a marked historical shift: 
 
Appreciation of the fine arts became a mark of high status in the late nineteenth 
century as part of an attempt to distinguish “highbrowed” Anglo Saxons from the 
new “lowbrowed” immigrants, whose popular entertainments were said to corrupt 
morals and thus were to be shunned. […] In recent years, however, many high-status 
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persons are far from being snobs and are eclectic, even “omnivorous” in their tastes. 
[…] This suggests a qualitative shift in the basis for marking elite status – from 
snobbish exclusion to omnivorous appropriation. (Peterson and Kern, 1996: 900) 
 
 
The notion of the cultural omnivore (also referred to as ‘omnivorousness’) has 
attracted considerable attention, in part because it explicitly challenges Bourdieu’s 
contention concerning the homologous relations between the social space, the 
symbolic space and the space of class habitus. From the outset, the rise of 
omnivorous tastes among the upper classes was seen as an anomaly compared to 
Bourdieu’s findings in France in the 1960s and 1970s. Since Peterson’s initial studies, 
many scholars have debated both the notion itself (i.e. its theoretical-methodological 
underpinnings and issues concerning measurement) and the significance of this 
purported historical trend (for overviews, see Peterson, 2005; Warde et al, 2007; 
Ollivier, 2008). 
 
Following the terminology of Warde et al (2007: 145; 2008: 149), two definitions of 
the cultural omnivore can be pinpointed in the current debate. The volume definition 
maintains that some people, an identifiable sector of the population, do and like more 
activities and things than others. Researchers have typically defined this type of 
omnivorousness operationally by counting the numbers of activities or cultural goods 
chosen by a respondent in a survey. In this sense, the omnivores are characterised by 
‘broad’ tastes for a wide variety of cultural goods, whereas univores are characterised 
by ‘narrow’ tastes for a more limited set of goods. The compositional definition 
suggests that a distinctive taste orientation is entailed in the patterns of cultural 
preferences involved. This type of omnivorousness has been operationally defined by 
a priori categorizing of cultural goods or activities as ‘high-brow’, ‘middle-brow’ or 
‘low-brow’, in order to measure the extent to which respondents’ preferences cross-
cut these categories. Omnivores are viewed as straddling symbolically significant 
boundaries, whereas univores are viewed as less inclined to do so. 
 
As regards the substantial implications drawn from such analyses, two main positions 
can be identified in the general debate about the implications of the rise of the 
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cultural omnivore, and both expand on Peterson’s initial assertions. The decline of 
cultural distinctions argument is tied to what Peterson and Kern (1996) have referred 
to as an ‘openness to appreciating everything’, indicating that cultural 
omnivorousness is ‘antithetical to snobbishness’. The usual tendency in this regard is 
to pitch empirical evidence of omnivorous tastes against the Bourdieusian homology 
argument (e.g., Chan and Goldthorpe, 2005, 2007b, 2007d, 2007c). In this view, 
Bourdieu is depicted as having asserted that the members of the dominant class ‘seek 
to demonstrate a superiority of their own lifestyle over those of other classes’ (Chan 
and Goldthorpe, 2010: 4). Thus, the rise of omnivorousness is taken to implicate a 
weakening of such cultural boundaries and, hence, a refutation of the existence of a 
tight homology between the social space and the symbolic space. The rationale of this 
argument is that the more social actors located in the upper sectors of the social space 
tend to like or do the same things as people located elsewhere, the less distinctive 
their cultural tastes. 
 
The reconfiguration of cultural distinctions argument, on the other hand, suggests 
that the preferential eclecticism associated with the omnivore figure is a new 
embodiment of class domination, in that it implies a capacity to reflect and absorb 
previously opposed elements of cultural tastes (e.g. Warde et al, 2008; Bennett et al, 
2009).12 In this view, omnivorousness does not imply a meltdown in cultural 
distinctions. Rather, it is asserted that the increased occurrence of omnivorousness 
points to the formulation of ‘new rules’ governing the pursuit of recognition and 
social status. Although more sympathetic to Bourdieu’s work, proponents of this 
argument are still caught up in the reading of Bourdieu as having depicted the 
dominant class as ‘snobbish’ univores who shun ‘popular’ or ‘low-brow’ cultural 
forms. Thus, the empirical evidence of resourceful people exhibiting ‘broad’ and/or 
‘eclectic’ tastes is taken to imply a new historical trend that reconfigures and even 
                                              
12 Some scholars (e.g. Kuipers, 2006; Lahire, 2011; Friedman, 2012) have suggested that it might as 
well be the other way around – that omnivorous tastes can imply disadvantages in social life.  
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challenges ‘old’ principles of cultural distinctions, thus rendering the Bourdieusian 
argument somewhat dated. 
 
However, as several critics have pointed out (e.g. Holt, 1997; Atkinson, 2011; Prieur 
and Savage, 2011; Savage and Gayo, 2011; Rimmer, 2012), there are a number of 
serious problems inherent in the omnivore thesis, regarding both the crudeness of 
measurement of cultural preferences and tastes, and the ways in which it has been 
pitched against Bourdieu’s model of taste distribution. First, as most studies of 
omnivorousness have relied on secondary analyses of survey data not necessarily 
gathered for the identification of fine-grained cultural distinctions, scholars (have had 
to) deploy crude measures based on wide genre categories. For instance, in the 
mapping of musical tastes, champions of the omnivore thesis (e.g. Peterson and 
Simkus, 1992; Chan and Goldthorpe, 2007c) have deployed categories such as 
‘pop/rock’, ‘classical’ and ‘country music’. In this way, they have tended to obscure 
the fact that taste distinctions may exist within these somewhat arbitrary genre 
categories. Indeed, it is arguably a likely scenario that people might like some cultural 
goods associated with a musical genre, while shunning others. As remarked by 
Gripsrud et al (2011: 512): ‘Hank Williams is fine, and maybe Dolly Parton on a 
good day, but most country music singers are not.’ In other words, while people 
located in different sectors in the social space might report preferences for the same 
musical genres, the preferences for artists or even individual works might be highly 
different. Thus, assuming that broad pre-constructed genre categories can function as 
indicators of cultural taste can be highly misleading, as they do not capture the 
tensions and ‘hidden dimensions’ within the categories employed (Grossberg, 1992; 
Holt, 1997; Jarness, 2007; Beer, 2010; Atkinson, 2011).13 
 
Second, as pointed out by Savage and Gayo (2011: 340), ‘brow’ categories (i.e. the a 
priori clustering of cultural goods into hierarchically ordered categories of taste 
                                              
13 In this regard, it should be noted that Bourdieu (1984) primarily focused on the differential 
distribution of preferences for specific works across a wide range of cultural domains and genres. 
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cultures) are erroneously approached as analytical frames rather than as historical 
artefacts. Which types of preferences and tastes are considered ‘high’ or ‘low’ by 
cultural consumers may vary considerably in different contexts, and depicting certain 
goods as intrinsically belonging to fixed sets of taste cultures can thus lead to highly 
questionable claims about the differential distribution of tastes. Indeed, as the usual 
tendency of the adherents of the omnivore thesis is to see the ‘highbrow snob’ as 
reflecting a possessor of an embodied form of cultural capital, the conclusions they 
draw in pitching their empirical findings against the homology thesis are hardly 
convincing.14 As noted above, Bourdieu repeatedly highlighted the distinction 
between a ‘substantialist’ or ‘naively realist’ reading of his analyses on the one hand, 
and a ‘relational’ or ‘structural’ reading on the other. While Bourdieu’s own reading 
instructions should not govern the critical assessments of his work, it is a viable 
argument in its own right that there might exist homologies between the structures of 
the social space and the structures of the symbolic space in contexts other than France 
in the 1960s and 1970s, even though the particular goods and activities constituting 
the distributional oppositions in the symbolic space differ considerably from 
Bourdieu’s analyses. 
 
Third, the constructed dichotomy between ‘snobbishness’ and ‘openness’ is 
problematic: it confounds social actors’ more or less tolerant attitudes towards 
different types of cultural goods on the one hand, and their attitudes towards the 
tastes and preferences of other social actors on the other. As rhetorically asked by 
Lahire, 
 
[i]s it really a sign of greater tolerance when someone declares that they like a greater 
number of musical genres than any other people, or is it rather the simple reflection 
of their having a wider musical knowledge which would not necessarily exclude a 
severe symbolic hierarchisation? Conversely, does the fact that an individual does not 
like certain musical genres necessarily signify “intolerance”? There is nothing 
contradictory in the idea that someone might dislike something whilst believing that 
others were perfectly within their rights to like it. (Lahire, 2008: 183) 
 
                                              
14 For an elaborate discussion of misguided notions of cultural capital, see Prieur and Savage (2011). 
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Thus, the assumption that the extent to which social actors are either ‘snobbish’ or 
‘open’ directly reflects their preferences and tastes is questionable. Indeed, this 
dichotomy stems from a highly tendentious reading of Bourdieu, dating back in the 
Anglophone literature to Elster’s (1981) rather sour critique of Distinction, and 
reiterated by recent scholars (e.g. Bryson, 1996; Chan, 2010b; Warde, 2011; Roose et 
al, 2012). According to this view, Bourdieu’s argument is supposedly that members 
of the dominant class exhibit a ‘snobbish orientation’ and a ‘desire to consolidate 
social hierarchy by defending clear-cut cultural boundaries as part of an ongoing 
class struggle’ (Roose et al, 2012: 492, emphasis added). Thus, the empirical 
evidence of ‘open’ and ‘tolerant’ cultural consumers located in the upper sectors of 
the social space is pitched against Bourdieu’s work. However, this reading is quite 
reductionist, if not downright contradictory to Bourdieu’s initial analyses. Indeed, it 
misses the whole point of ‘misrecognition’, which is so pivotal to his argument. 
According to Bourdieu, the ‘illusio’ or ‘the feel for the game’ typical among social 
actors in the dominant class implies a ‘disinterested’ appropriation of cultural goods, 
‘unblemished by any cynical or mercenary use of culture’ (1984: 86). While 
Bourdieu certainly asserts that such disinterestedness is a socially profitable strategy, 
the point is that the ways in which social actors appropriate cultural goods are 
perceived as non-snobbish and thus misapprehended as a socially profitable strategy, 
both by others and themselves. The notion of ‘snobbish’ consumption styles as 
referred to in the omnivore literature perhaps more aptly describes the way in which 
Bourdieu depicts the anxious, pretentious and strained consumption styles of the 
petite bourgeoisie, rather than the disinterested, playful and aesthetically 
transgressing modes of consuming goods typical of the dominant class.  
 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the champions of the omnivore thesis by and 
large ignore Bourdieu’s distinction between opus operatum and modus operandi, i.e. 
the methodological point that cultural tastes and their symbolic meanings cannot 
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simply be ‘read’  from the cultural goods people consume (Holt, 1997).15 
Notwithstanding Bourdieu’s mapping of distributional oppositions in the symbolic 
space in terms of preferences for a wide range of goods, he nevertheless suggests that 
the same cultural goods may be perceived, appreciated and appropriated in 
qualitatively different ways or manners, implying that there ought to be an analytical 
de-coupling of the ‘whats’ and ‘hows’ of cultural consumption. This point is clearly 
evident in his depiction of the tastes and practices common among artists and 
intellectuals:  
 
[I]n the absence of the conditions of material possession, the pursuit of exclusiveness 
has to be content with developing a unique mode of appropriation. Liking the same 
things differently, liking different things, less obviously marked out for admiration – 
these are some of the strategies for outflanking, overtaking and displacing which, by 
maintaining a permanent revolution in tastes, enable the dominated, less wealthy 
fractions, whose appropriations must, in the main, be exclusively symbolic, to secure 
exclusive possessions at every moment. Intellectuals and artists have a special 
predilection for the most risky but also most profitable strategies of distinction, those 
which consist in asserting the power, which is peculiarly theirs, to constitute 
insignificant objects as works of art, but in another mode, by other classes or class 
fractions (e.g., kitsch). In this case, it is the manner of consuming which creates the 
object of consumption, and a second-degree delight which transforms the ‘vulgar’ 
artifacts abandoned to common consumption, Westerns, strip cartoons, family 
snapshots, graffiti, into distinguished and distinctive works of culture. (Bourdieu, 
1984: 282, emphasis added) 
 
In Bourdieu’s analytical framework, the notion of modus operandi is tightly linked to 
the notion of habitus. As previously noted, the habitus is not directly observable and 
measurable, as it works beneath the level of consciousness, and first and foremost as 
a pre-reflexive ‘practical sense’. Thus, first-hand data about the ways in which people 
perceive, appreciate and appropriate cultural goods are not directly accessible, neither 
to the sociologist, nor to the social actors themselves. As noted by Weininger (2005: 
93), Bourdieu apprehends the structures of class habitus interpretively through the 
analysis of a variety of data. By contrast, the omnivore thesis is based on the 
assumption that cultural tastes can be directly read from the volume and/or 
composition of goods respondents in a survey report preferences for. Thus, the ways 
                                              
15 See Ollivier (2008) for a notable exception. 
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in which the social distribution of tastes is empirically scrutinised is at best limited in 
scope compared to Bourdieu’s analyses.  
 
There are, however, reasons to suspect that historical processes related to both the 
supply side and the demand side of cultural consumption (e.g. new technologies, 
increased mass production of goods, increased access to higher education, increased 
purchasing power) have rendered the basis for social distinction through the 
consumption of goods more complex compared to earlier times. Nevertheless, as Holt 
(1997: 103) points out, the fact that cultural goods no longer directly signal social 
rank does not necessarily entail that lifestyle differentials no longer have social 
classificatory power. Rather, insofar as the goods themselves no longer serve as an 
accurate representation of consumer practices, there is all the more reason to follow 
the analytical strategies proposed by Bourdieu in mapping out possible differences in 
social actors’ embodied modes of consuming cultural goods. 
 
In sum, the point could be made that the notion of the cultural omnivore functions as 
an unfortunate ‘red herring’ in drawing attention away from important processes 
pertaining to lifestyle differentiation. Indeed, attempts to ‘test’ the validity of 
Bourdieu’s model of structural homologies between the social space and the symbolic 
space by pointing to empirical evidence of ‘broad’, ‘eclectic’, ‘hybrid’, ‘open’ and/or 
‘tolerant’ tastes among people located in the upper sectors in the social space are far 
from convincing. While it would, in its own right, be interesting to scrutinise the 
ways in which distributional oppositions manifests themselves in (dis)similar ways 
across contexts – for instance by focusing on the fluctuating symbolic value of certain 
practices and tastes – it is a highly questionable analytical strategy to assume that 
measuring the pervasiveness of the intolerant ‘highbrow snob’ figure can function as 
a litmus test in assessing the Bourdieusian homology thesis. In accordance with 
several other scholars (e.g. Atkinson, 2011; Friedman, 2011; Rimmer, 2012), I would 
thus propose a ‘re-orientation’ back to Bourdieu’s original analytical concern with 
social actors’ modus operandi, i.e. an empirical scrutiny of the ‘hows’ of cultural 
consumption. 
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2.3.3 Symbolic boundaries and social closure 
A related but somewhat different objection to Bourdieu’s model of the class-status 
nexus is the supposition that it erroneously presumes that lifestyle differentials 
directly lead to status hierarchisation. Partly pitched against Bourdieu’s inquiries, 
Lamont (1992, 2000; Lamont and Fournier, 1992; Lamont and Molnar, 2002) has 
thus championed the study of ‘symbolic boundaries’ – the conceptual distinctions 
made by social actors to categorise people, practices and so forth in everyday life. Of 
particular interest in the current discussion is the ways in which Lamont (1992) 
documents the various ‘evaluative repertoires’ used by upper-middle class men in 
France and the United States to produce such symbolic boundaries. By way of 
qualitative interviews she asks her interviewees to state the criteria they use for 
evaluating others, examining the personal characteristics that interviewees admire and 
despise, which, in turn, are thought to determine whether they will seek out or avoid 
interaction with others. Through a comparative perspective, she finds that Americans 
are less prone to make explicit judgments of other people’s cultural tastes than their 
French counterparts, and it is thus asserted that ‘cultural boundaries’ have less ritual 
strength in the US compared to France. In other words, cultural taste is taken to have 
less stratifying impact in the US than Bourdieu found in France, and Lamont thus 
rejects the idea that Bourdieu’s model is of a universal character. 
 
Furthermore, Lamont (1992: 184) depicts Bourdieu’s theoretical-methodological 
framework as failing to comprehend ‘moral boundaries’, which is claimed to be a 
‘blind spot’ in his theory. To remedy this, her analytical strategy is to map out the 
‘relative salience’ of several kinds of boundary work. From her empirical material, 
Lamont (1992: 4) extracts three kinds of symbolic boundaries: (1) ‘moral 
boundaries’, which are drawn on the basis of moral character, and qualities such as 
honesty, work ethic, personal integrity and consideration for others; (2) 
‘socioeconomic boundaries’, which are drawn on the basis of judgments concerning 
people’s social position as indicated by their wealth, power or professional success; 
and (3) ‘cultural boundaries’, which are drawn on the basis of education, intelligence, 
manners, tastes and command of high culture. By documenting narratives of all three 
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types of boundary work, Lamont finds systematic patterns corresponding both to 
differences in national cultures, and to intra-national differences between rural and 
urban areas. The underlying logic of this particular analytical strategy is that in cases 
in which interviewees verbally express that certain ‘moral’ qualities are considered 
admirable traits – and not ‘cultural’ or ‘socioeconomic’ qualities – the former is held 
to be ‘more salient’, i.e. outweighing the others, as regards the stratifying impact of 
boundary work. 
 
While Lamont should be credited for highlighting the dangers of assuming that 
lifestyle differentials directly translate into status hierarchisation without further 
empirical investigations, her own analyses rest on at least two problematic 
assumptions: first, that explicit subjective boundary work or consciously intended 
exclusion is a necessary pre-condition for the creation of objective social boundaries; 
and second, that the relative salience of different forms of symbolic boundaries can 
be discerned from discursive formations manifested in the ways in which people talk 
about themselves and others. In this section I shall concentrate on the former 
assumption. I shall return to the latter in the next section, where a broader discussion 
of the significance of moral will be provided. 
 
Notwithstanding Lamont’s contested reading of Bourdieu – as outlined above, he did 
in fact explicitly highlight the danger of confusing ‘classes on paper’ with ‘real 
classes’ in stressing the importance of analysing ‘classification struggles’ between 
groups of social actors – the most serious objection to Lamont’s analytical framework 
is the problematic assumption that the presence or absence of conscious and/or 
explicit boundary work is a ‘litmus test’ for deciding whether or not differences in 
cultural tastes and lifestyles have any stratifying impact. In this regard, Lamont looks 
for explicit demarcations among the upper classes in society. In effect, the presence 
or absence of such demarcations is used as the measure for deciding whether or not 
different properties (e.g. practices, capabilities and possessions) are decisive in the 
formation of social collectives as well as the differential distribution of privileges and 
opportunities in society. As noted by Holt (1997), Lamont thus one-sidedly focuses 
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on the voluntaristic aspect of social practice at the expense of important structural 
aspects which may have considerable effects on people’s life chances, independent of 
their subjective intention, awareness and/or acknowledgement of such processes. In 
this regard, the Lamontian boundary work approach fundamentally differs from the 
Bourdieusian approach in its depiction of the relationship between agency and 
structure. Whereas Bourdieu focuses on the dialectics between structural relations 
(i.e. correspondences between social positions, embodied dispositions and manifested 
preferences/practices), Lamont is almost exclusively concerned with social actors and 
their self-understandings. This opposition is clearly manifested in the importance the 
two grant explicit social demarcation. According to Bourdieu, ‘misrecognised’ or 
‘doxic’ power relations can occur without dominant actors’ active boundary work, 
given that other criteria are fulfilled. In Bourdieu’s view, systems of relations 
between social positions partly determine the structurally defined opportunities and 
capacities social actors have for exerting power. Through processes of symbolic 
violence, power relations are misrecognised as such, and relations of cultural 
domination can thus prevail relatively independently of, for instance, upper class 
disdain or lower class deference. According to Lamont, by contrast, there cannot be 
cultural domination without explicit boundary work on the part of the (supposedly) 
dominant actors. In subjectivist fashion, it is presumed that that which is not 
discursively manifested will not have stratifying effects. From a Bourdieusian 
perspective one can argue that relations of domination may prevail independently of 
whether those benefiting from them explicitly demarcate themselves from those who 
do not. From a Lamontian perspective one regrettably cannot. While explicit 
boundary work may be regarded as one way in which barriers between groups of 
social actors are erected, this is not necessarily the only form it can take. Indeed, as 
Holt points out: 
 
[T]he work of Goffman, Cicourel, Bourdieu and Willis demonstrates that knowledge 
of and strategic defence of boundaries is not a necessary precondition for their 
successful enactment. In fact, this sort of explicit ideological struggle to defend 
boundaries is actually a sign that boundaries are under siege, or, in Bourdieu’s 
terminology, they have moved from common sense acceptance of doxa to orthodoxy 
and heterodoxy. (Holt, 1997: 106) 
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Nevertheless, while the conclusions Lamont (1992: 181ff) draws vis-à-vis what she 
depicts as a ‘Bourdieusian view’ might very well be questioned, I would argue that it 
is more fruitful to incorporate the notion of symbolic boundaries into a Bourdieu-
inspired framework than simply reject Lamont’s work as another example of anti-
Bourdieusianism rooted in poorly interpreted depictions of his work. As alluded to 
above, the mapping out of processes pertaining to the formation of actual social 
collectives or ‘status groups’ was never a primary concern in Bourdieu’s analyses 
(although he explicitly referred to such processes on several occasions). However, in 
order to avoid the one-sided voluntarism implied in the Lamontian framework, a 
more tenable theoretical model of status group formation is necessary. This is 
possible, I argue, through a ‘cross-fertilization’ with the Weberian notion of social 
closure.   
 
The term social closure was originally coined by Weber (1978: 43ff, 302ff, 336ff, 
635ff, 926ff) and refers to processes whereby one group of social actors monopolises 
advantages by closing off opportunities to another group of outsiders which it defines 
as inferior and ineligible (for an eloborate account of Weber's notion of social 
closure, see Murphy, 1988). According to Weber, monopolisation of opportunities 
can occur only insofar as a social group has the power to do so. In this way, the 
notion of social closure is tightly related to Weber’s account of power and 
domination. As regards the formation of status groups, Weber held that social closure 
involves the identification of certain specific attributes of lifestyles as the basis for 
excluding those without these attributes from access to particular resources (Scott, 
1996: 31ff). Since Weber’s seminal work, scholars have elaborated on the notion of 
social closure (e.g. Parkin, 1979; Murphy, 1988; Hansen, 1995; Manza, 1992). I shall 
return to some of these developments later, but for present purposes I shall 
concentrate on a conceptual distinction alluded to, but not elaborated on, by both 
Murphy (1988: 1) and Manza (1992: 286ff). Expanding on their advice, I put forward 
the argument that the problems inherent in Lamont’s framework can be remedied by 
a distinction between formalised and non-formalised closure. We might thus 
tentatively define formalised closure as structured social boundaries arising from the 
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exclusive possession of scarce resources legally sanctioned by the state. These 
include what Bourdieu (1986) has termed ‘economic capital’ (e.g. property and 
money) as well as ‘institutionalised cultural capital’ (e.g. educational credentials, 
diplomas and certificates). While the value of such resources may fluctuate, for 
instance due to an altered relationship between supply and demand in the labour 
market, they are nevertheless institutionally secured to some extent. For instance, in 
the case of educational credentials, the educational system can regulate the market on 
the supply side by educating fewer medical doctors, lawyers, social scientists, etc. 
 
Non-formalised closure, on the other hand, might be tentatively defined as structured 
social boundaries arising from subjective evaluations of esteem, honour and prestige, 
which may, in turn, be crystallised into more or less exclusive social collectives that 
control access to scarce resources, both material and symbolic. Such boundary 
crystallisations may for instance comprise what Weber (1978: 306) has termed 
‘connubium’ (i.e. systematic marriage patterns, for instance arising from restrictions 
on inter-marriage) and ‘commensality’ (i.e. shared eating and living arrangements). 
In other words, this form of social closure arises from informal social networks, 
residential segregation, social actors’ choice of friends and partners, preferences as 
regards leisure activities and so on. Translated into a Bourdieusian vocabulary, non-
formalised closure may be thought of in terms of symbolic capital. Unlike 
institutionalised forms of capital – such as educational credentials, implying a legal 
monopoly of resources through the licensure of the state – the value of symbolic 
forms of capital is arguably more unstable.16 Such assets are potentially kept under 
                                              
16 It might, however, be noted that the state may play an important role as regards the distribution of 
symbolic capital. As pointed out by Bourdieu (1996b), the state functions as a ‘central bank of 
symbolic capital’, meaning that a symbolic recognition is already secured institutionally, as is the 
case with educational credentials, which in a sense lends it an aura of legitimacy. Moreover, the 
symbolic value of certain practices and tastes may also be safeguarded by the state, at least to some 
extent. Typical examples would here include the Arts Council’s provision of financial support to 
certain forms of cultural production at the expense of others, as well as the educational system’s 
awarding of certain forms of knowledge and discrediting of others. In these ways, the state indirectly 
provides legitimacy for certain forms of knowledge, cultural tastes and lifestyles. Yet, this form of 
safeguarding is arguably much less stable and secure than legal monopolies of resources, such as 
property, educational credentials and licenses protected by the state. 
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continuous open review, as there is no resort to the protection of for instance 
professional licenses when the symbolic value of one’s assets is in decline due to 
inflationary processes. The crucial question is thus how, if at all, processes of social 
closure are at work when there are few, if any, legal and ‘objective’ boundaries 
securing the monopolisation of resources, leaving some groups enriched and others 
excluded. Given the absence of (or, at least, the weak role of) legal and institutional 
backing, one may ask how the symbolic value of certain practices (e.g. driving a 
certain car, or reading a certain author) is secured. Hence, it is necessary to separate 
formalised and non-formalised closure on an analytical level. 
   
It must, however, be underscored that this is an analytical distinction which 
highlights that closure processes may take several forms. On an empirical level, by 
contrast, these ideal types of social closure may of course be entwined. They are thus 
not to be read as mutually exclusive. For instance, social actors possessing specific 
types of credentials – say, lawyers, medical doctors, or other members of numerus 
clausus professions – may evaluate and categorise others on the basis of knowledge, 
manners and tastes, and, consciously or otherwise, choose friends or spouses with 
similar educational credentials while avoiding others. Thus, the two types of closure 
may overlap. However, the two types of closure may not necessarily do so, hence the 
need to avoid Lamont’s analytical conflation. More specifically, the deployment of 
this dual model of social closure in empirical inquiries implies that not finding 
evidence of social closure through symbolic boundary work does not rule out the 
possibility that there might be evidence of formalised closure through the workings 
of, for instance, property, credentials and licences safeguarded by the state.  
 
As argued above, the main problem with the boundary work approach is the (partly 
implicit) claim that conscious boundary work is the only form social closure can take 
in order to be effective. Seen in the light of this dual model, the conflation of social 
closure with the question of whether social actors located in the upper sector of the 
social space act as ‘snobs’ or actively demarcate themselves from others, only 
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produces a partial picture of social closure, as it neglects important legal and 
institutional aspects, as well as ‘misrecognised’ social processes. However, what a 
focus on explicit boundary work can provide is a deeper understanding of whether, 
and if so in which ways, classification struggles exist between groups of social actors, 
i.e. endeavours to (de-)monopolise the power to define the dominant principles of 
social esteem, honour prestige, etc. 
 
So far I have argued that the boundary work approach is in itself insufficient to 
empirically interrogate power relations and the formation of status groups primarily 
because it conflates the question of social closure with manifested discursive 
boundaries and that it thus neglects crucial structural and institutional aspects. 
However, as argued above, there are also gaps and inconsistencies both in Bourdieu’s 
own analyses and in the contemporary use of his analytical tools, especially as 
regards the formation of realised status groups. While it might be argued that the 
notion of social closure is already implicit in Bourdieu’s vocabulary through his 
deployment of the capital metaphor, my point is that by explicitly making use of the 
term in empirical analyses, possible exclusionary effects of the unequal distribution 
of different species of capital may thereby become clearer. In this regard, the 
boundary work approach may, after all, provide valuable insights about matters that 
have hitherto been insufficiently scrutinised by most Bourdieusians. By reworking 
Lamont’s approach into a complementary, and not as an alternative, framework of 
sociological analysis, it may rectify some of the shortcomings of the Bourdieusian 
framework. In viewing symbolic boundary work as a form of non-formalised closure 
that operates alongside formalised forms of closure – in either reinforcing or 
contradictive ways – both Lamont’s conflation, as well as Bourdieu’s somewhat 
inadequate account of status group formation, can be avoided.  
 
More specifically, in focusing on social actors’ classifications of both cultural goods 
and the tastes and practices of other cultural consumers, a deeper understanding of the 
ways in which the universe of lifestyles functions as a system of semantic signs is 
possible. Moreover, focusing on subjective evaluative repertoires can also provide 
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information about social actors’ perceptions of power relations tied to the distribution 
of different species of capital, in that it may provide an indication of whether closure 
processes are under the spell of doxa (i.e. common sense acceptance), or whether they 
can be better explained in terms of classification struggles, meaning that there exists a 
field of opinion in which competing discourses are confronted. However, a thorough 
rethinking of how different evaluative repertoires work in either contradictive or 
reinforcing ways is required. It is to the issue of moral, power and legitimacy we turn 
next. 
 
2.3.4 The significance of moral 
The last two decades the issue of moral and its significance as regards the class-status 
nexus have been increasingly discussed (e.g. Lamont, 1992, 2000; Sayer, 2005; 
Skarpenes, 2007; Skarpenes and Sakslind, 2010; Skjøtt-Larsen, 2008, 2012). Indeed, 
we might even depict this increased scholarly attention as a ‘moral turn’ within the 
research field. As is often the case with scholarly debates related to issues of class, 
status and lifestyles, the work of Bourdieu serves a point of departure; and as with 
other aspects of his work, there exist several contradictory readings of it, as well as a 
corresponding variety of critiques and sympathetic apologies. A key figure in the 
former category is Michèle Lamont (1992: 184ff) who asserts that Bourdieu’s lack of 
concern with moral betrays a ‘blind spot’ in his theory. As noted above, she attempts 
to remedy this by mapping out the ‘relative salience’ of three kinds of symbolic 
boundaries: moral boundaries, socioeconomic boundaries, and cultural boundaries. In 
this regard, Bourdieu is depicted as having given too much attention to the last of 
these at the expense of the first.  
 
By ranking interviewees on five-point scales pertaining to different kinds of symbolic 
boundaries, Lamont (1992: 222) asserts that it is possible to analytically break down 
the components constituting the ‘evaluative repertoires’ of social actors. Based on the 
assumption that ‘boundaries exist only if they are repeatedly defended by members of 
inner groups’ (1992: 3), the relative salience of the different types of boundary 
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drawing occurring in the interview situation are held to indicate which types of 
boundaries that are erected against other people in everyday life, and which are not. 
In effect, if a given interviewee exhibits a high occurrence of ‘moral’ aversions to 
other people (e.g. to ‘dishonesty’) and a corresponding low occurrence of ‘cultural’ 
aversions (e.g. to ‘bad tastes in music’), this finding is taken to indicate that moral is 
more important than aesthetics and cultural consumption for this particular 
interviewee. Moreover, by comparing aggregates of interviewees with different 
characteristics, she holds that it is possible to assess the relative importance of 
different kinds of boundaries, for instance between countries. In other words, 
Lamont’s analytical strategy presupposes a zero-sum relationship between different 
evaluative repertoires, meaning that the more salient moral boundary work is in the 
interview data compared to other kinds of boundary work, the less significant the 
others are as regards the erection of ‘real’ boundaries between people. 
 
However, while Lamont should be credited for drawing attention to moral and the 
scrutiny of its consequences in the class-status nexus, the assumption of such zero-
sum relationships between different kinds of boundary work is questionable. It may 
be erroneous to assume that the fact that people disregard others due to moral criteria 
of evaluation implies that cultural or socioeconomic criteria of evaluation are 
rendered less significant. Indeed, it is arguably a likely scenario that a given social 
actor disregards others due to bad morals (e.g. for exhibiting ‘racist’ or ‘misogynist’ 
attitudes) as well as due to bad aesthetics (e.g. for exhibiting ‘bad’ tastes in literature 
and music). Even the very same practice – say, driving a SUV car – may elicit both 
moral and aesthetical aversions in that it is depicted as morally wrong due to high 
fuel consumption contributing to global warming, as well as aesthetically flawed due 
to a bad car design. In other words, different criteria of evaluation may very well be 
tightly entwined and working in reinforcing rather than contradictive ways. Thus, 
what type of repertoire is most salient may depend more on the perceived 
characteristics of the classified people in question, and not whether the classifiers 
themselves are predominantly ‘moral’, ‘socioeconomic’ or ‘cultural’ in their 
boundary work orientations. While it might be fruitful to differentiate between 
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different ideal types of boundary work on an analytical level, the argument put 
forward by Lamont about the relationship between them is hardly convincing. 
 
A related, but slightly different view of the significance of moral has been advanced 
by the Norwegian scholar Skarpenes (2007; Skarpenes and Sakslind, 2010). Drawing 
on the works of both Lamont (1992, 2000) and Boltanski and Thévenot (2006), 
Skarpenes’ inquiry focuses on ‘legitimations’ and different ‘grammars of worth’ 
which social actors use to justify their actions. Based on in-depth interviews with 
highly educated Norwegians in the public and private sectors, he finds that the 
interviewees rarely pass judgements on other people’s practices and tastes, nor do 
they attempt to legitimise or justify themselves through references to elevated 
aesthetics and scholastic knowledge. Moreover, they explicitly draw on moral 
repertoires of evaluation in depicting themselves in opposition to what they conceive 
of as dubious cultural ‘snobbism’. Thus, it is argued that the highly educated middle 
class has internalised ‘egalitarian values’ deeply embedded in Norwegian society 
which, in turn, have negative consequences for both the currency of certain cultural 
practices and the legitimacy of taste hierarchies. Thus, Skarpenes refutes the idea that 
the Bourdieusian model of symbolic domination can be applied to the case of 
Norway. Indeed, he even argues that in the case of Norway Bourdieu’s model should 
be ‘turned on its head’. Whereas Bourdieu (1990b: 54) argues that dominated actors 
(i.e. people of the working classes) make ‘a virtue of necessity’ by refusing ‘what is 
anyway denied to them’ and by ‘willing the inevitable’, Skarpenes argues that it is the 
other way around in Norway. According to Skarpenes, it is the people of the highly 
educated middle class who deny themselves consumption of ‘high culture’ because 
the people of the working classes deny them such practices (Skarpenes, 2007: 553). 
 
While the analytical strategies and their related premises bear important resemblances 
to those of Lamont, Skarpenes’ inquiry focuses more on legitimacy than does 
Lamont’s. Moreover, he points to the existence of a mobilisation of moral criteria of 
evaluation directed directly against a type of cultural snobbism perceived to be 
morally dubious. Thus, he does not just presuppose a contradictory relationship 
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between different evaluative repertoires, but rather points to empirical examples of it, 
which is arguably a great improvement vis-à-vis Lamont. Nevertheless, this study has 
been harshly criticised for a biased reading of Bourdieu’s model, certain 
methodological flaws, as well as questionable interpretations of the interview data 
(Skogen et al, 2008a, 2008b). Perhaps more important as regards the current 
discussion is the fact that the study is based on a different theoretical footing than that 
deployed by Bourdieu and his followers, which, among other things, implies that it 
operates with a rather different conception of legitimacy (Andersen and Mangset, 
2012). Legitimacy in the Bourdieusian sense means the extent to which power 
relations are (tacitly) accepted or endorsed by subordinate groups. As Bourdieu’s own 
analyses have suggested, legitimacy may be brought about by processes of 
misrecognition, i.e. social actors’ misapprehension of the power relation in question. 
Thus, legitimacy is bestowed because power relations are naturalised and taken for 
granted. Legitimacy in Skarpenes’ sense, by contrast, means the extent to which 
actions – including expressing aversions to other people in the interview situation – 
are justifiable in moral terms. While there are reasons to suspect that legitimacy in the 
latter sense may have consequences for legitimacy in the former sense, it is not, 
however, necessarily the case that a low degree of justifiability (for instance as 
regards explicitly asserting oneself and/or denigrating others on the basis of one’s 
lifestyles and cultural tastes) means that power relations tied the differential 
distribution of lifestyles and tastes are not legitimate in the Bourdieusian sense of the 
term. For this reason, the two meanings of the term should not be confused. Indeed, 
as noted by Parkin:  
 
Legitimations are the claims that dominant groups make about themselves – claims 
that they would naturally wish everyone else to accept. Legitimacy, on the other 
hand, refers to the conditions in which such claims have in fact been accepted and 
endorsed by subordinate groups. That is, the grounds upon which obedience is 
claimed are accepted as valid by those who are expected to do the obeying. 
Legitimations emanate from on high, but legitimacy is bestowed from below. 
(Parkin, 2002: 77ff) 
 
Thus, focusing only on (the absence of) explicitly stated claims to legitimacy, as for 
instance Skarpenes does, might lead to a reductionist view. As Parkin goes on to 
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argue, there is no necessary connection between the two, and it would thus be 
questionable to make inferences about legitimacy on the grounds of empirical 
inquiries into the form and content of legitimations. 
 
Moreover, as suggested by Gullestad (1984, 1985, 1992), there exists an ‘egalitarian 
ideology’ among Norwegians that somewhat paradoxically conceals, and even helps 
to maintain, the hierarchical structures of society. More specifically, Gullestad holds 
that a ‘code of modesty’ prevails in Norwegian society which implies an ‘under-
communication of success’ among the successful. The typical Norwegian code of 
conduct thus demands a person be self-effacing, not boastful, not forthcoming; in 
short, not ‘blowing one’s own trumpet’. In effect, this code of modesty entails that 
successful people cannot claim prestige for themselves, and accordingly they have to 
‘downplay’ their successfulness. The egalitarian values pointed to by Skarpenes 
might thus, in the light of Gullestad’s inquiries, be interpreted as a form of impression 
management (Goffman, 1959), employed consciously or otherwise, rather than 
evidence of a lack of legitimacy for power based on cultural capital, or even that 
certain practices and tastes function as symbolic capital. Indeed, as suggested by 
Daloz (2007, 2010), impression management in the form of ‘conspicuous modesty’ is 
a hallmark of members of various elites in Scandinavian countries. 
 
However, pointing out questionable aspects in both Lamont’s and Skarpenes’ 
analytical frameworks is not to say that moral has no significance as regards the 
class-status nexus. Nor does it imply that the Bourdieusian framework is flawless in 
this regard. The point is, however, that the arguments they advance about the 
significance of moral are, for reasons outlined above, unconvincing. Moreover, the 
ways in which their empirical findings are held to have repercussions for a 
Bourdieusian model of social stratification are somewhat misguided. True, moral was 
never a primary concern in Bourdieu’s work, but as noted by several scholars more 
sympathetic to it (e.g. Sayer, 2005; Skjøtt-Larsen, 2012), the significance of moral 
can be perfectly well comprehended within a Bourdieusian framework. As argued by 
Sayer (2005: ch. 2), a qualification of the notion of habitus to encompass ‘ethical 
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dispositions’ might remedy the shortcomings pointed out by Bourdieu’s critics.17 
Thus, in similar ways as the model proposed for the structuring of aesthetical 
dispositions, the structuring of ethical dispositions might be thought of in a similar 
fashion: the social space reflects the basic conditions for the structuring of different 
class habitus which, in turn, structure unified sets of practices more or less in 
accordance with certain moral standards, as well as perceptions, classifications and 
moral judgements of other people’s attitudes and practices. To expand on this 
argument, I shall point to six different, though interrelated, ways in which moral can 
be apprehended in a Bourdieu-inspired mode of analysis.  
 
First, moral can be thought of as differentially distributed moral-political attitudes or 
stances as regards a range of themes and issues. In fact, such an analysis is performed 
by Bourdieu himself. In Distinction (1984: 452), the construction of a ‘political 
space’ reveals that different political stances (e.g. adherence to various political 
parties) are distributed according to the structures of the social space in similar ways 
as different cultural tastes and lifestyles. Moreover, Bourdieu (1984: 312) depicts 
how the distribution of specific moral attitudes varies systematically by classes and 
class fractions. Following a Bourdieu-inspired approach, researchers associated with 
the COMPAS project (e.g. Prieur et al, 2008; Skjøtt-Larsen, 2008, 2012; Harrits et al, 
2010; Faber et al, 2012) have shown that social actors located in different sectors of 
the local social space in the Danish city of Aalborg hold oppositional stances as 
regards a range of both political and moral issues. What these analyses suggest is that 
the distributional oppositions of moral-political stances seem to map neatly onto the 
structural oppositions in the social space, and work in tandem, as it were, with 
distributional oppositions involving cultural preferences and tastes. Thus, such 
analytical strategies might remedy the questionable notion that moral necessarily 
contradicts aesthetics as regards the erection of symbolic boundaries between groups 
of social actors.  
                                              
17 The notion of ethical dispositions is alluded to, but not elaborated on, by Bourdieu himself (e.g. 
1998: 70). 
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Second, moral can be analysed in terms of cultural taste itself. That is, moral 
concerns can be an important part of social actors’ mode of consumption, i.e. the 
ways in which they perceive, appreciate and appropriate cultural goods. Indeed, as 
noted by Bourdieu in his discussion of the ‘popular aesthetic’,  
 
working-class people expect every image to explicitly perform a function, if only that 
of a sign, and their judgements make reference, often explicitly, to the norms of 
morality or agreeableness. Whether rejecting or praising, their appreciation always 
has an ethical basis. (Bourdieu, 1984: 5)  
 
Unlike the ‘moral agnosticism’ associated with the cultural tastes of the dominant 
classes (i.e. a ‘distanced’ and ‘disinterested’ mode of consumption), people of the 
working classes are portrayed as predisposed to ‘annex aesthetics to ethics’. In other 
words, moral is according to Bourdieu part and parcel of some groups’ aesthetical 
tastes. Furthering the point advanced above about the need to scrutinise the ‘hows’ 
and not just the ‘whats’ of cultural consumption, a focus on moral could, indeed, be a 
fruitful endeavour in this regard. For instance, the increasing demand for ‘vegetarian’, 
‘green’ and ‘organic’ goods points to an increased number of ‘morally conscious’ 
consumers. As such goods are predominantly consumed by resourceful consumers, it 
is far from a given that moral is predominantly a concern of the working classes. 
Moreover, it might also be the case that moral criteria of evaluation are more linked 
to some types of goods (e.g. food, clothing, motor vehicles) and less to others (e.g. 
music, literature, films), and/or that such moral concerns vary by classes and class 
fractions. Either way, a mapping out of the social distribution of different moral 
modes of consumption vis-à-vis other modes of consumption might bring about 
additional insights into lifestyle differentiation.  
 
Third, moral can function as (a part of) the evaluative repertoires social actors 
employ, consciously or otherwise, in their perceptions, classifications and judgements 
of other people. Moral in this sense is close to the way in which Lamont depicts it 
(i.e. as symbolic boundaries drawn on the basis of moral standards such as honesty, 
work ethic, personal integrity and consideration for others). However, as discussed 
above, the interpretation of such boundary work vis-à-vis other forms of boundary 
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work should be conducted with some caution, as moral may work in both reinforcing 
and contradictory ways as regards the judgement of others. Nevertheless, there are 
reasons to believe that moral boundary work is an important component of what I 
have referred to as non-formalised closure. An extended analytical focus on moral 
boundary work can thus provide insights into matters that have hitherto been 
understudied by scholars concerned with the class-status nexus.   
 
Fourth, moral, or rather acting in moral ways, can be analysed in terms of field-
specific symbolic capital. Certain moral practices or modes of conduct might in 
themselves have currency within a social field and thus function as assets that may 
under certain conditions be converted into privileges and advantages. For instance, as 
asserted by Daloz (2007, 2010), exhibiting a form of ‘conspicuous modesty’ is 
socially profitable among various Scandinavian elites, due to (tacit) egalitarian moral 
standards. More generally, in line with a Bourdieusian field analytical approach, the 
power to define ‘correct’ moral conduct can be thought of as constituting struggles 
within hierarchically stratified fields (e.g. the religious field) in which social actors 
endeavour to impose their perceptual categories and world-views on others. While 
most scholars within the research field have been preoccupied with aesthetical 
matters (e.g. consumption choices and cultural tastes) as regards the distribution of 
symbolic capital, there is, in principle, no reason why moral matters should not be of 
equal analytical importance. 
 
Fifth, moral sentiments can be thought of as position-takings directed against 
powerful others, potentially pushing back the limits of doxa and exposing the 
arbitrariness of power relations, and thus functioning as a means to challenge and 
reduce the effects of symbolic violence. Insofar as such position-takings result in 
‘bringing the undiscussed into discussion’ (Bourdieu, 1977: 168), they can be 
regarded as a ‘heterodoxy’ explicitly challenging the ‘orthodoxy’. For instance, the 
egalitarian sentiment that ‘all people are of equal value’ might have implication for 
the ways in which non-possessors of certain assets (e.g. money or educational 
credentials) perceive and relate to possessors of these assets. Indeed, such sentiments 
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may even entail feelings of suspicion and mistrust towards resourceful others. So 
while such assets may very well function as economic and cultural capital within 
certain fields, they do not necessarily function as symbolic capital, in the sense of a 
misrecognised source of power constituting awe or deference in the eyes of non-
possessors. However, whether such challenges and position-takings are fuelled by 
egalitarian values to eradicate or compress social hierarchies, or if they are merely 
endeavours to usurp power in order to reshape the principles for social 
hierarchisation, it is important to note that the mere existence of heterodoxic position-
takings does not necessarily entail an eradication of relations of domination and the 
legitimacy which bestows it. As the work of Gullestad has suggested, it might also be 
the case that egalitarian sentiments somewhat paradoxically conceal, and even help to 
maintain, the hierarchical structures of society. Nevertheless, insofar as there exists a 
‘field of opinion’ constituted by more or less antagonistic position-takings, a focus on 
moral sentiments may draw attention to issues concerning power and legitimacy in 
fruitful ways. 
   
Finally, moral sentiments can be conceived of as one of several principles social 
actors use to legitimise and justify their actions to others. As suggested by Boltanski 
and Thévenot (2006) and Skarpenes (2007), empirical studies of how social actors 
draw upon different types of justifications in order to assess whether an action 
benefits the ‘common good’ can illuminate the ways in which different ‘grammars of 
worth’ work in either reinforcing or contradictive ways in different social contexts. 
Indeed, this analytical framework is particularly designed to elucidate the most 
‘legitimate’ (i.e. justifiable) types of arguments, which are held to be those social 
actors actually use when debating public issues to appeal to common interest (Lamont 
and Thévenot, 2000: 5). While interesting in its own right, this analytical framework 
is also of interest as regards the issue of legitimacy in the Bourdieusian sense. Insofar 
as there exist position-takings that push back the limits of doxa and/or explicitly 
challenge the legitimacy of power relations, the scrutiny of how powerful groups or 
individuals attempt to justify and legitimise their privileges and advantages to others 
in different situations can provide valuable sociological insights which do not 
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necessarily contradict those put forward by Bourdieu, although the proponents of this 
framework explicitly pitch their framework against Bourdieu’s work (e.g. Boltanski, 
2011).18 
 
In sum, I argue that the significance of moral as regards the class-status nexus is 
perfectly comprehensible within an extended Bourdieusian framework, although 
Bourdieu himself has been criticised for paying it lip-service. It is, however, 
important to highlight that pervasiveness of moral in one of the senses alluded to 
above does not necessarily imply consequences for stratifying processes linked to 
moral in the other senses. Nevertheless, insofar as analytical precautions are taken 
into account, the inclusion of the issue of moral in empirical inquiries into processes 
pertaining to social stratification implies a broader conception of ‘lifestyles’ than is 
usually the case within the research field. Indeed, this might remedy an unfortunate 
tendency of scholars preoccupied with mapping out the social distribution of a limited 
set of cultural tastes. As noted by Scott,  
 
It is symptomatic […] that the term ‘lifestyle’ has virtually replaced the term ‘style of 
life’ in academic discourse. This particular distinction was not made by Weber, but 
the common English translation of his term Lebensstil as ‘style of life’ properly 
grasps the way in which he saw it as reflecting the totality of a group’s existence: its 
whole way of life. A person’s status, Weber argued, typically follows from their 
‘style of life’. […] As Weber showed, these styles of life are rooted in specific class 
relations that condition a way of life and, therefore, form the bases of status 
judgements. By contrast, the term ‘lifestyle’ has been popularized in discussions of 
contemporary consumerism and is simply ‘a way of using certain goods, places, and 
times that is characteristic of a group but is not a totality of their social experience’. 
(Scott, 2002: 33ff) 
 
A broadening of scope of what constitutes different lifestyles (or ‘styles of life’) 
might, therefore, help to remedy this unfortunate tendency. Attempts by researchers 
to include issues related to moral in their scrutiny of the universes of lifestyles are 
thus a much-welcomed contribution to a body of research that has been 
predominately concerned with consumption choices and cultural tastes.  
                                              
18 See Andersen and Mangset (2012) for an interesting comment on the possibilities of cross-
fertilising the two analytical frameworks. 
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2.4 Conclusion  
In this chapter I have endeavoured to ‘distil’ or ‘untangle’ a general Bourdieusian 
model of social stratification on the basis of Bourdieu’s empirical inquiries. 
Tentatively justified by the assertion that several fruitful aspects of Bourdieu’s 
theoretical-methodological framework have been eviscerated by adversaries’ 
misguided recasts of his work (which in turn have served as ‘straw men’ against 
whom rival arguments have been directed), I have offered a reading of Bourdieu’s 
account of the class-status nexus which I hope does it more justice. However 
‘apologetic’ this account may be, my aims have not been to lament that fact that 
Bourdieu’s work has been poorly interpreted. Rather, I have discussed his work at 
some length to extract important sociological insights which are unfortunately often 
ignored and/or poorly understood in contemporary debates on social stratification. 
Thus, the aim of this chapter has been to (re)construct a theoretical-methodological 
framework inspired by that of Bourdieu in order to make sense of the present 
empirical case. In this regard I forward the argument that a relational model of the 
class-status nexus may be distilled from his empirical analyses. Somewhat simplified, 
a Bourdieu-inspired model of the class-status nexus can be portrayed as 
encompassing four interrelated insights:  
 
1. A depiction of the principles for a differential social distribution of lifestyle 
properties (e.g. cultural tastes and moral-political attitudes). 
2. A depiction of the principles for how more or less exclusive status groups are 
formed on the basis of such lifestyle differentials. 
3. A depiction of the principles for how the mastery of certain lifestyles can be 
consolidated into assets productive of advantage or privilege. 
4. A depiction of the principles for how power relations arising from this 
differential distribution of such advantages come to be seen as legitimate in the 
eyes of subordinates.   
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These insights, I argue, may help to scrutinise societal inequalities and processes 
pertaining to social stratification in empirical contexts different from France in the 
1960s and 1970s, regardless of whether or not these processes take on exactly the 
same forms as the ones depicted by Bourdieu himself. Despite certain critics’ 
recurrent insistence, then, I argue that there is no need to disregard the Bourdieusian 
framework. On the contrary, I advance the argument that a Bourdieu-inspired 
framework makes for a more fruitful framework for the analysis of the relationship 
between class and status than the alternatives proposed by rival perspectives, 
although these may contain certain additional insights that may prove helpful in 
empirical analyses. Thus, I maintain that a ‘distilled’ Bourdieusian model and a 
related conceptual tool kit can be fruitfully deployed in order to construct another 
‘particular instance of the possible’: present day Stavanger.  
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3.1 Introduction 
Expanding on the discussions in the previous chapter, I now move on to clarify the 
way in which I have constructed the research object. In this regard I shall respond to 
Bourdieu’s (2004b; Bourdieu et al, 1991; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992) invitation 
to conduct a ‘reflexive sociology’ by endeavouring to practise ‘participant 
objectivation’ in constituting the present empirical case of Stavanger as a ‘particular 
instance of the possible’. Put in less complicated terms, in what follows I elaborate on 
the theoretical-methodological rationale for matters regarding the deployment of 
research methods, sampling strategies and analytical strategies in order to 
comprehend the entwinement of class and status relations in present day Stavanger. 
 
In the previous chapter I argued that several fruitful aspects of the Bourdieu’s model 
of social stratification are eviscerated by his detractors’ somewhat misguided 
disregard of it, and that the alternative analytical approaches employed often lack a 
proper conceptual framework whereby to attain crucial sociological insights. More 
specifically, I cast doubt upon the soundness of the ways in which several scholars 
have conceptualised, operationally defined, measured and drawn substantial 
conclusions about different aspects of the class-status nexus. Accordingly, I proposed 
a ‘reorientation’ back to Bourdieu’s original relational concern with the scrutiny of 
social actors’ modus operandi and the social and economic conditions which 
structure different sets class habitus, in order to break with questionable assumptions 
implied in much contemporary research on matters concerning class, status and social 
closure. To follow Bourdieu’s leads thus implies that one ought to construct research 
objects differently than both ‘methodological individualists’ and ‘methodological 
collectivists’. Whereas the former hold that social phenomena must ultimately be 
explained in terms of individuals or individual actions, the latter hold that the same 
phenomena must ultimately be explained in terms of supra-individual factors that 
have a structuring power over individual agency (Hjellbrekke, 1999b: 60ff). By 
contrast, Bourdieu’s call for a ‘methodological relationism’ entails an endeavour to 
‘transcend’ or ‘overcome’ what he depicts as a misguided epistemological dichotomy 
between these methodological approaches by insisting that no analytical level or 
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unity can be attributed the ultimate explanatory power as regards a social 
phenomenon.19 Rather, Bourdieu’s relationism insists that sociological explanations 
must focus on the complex relations existing within and between social structures, 
fields, positions, position-takings and so forth.  
 
In the construction of the present research object – which may be tentatively defined 
as an attempt to map out processes of social closure on the basis of lifestyle 
differentials between social actors geographically situated within the borders of the 
municipality of Stavanger – I shall employ a similar relational approach. More 
specifically, I endeavour to map out possible structural relationships or 
correspondences between what Bourdieu has referred to as ‘objectivity of the first 
order’ (i.e. the social space, or the system of relations between individuals’ 
possession of capitals), and ‘objectivity of the second order’ (i.e. the space of class 
habitus, or the system of relations between individuals’ modes of perceiving and 
comprehending the social world) (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 7). 
 
In this ‘double reading’ of social relations in Stavanger I shall expand on a series of 
studies conducted by Lennart Rosenlund, who, inspired by the work of Bourdieu, has 
mapped out structural relationships between the local social space and the space of 
lifestyles by subjecting survey and census data to different forms of Geometric Data 
Analysis (GDA) (Le Roux and Rouanet, 2004). In this chapter there will be a fairly 
extensive discussion of Rosenlund’s work, both in order to provide the reader with 
contextual information on what he refers to as a ‘structural history of Stavanger’, and 
because the theoretical-methodological rationale for the sampling of cases draws 
upon his work. I then move on to discuss the advantages and limitations of employing 
in-depth qualitative interviews in empirical studies of the class-status nexus, 
addressing in particular the issue of generalisability. Finally, I discuss the ways in 
which I have approached the interview data in a relational mode of analysis, focusing 
                                              
19 For a different type of critique of a ‘sociology of the variable’, see Blumer (1969, ch. 7). 
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especially on sampling strategies and procedures regarding the conducting of the 
qualitative interviews.  
 
3.2 A structural history of Stavanger 
Drawing on Bourdieu’s notion of the social space, this study is based on a 
fundamental assumption that the population of Stavanger can be understood as a 
system of class relations, objectified as a stratified space of social positions in which 
scarce resources are unequally distributed. In this sense, the units of analysis – forty-
six Stavangerians who underwent qualitative research interviews – are initially 
viewed as cases of a set of nominally differentiated class positions. In this regard, it is 
important to underscore that Stavanger itself is not constructed as a case, but rather 
viewed as a historical-structural context in which the units of analysis are situated. In 
other words, Stavanger will not be analysed as a member of a larger set of objects or 
cultural entities in relation to which the empirical findings about the attributes of this 
specific city as a whole are compared and discussed (e.g. as a Norwegian city, as a 
socially stratified community, or as a subject to historical change due to a booming 
oil industry). While the empirical findings generated in this study might very well be 
used for such comparative purposes, this is not my focal concern here. 
 
Although this study is based on assumptions concerning the make-up of Stavanger’s 
class structure, these assumptions are nevertheless empirically founded. In a series of 
studies Rosenlund (1996, 1998, 2000a, 2000b, 2000c, 2002a, 2002b, 2007, 2009a, 
2009b, 2011) has deployed and extended Bourdieu’s theoretical-methodological 
framework in empirically mapping out the historical evolution of the local class 
structure, as well as the social distribution of lifestyle differentials. Rosenlund’s 
studies point to structural homologies between the local social space and the space of 
lifestyles that are strikingly similar to those depicted by Bourdieu (1984) in France in 
the 1960s and 1970s. In this way, Rosenlund demonstrates that Bourdieu’s 
conceptual and methodological tools are ‘perfectly applicable in another country, 
from a different cultural area and at the scale of the metropolis rather than an entire 
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society’ (Wacquant, 2009: iii). In what follows I shall focus on three facets of his 
inquiries so as to provide a historical-structural point of departure for my own 
empirical study: first, the historical evolution and transformation of the structures of 
the local social space; second, the correspondence between the social space and the 
space of lifestyles in present day Stavanger; and finally, the socially stratified 
appropriation of physical space in Stavanger’s urban areas. 
 
3.2.1 The structural transformation of the local social space 
Based on diachronic analyses of census data from 1970 and onwards, as well as 
survey data from 1994, 2007, and 2009, Rosenlund (2009a: ch. 7; 2009b) points to 
historical processes of what is referred to as a ‘metamorphosis from a small town to a 
city’. Stavanger’s economy was long characterised by fishing and canning industries. 
The advent of the oil industry in the late 1960s, however, brought with it tremendous 
changes for the city. Most importantly, these changes implied a restructuring of the 
industrial sector – away from food processing towards manufacturing high-tech 
products adapted to the needs of the oil industry. Moreover, compared to the 
development in other Norwegian cities in the post-war period and onwards, Stavanger 
has undergone the most profound and far-reaching changes in terms of the size of the 
working population, occupational structure, education level and income. Indeed, the 
presence of oil companies offering high-paid jobs has profoundly increased the 
average income of the population. The influx of a well-paid work force has also 
contributed to increasing the housing costs to among the highest in Norway, in some 
segments surpassing Norway’s capital Oslo. 
 
As regards the make-up of the class structure, Rosenlund identifies two 
interconnected developmental traits or change patterns. First, a major re-shaping 
process of the social hierarchy – defined in terms of volume of capital – is identified. 
On average, Stavangerians have become ‘richer’ in both economic and cultural 
capital. Moreover, Rosenlund holds that there are signs indicating that the 
hierarchical principle of social differentiation has lost some of its former strength; the 
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analysed occupational groups are less differentiated according to their average 
volume of capital in 1990 than they were in 1970. A reconstruction of the local social 
space based on 1970 data reveals a small upper class, a relatively small intermediate 
class and a large working-class segment. By contrast, the reconstructions based on 
1980 and 1990 data indicate that the upper and intermediate classes have grown 
substantially in relative size, while the working classes have diminished 
correspondingly.  
 
Second, Rosenlund identifies a re-shaping process in terms of the emergence and 
growing strength of the capital composition principle of social differentiation – the 
second dimension of the social space. Through a series of successive analyses of the 
upper and intermediate classes in 1970, 1980 and 1990, Rosenlund reveals that the 
inverse or ‘chiastic’ relationship between indices of cultural and economic capital has 
grown in strength decade by decade. This second developmental trait is seldom 
considered by sociologists concerned with structural changes, and far from heralding 
‘the death of class’ on a structural level, Rosenlund (2009a: 262ff) posits that the 
structural history of recent decades instead points to a metamorphosis ‘from a one-
dimensional social hierarchy to a space in two dimensions’. Thus, by the 1990s, the 
local social space of Stavanger had developed into a structure that is by and large 
similar to Bourdieu’s theoretical model of the social space, which depicts a 
differential distribution of capitals both according to the capital volume and capital 
composition principles of social differentiation. So while the inquiry into the 
structural history of Stavanger in one sense indicates a change process corresponding 
to the views forwarded by scholars who claim that class differences are ‘fading’ due 
to the fact that the relative size of the working classes is decreasing while the relative 
size of the intermediate classes is increasing (e.g. Colbjørnsen et al, 1987), the 
structural change process is, according to Rosenlund, better conceptualised as a 
‘reshaping’ of the local class structure, as the capital composition principle of social 
differentiation seems to be increasingly prominent. 
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Parallel to this development Rosenlund (2009a: ch. 2; ch. 8) points to profound 
changes in Stavanger’s cultural life. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century 
Stavanger was divided by two cultural ‘poles’. On the one hand, the bourgeoisie was 
developing a taste for culture of the continental European type. In this regard, Det 
Stavangerske Klubselskab played a pivotal role, and the local ‘aristocracy’ of wealthy 
merchants met daily to discuss the matters of the day, business and cultural matters.20 
On the other hand, a pietistic religious movement had a distinct influence among 
craftsmen, shopkeepers, workers, fishermen and farmers. Their interests and ways of 
life were predominantly shaped by low-church layman movements and teetotalism, 
and this stood in stark contrast and at times clashed with the bourgeoisie’s increasing 
embracement of music, literature and theatre. 
 
While the tension between these cultural poles continued to exist throughout the 
twentieth century – remnants exist even today – Rosenlund points to a development 
in cultural life corresponding to the metamorphosis of the Stavangerian class 
structure. First of all, the number of highly-educated professionals employed in firms 
related to the oil industry (e.g. geologists, engineers, economists and lawyers) as well 
as in academia, media, advertising, design and cultural production has grown strongly 
throughout recent decades. These highly-educated professionals – many of whom are 
foreigners and out-of-towners – have brought with them new impulses and ways of 
life to Stavanger, as well as an increased demand for cultural diversity. 
Simultaneously, the ‘supply side’ of cultural consumption has expanded and 
diversified enormously. The advent of cultural institutions such as art associations 
(Stavanger kunstforening, as well as several private associations run by oil firms), 
museums (Stavanger kunstmuseum, Norsk oljemuseum), theatres (Rogaland teater, 
Kjellerteateret), a cultural centre (Sølvberget), a cinema (Stavanger kinematografer), 
a professional orchestra (Stavanger symfoniorkester), music venues (Stavanger 
konserthus, Folken, Tau Scene), music festivals (Mai-Jazz, Den internasjonale 
                                              
20 There was, however, a certain tension within Det Stavangerske Klubselskab, and the embracement 
of European bourgeoisie culture was not unison (see Furre, 1990). 
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kammermusikkfestivalen, Numusic, Rått og Råte), a literature festival (Kapittel), a 
food festival (Gladmat) – all point to an increase in Stavanger’s cultural life. In 2008 
Stavanger was even appointed the official ‘European Capital of Culture’.21 Moreover, 
the ever-increasing number of shops, restaurants, bars and cafés leads the 
development away from a pietistic and temperate past towards ‘hedonistic’ lifestyles 
associated with increased wealth and prosperity.  
 
3.2.2 Structural homologies  
Notwithstanding historical change processes as regards the make-up of the class 
structure and the diversification and intensification of cultural life, present day 
Stavanger is marked by a ‘classed’ distribution of different lifestyles and cultural 
tastes. By way of Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) (Hjellbrekke, 1999a; Le 
Roux and Rouanet, 2010) of survey data on lifestyle properties from three points in 
time (1994, 2007 and 2009), Rosenlund (2009a, 2009b) has shown persistent 
structural homologies between the local social space and the space of lifestyles, 
meaning that more or less unitary lifestyle properties (e.g. consumption choices, 
cultural tastes and moral-political attitudes) correspond systematically to different 
classes and class fractions. 
 
As noted above, the local social space is structured in similar ways to Bourdieu’s 
(1984) theoretical model of social stratification – both according to the capital 
volume and the capital composition principles of social differentiation. The 
characteristics of Rosenlund’s second space construction – the local space of 
lifestyles – are also commensurable with those presented in Distinction; the various 
components of lifestyles are structured in patterns that correspond to both 
differentiation principles in the social space. Among respondents located in the upper 
sectors of the social space one finds preferences and practices which require large 
                                              
21 The European Capital of Culture is a city designated by the European Union for a period of one 
calendar year during which it organises a series of cultural events. For studies of the events taking 
place in relation to what is referred to as ‘Stavanger2008’, see Bergsgard and Vassenden (2009; 
2011) and Berg and Rommetvedt (2009).  
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amounts of economic and/or cultural capital, as well as rejections and a dislike of 
taste expressions common in the lower sectors of the social space. In the lower 
sectors, by contrast, one finds inversions of the taste expressions common in the 
upper sectors – typically preferences for cultural goods and practices which require 
fewer resources, as well as corresponding rejections and a dislike of taste expressions 
common among more resourceful respondents. Thus, the capital volume principle of 
social differentiation is manifested in the distributional opposition between the 
practices and tastes of respondents endowed with high and low volumes of capital 
respectively. This empirical finding fits well with Bourdieu’s (1984) assertion that the 
further away from ‘necessity’ social actors are situated (i.e. the more capital they are 
endowed with), the more likely they are to exhibit an embodied ‘feel for the game’ of 
cultural distinctions, either through consumption of cultural goods (e.g. literature, 
theatre and music) or through consumption of material goods (e.g. cars, yachts and 
electronic gadgets). 
 
Along the capital composition dimension of the social space a somewhat different 
logic prevails; the liking and disliking of cultural goods and practices correspond 
systematically to the respondents’ ‘balance sheet’ of capital endowment. Respondents 
endowed with a preponderance of cultural capital (i.e. those located in the ‘cultural’ 
fractions of the social space) typically report high interest in the universe of cultural 
goods and a corresponding low interest in the universe of material consumption 
goods, whereas respondents endowed with a preponderance of economic capital (i.e. 
those located in the ‘economic’ fractions of the social space) typically report 
diametrically opposed preferences and tastes. Thus, the capital composition principle 
of social differentiation is manifested in the distributional opposition between the 
practices and tastes of respondents endowed with preponderance of cultural and 
economic capital respectively.  
 
Moreover, by comparing survey data from 1994, 2007 and 2009, Rosenlund (2009b) 
finds remarkably persistent patterns in the socially stratified distribution of lifestyles 
and cultural tastes. Contrary to the claims of the champions of the omnivore thesis, 
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the structural homologies between the social space and the space of lifestyles seem to 
be strikingly steadfast. In other words, there are few signs of a decline or a dramatic 
reconfiguration of the differential distribution of lifestyle properties in Stavanger 
during the course of the past fifteen years. As the two space constructs are 
homologically structured, Rosenlund concludes that they are ‘two translations of the 
same sentence’: 
 
The social space gives a picture of a social structure or a social topology which is a 
system of ordered positions hidden from the everyday experience and 
comprehension. The space of lifestyles is an objectivation and a representation which 
systematises and structures the symbolic world of all the ways and means by which 
the social agents are participating in the experienced social world, how they think 
about it and how they perceive it. The features of the two space constructs based on 
data from Stavanger and the demonstrated relationships between them are supporting 
Bourdieu’s claim of the general applicability of his model. (Rosenlund, 2009a: 187) 
 
 
3.2.3 The appropriation of physical space 
Expanding on Bourdieu’s (1996a, 1999) model of homologies between social, mental 
and spatial structures, Rosenlund (2009a, 2011) suggests that the homology principle 
extends to the appropriation of urban physical space via the workings of 
differentiated class habitus. First of all, he demonstrates that there exist tendencies for 
‘classed’ residential segregation, meaning that different classes and class fractions 
tend to reside separately from one another in different parts of the urban environment. 
By subjecting demographic indicators of 68 geographical zones to Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA) (Le Roux and Rouanet, 2004), Rosenlund demonstrates 
two sets of distributional oppositions corresponding to the capital volume and the 
capital composition principles of social differentiation. The distributional opposition 
along the capital volume dimension of the social space is manifested in an opposition 
between high-priced areas located at some distance from the city centre – typically 
where social actors endowed with high volumes of capital of either form reside – and 
considerably less expensive areas located in the vicinity of the city centre – typically 
where social actors endowed with low volumes of capital reside. The distributional 
opposition along the capital composition dimension, on the other hand, is even more 
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dramatic in terms of physical distance; the cultural fractions of the upper sectors of 
the social space tend to live close to the city centre in old working-class areas now 
subjected to gentrification, while the economic fractions mainly live on the outskirts 
of the city.   
 
Second, on the basis of survey data Rosenlund scrutinises how respondents perceive 
and classify residential areas other than the ones in which they reside. In this regard 
he finds strong tendencies indicating that those who perceive a certain residential area 
as attractive are endowed with similar capital portfolios and tend to have similar 
lifestyle profiles as those who actually live there. Conversely, the antipathies towards 
various areas follow an opposite logic; those who dislike a certain area tend to be 
endowed with dissimilar capital portfolios as well as dissimilar lifestyle profiles than 
those who reside in these areas. 
 
Finally, Rosenlund demonstrates that the frequenting and appropriation of public 
spaces (e.g. concert halls, theatres, cinemas, restaurants, pubs, cafés and sport arenas) 
are stratified according to the same logic. The respondents who report frequenting 
certain public spaces while avoiding others tend to have diametrically opposed capital 
portfolios compared to those who report opposite preferences or guiding principles as 
regards their movements in public space. In other words, Rosenlund’s analysis 
indicates that members of different classes and class fractions tend to choose their 
movements in urban areas with great care, seeking out places where they feel ‘at 
home’, while avoiding places where they feel ‘out of place’. Thus, Rosenlund (2009a: 
302ff) asserts that the structure of social relations as depicted in the social space 
retranslates itself into physical and geographical structures via the mediation of the 
habitus. Stavangerians tend to appropriate physical space according to the same logic 
as they appropriate cultural goods and leisure activities; their perceptions of the 
various parts of the city and their actual appropriation of them are governed by the 
capital volume and capital composition principles of social differentiation. In other 
words, Stavangerians seem to be endowed with ‘practical knowledge’ of the social 
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geography of the city and they ‘know’ where they fit in and where they do not. They 
are, to put in it Goffmanian terms, endowed with a highly concrete ‘sense of one’s 
place’, as well as a ‘sense of other people’s place’.  
 
To summarise, Rosenlund’s inquiries lend extensive empirical support to the 
Bourdieusian model of social stratification, meaning that there exist homologies 
between social, mental and spatial structures in Stavanger. Besides functioning as an 
important historical-structural contextual backdrop for the present empirical inquiry, 
Rosenlund’s empirical findings also serve as an analytical point of departure in two 
ways. First, his construction of the local social space constitutes the basis for the 
rationale underlying the sampling of forty-six individuals subjected to qualitative 
interviewees, in the sense that these are recruited so as to ensure a distributional 
dispersion along both the capital volume dimension and the capital composition 
dimension of the social space. Second, the empirical findings concerning the 
structural homologies between the social space and the space of lifestyles constitute a 
basis for further empirical scrutiny of the social actors’ modus operandi. As 
Rosenlund’s inquiries are exclusively based on census and survey data, they imply 
certain limitations, especially as regards social actors’ modes of perceiving cultural 
goods, other people’s lifestyles and tastes, different urban areas, etc. Other types of 
data would arguably be required to examine such aspects in depth.  
 
3.3 The qualitative interview method 
Notwithstanding the illuminating aspects of quantitatively oriented studies such as 
Rosenlund’s, they do entail certain limitations. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
inquiries into the ‘whats’ of cultural consumption only get us so far in understanding 
the ways in which lifestyle differentials pertain to social stratification. More 
specifically, studies of lifestyle differentials based on survey data (i.e. in terms of 
statistical distributions of tastes and preferences for certain goods and activities) 
entail two important limitations. First, data on how respondents perceive, appreciate 
and appropriate goods are difficult to obtain. Although it might be possible to extract 
 88
different modes of consumption interpretively from statistical patterns arising from 
analyses of survey data, such arguments remain largely unsubstantiated and thus 
speculative. Second, survey data on cultural preferences lack information on the ways 
in which respondents relate to other cultural consumers, for instance how they 
evaluate other people’s tastes in terms of social esteem. While scholars associated 
with the omnivore thesis have put forward sweeping claims about the ‘democratising’ 
consequences of ‘open’, ‘broad’ and ‘eclectic’ cultural tastes, such inferences are 
hardly convincing, as there is nothing contradictory in the idea that people might 
exhibit preferences for a wide range of cultural goods, while judging other people’s 
preferences and tastes. Conversely, even though taste oppositions are systematically 
distributed according to the structures of the social space, it does not necessarily 
follow from this that estimations of honour or prestige are involved, nor that certain 
tastes function as cultural and/or symbolic capital whose distribution amounts to 
processes of social closure and relations of domination and subordination. 
 
In other words, in lieu of data on such matters scholars have tended to treat social 
actors’ modes of perceiving both goods and other people as a ‘black box’, either by 
ignoring this aspect completely, or by reflexively admitting the limitations of their 
analyses by pointing to the need to assess such issues by way of qualitative methods 
(e.g. Chan and Goldthorpe, 2010: 18; Chan, 2010a: 242ff). Either way, the existence 
of this black box betrays important shortcomings in a body of research that has been 
preoccupied with the analysis of survey data (for notable exceptions, see for instance 
Lamont, 1992; Holt, 1998; Skarpenes, 2007; Ollivier, 2008; Lahire, 2008; Skjøtt-
Larsen, 2008, 2012; Bennett et al, 2009). This is of course not to say that 
quantitatively oriented inquiries have not provided valuable insights in this regard. 
However, notwithstanding the sophistication of quantitative methods, there are 
certain limitations to them which highlight the need to assess certain empirical 
questions by different means. In what follows I shall discuss the ways in which the 
qualitative research interview (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2008; Silverman, 2011) can 
function as a tool to empirically assess stratifying processes regarding social actors’ 
modes of evaluating and classifying cultural goods and other cultural consumers.  
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3.3.1 What can qualitative interview data tell us? 
Following Geertz’ (1975) call for a context-sensitive scientific approach by way of 
what he has dubbed ‘thick descriptions’, I shall take his discussion of the difference 
between a ‘twitch’ and a ‘wink’ as a point of departure for discussing qualitative 
interviews more generally:22 
 
Consider […] two boys rapidly contracting the eyelids of their right eyes. In one, this 
is an involuntary twitch; in the other, a conspiratorial signal to a friend. The two 
movements are, as movements, identical; from an I-am-a-camera, “phenomenalistic” 
observation of them alone, one could not tell which was twitch and which was wink, 
or indeed whether both or either was twitch or wink. Yet the difference, however 
unphotographable, between a twitch and a wink is vast; as anyone unfortunate 
enough to have had the first taken for the second knows. The winker is 
communicating, and indeed communicating in a precise and special way: (1) 
deliberately, (2) to someone in particular, (3) to impart a particular message, (4) 
according to a socially established code, and (5) without cognizance of the rest of the 
company. […] The winker has done two things, contracted his eyelids and winked, 
while the twitcher has done only one, contracted his eyelids. Contracting your eyelids 
on purpose when there exists a public code in which doing so counts as a 
conspiratorial signal is winking. […] That, however, is just the beginning. Suppose 
[…] there is a third boy, who, “to give malicious amusement to his cronies,” parodies 
the first boy’s wink, as amateurish, clumsy, obvious, and so on. He, of course, does 
this in the same way the second boy winked and the first twitched: by contracting his 
eyelids. Only this boy is neither winking nor twitching, he is parodying someone 
else’s, as he takes it, laughable, attempt at winking. Here, too, a socially established 
code exists (he will “wink” laboriously, overobviously, perhaps adding a grimace – 
the usual artifices of a clown); and so also does a message. Only now it is not 
conspiracy but ridicule that is in the air. If the others think he is actually winking, his 
whole project misfires as completely, though with somewhat different results, as if 
they think he is twitching. One could go further: uncertain of his mimicking abilities, 
the would-be satirist may practice at home before the mirror, in which case he is not 
twitching, winking, or parodying, but rehearsing; though so far as what a camera, a 
radical behaviourist, or a believer in protocol sentences would record he is just 
rapidly contracting his eyelids like all the others. (Geertz, 1975: 6ff) 
 
Here, Geertz makes a crucial analytical point. Without concepts such as ‘winking’, 
given meaning by a theory of communication, the most precise study of ‘eyelid-
contracting by human beings’ would be quite meaningless. Accordingly, Geertz 
favours an ‘adverbial’ approach, as it provides ‘thicker’ descriptions, in the sense that 
it does not just tell us what was done but how it was done. By paying attention to the 
                                              
22 In this example Geertz expands on the work of Ryle (1971). 
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context in which the action has occurred, it is argued that more valid inferences from 
the analysis in question can be drawn. In this particular case, the crucial distinctions 
between ‘twitching’, ‘winking’, ‘parodying a wink’ and ‘rehearsing a wink’ provide 
descriptions of at least four qualitatively different ways of ‘contracting eyelids’. 
Thus, by paying attention to the context of the situation, interpretative distinctions are 
rendered possible.23 
 
This important insight can be easily transferred to issues regarding lifestyle 
differentiation and social stratification. Indeed, as discussed in the previous chapter, 
Bourdieu’s analytical distinction between modus operandi and opus operatum 
follows a similar logic. By distinguishing between different modes of practice as 
generated by different class habitus on the one hand, and the observable outcomes of 
these practices on the other, Bourdieu breaks with an unfortunate ‘substantialist’ 
tendency within the research field to conflate the two aspects of human conduct. In 
other words, a given practice might have different meanings in different social 
contexts. For instance, there is, according to Bourdieu’s (1984) line of reasoning, an 
important difference between appreciating a given cultural good – say, a performance 
of Bach’s Well-Tempered Clavier – with ‘ease and naturalness’, as opposed to 
appreciating it in an ‘educational’ and ‘instructive’ manner. 
 
However, the notion of habitus radically complicates matters, as it suggests that a 
considerable part of social life is conducted in a taken-for-granted, unreflective 
manner. Thus, it would be problematic to assume that a given social actor placed in a 
qualitative interview setting can function as what Holstein and Gubrium (1995) have 
referred to as a ‘vessel of answers’, i.e. a wellspring of opinions and emotions, 
providing ‘facts’ about underlying intentions, reasons for conduct and so forth. As the 
habitus first and foremost functions as a pre-reflexive ‘practical sense’, valid data on 
                                              
23 This is a point which is, I presume, quite uncontroversial among sociologists. However, as 
Hammersley (2008:57) has pointed out, Geertz is ‘notoriously elusive on some key points’ and it is 
not clear what background information that needs to be provided in order to comprehend what is 
‘going on’. However illuminating Geertz’ point may be, then, a sound foundation for how for 
instance qualitative interview data is to be interpreted is not provided. 
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how or why people perceive, appreciate and appropriate cultural goods are not 
directly accessible, either to the sociologist, or to the social actors themselves.  
 
Nevertheless, what is accessible is the ways in which social actors classify objects in 
the social world (e.g. cultural goods, and their own and other people’s consumption 
styles). In this regard, qualitative interviews can be a suitable method to map out 
different modes of classificatory practices. Unlike standardised questionnaires – 
which inevitably entail certain limitations due to pre-constructed response options – 
open-ended questions in a qualitative interview may render possible an inquiry into 
interviewees’ classifications of goods, people and so forth in their own terms. In this 
way, interviewees’ more or less explicit standards of evaluation can be assessed 
indirectly. Thus, major improvements vis-à-vis the unfortunate crudeness implied by 
some scholars’ one-sided attention to statistical distributions of tastes and preferences 
are rendered possible, as ‘thicker’ descriptions of such preferences are provided. The 
structures of the habitus can in other words be approached by proxy, in directing 
attention to the ways in which interviewees classify objects in either positive or 
negative terms. 
 
In this way, I argue that qualitative interview data can provide important sociological 
insights about the class-status nexus in at least three ways. First, by scrutinising the 
ways in which interviewees classify, evaluate and judge various cultural goods, 
qualitative interview data can provide insights about social actors’ modes of 
appropriation of such goods. Second, scrutinising the ways in which interviewees 
classify, evaluate and judge other people’s cultural tastes and ways of life can provide 
valuable information on processes pertaining to group inclusion and exclusion, i.e. 
non-formalised social closure. Finally, the ways in which interviewees classify both 
cultural goods and other people’s ways of life can potentially reveal hierarchical 
relations of domination and subordination, through the scrutiny of speech acts 
expressing feelings of superiority, aversion, ressentiment, deference, awe and so 
forth.  
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3.3.2 The limitations of qualitative interview data  
All empirical inquiries that aim to draw, or aim to provide a basis for drawing, 
conclusions about some general type of phenomenon or about members of a wider 
population are faced with certain challenges as regards generalisability, both 
internally (i.e. within cases) and externally (i.e. between cases) (Gomm et al, 2000). 
While the qualitative interview is a well-suited method with which to scrutinise social 
actors’ modes of classificatory practice, it does, however, entail certain limitations 
that render both types of generalisation particularly challenging. As regards 
generalisation within cases (for instance, drawing inferences from an individual’s 
actions in one observed setting to the same individual’s actions in another unobserved 
setting), the qualitative interview method is particularly prone to errors as 
interviewees’ speech acts may be susceptible to the influence of the situational 
context, in the sense that the setting in which the data are generated affects the data 
itself. Potential influences include the (positive or negative) perceptions of both 
interviewer and interviewee, for instance the former may cause the latter’s speech 
acts to be affected by what he or she perceives to be the former’s values and 
definition of the ‘right answer’ (Lamont, 1992: 19). There is the danger of 
interviewees, consciously or otherwise, modifying their speech acts so as to resemble, 
or differ from, the perceived characteristics of the interviewer. This might threaten 
both the reliability and the validity of the data.  
 
However, the crucial question is to what extent the construction of data is affected by 
such processes; or, to put it somewhat differently, how ‘malleable’ social actors may 
be in the interview situation. While this question is in a sense unanswerable, 
assumptions about such matters are nevertheless decisive for the ways in which 
scholars approach interview data. This question ultimately boils down to the 
ontological and epistemological view of the ‘subject’. For instance, radical 
constructionist critics (e.g. Holstein and Gubrium, 1995) have abandoned the idea of 
generating data about interviewees as more or less coherent social subjects, and 
through various forms of ‘discourse analysis’ or ‘conversation analysis’ they have 
turned their attention to how data about speech acts are produced in the first place. 
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Translated into the current problematic, the search for an interviewee’s ‘true’ 
classifications of goods or other people would, according to this view, be rather futile, 
as it would imply the erroneous assumption that there is a ‘true’ set of opinions 
located in the subject. Instead, a context-sensitive analytical focus on how speech acts 
come into play in the interview situation is favoured. 
 
However, as Hammersley (2008: ch. 5) has pointed out, there is an unfortunate 
tendency for radical constructionists to abandon ship too early, as it were. In other 
words, despite critics’ declarations of ‘the death of the subject’, there might in fact be 
something valuable to learn about social subjects by way of qualitative interviews. 
According to Bourdieu’s (1990b: 53) assertions about the habitus, it is both 
transposable and durable, meaning that a given social actor will always betray an 
idiosyncratic ‘signature’ on his or her actions across various social settings, for 
instance on his or her speech acts in the interview situation. Habitus has the capacity 
to generalise, through analogical transfers, its fundamental ‘generative schemes’ to 
different areas of social life. Bourdieu’s (1996b: 273) preferred example in this 
regard is that of handwriting, which is depicted as embodying a ‘stylistic affinity’ for 
each social actor regardless of the materials used (a blackboard or a sheet of paper, a 
pencil or a pen, etc.). Moreover, the structures of the habitus are viewed as ‘embodied 
history’, meaning that each social subject has its own history, its own unique 
experiences, that make up a relatively fixed structure or a repertoire of possible 
‘constructions’ of speech acts. 
 
It should, however, be noted that the assumption that speech acts are reflective of the 
structures of individual habitus does not necessarily entail an essentialist search for a 
subject’s ‘one true opinion’, but rather an attempt to interpret speech acts as being a 
part of a (limited) repertoire of meanings, preferences and classifications located in 
each subject. Contrary to the view that all social actors draw from a ‘common pool’ 
of linguistic resources on equal terms, the notion of habitus implies that the access to 
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this common pool is socially stratified.24 This does not imply that the subject is not 
susceptible to the influence of the local or situational context, but it does point to a 
questionable assumption implied by the view that such situational factors by and 
large govern the form and content of speech acts, as some radical constructionists 
would have it. By contrast, the assumption that the classificatory repertoires of social 
subjects are more or less limited renders possible the view that what the interviewees 
say in the course of a qualitative interview – and perhaps more importantly, how they 
say it – can be interpreted as reflecting at least parts of the structures of their habitus. 
Although this remains an assumption, as the empirical question of whether, and if so 
in which ways, classificatory repertoires are limited can hardly be assessed by any 
sound research design, it is arguably more viable than assuming that interviewees are 
malleable and entirely susceptible to the influence of the local or situational context.  
 
As regards generalisation between cases, for instance drawing inferences from a set 
of observed individuals to a larger set of unobserved individuals, there are according 
to Gomm et al (2000) two effective strategies for drawing conclusions – ‘theoretical 
inference’ and ‘empirical generalisation’. Theoretical inference is typically applied by 
experimental researchers in order to reach conclusions about what always happens, or 
what happens with a given degree of probability, in a certain type of theoretically 
defined situation. Empirical generalisation, by contrast, is typically applied by survey 
researchers in order to draw inferences about a larger but finite population of cases 
from the study of a sample drawn from that population. A hotly debated question 
within the social sciences is whether, and if so in which ways, some form of 
generalisation is possible for analyses based on qualitative data. Some scholars argue 
that such generalisation is of a different kind than that of statistical analysis, and that 
                                              
24 Against what he depicts as an ‘illusion of linguistic communism’, Bourdieu (1991b: 37) asserts 
that ‘[e]very speech act and more generally, every action, is a conjuncture, an encounter between 
independent causal series. On the one hand, there are the socially constructed dispositions of the 
linguistic habitus, which imply a certain propensity to speak and to say determinate things (the 
expressive interest) and a certain capacity to speak, which involves both the linguistic capacity to 
generate an infinite number of grammatically correct discourses, and a social capacity to use this 
competence adequately in a determinate situation. On the other hand, there are the structures of the 
linguistic market, which impose themselves as a system of specific sanctions and censorships.’ 
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what is involved is something that is ‘logical’, ‘theoretical’ or ‘analytical’ in 
character (e.g. Yin, 1994; Mitchell, 2000). Others suggest that qualitatively oriented 
studies need not make any claims about the generalisability of their findings. What is 
crucial, it is argued, is what others make of them; they facilitate the ‘transfer’ of 
findings from one setting to another on the basis of ‘fit’ (e.g. Lincoln and Guba, 
2000). Yet others argue that there are ways to draw inferences on the basis of 
qualitative data that are in effect the same as those which survey researchers produce. 
Although empirical generalisations are usually couched in a probabilistic logic (i.e. 
that conclusions about a population are drawn on the basis of the numerical 
probability that the differentially distributed features of the sample cases also can be 
found in the population), this is not necessarily the only means through which such 
conclusions can be drawn. Indeed, as argued by Gomm et al, 
 
[d]enial of the capacity of case study research to support empirical generalization 
often seems to rest on the mistaken assumption that this form of generalisation 
requires statistical sampling. This restricts the idea of representation to its statistical 
version; it confuses the task of empirical generalisation with the use of statistical 
techniques to achieve that goal. While those techniques are a very effective basis for 
generalization, they are not essential. After all, […] we all engage in naturalistic 
generalization routinely in the course of our lives, and this may take the form of 
empirical generalization as well as of theoretical inference. Given this, there is no 
reason in principle why case study research should not provide the basis for empirical 
generalization. (Gomm et al, 2000: 104) 
 
However, the use of qualitative methods such as the qualitative research interview 
entails certain limitations in that such methods are unable to provide a numerical 
probability that the features found in the studied cases also applies to unstudied cases. 
With a statistically representative sample, by contrast, such probable accuracy can be 
calculated. Nevertheless, as Gomm et al (2000: 105) point out, it is possible for 
qualitative researchers to try to take account of probable relevant heterogeneity 
within the population with which they are concerned in at least two complementary 
ways: first, by using theoretical ideas and information about the cases and the 
populations in their analyses; and second, by selecting cases for study on the basis of 
such ideas and information. So while case studies cannot provide sound information 
about the distribution of features across the population, it can, nevertheless, show 
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features that seem likely to be modal, given that they are observed within all or most 
of the sample cases irrespective of their other differences. It is to the theoretical-
methodological rationale of my analytical strategies we now turn. 
 
3.4 Analytical strategies 
Drawing on Bourdieu’s (1984) notion of a field of cultural consumption which 
constitute a totality of more or less antagonistic ‘stylistic possibles’ from which each 
singular consumption choice – or, more generally, each classifiable act – derives its 
social meaning, I shall analyse speech acts and classifications uttered by interviewees 
as stances or ‘position-takings’ within this field. That is, I shall view interviewees’ 
classificatory practices as being implicated in a more or less ‘misrecognised’ game in 
which the definitions of what constitute socially esteemed lifestyles are one of the 
fundamental stakes.25 As discussed in the previous section, this study is based on the 
assumption that interviewees’ speech acts are drawn from a limited repertoire of 
classificatory practices located within each subject, i.e. in their individual dispositions 
or habitus. Moreover, it is informed by the notion of class habitus and the working 
hypothesis that there are structural affinities between the system of relations between 
social actors’ modes of classificatory practice on the one hand, and the system of 
relations between social actors’ endowment of different species of capital on the 
other. In other words, this study hinges upon the general epistemological idea that it 
is possible to empirically assess whether, and if so in which ways, there exist 
homologies between the structures of the space of class habitus and the structures of 
the social space. In what follows I shall clarify the ways in which I endeavour to 
assess this empirical question by discussing the theoretically informed sample 
strategies as well as the procedures through which data on classificatory practices is 
obtained. 
                                              
25 It is important to highlight that the notion of position-taking does not necessarily imply a conscious 
acknowledgement of participating in a pursuit for social distinction, esteem and prestige. On the 
contrary, as discussed in the previous chapter, Bourdieu’s notion of misrecognition implies that a 
differential distribution of lifestyle choices can have stratifying effects without the existence of social 
actors intentionally pursuing a ‘cynical’ calculation or a ‘mercenary’ use of cultural goods.  
  97
3.4.1 Sampling and recruitment strategies 
As the work of Rosenlund shows, the class structure of Stavanger can be represented 
as a two-dimensional social space constructed by means of Multiple Correspondence 
Analysis (MCA). The rationale underlying the sampling of interviewees directly 
draws on Rosenlund’s constructions, in that the interviewees are recruited so as to 
ensure a distributional dispersion along both the capital volume dimension and the 
capital composition dimension of the local social space. Before I move on to 
elaborate on the specifics of this sampling strategy, a few notes on the deployment of 
MCA are necessary. 
 
MCA is a statistical technique which provides a geometric model of categorical data, 
and is used to detect and visually represent underlying structures in a data set 
(Hjellbrekke, 1999a; Le Roux and Rouanet, 2010). It proceeds by calculating chi-
squared distances between individuals (rows) and categories (columns) in a data 
matrix. The geometrical distances between rows and columns are maximized in order 
to uncover the underlying dimensions best able to describe the central oppositions or 
distributional differences in the data. The statistical correspondences between the 
rows and columns are thus represented graphically as a low-dimensional Euclidean 
space, meaning that the axes constituting the space represent the central oppositions 
in the data. Each axis represents a portion of the total variance in the cloud. The 
graphical ‘maps’, i.e. the factorial planes, thus facilitate and ease the interpretation of 
the underlying structures of the data.  
 
When interpreting the results from an MCA one focuses on two clouds. The cloud of 
categories facilitates a visual assessment of the coordinates of the mean modality 
points of all the categories, i.e. the mean position of all individuals characterised by a 
given category within the low-dimensional space. An inspection of the categories’ 
contributions to the axes, as well as the distances between the mean modality points 
of the categories, are of great importance to the interpretation of substantial 
 98
sociological ‘meaning’ of the oppositions within the space. In Rosenlund’s 
construction of the local social space,26 the cloud of modalities can reasonably be 
interpreted as indicating a differential distribution of cultural and economic capital 
following a dual distributional logic accounted for above. As we can see in Figure 1, 
the first axis depicts an opposition between high and low volumes of capital of either 
form. The second axis depicts the chiastic or inverted distributional relations between 
individuals endowed with preponderance of cultural and economic capital 
respectively.27  
 
 
Figure 1: The cloud of categories, fac.plane 1-2 
 
                                              
26 Rosenlund’s construction of the local social space is based on data generated through the 
Stavanger2008 survey, administered by University of Stavanger and International Research Institute 
of Stavanger (IRIS) (see Berg and Rommetvedt, 2009: 16ff). For a detailed account of Rosenlund’s 
social space approach, see Rosenlund (2009: 87ff). 
27 See Appendix 2 for a full list of the categories’ contributions to the axes and Appendix 3 for a full 
list of the coordinates of the active categories. In order to ease the readability, the axes have been 
inverted in factor plane 1-2. This does not affect the interpretation of the substantial results. 
Capital volume + 
Econ.cap.+ 
Cult.cap. - 
Cult.cap. + 
Econ.cap.- 
Capital volume - 
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The second cloud – the cloud of individuals – facilitates a visual assessment of the 
system of relations between all the individuals subjected to the analysis. Each 
individual has a singular set of coordinates according to the axes in the low-
dimensional space, meaning that their position is determined by their characteristics 
as regards all the categories included in the analysis. In other words, each respondent 
subjected to Rosenlund’s survey can be located within the social space. As the first 
two axes can reasonably be interpreted as capital volume and capital composition 
dimensions respectively, an individual’s position within the cloud of individuals can 
thus be interpreted as its ‘situatedness’ within the two-dimensional capital 
distribution, relative to the other individuals’ capital portfolios (see Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2: The cloud of individuals, fac.plane 1-2 
 
The logic underlying the interpretation of the cloud of individuals is that the closer 
the individuals are to one another, the more they have in common in terms of 
possession of capitals; and the more remote they are from one another, the less they 
have in common. In other words, individuals located in the upper left quadrant are 
endowed with high volumes of capital, with a preponderance of cultural capital; 
Capital volume + 
Econ.cap.+ 
Cult.cap.- 
Cult.cap. + 
Econ.cap. -
Capital volume - 
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individuals located in the upper right quadrant are endowed with high volumes of 
capital, with a preponderance of economic capital; individuals located in the lower 
left quadrant are endowed with low volumes of capital, with a preponderance of 
cultural capital; and individuals located in the lower right quadrant are endowed with 
low volumes of capital, with a preponderance of economic capital. It might also be 
noted that the cloud of individuals is shaped like a tulip, meaning that the capital 
composition principle of social differentiation is more prominent in the upper 
quadrants than in the lower quadrants. 
 
Having outlined the basic tenets of MCA and Rosenlund’s construction of a local 
social space, we now move on to the sampling strategies and the procedures through 
which the interviewees’ location within the social space is determined. The sampling 
strategy is inspired by the Danish COMPAS project (e.g. Prieur et al, 2008; Skjøtt-
Larsen, 2008, 2012; Harrits et al, 2010; Faber et al, 2012), in which a mixture of 
MCA and qualitative interviews was employed in order to analyse interviewees’ 
classificatory practices in the light of their positions in the social space. More 
specifically, the COMPAS project employed an innovative two-step sampling 
strategy in the following fashion. First, a random sample of individuals drawn from 
the population was subjected to a survey questionnaire. Subsequently, a smaller sub-
sample drawn from the original sample was subjected to qualitative interviews. As 
the individuals subjected to qualitative interviews had also participated in the survey, 
these individuals’ positions in the cloud of individuals – constructed on the basis of 
survey data by way of MCA – could be located. In this way, the speech acts uttered in 
the qualitative interviews could be analysed in the light of their positions in the social 
space.28 
 
                                              
28 A similar strategy was employed in the British CCSE project (e.g. Le Roux et al, 2008; Bennett et 
al, 2009; Silva et al, 2009). However, as opposed to the COMPAS project, in which a ‘reciprocal 
approach’ (i.e. the construction of both a social space and a space of lifestyles and the mapping out of 
the correspondences between them) was deployed, the Britons did only construct a space of 
lifestyles, and interviewees’ position in the social space could thus not be located.  
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In the present study it was not, however, possible to recruit a subsample from 
Rosenlund’s original sample of survey respondents due to anonymity issues. A 
‘second best’ strategy was thus employed as follows. First, informed by Rosenlund’s 
construction of the local social space the mean modality points of a range of 
occupational categories were located within the cloud of categories. Second, based on 
an ‘educated guess’ informed by Rosenlund’s findings as well the Oslo Register Data 
Class Scheme (ORDC) (Hansen et al, 2009), 29 a number of occupations were chosen 
to tentatively represent the four quadrants of the social space. Third, forty-six 
interviewees were strategically recruited on the basis of information on their 
occupation in order to ensure a dispersion of interviewees across the four quadrants. 
Fourth, at the end of the interview sessions the interviewees were subjected to parts 
of the original survey questionnaire to attain information on their scores on the active 
categories used in Rosenlund’s construction of the social space (i.e. indices of capital 
endowment, such as household income, value of house, value of second home, value 
of car, education level, education type, occupation, occupational sector, father’s 
education, father’s occupation, number of books at home, frequency of theatre visits 
last year, etc.). Fifth, information on the interviewees was coded and then added to 
the original survey data set. Finally, by way of MCA the local social space was 
reconstructed with the forty-six interviewees projected onto the space as 
supplementary cases, meaning that their position within it could be located without it 
affecting the construction of the space. Thus, the interviewees’ positions in the local 
social space could be located without them being part of the original sample of survey 
respondents.30 As shown in Figure 3, the interviewees are dispersed across all four 
quadrants of the social space, i.e. both along the capital volume dimension and the 
                                              
29 The ORDC is a class scheme inspired by Bourdieu’s (1984) notion of the social space, and 
distinguishes class and class fractions according individual’s occupations and their presumed capital 
portfolios. 
30 The construction of the social space and the projecting of the interviewees onto the space were 
conducted by Rosenlund using SPAD 7 software. 
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capital composition dimension of the space.31 In other words, the initial goal of 
achieving a distributional dispersion of interviewees along both axes of the social 
space through an ‘educated guess’ was successful.   
 
While the structures of social space constitute the basic rationale for the sampling 
strategy, additional ‘secondary characteristics’ also guided the recruitment of 
interviewees. First of all, it was a requirement that the interviews resided and/or 
worked within the borders of the municipality of Stavanger. Second, based on 
information on the characteristics of the population, I endeavoured to achieve an 
approximately even distribution of males and females. The final sample includes 25 
males and 21 females. Third, I endeavoured to ensure a distributional dispersion 
according to the age of the interviewees. In accordance with Rosenlund’s rationale 
for the survey sample, I recruited interviewees aged 25-67. The average age of the 
interviewees is 39.8. Finally, I excluded ethnic non-Norwegians from the sample. 
This is of course not to say that ethnicity is viewed as unimportant as regards the 
assessment of lifestyle differentials. However, as this analysis focuses on the 
relationship between status and class – and not ethnicity – I only included ethnic 
Norwegians in the sample.  
                                              
31 The graph does, however, reveal that the sample is somewhat skewed towards the ‘cultural pole’ of 
the second axis, meaning that there could ideally have been proportionally more interviewees 
endowed with a preponderance of economic capital.      
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Figure 3: Projection of interviewees onto the cloud of individuals, fac.plane 1-2 
 
To summarise, the sample strategy involves an endeavour to take into account 
relevant heterogeneity within the population of Stavanger by using theoretical ideas 
and information attained from previous studies about its class structure. Insofar as it 
is correct that qualitatively different lifestyles are unevenly distributed according to 
the structures of the local social space, the selection of cases from all the quadrants of 
the social space implies a sound basis for the scrutiny of social actor’s mode of 
classificatory practice and its potential pertinence to processes of social stratification. 
While a sample of forty-six cases cannot by any means represent the totality of such 
Capital volume + 
Cult.cap. + 
Econ. cap - 
Econ. cap + 
Cult.cap. - 
Capital volume - 
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modes of classificatory practices, it is nevertheless likely that it can tap into at least 
some important differences in this regard. My main objective is not to provide an 
accurate picture of the classificatory practices of Stavanger’s population; rather, my 
goal is to examine how classificatory practices are expressed by people located in 
different positions in the social space. To the extent that the sample include people 
endowed with different capital portfolios – both in volume and composition of 
capitals – it is suitable to my objectives.    
 
3.4.2 Procedures 
On the basis of the sampling strategy outlined above potential interviewees were 
chosen on the basis of information attained through Internet search engines and 
online phone directories. I also used the so-called snowball sampling technique, 
meaning that already recruited interviewees helped to recruit future interviewees from 
among their acquaintances. However, in order to avoid tapping into certain 
subcultures or social cliques, I used this technique with care. Availability and 
eligibility were determined on the basis of additional information obtained through 
telephone calls and e-mail correspondences. The response rate was high, except for 
potential interviewees presumably endowed with high amounts of economic capital. 
It was notoriously difficult to attain personal contact with CEOs, economists, 
financiers and real estate agents; phone calls were screened by secretaries and e-mails 
were left unanswered. Presumably, these people lacked interest and/or were too busy 
to spare the time for a sociologist and his questions. Eventually I attained contact 
with a key figure in Stavanger’s financial milieu who personally distributed my letter 
of request. With the aid of this figure several interviewees endowed with high 
amounts of economic capital were recruited (see Appendix 4 for a full list of 
interviewees). 
 
I conducted all the interviews myself between September 2009 and May 2010. The 
interview sessions lasted on average approximately 1.5 hours (the shortest 40 minutes 
and the longest 2.5 hours) and were recorded using a portable digital MP3 recorder. 
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The interviews were conducted at a time and place chosen by the interviewees. Most 
of them were conducted at their homes or at their workplace.32 The data was collected 
using the semi-structured interview method (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2008), meaning 
that I deployed an interview schedule which contained a number of basic questions to 
which all the interviewees were subjected (see Appendix 5). Yet, the schedule was 
constructed so as to invite the interviewees to classificatory practice in their own 
terms. Thus, the chronology of the questions and the ways in which they were 
phrased varied somewhat from interview to interview. 
 
Informed by the theoretical-methodological debates discussed in the previous chapter 
the interview schedule was constructed so as to tap information according to three 
main thematics. First, based on the assumption that the ways in which people classify 
objects in the social world are indicative of the structures of their habitus, I invited 
the interviewees to classify a variety of goods (both cultural and material) in order to 
tap their modes of consumption of such goods. More specifically, I probed on the 
interviewees’ expressed likes and dislikes of specific goods in order to attain 
extended information on their evaluative criteria. In this regard I usually probed on 
their evaluation of goods already mentioned by the interviewees themselves, but I 
also brought up names and types of goods myself, especially if the interviewees were 
less talkative.    
 
Second, based on the assumption that the ways in which people draw symbolic 
boundaries between themselves and others are indicative of elective affinities and 
processes of non-formalised closure, I invited the interviewees to classify other 
people in terms of their cultural tastes and lifestyles; or more generally, their ways of 
life. In this regard I used a combination of general, abstract questions (e.g. ‘What 
types of people do you like/dislike?’) and more specific, concrete questions tied to 
specific geographical areas, milieus, and enterprises in Stavanger (e.g. ‘You 
                                              
32 I always ensured that the interview setting was ‘private’, in the sense that co-workers, family 
members or others could not listen in to what was being said. 
 106
mentioned that you do avoid going to the theatre because of the people going there; 
can you describe why you dislike these people?’). This dual mode of phrasing 
questions was informed by the possibility that moral sentiments (e.g. politeness, 
modesty and the valorisation of equality as sameness) might influence speech acts, 
particularly the ways in which interviewees classify other people in negative terms. 
As previous research has suggested, there prevails a ‘code of modesty’ among 
Norwegians (Gullestad, 1992; Daloz, 2007). Insofar as this is the case, one would 
thus expect that this code of modesty would manifest itself in restricting or modifying 
interviewees’ expressions of antipathies towards others, as this would indirectly entail 
an elevation of themselves. Thus, I endeavoured to tap boundary drawing and 
negative classifications of others by phrasing questions in different ways during the 
course of the interviews. In other words, informed by Gullestad’s notion that there 
exists an ‘egalitarian ideology’ in the Norwegian society that somewhat paradoxically 
conceals, and even helps to maintain, social hierarchies, I experimented with different 
types of questions in order to shed light on possible tensions between egalitarian 
values on the one hand, and processes of social closure on the other. 
 
Finally, based on the assumption that the ways in which interviewees classify both 
goods and other people’s ways of life can reveal subjective perceptions of 
hierarchical relations of domination and subordination, I invited the interviewees to 
recall and to describe incidents and situations in which they had experienced feelings 
of superiority, aversion, ressentiment, inferiority, deference, awe, and so forth related 
to their own and others’ cultural tastes and lifestyles. On several occasions such 
matters were brought up by the interviewees themselves, and I thus endeavoured to 
probe on their perceptions of such situations. Informed by previous research 
indicating that people are reluctant to explicitly express perceptions of hierarchy due 
to egalitarian sentiments, especially if they involve feelings of superiority (e.g. 
Gullestad, 1992; Lien et al, 2001; Skarpenes, 2007), I endeavoured to phrase such 
questions in a somewhat ‘discreet’ or indirect way, typically as follow-up questions 
based on something that was mentioned at an earlier stage in the interview (e.g. ‘You 
said that you cannot stand people with a bad taste in music and that you catch 
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yourself looking down on such people; can you elaborate on what you mean by 
that?). In this way, I endeavoured to approach the tension alluded to above from a 
somewhat different angle.  
 
Having completed the interview sessions, the recordings of the interviews were 
subsequently transcribed in full by me and two assistants using Express Scribe 
transcription software. All the interviews were conducted and transcribed in 
Norwegian. The interview quotes used in this thesis is translated into English by me, 
with assistance from a British language consultant. In the initial phases of the analysis 
I followed Bourdieu’s (1992: 230) advice in constructing square-tables of pertinent 
properties of the interviewees. More specifically, each time I discovered a property 
necessary to characterise an interviewee in terms of his or her speech acts, I created a 
new column and subsequently assessed the presence or absence of this property 
among the other interviewees. In this way, I gradually constructed categories of 
interviewees’ classificatory practices in an endeavour to group together types of 
classifications that were as similar as possible, and by the same token, as different as 
possible from the types of classifications placed in the other categories. At a later 
stage in the analysis, the interviewees were projected onto the local social space as 
described above. In this way, a more focused scrutiny of the correspondences 
between the interviewees’ classificatory practice and their positions in the social 
space was rendered possible.  
 
3.5 Conclusion 
Drawing on Bourdieu’s theoretical-methodological rationale for his model of social 
stratification, I have argued that it is possible to study social actors’ classificatory 
practices in a relational mode of analysis. By employing qualitative, in-depth 
interviews I shall in the following empirical analysis endeavour to map out possible 
homologies or structural affinities between the local social space and the space of 
class habitus in Stavanger. Notwithstanding certain challenges implied in the 
employment of qualitative interviews and the limited sampling of cases – in particular 
issues related to generalisability – I hold that that this analytical strategy can help 
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remedy some of the problems inherent in previous attempts at mapping out lifestyle 
differentiation on the basis of survey data. However, my point is not that the 
qualitative interview method can replace or surpass statistically oriented techniques. 
On the contrary, the current analysis aims to expand on previous quantitatively 
oriented research on lifestyle differentiation and social stratification. Yet, insofar as 
the empirical findings call for it, I aim to challenge previously held assumptions 
about such matters. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Since the works of Weber (1946), Simmel (1997a, 1997b) and Veblen (1967), 
sociologists have attempted to theorise and/or empirically map out the social 
distribution of differentiated cultural tastes and lifestyles. In contemporary scholarly 
debates, the work of Bourdieu (1984; see also Bourdieu and de Saint Martin, 1976; 
Bourdieu and Darbel, 1990; Bourdieu et al, 1996) often serves as a point of 
departure. Bourdieu holds that there are structural affinities, or ‘homologies’, 
between the structures of ‘the symbolic space’ and ‘the social space’, meaning that 
qualitatively different tastes and lifestyles are unevenly distributed among different 
social classes and class fractions. However, this homology thesis has been challenged 
on both theoretical-methodological and empirical grounds. Scholars have recently 
been preoccupied with measuring the degree of ‘omnivorousness’, i.e. the extent to 
which cultural consumers’ tastes are becoming ‘broader’, and/or the extent to which 
these broad tastes straddle divides between ‘highbrow’, ‘middlebrow’ and ‘lowbrow’ 
cultural forms (for overviews, see Peterson, 2005; Warde et al, 2007; Ollivier, 2008). 
Although the champions of the omnivore thesis do differ in their views of the 
consequences of the supposed ‘rise of the cultural omnivore’, consensus seems to 
exist that we are witnessing a process through which traditional cultural hierarchies 
are becoming increasingly blurred, implying that a classed distribution of distinct 
tastes and lifestyles has changed and may even be declining. The existence of more 
hybrid cultural tastes is thus thought to mark an erosion of, or at least a marked 
reconfiguration of, Bourdieu’s (1984) model of taste distribution. 
 
In this chapter I shall critically engage in this debate. The aim is twofold: on the one 
hand I shall empirically map out taste differentials in Stavanger based on interview 
data; on the other, I shall base the discussion upon the theoretical-methodological 
controversy associated with the notion of the cultural omnivore. This stream of 
research and its attempts to account for the social distribution of tastes lean on several 
questionable premises. The most serious objection to the usefulness of the notion of 
omnivorousness is the methodological point that cultural tastes and their symbolic 
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meanings cannot simply be ‘read’ from the volume or composition of the cultural 
goods and leisure activities social agents (dis)like or (do not) participate in. Although 
attempts to map out distributional patterns of the cultural goods consumed may yield 
valuable insights, such patterns hardly tell the whole story of cultural tastes, lifestyles 
and the social distribution thereof. Indeed, several scholars have suggested that the 
same cultural goods may be perceived, appreciated and appropriated in qualitatively 
different ways, implying that there ought to be an analytical de-coupling of the 
‘whats’ and ‘hows’ of cultural consumption (see for instance Fiske, 1989; Holt, 1997; 
Jarness, 2007; Ollivier, 2008; Prieur and Rosenlund, 2010). In other words, there are 
reasons to view the distribution of what Bourdieu (1984, 1990b) has termed ‘modes 
of consumption’ as an analytically separate – though possibly empirically interrelated 
– dimension that may or may not be related to the distribution of the consumption of 
cultural goods. While there may be a connection between what social actors consume 
and how they consume their cultural products of choice, this is by no means a 
necessary connection. Thus, the one should not to be confused with the other. The 
nature of this relationship is, ultimately, an empirical question. 
 
This chapter addresses whether, and if so how, the distribution of taste corresponds to 
class relations in present day Stavanger. Based on the assumption that the ways in 
which the interviewees classify various goods are indicative of how they perceive, 
appreciate and appropriate these goods, I shall first of all map out the main 
differences in this regard. The bulk of the chapter contains thorough empirical 
descriptions of four modes of consumption constructed on the basis of the interview 
data. In the second part I focus on the social distribution of these qualitatively 
different taste orientations by mapping out the interviewees’ localisation in the local 
social space. I advance my argument to a more abstract level and return to the 
Bourdieusian theoretical model of social stratification. Close attention will be paid to 
the notion of homology and I shall accordingly discuss my findings in the light of 
previous attempts to chart the social distribution of cultural tastes, addressing in 
particular the omnivore debate. 
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4.2 Consumption as an end in itself 
There is a fundamental difference traceable in the interview data between those who 
appropriate a given good as a means to an end, and those who appropriate a given 
good as an end in itself. There are interviewees who appropriate their goods of choice 
instrumentally, meaning that the sole purpose of consuming them is to achieve 
something else (e.g. relaxation, self-improvement and practical know-how). By 
contrast, there are also interviewees whose consumption of goods satisfies no purpose 
other than the sheer enjoyment of consuming such goods: the goods are appreciated 
for their own sake. This opposition is apparent in consumers of cultural goods (e.g. 
books, plays and pieces of music) and material goods (e.g. motor vehicles, sports 
equipment and clothing). However, non-instrumental consumption of cultural goods 
seldom coincides with non-instrumental consumption of material goods: interviewees 
with non-instrumental tastes for cultural goods usually display a marked instrumental 
orientation towards material goods, shunning ‘material excesses’ and 
‘extravagances’. Conversely, interviewees with non-instrumental tastes for material 
goods tend to have an instrumental orientation towards cultural goods, dis-identifying 
with all forms of ‘intellectual snobbery’. While most of the interviewees report 
consuming goods of both types, they tend to consume them differently and with 
different degrees of commitment. In the following I shall thus differentiate between 
what I call the intellectual mode of consumption and the luxurious mode of 
consumption. 
 
4.2.1 The intellectual mode of consumption 
This mode is primarily characterised by a non-instrumental orientation towards 
cultural goods, implying an aestheticising and sober celebration of ‘art for art’s sake’. 
Interviewees in this category are the most avid and voracious cultural consumers in 
the sample, both in terms of the reported volume of items liked (i.e. number of 
cultural domains, number of genres and sub-genres within each domain, as well as 
the number of artists and works), and in terms of time spent on cultural consumption 
(e.g. reading books, watching plays and visiting art galleries). However, this 
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voraciousness does not imply an ‘anything goes’ approach to cultural consumption. 
On the contrary, these interviewees report far more elaborate and specific evaluative 
criteria compared to the others. While they may express a certain degree of openness 
to some goods, others are rejected. Having been exposed to a wide range of cultural 
expressions throughout their lives – and thus presumably endowed with a high degree 
of familiarity and knowledgeability – they tend to make high demands as to what 
kinds of cultural goods are worthy of their appreciation. Bored with all that is 
‘clichéd’, ‘generic’ and ‘stale’, they crave something ‘new’, ‘experimental’ and 
‘challenging’: 
 
Vegard: You said earlier on that you have this need to be challenged. What do you 
mean by that? 
Interviewee: Yeah, or to feel that… For instance, when I read fiction, I really enjoy 
the feeling… You know, ‘Wow, this author really impresses me! How did this person 
come up with all that and compose it the way she did?’ […] Way too often I get the 
feeling that I’ve seen it all before. You can walk around, visiting galleries and 
cafés… You know, checking out the local amateur artists. Sometimes it can be 
exciting, but most of the time you see stuff that’s been produced a thousand times 
before. So what I really enjoy is when something is original, when something really 
surprises me. It’s the same with music. I often catch myself thinking ‘heard it before, 
seen it before, read it before’.  
V: You also used the term magical. […] Can you describe what makes things 
magical? 
I: Well, no. And I guess that’s exactly the point. You know, that you cannot easily 
translate the impression you get into words. And that’s what makes things magical. If 
an artist, or an author, or a musician, manages to do just that. I don’t know. It brings 
about a certain kind of feeling. […] For that to happen, my experience is that a work 
of art has to be original, or at least something I haven’t seen before. [...] When it 
comes to visual art, I like it when artists mix media. Collages… You know, 
experimental stuff. […] If an artist manages to show me things I haven’t seen before, 
I get this delightful feeling. [Laughs] Maybe it’s as simple as that.    
 (Julia, artist, late 20s) 
 
I saw Ibsen’s The Wild Duck33 at Carte Blanche,34 the experimental version that 
lasted for approximately twelve hours. It was amazing! It was sort of an eye-opener. 
It was like, ‘maybe there is something to Norwegian drama after all?’ […] The 
artificial language, the bad realism, the stiffness… That’s what has bothered me 
                                              
33 An 1884 play by the Norwegian playwright Henrik Ibsen. 
34 The national contemporary dance theatre in Bergen. 
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before. It just doesn’t interest me. We’ve got movies for that sort of thing. We do not 
need that on a stage. [Laughs] But plays like that, it was unbelievable. […] It was 
totally surprising. In the sense that you didn’t know what would happen next. It was 
mostly improvised. The whole set… It was surreal. And music was an essential part 
of it. It was a concert-meets-theatre sort of thing, as opposed to the usual recitation of 
lines. They went beyond that, and that’s what made it so interesting. […] I like to be 
taken by surprise. I like stuff that has a certain degree of distinctiveness. And that 
goes for all forms of art, all genres.  
(Oliver, musician, mid 30s) 
 
In demanding that cultural goods ought to ‘surprise’ them in an ‘original’ way, these 
interviewees crave ‘intellectually challenging experiences’. Their preferences for 
cultural goods do not, however, follow a strict ‘high versus low’ scheme, i.e. they do 
not exclusively crave goods usually considered ‘highbrow’ while shunning the 
‘lowbrow’. On the contrary, these interviewees report highly eclectic tastes in terms 
of cultural goods and, perhaps more importantly, they reflexively problematise, 
historicise and deconstruct what they conceive of as ‘outmoded’ and ‘old-fashioned’ 
ways of classifying and appropriating goods: 
 
My impression is that my generation has managed to combine the high and the low, 
and that the divide between elite culture and popular culture has been blurred out for 
most of us. We move rather elegantly between different taste cultures, without 
difficulty, without being condemned. On the contrary, you are considered weird if 
you are too strict, you know, if you cannot allow yourself to watch a reality show on 
telly. 
 (Thomas, journalist, early 40s) 
 
I guess it’s still there, the old-fashioned… You know, the high culture-popular 
culture divide. […] Yet at the same time I feel that those boundaries are fading. They 
were much more prominent before. I guess they express themselves differently now. 
[…] There is something about the time we’re living in. You know, things change. It’s 
easier today, you know, to surpass those boundaries. You can be a passionate football 
fan one day and go to an art exhibition the next. […] But then again, there are 
undoubtedly huge differences between people growing up in different types of 
homes… The refined homes, as they call them, with huge bookshelves, and music 
and culturally interested parents… Those people are raised to become interested in 
culture. They don’t just get the usual package at school. So I guess we’ve still got a 
system which opens more doors for some. It’s still there.   
 (Olivia, head of cultural enterprise, late 40s) 
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While they do consider certain cultural goods as ‘vulgar’, ‘poor’ and ‘shallow’, and 
other goods as ‘refined’, ‘challenging’ and ‘clever’, such classificatory distinctions do 
not necessarily follow the a priori division of cultural goods usually deployed by 
cultural sociologists (e.g. in the case of music, sociologists often consider a liking for 
‘classical music’ to betoken ‘highbrow’ taste, and a liking for ‘country and western’ 
to betoken ‘lowbrow’ taste). Yet these interviewees are fully aware that such 
classifications and their appurtenant social connotations are widespread, both among 
intellectuals and lay people, and it is their reflexive and somewhat playful way of 
transgressing these distinctions that is the most distinguishing feature of these 
interviewees’ mode of appropriating cultural goods. However, far from implying a 
‘meltdown’ in cultural distinctions as some proponents of the omnivore thesis would 
have it, the propensity to straddle ‘old’ hierarchical divides is instead a rather 
advanced mode of appropriating goods that requires a fair stock of knowledge, as 
well as what Bourdieu (1990b: 66) refers to as ‘a feel for the game’. 
 
This strategy of aesthetical transgression seems to take two forms: these interviewees 
like different goods than the ‘common’ cultural consumer; and they like ‘common’ 
cultural goods differently. As regards the former strategy, there is a marked tendency 
for these interviewees to reject cultural goods already canonised as ‘high culture’. 
Nowhere is this more evident than when the interviewees express their opinions on 
Stavanger2008 and the cultural events arranged by the local European Capital of 
Culture organisation: 
 
V: Stavanger2008… Did you go to any events? 
I: No, I didn’t care for that stuff at all. […] It was… I don’t know… A sort of 
package thing, hyped up for all the wrong reasons.  
 (Julia, artist, late 20s) 
 
There was nothing there that caught my interest. It was all about… Things were 
supposed to look good on paper. You know, a quote-unquote magnificent play out on 
a beach somewhere in the middle of nowhere. Weak stuff like that. It was just 
artificial forms of culture. […] It was constructed so as to look good in an application 
or something.  
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 (Oliver, musician, mid 30s) 
 
It was all a big hype, a big memorial stone erected by initiators who wanted a big 
project to show the world the kinds of enterprising people they are, and that they 
were able to think big. It was all a hoax. You know, what did it really mean? Is 
Stavanger a European capital of culture? Well, I can tell you: it’s not. It’s just a tiny, 
shitty town on the edge of the North Sea that merely has a cultural life to speak of, at 
least compared to other European cities. But, according to these people, if we can 
label it as such… You know, brand it, call it something nice, and wrap it in foil… 
We’ll get three-hundred million in funding from the state to buy us some shopping 
mall-like culture, something really nice from foreign countries. […] It all boiled 
down to the vanity of the political establishment. […] I call it bureaucratic art.  
 (Oscar, academic, late 30s) 
 
These interviewees, who knowledgeably and critically select their cultural goods, and 
weed out events that do not rouse their intellectual interest, seem rather perplexed by 
goods they consider to be ‘clichéd’, ‘stale’ or just plain ‘boring’ being ‘hyped up by 
the establishment’. Accordingly, many ‘canonised’, ‘institutionalised’ and 
‘established’ cultural forms are disliked, either because the goods are perceived as not 
meeting certain aesthetical standards, or because the interviewees have been 
overexposed to such goods which then cease to stimulate them intellectually. Such 
goods are not necessarily classified as ‘bad’, but they are no longer ‘exciting’. They 
are ‘too obvious markers of good taste’ and they are no longer ‘challenging’ or worth 
seeking out: 
 
V: You mentioned that you often find artists boring… 
I: Frans Widerberg,35 for instance… I don’t bother seeing his work. It’s not that I find 
his art bad, but I’ve seen too much of it. I know exactly what his works are like. He 
makes bad art and he makes good art. But I wouldn’t go to an exhibition unless 
someone told me he had suddenly made something completely new and different.  
 (Sofia, academic, late 60s) 
 
 
 
                                              
35 Norwegian painter. 
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V: Is there anything you wouldn’t put on your walls at home? 
I: Visual art is a very difficult genre. […] What you put on your walls at home is a 
very social thing. It’s sort of like a social game, some kind of statement. And it can 
often speak too clearly. And I… Well, I don’t want to be too obvious in that regard. I 
want something that does not speak too loudly. Visual art tends to get outdated, vain 
or just simply wrong very quickly. For instance, when I was a teenager, I loved 
Edward Hopper.36 Yeah, this is a very good example. My mum gave me this huge, 
framed Nighthawks at the Diner, which is one of his most well-known pieces. I’ve 
still got it. But I cannot bring myself to put it on my wall. It’s almost a cliché. […] 
Yet I love that picture. But there are some barriers in my head which keep me from 
putting it on my wall. So it stays in the basement. And it’s a very strange mechanism. 
But what you put on your wall defines you in a way. And it’s not that I’m afraid of 
showing the world that I like that picture. It’s just that I want something that’s less 
definable, or less obvious. And my experience is that most of the things that have 
been canonised at some point become kitsch. […] It testifies to a lack of 
understanding in some way. […] It’s the same with Munch.37 […] It would be too 
banal, or kitschy in a sense. […] It’s very strange, and one could easily catch oneself 
being extremely vain about these things. But I still believe it’s true.  
 (Jonas, head of local cultural enterprise, mid 30s) 
 
An important aspect of this strategy of transgression seems to be to avoid ‘clichéd’ 
cultural goods, particularly if these are mistakenly or undeservedly considered to be 
‘high culture’ by people perceived as not properly endowed with a sense of 
aesthetics. This does not, however, mean that these interviewees altogether shun 
goods associated with ‘high’ or ‘legitimate’ culture. It means that they select their 
goods with great care, often in reflexive opposition to what they conceive of as ‘the 
staleness of the establishment’. The flipside of this strategy is seeking out rare goods 
not (yet) consecrated by the established art world. A fruitful strategy in this regard 
seems to be seeking out ‘quality goods’ in genres usually regarded as ‘vulgar’, such 
as Bollywood films,38 crime novels and country music, and appreciate them in an 
aestheticising manner: 
 
 
                                              
36 American painter. 
37 Norwegian painter. 
38 Bollywood is the informal term used for the Hindi-language film industry based in Mumbai, India. 
Bollywood films are not regularly distributed through cinemas in Norway, though there is an annual 
festival called Bollywood Festival Norway. 
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V: What kind of music do you listen to? 
I: Well, I like… At the moment I listen to a lot of singer-songwriters, you know, in 
the country vein. Music dating back to The Byrds39 and up to recent times. You 
know, Wilco40 and that kind of stuff. Country with a slight Americana touch. […] 
But no Nashville country. You know, the Garth Brooks41 type of thing. I like what is 
usually referred to as alternative country. 
 (Elias, high school teacher, early 30s) 
 
I’ve got this thing about Bollywood films and Indian music. It’s kind of peculiar, but 
it’s a little thing I’ve gradually got into. I’ve navigated that landscape and picked out 
the good stuff. And if you’re selective and weed out the bad stuff, it’s very exciting. I 
know quite a bit about India from my studies. And I find it exciting to have a special 
interest, something I know quite a bit about, something that very few other people 
have the slightest clue about. That’s a value in itself. There’s a lot of music in India. 
Much of it is bad, but a small proportion of it is really good. […] It’s not that music 
that has been produced in like fifteen copies is by definition good. But, you know, I 
like to dig up obscurities. […] That’s what I like and find interesting. When it comes 
to Bollywood… I like the aesthetic. I like the women, the men, the music, the 
dancing… I mean, it’s really stylish. And a lot of those films are extremely aesthetic 
and well-composed. I guess most people have a bad impression of it. And the ‘80s 
were bad. But in the ’90s and 2000s… Extremely aesthetic, well-composed, very 
good… […] It’s all about… You know, I know the language, I know the culture… 
So it’s nice to get an update on what’s going on over there. And of course, that 
peculiar feeling of knowing about something that most people don’t have the 
slightest clue about.   
 (Philip, high school teacher, late 30s) 
 
There is nothing worse than bad crime fiction. And there’s a lot of that stuff around. 
I’d say most of the crime fiction sold in Norway is shit. But that does not, of course, 
mean that I have something against the genre per se, because I really like good crime 
fiction. […] In general, I like to take popular genres seriously, you know, 
academically. So I’ve got this analytical interest in crime fiction. […] The main 
problem with the genre is that it has become a refuge for writers who haven’t 
mastered a proper literary language. But of course, that’s not true of all of them. But I 
guess it explains why the genre is usually frowned upon. […] But there are good 
crime writers and there are bad crime writers. And the best crime writers are of 
course way better than the run-of-the-mill, you know, plain fiction writers. Even if 
they don’t get treated as such. George Pelacanos42 is one of them. He’s got a proper 
language. And there’s a couple of Norwegians…. Jørgen Gunnerud, Vidar 
Sundsstøl… Jon Michelet’s first books…43 And of course… I’ve read a lot of noir, 
                                              
39 American band. 
40 American band. 
41 American musician. 
42 American author. 
43 Norwegian authors. 
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you know, the hardcore crime fiction. Of course, Chandler, Hammett, Macdonald, all 
those guys.44 Chandler, for instance… His use of language is so extremely… It’s 
almost kitsch. He pushes it so far that it almost falls apart. And that makes for a fun 
read. And of course, it’s got a historical value as well. […] Both sociologically and in 
terms of cultural history… It’s really interesting. […] Well, I guess I’m on the 
barricades to defend good crime fiction against the bad. In a sense, I want it to be 
classified in a separate popular cultural category.  
 (Jonas, head of local cultural enterprise, mid 30s) 
 
However, this aestheticising flirt with ‘popular culture’ does not imply all forms 
defined as popular culture are embraced. Although they do report seeking out music, 
literature and films that are usually referred to as popular culture, they are merciless 
in their portrayals of ‘bad’ forms of popular culture. Just as with ‘high’ culture, they 
eclectically choose sub-genres, artists and works to weed out the ‘good’ from the 
‘bad’. However, unlike those who shun popular culture for moral reasons, these 
interviewees shun such goods for aesthetic reasons, pointing out flaws such as 
‘sentimentality’, ‘misplaced heartiness’ and ‘obviousness’. This is apparent in their 
depictions of goods from a number of cultural domains, for instance festivals, the 
visual arts and comedy: 
   
I: Here in Stavanger, we’ve got all these popular events. You know, Gladmat,45 the 
international volleyball tournament, big concerts in the town square... They don’t 
interest me at all. They just don’t appeal to me. 
V: Why is that? 
I: I guess it’s fair to say that these events have an explicit popular profile. I don’t 
want to make myself appear vainer than I really am, but… It just doesn’t appeal to 
me because of their profile. It’s popular in the bad sense of the word.       
 (Elias, high school teacher, late 30s) 
 
V: Are there any types of visual art you steer clear of? 
I: Yeah, that happens quite often, actually. And it’s not because I want to appear very 
distinguished or anti-popular or anything like that. But, you know, visual art with a 
popular appeal… I don’t care much for that. […] The immediate kind of art that 
                                              
44 American authors. 
45 Local food festival. 
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appeals to everyone in the exact same way, I just don’t find it interesting. You don’t 
get a personal relationship with the picture. I find that boring. […]  
V: More specifically, what kind of art would you not have hanging on your walls at 
home? 
I: Nothing mass-produced. You know, an ultra-popular work of art. […] The kind of 
art that people buy to decorate their walls, even if they haven’t got the slightest 
interest in art... There is nothing wrong with that, of course. But it’s not for me. […] 
Like the local artist, what’s his name? The guy from Klepp… Storm Juliussen. I’m 
not a big fan, I can tell you that. […] I wouldn’t have one of his pictures of sailing 
ships hanging on my wall. No way.    
(Emil, musician and social worker, late 30s) 
 
V: Is there any kind of comedy you dislike? 
I: Yeah, I don’t find punchline-based comedy funny at all. That’s exactly what Monty 
Python46 rebelled against in their prime. […] Those obvious hate objects… The 
Norwegian attempts… I’ve even forgotten their names. The Karl & Co kind of stuff, 
Mot i brøstet…47 It’s nothing but an outdated, Norwegian, revue and farce tradition. 
A Tore Ryen48 tradition taken into television format. I dislike it on stage and I dislike 
it on telly. […] And I don’t find Kristian Valen49 funny. Probably because he’s just 
too much. It gets too loud in a way. And too fucking obvious. And you easily get 
bored with that stuff. […] It’s the same with music. From revue follows dansband.50 
    (Jonas, head of local cultural enterprise, mid 30s) 
 
Although these interviewees certainly shun a range of cultural goods perceived as 
‘popular in the bad sense of the word’, some cultural goods are perceived as so bad 
that they achieve cult status. A second strategy of aesthetical transgression is thus to 
like ‘common’ cultural goods differently than the ‘common’ consumer, i.e. in another 
mode. One distinguishing feature among these interviewees is their inclination to 
appropriate ‘vulgar’ and ‘popular’ cultural goods in a playful and ironic, yet 
aestheticising, manner. Despite, or perhaps because of, the established art world’s 
dismissal of such goods, these interviewees regard them as ‘aesthetically interesting’: 
 
                                              
46 British comedy group. 
47 Norwegian situation comedies. 
48 Norwegian director and playwright.  
49 Norwegian comedian and musician. 
50 Dansband (‘dance band’) is a Swedish term for a band that plays dansbandsmusik (‘dance band 
music’). The genre has been hugely influential in Scandinavian countries since the seventies. 
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V: You said earlier that you like bad films. Can you elaborate?  
I: Take a film like the Norwegian Dis,51 or a more recent example, the American film 
The Room.52 It’s so bad that it becomes good in a way. You sit there, and it’s like: 
‘Huh-huh, now something funny is about to happen.’ And this approach, that you 
look for funny aspects, or that you are aware of such things… When you have seen a 
film several times, you start seeing things you haven’t noticed before… And that 
particular film… There is just something about the setting, the things they say, and 
the way they say it… […] I would definitely say that I watch that film with a 
different pair of glasses, so to speak. Compared to other films, you know, high-
quality work… Then it’s the other way around. They are so thought-through and well 
done that you become fascinated by all the details that are correct. Like the American 
television series Mad Men. So there are two totally different approaches to seeing a 
film. […] Of course, you’ve got that ironic twist, that ironic distance, in a sense. But 
still, with films like The Room, and especially that one, when you see it several times 
you actually start liking it. And you start seeing stuff and start thinking: ‘Hey, there’s 
actually something there! There’s got to be a reason why people are so obsessed with 
this film, apart from it being really bad.’   
 (Emil, musician and social worker, late 30s) 
 
I: I’ve got a lot of bad records at home. But they have to be bad enough. Or, rather, a 
record has got to have some kind of personality to it. The personality has to shine 
through. That goes for good records as well as bad ones. That’s what turns me on, the 
personal expression. If I hear a band that tries to sound like another band, that’s not 
interesting to me at all. But if they fail to do so, then it becomes interesting. […] One 
of William Shatner’s records, for instance.53 It’s called Transformed Man. On this 
record his ego has run amok. It’s a mix of Shakespeare and Beatles songs. Beatles 
songs with Shakespeare’s sensitivity, sort of. Because he’s a superstar, I guess he 
thinks he can… I don’t know. It’s just fascinating. And we have a couple of local 
ones as well, Anniken Loken and Arvid Sletta.54 Yeah, there are lots of them. 
V:  What is it that fails? How do you sort the right kind of bad from the wrong king of 
bad? 
I: That’s totally subjective. What I might find entertaining… Someone else might 
say: ‘No, no! This is just bad.’ But I might say: ‘Yeah, of course it is, but just listen 
to this.’ […] I don’t know. I guess it crosses a line somehow. […] For instance, the 
Arvid Sletta record… The musical expression is so totally beyond everyone’s 
conception of what music is supposed to be, so it ends up being funny and, you 
know, transgressive somehow. 
 (Oliver, musician, late 30s) 
 
                                              
51 A 1996 feature film directed by the Norwegian Aune Sand. 
52 A 2003 feature film directed by the American Tommy Wiseau. 
53 Canadian actor, musician, recording artist, author and film director. 
54 Obscure Norwegian musicians. The interviewee later informs me that both are ‘mentally 
challenged’.  
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A controlled, distanced and somewhat ironic fascination with goods regarded as 
‘kitsch’55 seems to be the hallmark of this strategy. While the ironic appropriation of 
‘bad’ cultural goods might not be distinguishing in itself, this form of subtle irony is 
quite different from merely consuming goods one does not like in a tongue-in-cheek 
manner. Rather, these connoisseurs of vulgarity differentiate between and weed out 
goods not worthy of appreciation on their quest to find ‘particularly dated’ and 
‘inappropriately serious’ attempts at ‘heartfelt artistic expressions’. Though such 
goods are regarded as flawed according to ‘normal’ aesthetical standards, these 
interviewees hold that these goods ‘accidently’ (i.e. not intended as such by the artist) 
end up transgressing aesthetical boundaries. Thus, the irony involved in the 
appropriation of such goods should not be understood as merely poking fun at bad 
attempts to create art. Although mockery is no doubt involved, the goods are also 
appreciated for their ‘aesthetical uniqueness’. There is a certain seriousness attached 
to the playful manner in which such goods are appreciated. Contemporary artistic 
attempts to re-create the uniqueness of goods that have already achieved cult status, 
and/or goods perceived as deliberately designed for ironic appropriation, are thus 
shunned: 
 
V: We were talking about distance and irony and a certain kind of art that is 
produced tongue-in-cheek. […] Are there types of irony that you don’t appreciate in 
art? 
I: Yeah, there is a lot of it. […] It is, for instance, a bad idea to do cover songs of old 
classics in a humorous way. I can’t stand it! [Laughs.] That’s a bad form of irony. 
Like Nouvelle Vague,56 Señor Coconut,57 Susanna & the Magical Orchestra,58 all that 
stuff. […] And of course, bands like Turbonegro,59 that’s a good example. They’ve 
got this approach that ‘everything has been done before, so let’s just play watered-
down boogie in an ironic way.’ […] Of course, one cannot be a full-on modernist 
nowadays, but then again, you cannot just give in, if you know what I mean? […] It’s 
                                              
55 The term kitsch usually refers to form of art that is considered an inferior, tasteless copy of an 
extant style of art or a worthless imitation of art of recognized value (Greenberg, 1961; Elias, 1998; 
Adorno, 2001). For less condescending depictions of kitsch, see Sontag (1966) and Rolness (1992). 
56 French band. 
57 German composer, musician and producer; also known as Uwe Schmidt. 
58 Norwegian band. 
59 Norwegian band. 
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the same with the film industry. While I can appreciate a guy like Tarantino,60 it’s the 
whole… We’re now being served up what used to be called B-movies… But now 
we’re getting remakes of such films, with a big budget, and a kind of… A distance, 
and an intentional kind of irony. Generally, I don’t care much for that. […] It’s the 
whole retro thing. Like Death Proof 61 and all that stuff. Perhaps they are entertaining 
in a way, but it’s the whole… Certain film makers fall in love with a certain type of 
expression, and they attempt to recreate it with a bigger budget. I guess what they’re 
aiming for is a kind of revival of cult films from the seventies. But that’s just not 
possible. They just construct a type of… I don’t know. I think it’s impossible.    
 (Oliver, musician, late 30s) 
 
To summarise, the two strategies of transgressing aesthetic boundaries – liking 
different things and liking things differently – are distinguishing features which 
demarcate these interviewees from the other ones reporting an interest in cultural 
goods. Unlike those who somewhat pedantically follow a ‘high versus low’ scheme 
in their consumption choices – either by expressing a certain goodwill towards 
already canonised cultural goods while shunning those that are not, or vice versa – 
these interviewees reflexively and playfully transgress such boundaries. Following 
Bourdieu’s idea (1984) of viewing the universe of cultural goods as a relationally 
defined system of signs, a given good always bears with it certain social 
connotations. However, the act of consuming a given good does not necessarily mean 
the same thing for everybody. On the contrary, by emphasising the way in which 
these interviewees subvert existing meanings attached to cultural goods, it might be 
argued that they have the means both to create new meanings out of these goods, and 
to decipher and appreciate other people’s playful transgressions. Such re-ordering and 
re-contextualising of objects to communicate new meanings within a system of signs 
presuppose prior and sedimented meanings attached to the goods, as well as social 
actors more or less reflexively pursuing the subversion of ‘old’ meanings. According 
to semiologist John Clarke, social actors may thus function as ‘bricoleurs’ in 
subverting the system of cultural signs:62 
                                              
60 American film director, screenwriter, producer, and actor. 
61 A 2007 feature film directed by the American Quentin Tarantino. 
62 Hebdige and Clarke, or more generally, scholars associated with the Birmingham school and its 
inquiries into ‘subcultures’ and ‘countercultures’, have been criticised for an empirically unfounded 
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Together, object and meaning constitute a sign, and, within any one culture, such 
signs are assembled, repeatedly, into characteristic forms of discourse. However, 
when the bricoleur re-locates the significant object in a different position within that 
discourse, using the same overall repertoire of signs, or when that object is placed 
within a different total ensemble, a new discourse is constituted, a different message 
conveyed. (Clarke, 1975: 177; see also Hebdige, 1979: 103) 
 
This mode of (re)appropriating cultural goods thus constitutes a ‘secret language’ and 
a code with which to decipher it, accessible only to those in-the-know.63 Social 
differences are not only reflected in the objects consumed, but perhaps more 
importantly, in the signifying practices which represent those objects and render them 
meaningful. Far from revealing a ‘meltdown’ in the differential distribution of 
cultural tastes, the transgressing practices of these interviewees demarcate them from 
people who appropriate cultural goods without the playfulness. While not necessarily 
intended as a pursuit of social distinction, esteem and prestige (on the contrary, 
several of these interviewees explicitly downplay and dis-identify with such pursuits, 
the significance of which I shall return to in Chapter 7) their classificatory practices 
are distinguished from the classificatory practices of other interviewees.  
 
Although these interviewees certainly tend to enjoy ‘art for art’s sake’, their taste for 
material goods is of a rather different character. Unlike interviewees whose mode of 
consumption implies that shopping and acquiring expensive material goods are ends 
in themselves, these interviewees explicitly dis-identify with what they conceive of as 
a dubious combination of ‘materialism’, ‘squandering’ and ‘flashiness’:  
 
V: Do you have any preferences when it comes to furniture, interior design? What do 
you like? What do you dislike? 
                                                                                                                                           
‘heroism’ implied in their celebration of youthful rebellion (Thornton, 1995; Gelder, 2005). 
However, my point is not to explore the extent to which the aesthetical transgressions of the 
interviewees function as counter-forces threatening the political status quo. Rather, I employ the 
notion of bricoleur to highlight the ways in which some interviewees differ from other interviewees 
in their classifying practices. The question of whether these practices have political consequences is 
outside the scope of this inquiry. 
63 Indeed, as we shall see in the following chapters, the interviewees characterised by this mode of 
consumption not only weed out cultural goods not worthy of appropriation; cultural consumers 
perceived as lacking the ability to appreciate goods in similar ways are also disfavoured. 
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I: Yeah, of course I’ve got preferences. But if you ask me if I actually obey them, 
that’s a whole different story. I like clean and neat furniture. Not strict minimalism, 
but a clean design. […] But I am not materialistic. It’s not a matter of prestige for me. 
It doesn’t define who I am. […] And though I say that I don’t define myself by what 
my living room looks like, my impression is that there are lots of people who do just 
that. There are lots of people who spend time and energy making it all look perfect. 
And it’s easy to laugh at the expense of every other couple in their thirties who buy 
PH lamps64 or Arne Jacobsen chairs.65 It’s not that refined any more. It’s almost 
pathetic. [...] I could never pick the standard markers of good taste and just shove 
them into my home. That sofa, those chairs, that coffee table, those lamps… You 
know, stroll down to Møbelgalleriet66 and just pick something from their catalogues. 
Never.  
 (Oscar, academic, mid 30s) 
 
In a sense, this shunning of ‘standard markers of good taste’ is quite similar to the 
disfavouring of ‘already canonised’ cultural goods. Endowed with a feel for the game 
of distinctions, these interviewees shun all that is ‘obvious’, ‘clichéd’ and 
‘outmoded’. But whereas their consumption of cultural goods is marked by a certain 
commitment and avidity implied in their strategies of aesthetic transgression, their 
consumption of material goods is better characterised by moderation and asceticism, 
and in some cases even by abstinence. Apart from food and beverages, which some of 
these interviewees are highly interested in, material consumption is generally 
regarded as ‘unnecessary’, and should thus be avoided: 
 
V: Can you describe what kinds of clothes you wear? 
I: I don’t like buying clothes. I generally don’t like buying stuff. I really hate it, going 
to shops buying stuff. Except food. I love buying food. […] I can spend a lot of 
money on food. […] We buy fresh meat at Idsøe.67 And we buy fresh fish at the 
market. And vegetables as well. We buy fresh bread at Fredriks bakeri.68 And then on 
Saturdays there’s Ostehuset øst,69 the new fancy café. We buy fresh focaccia, 
ciabatta, croissants and stuff like that. […] Life’s too short to eat bad food. […] But 
generally, I find it terribly boring going shopping. It’s horrible! And I find it 
unnecessary to spend money on unnecessary things. We’re at a point in our lives 
                                              
64 A series of light fixtures designed by Danish designer and writer Poul Henningsen. 
65 Chairs designed by Danish architect and designer Arne Emil Jacobsen. 
66 Local furniture shop. 
67 Local butcher. 
68 Local bakery. 
69 Local café. 
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where we’ve got all the things we need. Well, most of it anyway. And if we’re going 
to get some more, or something different, we have to throw something out. And 
that’s unnecessary. You know, if what we’ve already got still works. So I don’t buy 
clothes unless I have to, or if I am somewhere really cheap. And that means that you 
probably won’t find me in a clothes shop. 
 (Thomas, journalist, early 40s) 
 
Consuming material goods is conditioned by purchasing power, and several 
interviewees point out that a lack of money limits their consumption of desired goods. 
However, purchasing power alone cannot explain the variations in material 
consumption, as some interviewees with high amounts of economic capital report 
quite modest consumption budgets compared to other interviewees who have 
considerably fewer economic resources. Moreover, the types of goods the money is 
spent on vary considerably. As is evident from the quotes above, Oscar and Thomas 
report shunning ‘unnecessaries’ such as designer furniture and expensive garments, 
yet report indulging in the consumption of types of food and drinks which other 
interviewees might consider to be ‘squandering’ money. Thus, in addition to 
purchasing power, different modes of consuming material goods are structured by a 
social factor. Indeed, some interviewees even report that perceived peer-pressure is 
taken into account when purchasing goods. This is the case with Philip, who reports 
having spent considerable time pondering the acquisition of a fifty-inch television 
screen:  
 
We had a regular telly up until recently. It was like seventeen years old. […] But now 
that we’ve rebuilt our house, and as the living room is so narrow, the only solution 
was to put the telly far away from the sofa. And eventually, after measuring distances 
and talking to people who know about such things, we found out we needed a fifty-
inch screen. And I actually like it, because, like I said, I watch quite a lot of films. It’s 
a whole different experience now. […] But of course, I was a bit ambivalent at first. 
You know, in the milieu, when you’ve got friends working at the university, it’s a 
bit… You get treated like a leper if you mention that you’ve bought a fifty-inch telly. 
Because you’re not supposed to have a telly at all, and definitely not an interest in 
such matters. But like I said, the reason why we bought it was because we had to put 
it far away from the sofa.  
 (Philip, high school teacher, mid 30s) 
 
 128
These interviewees do not necessarily shun material goods completely; some report 
being ‘style-conscious’ about clothing, furniture and gadgets such as computers, 
stereos and television screens. However, they explicitly point out that they do not 
wish to distinguish themselves on the basis of material consumption, and compared to 
interviewees who report higher consumption budgets, they are far more sober in their 
material tastes. Their rejection of ‘squandering’ money might thus be characterised 
by what Hebdige (1979: 103) has referred to as ‘conspicuous refusals’, meaning that 
the absence of a certain type of consumption is reflexively intended and thus socially 
loaded. Accordingly, interviewees characterised by an intellectual mode of 
consumption, implying that cultural goods are appreciated in an aestheticising and 
playful manner, tend to be much more moderate in their attitude to material goods, 
shunning the ‘extravagances’ and ‘excesses’ associated with expensive lifestyles.  
 
4.2.2 The luxurious mode of consumption 
Whereas the intellectual mode of consumption is characterised by an inclination to 
appropriate cultural goods as an end in themselves, the luxurious mode of 
consumption demonstrates an inclination to appropriate expensive material goods in 
a similar fashion. Reporting spending considerably more money on goods such as 
motor vehicles, boats, summer holidays, jewellery, sports equipment, clothing, food 
and beverages than the other interviewees in the sample, interviewees in this category 
are by far the most voracious consumers of expensive luxury goods.70 While they 
certainly have the economic means to fulfil their worldly desires, their taste for 
luxury does not seem to ensue directly from their endowment with economic capital, 
                                              
70 The notion of luxury goods is ambiguous. As noted by Daloz (2010: 61ff), ‘luxury’ is often 
contrasted to ‘real human needs’, which implies a complicated – and perhaps irresolvable – 
philosophical debate on the nature of ‘human needs’. From a less normative standpoint one could, 
alternatively, establish a distinction between ‘subsistence goods’ and ‘prestige goods’, but this 
distinction also entails an unfortunate essentialising of cultural goods, as what is considered 
prestigious might be contested and highly variable depending on context. Nevertheless, as is evident 
in the interview data, certain material goods are considered ‘excessive’ and thus to be avoided by 
some interviewees, while others find these goods attractive and worthwhile. Thus, the deployment of 
the term in this analysis is not so much intended as an endeavour to arrive at a definition of luxury, as 
much as a shorthand device with which to highlight the opposition between different modes of 
appropriating material goods.     
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as there are several other interviewees highly endowed with economic capital who do 
not report the same interest in expensive material goods. Indeed, what sets these 
interviewees apart from other consumers of such goods is first and foremost their 
willingness to spend money, as well as the ‘pleasure’ they report deriving from 
acquiring exclusive goods:  
 
I am privileged. I have an income that’s way beyond the average. I’ve got lots of 
investments in stocks and real estate. And I have the opportunity to do whatever I 
want. When it comes to leisure and my spare time, I never consider the cost. And 
that’s a privilege. If I feel like going to a concert, eating dinner at Café de France,71 
or if I didn’t have plans for the weekend and felt like going somewhere, I could do 
that. I don’t have to think about it. And that’s a privilege in itself. The cost of things 
is not a criterion for me leisure-wise. I do what I want. I think. […] I’ve got one goal 
in life, and that’s to spend all my money so that my children won’t find a lot of 
unspent money when I die. Instead, they should find objects and stuff that I’ve found 
pleasure in. And if they do find money, I have in a sense failed. Because money is 
just a means to do things you want and can find pleasure in. 
 (Johan, CEO, mid 50s) 
 
I’ve got this feminine side, and that’s shopping. I am quite a shopper. It could be 
food, or clothes, or shoes. You name it. All kinds of stuff. When it comes to food, I 
don’t care much for shops like REMA 1000.72 I don’t go to stores like that. I find that 
boring. There’s got to be fresh produce. You know, not just the usual stuff. I’d rather 
go to shops like Helgø.73 […] I buy a lot of clothes, and a lot of shoes. Well, not out 
of proportion. And I spend money on sports equipment. Bikes, cars, boats and stuff 
like that. […] I am quite conscious about what I want. And if I have decided on 
something, I spend quite a bit of time searching for what I want. […] When it comes 
to clothes and shoes, I go to Rolfsen and Geddon.74 I am materialistic. I am conscious 
about brands. I know what I want. There are some expensive brands that don’t 
interest me, because I don’t like them. But usually, I like the expensive brands. 
That’s what I end up buying anyway. […] I usually go to stores that are classed as 
expensive stores. […] I could never buy my trousers at Cubus, H&M and all those 
places.75 
(Wilhelm, manager, oil company, early 40s) 
 
                                              
71 Local restaurant. 
72 Norwegian grocery store chain. 
73 Local grocery store. 
74 Local clothing stores. 
75 Clothing stores. 
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In seeking pleasure and happiness by acquiring material goods, these interviewees are 
adhering to a morality of hedonism. Unlike other interviewees in the sample – who 
report either completely shunning ‘material excesses’, or moderation in their material 
consumption, for instance due to a lack of purchasing power or due to moral 
convictions – these interviewees are endowed with both the objective possibilities 
and the subjective willingness to indulge in luxury. Despite their awareness that most 
people cannot afford their expensive lifestyles, they see no point in being ‘stingy’. 
Indeed, they repeatedly distance themselves from those whom they conceive of as 
‘cheapskates’, and they dismiss people who are perceived as criticising their lifestyles 
as ‘envious’. 
 
While all the interviewees in the sample report consuming material goods, many of 
them consider acquiring such goods to be a ‘necessary evil’, and often point out that 
they choose ‘reasonably priced’ and ‘simple’ alternatives. By contrast, interviewees 
with a taste for luxury have a qualitatively different commitment to material goods, 
emphasising qualities such as ‘exclusiveness’, ‘patina’ and ‘charm’, while 
disparaging what is considered ‘cheap’, ‘inauthentic’ and ‘undistinguished’: 
 
I hate everything associated with Norway. I hate the Norwegian aesthetic. […] 
Pinewood furniture, dried flowers and national romanticism. At my place you won’t 
find anything that resembles Norwegianness. I don’t like it. As simple as that. […] 
The first thing I bought when I moved in here was some crystal decanters from the 
sixties. You know, for whisky. […] The problem is that Norwegian stores usually 
have very limited selections, especially when it comes to furniture. I guess the 
demand for good stuff is low anyway. Most people haven’t found out about it, either 
by travelling or by reading foreign magazines and books, or by watching films. You 
know, to broaden their perspective. They don’t understand that they can order stuff 
from abroad, or actually going there to buy it. They just end up going to IKEA, 
Living and Bohus76 and buy all that cheap crap that has neither character nor beauty. 
People choose to buy a cheap replica of a grandfather clock for a thousand kroner 
instead of waiting for an auction and buying the real deal for ten thousand. If it 
resembles the original a little, they’ll buy it. But I would rather wait it out until I find 
something that’s got an inner quality, either because of good craftsmanship, or 
because it’s got patina, a charming design which makes it worth acquiring.  
                                              
76 Chain-stores selling furniture and home products. 
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 (Lucas, lawyer, mid 30s) 
 
I’m not necessarily preoccupied with the modern and trendy, but I guess it’s 
important for me to have something that not everybody else has. Clothes, for 
instance. I’ve got some favourite brands that are quite unusual. […] I guess it’s not 
the end of the world if I see someone in a similar jacket, it’s not like that. It’s just that 
some people think it’s really important to be just like everybody else. But I think, 
when you grow up, you become more… It’s more important to become oneself in a 
way. […] Well, I guess I would be quite perplexed if I got to a party and there was 
someone there with a similar dress.   
 (Anna, manager, oil company, early 50s) 
 
Blindly following the dictates of ‘fashions and fads’ and acquiring ‘what everybody 
else has’ seem to be considered the ultimate sign of the undistinguished. Conforming 
to the tastes of ‘common’ people is thus to be avoided at (almost) any cost. 
Concerned with exclusivity and individuality, these interviewees typically report 
avoiding big chain stores and their ‘mass-produced’ goods. Even local niche stores 
providing goods within their area of interest are avoided due to the danger of losing 
one’s individuality. As far as possible, they prefer buying their goods of choice while 
abroad or online. Moreover, these interviewees are far more concerned about brands 
than the others in the sample, and they typically shun brands that have connotations 
with the ‘generic’ and ‘cheap’. This is particularly evident in their depiction of cars: 
 
V: What kinds of cars do you like? 
I: Well, it’s got to be an Audi. Yes. Acceptable luxury, as they call it. […] There are 
certain mechanisms, of course. I’ve got certain preferences, certain brands that I like. 
You know, you associate things with certain brands. And then you classify them in 
your head. And there are brands that appeal to me, and there are brands that don’t 
[…] Like Skoda. I guess it boils down to psychology. Because the Volkswagen 
company produces both Skoda and Audi. So there are a lot of similar parts. But I 
would never drive a Skoda.  
(Georg, banker, late 40s) 
 
You know, I still have a problem with cars like KIA, the whole concept. I cannot 
identify with it. And Skoda… The cars are fantastic, but there’s one thing I don’t like 
about them. And that says it all. It’s the logo. It’s so fucking ugly! They have even 
put it on the steering wheel, so you have to look at it all the time. That green lion. 
This friend of mine, he’s got a new… What’s its name? The top model…. It’s called 
Superb. Brand new. Beautiful. Great interior and all. And that’s what I told him when 
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I tried it: ‘Everything’s perfect, except for one little thing. I would ask the salesman 
to change the steering wheel. Or paint it black… So you don’t have to look at that 
green, ugly logo.’ But Skoda is not a bad car. […] I also had a Hyundai once, as a 
rental car. That was a rattletrap, I can tell you that. All plastic and it didn’t give 
that… [Makes a kissing sound] That solid feeling. […] I guess I have a problem with 
the Korean mentality. 
(Johan, CEO, mid 50s) 
 
This concern with brands seems twofold. First, it is linked to the perceived quality of 
goods. Disliking ‘low quality’, ‘bad design’ and ‘fragility’, these interviewees often 
have their own favourite brands of choice and seem to assume these brands will 
guarantee the desired quality. Second, it is linked to what Baudrillard (1981) refers to 
as ‘sign value’, meaning the value and emotional attachment accorded to an object 
due to the prestige it bestows upon the possessor, rather than the actual material value 
and utility derived from the function and the primary use of the object. In reporting 
that the consumption of a certain brand provides ‘the right feeling’, these 
interviewees typically shun goods failing to provide such feelings. Some even report 
brand loyalty, buying only Jaguar cars, Apple computers, Chanel cosmetics, etc. By 
the same token, some brands are resolutely shunned, especially if they are regarded as 
‘inauthentic’, ‘generic’ or ‘cheap imitations of the real deal’. While such brands may 
represent goods of the desired quality, they are nevertheless rejected as they give the 
consumers the wrong kinds of associations. Thus, the quality of goods seems to be a 
necessary, but far from sufficient, requirement when these interviewees acquire 
material goods. Adhering to certain brands that connote both quality and exclusivity 
is the hallmark of this mode of consuming material goods.  
 
By contrast, these interviewees demonstrate a quite different inclination in their 
consumption of cultural goods. Unlike the previous category of interviewees, they 
typically report limited interest in such matters. Although they do report spending 
time reading books, visiting art galleries and attending plays and concerts, they do not 
enjoy cultural goods as an end in themselves. On the contrary, their cultural 
consumption is much more pragmatic and instrumental, and they typically report 
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consuming such goods in order to ‘relax’ or ‘be entertained’. Goods that are 
considered ‘too heavy’ are thus avoided: 
 
V: Books and literature… Do you like to read? 
I: Usually during holidays. I can’t bring myself to read in the week. But if I do read, I 
grab what’s lying around. Nothing too heavy. […] I don’t seek out particular authors 
to read their acclaimed books. I don’t have time for that. […] I steer clear of heavy, 
Russian authors. I can’t stand that type of thing. I don’t need sentences that stretch a 
whole page. It’s got to be an easy-read.     
 (Kristian, dentist, late 30s) 
 
V: You said that you don’t read certain kinds of books. Why is that? 
I: I don’t see any reason to, I guess. It doesn’t give me anything. Just look at my 
background. I mean, I’m a realist. […] I am a person who likes facts. To analyse a 
text… To me, that’s… I cannot bring myself to sit down and do that. I don’t need 
that. I guess there are people who do, and that’s… I can understand why. When 
people sit down and find this particular sentence, this one line. I can understand that 
it gives them something. But to me… […] It’s unthinkable. To me, a book is a matter 
of entertainment. I don’t seek out books to achieve a cultural understanding, or 
because it’s got a particularly good plot, or because it’s well-written. That’s not 
important to me. I guess some people can just freeze at one sentence, sitting there 
pondering it, because it’s so good. I’m not like that. I plough on through. I play the 
film in my head while I read the book. I’m an entertainment junkie. It’s the 
excitement that draws me to it. 
 (Mikkel, manager, oil company, early 40s) 
 
Moreover, these interviewees report frequently attending plays and classical music 
concerts, and some of them seem to be voracious consumers of what sociologists 
usually depict as ‘highbrow culture’. However, their attendance is not necessarily 
motivated by a love of art, but by a pragmatic social inclination, such as ‘socialising’ 
or ‘entertaining clients’: 
 
V: Do you go to concerts? For instance classical concerts at Stavanger 
Konserthus?77 
I: Yes, quite often actually. But when I do, it’s because of my job. I do it because it’s 
important to my clients. I do it because of them. Definitely not for myself. I am 
tormented by it. Well, it’s not that I get grumpy or hateful or anything. I am able to 
                                              
77 Local concert hall. 
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sit there and listen. And I guess some pieces are good. But nothing is good enough to 
make me want to do it again. […] I choose to believe that it’s unreasonable to spend 
time on it.   
(Wilhelm, manager, oil company, early 40s) 
 
 V: Music… You mentioned classical music and jazz earlier on. 
I: I never listen to that kind of music at home. […] I want it live, at a concert. At 
home I listen to a kind of light… Call it background music. It’s mostly pop music of 
some kind. Rock or ballads. Not jazz. And I use music differently at home or in my 
car compared to going out. If I’m travelling, and if I’ve been out eating or something, 
I really enjoy going to a jazz club afterwards. Have a couple of beers. That’s really 
nice. 
V: Have you thought of why you never play jazz at home?  
I: I have no idea. But I guess it has something to do with the social aspect. […] If I’m 
listening to music at home, it’s to relax. Often in combination with work, or while 
reading the paper. […] But when I go out with friends… […] It’s because of the 
social aspect. And I guess there are a lot of people like me. I’m not alone in thinking 
like this. The keenest music lovers acquire all sorts of CDs, narrow genres… And 
play them at home. I’m not like that at all. That doesn’t mean that I don’t have a lot 
of jazz CDs, because I do. But I very seldom listen to them. I’ve got lots of CDs and 
a bunch of tracks on my iPod. I might play a track or two, and then tune in to 
something lighter afterwards. 
 (Johan, CEO, mid 50s) 
 
The luxurious mode of consumption seems thus to be the intellectual mode reversed; 
an inclination to appreciate material goods as an end in themselves, accompanied by 
an inclination to appreciate cultural goods as a means to an end. While they do, at 
least to some degree, report consuming similar cultural goods as interviewees in the 
previous category, the mode of appropriating them is of a rather different character. 
Indeed, these interviewees explicitly contrast their own tastes and practices with those 
of people whom they perceive as more avidly interested in consuming cultural goods. 
However, notwithstanding the internal differences in the types of goods the 
interviewees in the two categories derive pleasure from, they share the propensity to 
enjoy goods as an end in itself. This propensity clearly demarcates them from 
interviewees whose consumption of goods functions as a means to an end. 
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4.3 Consumption as a means to an end 
A number of interviewees in the sample do not consume their art for art’s sake, nor 
do they find pleasure in acquiring expensive material goods. These interviewees, by 
contrast, demand something more from their cultural consumption than merely the 
pleasure derived from it. They are in a sense more instrumental in their orientations 
towards cultural goods than their counterparts. If there is nothing ‘comprehensible’ or 
immediately ‘useful’ to be derived from the consumption of goods, these 
interviewees simply see no point in consuming them. There are, however, important 
differences within the group of interviewees characterised by such taste orientations. 
As with the non-instrumental consumption of goods, there is an inversely related 
opposition between preferences for cultural and material goods, meaning that a given 
interviewee reporting a high degree of interest in cultural goods tends to be 
accompanied by a low degree of interest in material goods, and vice versa. Thus, in 
the following I shall differentiate between what I call the educational mode of 
consumption and the practical mode of consumption.  
 
4.3.1 The educational mode of consumption 
Similar to the interviewees characterised by an intellectual mode of consumption, 
those who appropriate goods in an educational mode typically report an avid interest 
in cultural goods and a corresponding indifference to material goods. However, 
unlike their intellectual counterparts, this category is comprised of interviewees 
somewhat less familiar with cultural goods, typically reporting an urge to ‘learn 
more’ and to ‘educate themselves’ by exposure to cultural forms not previously 
encountered. Indeed, these interviewees report a remarkable degree of curiosity and 
an extraordinary willingness to understand ‘the meaning’ of cultural goods: 
 
V: Are there any types of plays that are more interesting that others?  
I: No, not really. I like it all. Well, of course I find myself thinking ‘this was difficult 
to comprehend’, or ‘what happened there?’ My son recently came home from school. 
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They had been to a play at the theatre, it was called Borkman.78 And he said: ‘Mum, I 
didn’t understand any of it.’ I haven’t got round to seeing it yet. But generally I find 
plays very demanding, and you have to sit down to prepare yourself before you go to 
see it. You know, ‘What is this really about?’ You have to understand the art form 
and what it’s supposed to give you. […] But you don’t necessarily have to understand 
everything. Some things are just too incomprehensible. I often catch myself thinking 
‘What did they mean by this?’ But in a way, that’s the way it’s supposed to be. You 
are supposed to go away pondering the meaning of it afterwards. […] I remember 
one time, we had been to a Jon Fosse79 play and my husband said: ‘Oh my god, what 
is this crap? I didn’t get it all!’ And of course, it was really incomprehensible. […] 
Many of the things they showcase here in Stavanger, they are too… They are very 
demanding. And common people haven’t got the big visions and the proper 
knowledge about such stuff.  They just don’t get it. And there’s been a lot of criticism 
in that regard. […] In my view, there is too much of the demanding stuff. But then 
again, I like it too. It’s so different from what I’m used to. […] And I think it’s 
important that there are people you can reach towards, who can make you curious 
about such matters. You know, ‘Why have they done it like that? What was that play 
about? Who were the authors? Why did they say that?’ I sort of like it when things 
get a bit abstract.  
 (Klara, pre-school teacher, late 30s) 
 
In reporting a lack of knowledge of and familiarity with cultural goods, these 
interviewees demonstrate a remarkable degree of trust in people perceived as experts, 
and they often seek guidance through a variety of sources, such as book clubs, the 
cultural sections in newspapers, reviews, art critics, etc. Thus, these interviewees 
seem to betray a certain ‘goodwill’ towards the taste of others, implying a somewhat 
alienated, yet highly eager and enthusiastic relationship, to certain cultural forms. 
Unlike the interviewees who knowledgeably and critically weed out goods that do not 
interest them intellectually, these interviewees are instead characterised by what 
Bourdieu (1984: 323ff) refers to as a state of ‘allodoxia’, meaning the indiscriminate 
reverence and the somewhat misplaced beliefs typical among cultural consumers less 
familiar with ‘legitimate culture’. Arguably betraying a gap between 
acknowledgement and knowledge, these interviewees report engaging in autodidactic 
projects to ‘educate themselves’: 
  
                                              
78 An 1866 play by the Norwegian playwright Henrik Ibsen. 
79 Norwegian author and playwright. 
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V: What types of books do you like to read? 
I: […] Well, I’ve got this project, this plan… I’m supposed to read all the Norwegian 
literary classics that we have all heard of but never read. But as of now the project is 
going sort of badly. I started with this Amalie Skram80 stuff, but the language was too 
difficult. But I still have this plan to read more. Lately I’ve read My Struggle.81 […] 
The main problem with the reading project is that no-one wants to join me. I wanted 
to do this kind of reading circle with my friends. You know, each reading their own 
book, and then we were supposed to tell each other about it afterwards. But they all 
thought it was boring. You know, ‘These books aren’t relevant anymore.’ But then I 
said: ‘Of course they are. And it’s because they’re relevant that they still live on, 
that’s because they are that well-known.’ But it didn’t matter. They all left. And now 
I’ve sort of lost the momentum. No-one wants to play with me. [Laughs.] 
V: Why did you decide to look up those classics in the first place? 
I: Well, it’s our cultural heritage, and it’s a bit embarrassing not to have read those 
books. You should have at least read a couple of them. And if they have survived that 
long, it must be fun. It probably is. I hope. I don’t know. But like I said, the project 
has not really come into being… Yet.   
 (Nora, lawyer, mid 30s) 
 
V: Do you like plays? 
I: Plays, plays, plays… No, I’ve seen way too few. But I intend to see more. This 
autumn me and this friend of mine have initiated what we call project play. She has 
grown up in an actor’s home. You know, she’s the artsy type. […] And she has seen 
lots of plays and now she’s supposed to take me. She sort of takes me into another 
world. This is all new to me, because I’ve never really cared for plays. But it’s really 
fascinating. […] I guess I will be doing it a lot more in the future. Less beer, more 
plays. That’s the way things are going. 
V: Do you have an idea of what types of plays you like? 
I: Not really. Right now I’m trying to get to grips with the classics. All the things I 
haven’t seen. […] I have to start somewhere. I have seen some of them when I was 
younger, but I feel I have to know these big, important, Norwegian classics. That’s 
my focus right now. […] But I guess I’m a tabula rasa, I’m open to anything new. 
[…] As of now we buy tickets to everything they showcase. Eventually, I’ll develop 
a taste and be able to say what I like and what I don’t like. Right now everything is 
fun.  
 (Andrea, public sector consultant, early 30s) 
 
Whereas the interviewees who appropriate their cultural goods of choice in an 
intellectual mode typically shun ‘clichéd’ and ‘already canonised’ goods, these 
                                              
80 Norwegian author. 
81 A 2009-2011 six volume novel by the Norwegian author Karl Ove Knausgård. 
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interviewees betray a strikingly docile reverence towards such goods; they attend 
plays and read books in order to ‘learn’ and to ‘understand’ what they are all about, 
precisely because they are classified as ‘high culture’, ‘classics’ and ‘must-sees’ by 
others. Thus, they are in a sense much more compliant and credulous than their non-
conformist counterparts. But there are limits to their cultural goodwill: if nothing 
‘comprehensible’ and ‘useful’ can be extracted from the consumption of cultural 
goods, such goods tend to be disregarded, particularly if they are considered ‘too 
experimental’, ‘unpleasant’ or ‘offensive’: 
 
V: Do you like plays? 
I: Yes I do, but I was more into it before, when I studied abroad. But there are some 
things going on here in Norway too, I guess. For instance in Oslo. They’ve got Black 
Box82 and stuff like that. I’ve got a sister who is rather involved. When I visit her, she 
makes me go to all sorts of weird plays. Black Box is very alternative. You’re 
supposed to get confronted with your own… You’re supposed to feel and reflect on 
what you see. It’s supposed to awaken your senses to a greater extent than it’s 
supposed to in classical plays. […] It’s supposed to stimulate unpleasant feelings, if 
you know what I mean? War, violence, rape and God knows what. […] And it often 
ends up with me and my sister arguing afterwards, because she maintains that it’s 
supposed to be like that. […] And I guess that’s true. But my view is that when 
you’re going to plays as little as I do, and don’t see plays three times a week, you 
should enjoy yourself a little. I like it when it’s neat and cosy. […] At Black Box it’s 
all… I feel physically bad. I remember one play she took me to… I had to go before 
the performance was over because I was nauseated. My stomach hurt. My sister also 
found it rather unpleasant, but she stayed in her seat until the end. She is probably 
more curious than I am. It was all… It was almost disgusting. Violence and blood… I 
felt really bad.  
 (Lea, medical doctor, mid 30s) 
 
I’m not too good at enjoying drama. I can enjoy plays. You know, regular, almost 
conservative plays. I’m not too fond of Black Box type of plays. […] I guess I’m not 
deep enough. I don’t get it. I don’t understand what they’re trying to accomplish. I 
don’t get in the right mood, I guess. I can’t get a grip on it. I’m just sitting there 
trying to concentrate. I can’t let myself go. You know, plays where it’s all 
improvised, and it takes three hours because the actors just felt like it. No. It doesn’t 
appeal to me. I guess there’s an artistic gene that’s missing inside of me. It fell out. 
[Laughs.] 
 (Marta, manager, small firm, mid 30s) 
                                              
82 Theatre in Oslo, primarily showcasing contemporary dramatic art.  
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Moral criteria thus seem to be the hallmark of their judgements; goods are supposed 
to be ‘good’ in the sense that they should not rouse ‘unpleasant’ or ‘bad’ feelings. 
Unlike the previous category of interviewees, characterised by a morally agnostic 
aesthetic, these interviewees shun what is perceived as ‘immoral’. They seek out 
goods that can give them ‘insights’ in order to become a ‘better person’, both morally 
and politically: 
 
V: You were referring to ‘quiet books’. What do you mean by that? What 
distinguishes such books from other books? 
I: They’re all about the big questions in life. The essential questions. […] You’re 
easily through with books by Jo Nesbø83 and Stieg Larsson.84 But writers like 
Shantaram85 and books like The Hunger86 and Let me sing you gentle songs,87 and 
what’s its name… The one everyone has read… Oh, it’s so good… The Alchemist.88 
That’s a different kind of books. They never leave you. They enter your mind long 
after you’ve finished reading. They do something to you. Maybe you become a better 
person? Maybe you understand a little bit more? Yeah, those are good books. 
 (Maria, elementary school teacher, early 40s) 
 
V: You say you like the historical aspects when you read fiction, things you can learn 
from. Can you elaborate on what you expect of a good book? 
I: Well, new pieces of information. I really enjoy… For instance, I’m really into 
feminism. And in a sense… You cannot get the right answer, you know, a hundred 
per cent correctly. But what you can do is develop your point of view, and have 
internal discussions with yourself about what you really think about stuff. So I like to 
read what others’ points of view are. […] But as for history, it’s really important to 
understand what has happened before, so that history doesn’t repeat itself. And to 
learn where things originate from, what life is like in other societies. But it doesn’t 
have to be history per se. Like the book A Thousand Splendid Suns,89 it’s about what 
it’s like to be a woman in Afghanistan. You know, I think it’s really important to 
understand that cultures exist that are very different from ours. So I don’t know… A 
good book for me… it gives me knowledge that I didn’t have before. […] It opens up 
new points of view for me, in a way.   
 (Ella, shopkeeper, mid 20s) 
                                              
83 Norwegian author. 
84 Swedish author. 
85 A 2003 novel by the Australian author Gregory David Roberts. 
86 An 1890 novel by the Norwegian author Knut Hamsun. 
87 A 2005 novel by the Swedish author Linda Olsson.  
88 A 1998 novel by the Brazilian author Paulo Coelho. 
89 A 2007 novel by the Afghan-born American author Khaled Hosseini. 
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Concerned with not ‘wasting their time’ on ‘meaningless’ goods without a ‘proper 
message’, or ‘hurtful’ and ‘evil’ goods, these interviewees are quite strict in their 
views of goods which do not meet certain moral standards. Condemning all things 
‘stupefying’ and ‘messed up’, some of these interviewees even maintain that certain 
forms of popular culture should be banned by the government. Such goods include 
‘reality shows’ and ‘gossip magazines’: 
 
V: Is there anything you dislike on telly? 
I: Well, reality shows. I never watch that. It’s contributing to stupidity, plain and 
simple. […] The whole concept… I don’t like it when people on the telly argue about 
this and that. It all started with this show… Big Brother. It should have been banned! 
It really contributes to stupidity. And it says a whole lot about the kinds of people 
participating in these shows. […] There’s something about those people that does not 
appeal to me. […] I guess it’s people who desperately want to be in the spotlight. 
And I don’t like the way the whole thing is produced. […] It’s a bad form of 
entertainment. I’d rather read a book, if you catch my drift. […] But there’s a lot of 
literature and reading matter I never read. I never read Se&Hør.90 There’s so much 
nauseating stuff around… For example, Egil ‘Drillo’ Olsen,91 I sort of liked him, I 
still do. But, you know, they printed this picture of him in the bath tub, naked, with 
just a pair of green Wellingtons on. A double-page in Se&Hør… And he’s supposed 
to be a football manager and a communist and all. And then he sells out like that. It’s 
downright nauseating. The way these people, these so-called journalists, angle their 
articles and fabricate stories… Such magazines should be banned! It’s a desecration 
of human beings! 
 (Daniel, pre-school teacher, late 50s) 
 
V: These reality shows, what is it about them that you find troublesome? 
I: I’m not sure about the name of this particular show, but there’s this house where 
people live, and it’s supposed to be some kind of love affair. Everybody is supposed 
to propose or something. […] It’s really depressing. I think it’s harmful. These 
people are obviously not quite right, and the people who watch these shows, they just 
sit there and make fun of them. 
V: Harmful? In what way? 
I: First of all, it’s depressing. I just sit there and feel sorry for them. […] And there 
are lots of self-centred girls talking about all kinds of stuff. […] It’s just 
unbelievable. Well, I just hope they’re all right. 
 (Helene, medical doctor, late 20s) 
                                              
90 Magazine published in the Nordic countries. 
91 Manager of the Norwegian national football team. 
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The opposition between an aesthetic and a moral way of appropriating cultural goods 
is perhaps most evident in the significance interviewees attribute to the perceived 
intentions of the cultural producers behind the goods in question. Unlike those who 
adhere to the doctrine of aesthetic autonomy by explicitly refusing to assimilate, and 
in their view reduce, their reading of goods to the perceived moral-political attitudes 
of cultural producers, the interviewees characterised by the educational mode of 
consumption do not recognise or acknowledge such distinctions. Indeed, the 
perceived morality of the ‘message’ in goods such as novels and feature films seems 
to be the most important, and perhaps the only, parameter for cultural judgement: 
 
V: Is there any type of literature you steer clear of? 
I: Well, there are a lot of meaningless novels out there, novels without a proper 
message. They don’t really speak to me. I guess I’ve read a couple, but they don’t 
appeal to me. And comics, I never read that. There might be something there, but I 
haven’t found it. 
 (Emma, nurse, early 60s) 
 
V: Are there any types of films you never watch? 
I: I recently saw Naboer,92 the Norwegian film with Kristoffer Joner.93 It was 
extremely disgusting. It was so unnecessary… Well, the plot was not bad, but there 
was way too much blood and violence. I mean, ‘Get you point across in a different 
way!’ Again, it’s all about appealing to unpleasant feelings. It makes you want to get 
up and leave the cinema. I’ll never see that film again! 
 (Lea, medical doctor, mid 30s) 
 
I skip everything violent. There’s no point in reading it. If somebody is in pain, I 
don’t need to read about it. Because if I do, I feel it all over. So I just skip it. It’s the 
same if I’m at the cinema. I don’t want to see people in pain. And that’s why my 
husband has a hard time going to the pictures with me. […] But now I’ve got stuff to 
put in my ears and a scarf to cover my eyes. So now it’s fine. But I guess I look a real 
sight sitting there. [Laughs.] 
 (Maria, elementary school teacher, early 40s) 
 
                                              
92 A 2005 Norwegian film directed by Pål Sletaune. 
93 Norwegian actor. 
 142
While these interviewees are generally quite strict in their adherence to previously 
established distinctions between ‘high culture’ and ‘popular culture’ – typically 
reporting a certain reverence for the former and a corresponding scepticism of the 
latter – they do not necessarily shun all forms of ‘popular culture’ and 
‘entertainment’. Provided that goods classified as such are of an ‘educational’ and 
‘edifying’ character, they may allow themselves exposure to certain subtypes of such 
goods, such as the television programme 71 Degrees North:94 
 
V: You mentioned 71 Degrees North … If you compare that particular programme to 
other programmes… Do you have any criteria in that regard? Or do you watch 
anything? 
I: No, the contestants have to achieve something. I don’t like it when they get into 
arguments, when you get a feeling that the producers of such programmes edit the 
whole thing so as to give an impression of serious conflicts between the contestants. 
But when the contestants achieve something, when they are put to the test, and when 
they push themselves and do things you couldn’t imagine possible… That fascinates 
me. […] 
V: When such conflicts appear in such programmes… How come you don’t like 
them? 
I: It’s a waste of time. I cling to the view that we should all be kind, generous and 
good to each other, as far as it’s possible, without annihilating ourselves, of course. 
 (Maria, elementary school teacher, early 40s) 
 
There’s a lot of different reality shows. Most of them are all about mocking other 
people, exclusion, bad mouthing, making fun of others, strategies to get you to the 
top… And the foul language is beyond my belief in many of these shows. You had 
Big Brother for some time. But then there’s something like 71 Degrees North, a 
programme that can teach you stuff. […] We were hiking on Hardangervidda,95 and 
my son was helping the rest of us cross a river, and suddenly he turned around: 
‘Mum! Am I that guy from 71 Degrees North, or what?’ He had obviously learned 
something of value watching TV. You know, they interview the contestants… ‘How 
did you relate to the other contestants?’ Stuff like that. You can actually learn 
something good by watching such programmes. 
 (Klara, pre-school teacher, late 30s) 
 
                                              
94 Television series. 
95 Mountain plateau in the Hardanger region of western Norway. 
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These interviewees thus seem drawn towards goods perceived as edifying and 
morally good, and by the same token they avoid goods that are perceived as not 
providing them with this. Their concerns about edification also manifest themselves 
in their mode of appropriating material goods. Similar to those characterised by the 
intellectual mode of consumption, these interviewees typically report moderation in 
their consumption of goods such as furniture, clothing, motor vehicles and sports 
equipment. While some of these interviewees have the economic means to acquire 
expensive luxury goods, they nevertheless report a certain moderation in this regard, 
typically pointing to the unfavourable effects of ‘material squandering’: 
 
These acquaintances of ours, they buy two or three pairs of skis for their kids every 
year. And they’ve got the newest, coolest gadgets. And my view is this: it’s good that 
they’re out skiing, and that they’re outdoors. I mean, that’s really positive. But what I 
cannot understand is why they always get the coolest and newest equipment. 
Sometimes it’s good to wait for things, to be patient. […] I know quite a few people 
with lots of money. And some are discreet about it, but others… We know this 
couple, they have lots of money, and it’s obviously important to them. And you can 
really tell. The earrings, their jewellery, their shoes, everything… It’s all fancy and 
expensive. Even though I know nothing about that stuff, I can tell it’s expensive. And 
my view is this: ‘If it’s that important to you, go ahead!’ But I have to say, it looks 
kind of stupid. And especially when you’re drunk and say: ‘I made ten million last 
year’. I mean, you cannot say stuff like that. 
 (Nora, lawyer, mid 30s) 
 
While their material asceticism is quite similar to that of their intellectual 
counterparts, these interviewees seem more concerned with the moral aspects of 
material consumption. The instrumental inclination and the cultural goodwill alluded 
to above are even manifested in their preferences for holidays and travel destinations. 
Typically disfavouring ‘pointless’ activities like sunbathing, or more generally, 
destinations associated with ‘a life of leisure’, they instead seek out destinations and 
activities ‘with a point’: 
 
 V: What kinds of travel destinations do you steer clear of? 
I: I easily grow tired of big cities. A weekend in such places is enough. And then 
there’s this all-inclusive type of thing where you stay at a hotel for three weeks and 
there’s a children’s club, and you hang out at the beach during the day and attend the 
show in the bar at night. That’s not for me, not at all. 
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V: How come? 
I: Because you’re not meeting the locals. I want to go places where I can experience 
the real, authentic, everyday life. Even though everything is getting commercialised, 
there are still places you can go and decide for yourself what to do. […] I was 
recently in Thailand, and the loveliest thing I experienced was meeting the local 
fishermen. They didn’t know a word in English. But they still let me help them mend 
their nets. And meeting the local grocer, and helping him cut the vegetables and fruit, 
and learning something from him. That’s the sweetest thing! 
 (Klara, pre-school teacher, late 30s) 
 
I don’t care much for all-inclusive types of holidays. I went on one once, when I was 
young. I can’t say I would go back […]. I have to go somewhere where I can be 
active, where I have a purpose. […] Being in a city and experiencing new things and 
gaining knowledge. Not going to some beach and sunbathing, first your front, then 
your back. No, there’s nothing exciting about that.   
 (Emma, nurse, early 60s) 
 
Although the educational mode of consumption seems characterised by goodwill, 
reverence and docility, these interviewees’ classifications of goods can be quite strict 
in terms of the ones they do not like, implying that their taste for cultural goods is far 
from indiscriminate and uncritical. However, unlike the playfulness associated with 
the intellectual mode of consumption, these interviewees adopt a much more serious 
tone in their classifications. Whether they are praising or rejecting cultural goods, 
their judgements are typically of a moral and edifying character. Books, films, 
television programmes, plays, pieces of music, even summer holidays, are expected 
to provide a ‘recharge of one’s batteries’, ‘expanded knowledge’, ‘self-improvement’, 
‘the truth’ and the like. As these interviewees demand that cultural goods ought to 
provide them with something more than the sheer pleasure of consumption itself, the 
educational mode of consumption is characterised by a striking instrumental taste 
orientation. Typically, moral values are used as yardsticks against which both cultural 
and material goods are judged, demarcating these interviewees from their morally 
agnostic counterparts in the two previous categories of interviewees who refuse to let 
moral concerns influence their cultural tastes. Such educational and edifying concerns 
also demarcate them from another category of interviewees, whose instrumental 
orientation is of a more practical kind. 
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4.3.2 The practical mode of consumption 
The practical mode of consumption is primarily characterised by an orientation 
towards the practical or technical domains. Shunning what is regarded as 
‘unnecessary’ and ‘incomprehensible’, these interviewees explicitly dis-identify with 
lifestyles associated with ‘social climbers’ who supposedly make dubious attempts to 
‘stand out from the crowd’. By contrast, these interviewees somewhat jokingly 
identify themselves as the ‘grey mass’, ‘the average guys’, ‘the common people’ and 
so forth. Typically, they report spending their spare time making things ‘cosy’ for 
their families, or enjoying activities such as gardening, decorating, car repairs and 
carpentry. Compared to the other interviewees, they are the most moderate consumers 
of both material and cultural goods, typically pointing out that indulging in such 
activities is a ‘waste’ of both time and money. They do not, however, wholly refrain 
from cultural or material goods, as they report listening to music, watching films, and 
reading books, and buying clothes, cars and sports equipment. Nevertheless, they 
spend considerably less time and money on both cultural and material consumption, 
and perhaps more importantly, they report considerably fewer specific preferences as 
regards such goods: 
 
V: You mentioned bad films earlier, and that such films are a waste of time. What 
makes a film bad? 
I: Uh, where do I start? I don’t know. It’s difficult to say, because when you see a bad 
film, you really don’t get much of an impression. You’re just like… You see it and 
then you forget all about it. That’s my impression. I only remember the good ones. 
[…] I guess I’m bad at explaining why I don’t like things. When you ask me about 
what I don’t like, it’s difficult to recall it in my head. […] Maybe it’s because I don’t 
focus so much on it. Maybe then and there, but I easily forget about it. It doesn’t 
mean that much to me, I guess.  
 (David, technician, mid 20s) 
 
V: What types of films do you like? 
I: Most of them. 
V: Everything is equally good? 
I: Uh, well… I’m not that critical when I go to the cinema or watch films at home. 
You know, ‘what’s it all about?’ and this and that. I go there to be entertained. It 
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doesn’t have to be a good story or anything. I just sit there and relax, plain and 
simple.   
 (Eva, secretary, mid 40s) 
 
V: What kind of books do you like? 
I: I don’t read that much. I read to relax. […] It’s difficult to come up with a 
particular category. 
V: If you look back on the last five years… Is there anything you have read that you 
would recommend? 
I: Not that I can think of, no.  
 (Elisabeth, nurse, late 20s) 
 
Though in qualitatively different ways, the interviewees in the three previous 
categories can provide quite elaborate explanations for their tastes in cultural and/or 
material goods. The practical mode of consumption is, however, characterised by 
interviewees who are much less committed to their consumption choices. Indeed, 
they explicitly dis-identify with people whom they perceive as being ‘opinionated’ 
about such matters, and they repeatedly classify themselves as rather ‘indifferent’: 
 
The thing is, I don’t spend my time criticising, evaluating, or having strong opinions 
about something other people have spent their time making. I can’t just sit there and 
pass an opinion on something without having the slightest clue about what it’s all 
about. I don't want to waste my time doing that. [Laughs.] If anyone has strong 
opinions about such matters, be my guest. But I don’t care.  
 (Aurora, pre-school assistant, mid 30s) 
 
Their consumption of cultural goods is in a sense much more random, as they report 
‘tuning into some radio station or other while working in the garage’, ‘picking up 
some book or other at the airport while travelling’ or ‘watching some film on telly 
while half asleep’. But when probed, some of them do report certain preferences. 
Emphasising that goods such as films, books and pieces of music ought to be 
‘entertaining’ and ‘fun’, these interviewees particularly disfavour that which reminds 
them of the ‘dreariness’ and ‘pointlessness’ of the time they spent at school. In sharp 
contrast to interviewees characterised by a docile and reverent goodwill towards 
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cultural goods they do not fully master, these interviewees not only report a low 
interest in such things, they reject them outright as ‘boring’, ‘daft’ and ‘ridiculous’: 
 
V: Are there any types of books you steer clear of? 
I: That would be collections of poetry and stuff like that. This friend of mine, his 
mother teaches Norwegian. And from time to time, I ride with them in their car. And 
just to spite her, you know, to piss her off, he jokingly takes out this Tarjei Vesaas96 
best of poetry kind of stuff and starts to read. And we both laugh our heads off. You 
know, I can’t take it. [Laughs.] But seriously, I don’t think I’ve ever read a poem that 
applies to me and my life. When I read, something has got to happen. You know, 
some kind of action. But that stuff, no. Never. I don’t bother even opening the book, 
if you catch my drift? It’s got nothing to offer me.   
 (David, technician, mid 20s) 
 
V: Plays and drama… Is that something that interests you? 
I: Well, I like musicals. But all those plays we were forced to read at school… I 
resent them. It might be that I’d like them now, but I’m not sure if I’m willing to try. 
[Laughs.] Like the play The Wild Duck97 and all those weird… Bah! I really 
developed a bad relationship to plays through school. […] I don’t know why exactly. 
When there’s no music, no dancing, no fun… Just an old couch and a man… Well, I 
don’t know. […] I never really liked school. I don’t know the reason for that either. 
To be forced to do things one doesn’t really enjoy, I’ve never liked that. […] So if 
something does not appeal to me, I can’t read it. I have to wait for the right mood, of 
you know what I mean? And I never had that choice at school. There was a lot of 
reading matter that did not appeal to me.   
 (Aurora, pre-school assistant, mid 30s) 
 
If goods such as paintings, sculptures and art installations are not perceived as 
immediately ‘comprehensible’ and ‘meaningful’, they are rejected as ‘fraudulent’. 
Highly suspicious of ‘red-wine soaked artists’ and their ‘meaningless gibberish’, 
these interviewees wittingly or not adhere to a doctrine of strict realism. These 
interviewees demand that art represent ‘something real’, and they wholly shun 
anything perceived as an invitation to individual interpretation:  
 
 
                                              
96 Norwegian author. 
97 An 1884 play by the Norwegian playwright Henrik Ibsen. 
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V: Visual art, pictures… Do you find that interesting? 
I: Well, I guess I’m a bit odd in that regard. There’s got to be motifs that represent 
something. I don’t like the abstract stuff. That’s not for me. All this art that is made 
just for the sake of being art, that’s not something I’d put on my walls at home. […] I 
guess I’m not that creative. I’d rather look at a nice boat than all these splashes of 
colour. Because all these splashes… Like they say, and like I say… I could easily 
have made such splashes myself. But I guess there are people who can see something 
more in a picture than just these splashes of colour. I guess I’m not an artsy type. […] 
I would never go to an exhibition to look at some random abstract stuff. I have to 
know what I’m looking at. There’s got to be some bodies, some figures, or at least 
something that remotely resembles something real.  
 (Martin, carpenter, late 40s) 
 
My husband’s a member of an art club at work. And we have actually won quite a 
few pictures on these lotteries they arrange. So we’ve got some pictures hanging on 
our walls. […] But there are limits to what I allow him to put up. Once he came home 
with this picture… There were just these squiggles and some splashes of colour. And 
then I asked him: ‘Where on earth are you supposed to put that one?’ Because it was 
totally ugly.   
 (Eva, secretary, mid 40s) 
 
In a sense, these interviewees adhere to a form of ‘anti-intellectualism’ (Skirbekk, 
2002), evident in their refusal to partake in certain forms of cultural practices, in their 
rejections of ‘meaningless’ cultural goods, as well as in their suspiciousness towards 
people who are perceived as pursuing intellectual interests. Indeed, cultural activities 
and goods which have no immediately comprehensible ‘purpose’ are viewed with 
undisguised suspicion. Goods and activities perceived as ‘meaningful’ and ‘useful’ 
are, by contrast, much more welcomed by these interviewees. If the perceived 
‘message’ of a painting, a film or a book can be related directly to their lives in a 
specific and matter-of-fact way, they report enthusiastic adherence, particularly if 
such goods provide ‘facts’ and practical ‘know-how’. The quintessential example of 
this practical instrumentalism is their taste for documentary films: 
 
V: Do you like watching telly? 
I: There are lots of things on telly…  And like I say, it’s mostly crap. But then there 
are documentaries! They’ve got some meaning, something you can learn from. There 
should be more of that stuff on telly. Whatever kind.  
 (Martin, carpenter, late 40s) 
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V: You mentioned films earlier. Can you elaborate on what kinds of films you prefer? 
I: I like documentaries, because they deal with something real, something that has 
actually happened. You know, there is so much rubbish out there. […] That’s why I 
like documentaries. That’s pretty cool. You get to know about some war, or 
something that has actually taken place in the past. […] It’s real in a sense. And you 
know it’s true. And most of the times you’re told a good story too. […] It’s kind of 
hard to explain. In other types of films, there’s this emptiness. It doesn’t lead you 
anywhere, it doesn’t give you anything. […] In a documentary you at least get a real 
story, a story you can tell to others. And that’s kind of cool.  
(Robert, electrician, mid 20s) 
 
As regards feature films, they do not care much for ‘plot’, ‘character development’ or 
other aspects so dear to their intellectual counterparts. Rather, technical aspects such 
as the use of special effects, sound quality, the size of the cinema screen and 
comfortable seats are emphasised: 
 
 V: What kinds of films do you prefer? 
I: I’m a boy. I like crash-bang-bang! You know, there has got to be some action. I 
like to go to the cinema to watch films. Cool special effects and stuff like that. […] 
But the cinema here in Stavanger is crap. Most of the people I know go to the cinema 
in Sandnes.98 […] It’s much better there. The premises are much better. And the 
sound quality. There’s no digital sound at the cinema in Stavanger. But in Sandnes 
everything’s digitalised. So the sound is better, and the seats. All the seats can be 
tilted backwards. So all my buddies haven’t been to the cinema in Stavanger for ages. 
[…] 
V: What about films at home? 
I: The TV screen is very important. […] Because I use it all the time. The size is 
important. It has to fit the living room. Right now I’ve got a forty-two inch screen. 
And a Blue-Ray player. You know, HD quality.   
(Jon, electrician, mid 20s) 
 
I don’t really watch that many films. But if I do, I have to go to the cinema. I’m that 
kind of guy. If you’re going to see a good movie, you have to go to the cinema. It’s 
much better than watching it at home. I’m thinking sound quality, the size of the 
screen… I guess it sounds strange, but that’s just the way it is.  
(Martin, carpenter, late 40s) 
 
                                              
98 Stavanger’s neighbouring town. 
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The practical orientation also manifests itself in their accounts of the consumption of 
material goods. Although they do not reject the idea that pleasure can be derived from 
acquiring such goods, they are nevertheless much more pragmatic and instrumental in 
their material tastes than their luxurious counterparts. Unlike the brand-conscious 
interviewees who emphasise preferential criteria such as ‘exclusivity’, ‘individuality’ 
and ‘authenticity’, these interviewees explicitly reject such criteria as ‘vanity’ and as 
dubious attempts to ‘show off’. They report choosing ‘reasonably priced’ alternatives, 
emphasising qualities such as ‘durability’, ‘reliability’ and ‘functionality’. Such 
criteria are particularly prevalent in their depictions of motor vehicles:       
 
I: Cars… Do you have an interest in cars? 
R: Well, I guess many will think I am weird or strange because of this, because I 
know many people have this interest in cars. Well, in one sense I’ve got an interest in 
cars too, but my interest is this: it has to cost as little as possible per kilometre. For 
me, a car is a necessary evil, something you have got to rely on, something that will 
always work, no matter what. But it has to cost as little as possible. I’m forty-four 
years old and I’m driving my third car. I guess that says it all. 
I: What kind of car is it? 
R: It’s a Toyota Avensis. When I buy a car, I spend a lot of time looking. It has to be 
around ten years old and in good condition. Then you can use it for another ten years. 
That way you’ll have a minimum decrease in value. And if there’s any minor 
damage, I’ll repair it myself.  
I: Is there any type of car you would never buy? 
R: Yeah, British cars. You know, Rover or Mini and stuff like that. Just watch the 
statistics! If you look in the car magazines, you’ll see what’s best in terms of fewest 
technical flaws. I want a car that keeps running for as long as possible. And Toyota 
usually comes out well in these kinds of statistics. […] For me, personally, if it takes 
me from A to B, I don’t need anything else. 
 (Patrick, construction worker, mid 40s) 
 
A practical orientation coupled with a distaste for ‘extravagance’ and ‘excesses’ is 
also apparent in other domains, such as in terms of furniture and interior design, food 
and beverages and clothing. Such goods should be ‘simple’, ‘inconspicuous’, 
‘ordinary’ and ‘reasonably priced’. The interviewees also explicitly contrast their 
consumption choices with those of people whom they consider ‘posh’:  
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V: Do you like wine? 
I: Uh… Well, I actually I do. I drink it at home, but not at bars. It’s because of the 
danger of being labelled posh, or a member of high society. So I stick to beer. At 
parties I might drink liquor. You know, mixed with something. […] But it’s mostly 
beer. Wine… that’s for the posh people. The refined, as they say. So I prefer beer.   
(Lars, security guard, mid 20s) 
 
V: Where do you buy your clothes? 
I: I usually go to these standard, regular shops, like Cubus or H&M. To me, a pair of 
jeans is a pair of jeans. If it fits, it doesn’t matter what brand it is. […] The only trend 
I’m influenced by is the one that my daughters dictate: ‘Dad, you cannot wear that 
shirt anymore!’ So that’s the only relationship I have to fashion and trends. […] I 
guess I’m member of the grey mass and I don’t need to distinguish myself, at least 
not in that way. I’d rather… If people want to make up their mind about me, then 
they have to base their opinions on what I say or what I do, not on how I look. […] I 
cannot see why people are so preoccupied with looks. I cannot understand that 
mentality. Well, I guess I understand that people have a certain need to stand out, or a 
wish to do so… But why? That I cannot comprehend. Because I’m at the other end of 
the scale, I don’t have such needs. 
V: Why do you think people do that? 
I: I guess they have certain thoughts that I don’t have. Like ‘I want to show off’. But 
I cannot see why. […] I don’t understand that way of thinking. Because if they had 
dressed me in such fancy clothes, I don’t know if I’d dare show my face outside my 
door. 
 (Patrick, construction worker, mid 40s) 
 
Arguably one may infer from the low degree of elaboration and specificity in their 
classificatory practices, as well as the high occurrence of explicit dis-identifications 
with people perceived as dubiously preoccupied with ‘squandering’ money and 
‘showing off’, that these interviewees’ orientation towards material goods is quite 
similar to their instrumental and pragmatic orientation towards cultural goods. Unless 
cultural goods endow them with immediate satisfaction in terms of entertainment, 
comfort or practical know-how, these interviewees simply do not see any point in 
craving them. The instrumentality implied in the practical mode of consumption is, 
however, of a rather different sort than in the educational mode of consumption. 
While they do seek to gain knowledge through consumption, they are more 
concerned with learning something of practical or technical value, rather than 
becoming ‘a better person’, ‘more cultivated’ or suchlike.   
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4.4 The classed distribution of cultural tastes 
Based on the assumption that the ways in which social actors classify cultural goods 
are indicative of their modes of appropriating them, I have constructed four main 
categories. Each category is marked by a common code, a shared belief, regarding 
what is considered good and bad taste. The fundamental line of division may be 
found between appropriating cultural goods as a means to an end, as opposed to 
appropriating cultural goods as an end in itself. Moreover, this fundamental 
opposition manifests itself somewhat differently in the material and cultural domains, 
meaning that the interviewees’ tastes for material goods and cultural goods do not 
necessarily follow the same logic. 
 
Although the categories constitute a typology of cultural tastes, they may also be read 
as a typology of social actors, as the differentiated classificatory practices represented 
by the four modes of consumption tend to originate from the same group of 
interviewees (see Table 1). This does not, however, mean that each interviewee in a 
given category shares all the traits emphasised in the analysis; rather, it means that 
they share most of them. The typology employed is to be read as abstractions, and 
thus inevitably as certain simplifications, of empirical patterns traceable in the 
interview data. As regards the ways in which interviewees classify cultural goods and 
their own relation to them, I maintain that these four categories represent the most 
important differences in the empirical data.  
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The intellectual mode of consumption 
 
 
The luxurious mode of consumption 
 
Elias, secondary school teacher, early 30s 
Emil, musician/social worker, late 30s 
Freja, head of cultural enterprise, mid 40s 
Jonas, head of cultural enterprise, mid 30s 
Julia, artist/illustrator, late 20s 
Oscar, academic, mid 30s 
Oliver, musician, mid 30s 
Olivia, head of cultural enterprise, late 40s 
Peter, cultural worker, mid 30s 
Philip, secondary school teacher, mid 30s 
Sara, journalist, mid 40s  
Sofia, academic, mid 60s 
Theodor, head of cultural enterprise, mid 
40s 
Thomas, journalist, early 40s 
 
 
Anna, manager, oil company, early 50s 
Georg, banker, late 40s 
Henrik, economist, early 60s 
Johan, CEO, mid 50s 
Kristian, dentist, late 30s 
Lucas, lawyer, early 30s 
Mikkel, manager, oil company, early 40s 
Pia, lawyer, late 40s 
Wilhelm, manager, oil company, early 40s 
 
The educational mode of consumption 
 
 
The practical mode of consumption 
 
August, economist, late 50’s 
Andrea, public sector consultant, early 30s 
Daniel, pre-school teacher, late 50s 
Ella, shop-keeper, mid 30s 
Emma, nurse, early 60s 
Helene, medical doctor, late 20s 
Klara, pre-school teacher, late 30s 
Lea, medical doctor, mid 30s 
Maria, primary school teacher, early 40s  
Marianne, manager, small firm, late 40s 
Marta, manager, small firm, mid 30s 
Nora, lawyer, mid 30s 
Oda, manager, small firm, late 30s 
Sebastian, politician, late 30s 
 
 
Aurora, pre-school assistant, mid 30s 
David, technician, mid 20s 
Elisabeth, nurse, late 20s 
Eva, secretary, mid 40s 
Jon, electrician, mid 20s 
Lars, security guard, mid 20s 
Martin, carpenter, late 40s 
Patrick, construction worker, mid 40s 
Robert, electrician, mid 20s 
 
 
Table 1: Modes of consumption 
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Having established these differences, I shall now turn to the question of the social 
distribution of cultural tastes. In the following the question of homology will be 
scrutinised. Two focal points will be discussed: first, the nature of the relationship 
between the social space and the symbolic space; and second, the notion of class 
habitus and the genesis of socially differentiated tastes. 
 
4.4.1 The social space and the symbolic space 
In Chapter 3 the interviewees were projected onto the local social space by means of 
MCA. Based on their capital profiles, i.e. the values of the variables used when 
constructing the space, their coordinates within the space could be located. The 
interviewees are dispersed across the topography of differentiated class positions, i.e. 
according both to the capital volume and the capital composition principles of social 
differentiation. Expanding on this construction, convex hulls99 have been drawn to 
represent the relative distribution of the four modes of consumption according to the 
structures of the social space (see Figure 4).  
                                              
99 The ‘convex hull’ (or ‘convex envelope’) of a set X of points in the Euclidean space is the smallest 
convex set that contains X. For instance, when X is a bounded subset of the plane, the convex hull 
may be visualized as the shape formed by a rubber band stretched around X (De Berg et al, 2008: 
2ff). 
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Figure 4: The classed distribution of tastes, fac.plane 1-2 
 
As we can see, interviewees characterised by the intellectual mode of consumption 
are rather homogenous in their capital profiles, clustering in the upper left quadrant of 
the social space, implying that they are endowed with a high volume of overall 
capital, with relatively more cultural than economic capital. These interviewees are 
by far the most endowed with educational qualifications, and typically have MAs in 
the arts and humanities, some even PhDs. They also come from more ‘educated’ 
backgrounds, as their parents possess more educational qualifications than the parents 
of the other interviewees. They do, however, earn relatively less than the top earners 
in the sample, and they also own fewer economic assets. Comprised of academics, 
secondary school teachers, cultural producers, journalists and heads of local cultural 
enterprises, they are mostly employed in the public sector. 
Capital volume + 
Capital volume - 
Cult.cap. + 
Econ.cap. - 
Econ.cap. +
Cult.cap. - 
The intellectual 
mode of consumption 
The luxurious 
mode of consumption
The practical 
mode of consumption 
The educational 
mode of consumption 
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By contrast, interviewees characterised by the luxurious mode of consumption are 
typically located in the upper right quadrant of the social space, implying that they 
are endowed with a high volume of mostly economic capital. They are by far the 
highest income earners in the sample, and they typically have economic assets in the 
form of real estate, stocks, second homes, boats and cars. While most of them are 
educated, none of them are educated in the arts and humanities. Typically, they have 
educational qualifications equivalent to BA level. Their backgrounds are fairly 
mixed. Comprised of CEOs, managers, lawyers, dentists and economists, this 
category of interviewees are almost exclusively employed in the private sector.  
 
More dispersed across the social space than the previous two categories, the 
interviewees characterised by the educational mode of consumption are rather 
heterogeneous in their capital profiles. Most of them have educational qualifications 
equivalent to BA degrees or slightly lower. Relative to the other interviewees, they 
typically earn medium wages, and they rarely have other economic assets. Their 
backgrounds are mixed. Comprised of primary school teachers, pre-school teachers, 
medical doctors and nurses, but also managers of oil firms, bankers, consultants and 
shopkeepers, this category of interviewees is fairly evenly dispersed between the 
public and private sector.  
 
Finally, interviewees characterised by the practical mode of consumption are rather 
homogenous in their capital profiles, typically located in the lower quadrants of the 
social space, implying low volumes of overall capital. As only one of them has higher 
educational qualifications, they are by far the least educated in the sample. As regards 
economic capital, they are on average the lowest earning category of interviewees. 
Comprised of carpenters, machinists, electricians, secretaries, engineers and security 
guards, this category of interviewees are mostly employed in the private sector.  
 
Given these marked differences in the interviewees’ positions in the social space, this 
would indicate that different modes of consumption are differentially distributed 
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according to the structures of the social space, i.e. both according to the capital 
volume and capital composition principles of social differentiation. While the 
composition principle may not differentiate in the lower quadrants of the social space, 
quite the opposite is true of the upper quadrants. As there is a marked difference 
between the tastes of those endowed with high volumes of cultural capital 
(represented by the intellectual mode of consumption) and those endowed with high 
volumes of economic capital (represented by the luxurious mode of consumption), 
the composition principle of differentiation is, indeed, pivotal. This point is important 
to highlight, as social differentiation in terms of capital composition is rarely 
discussed in the contemporary literature on the relationship between cultural 
differentiation and social stratification. While Stavanger may, of course, be an 
exceptional empirical case in this regard, it is my contention that the theoretical-
methodological approach employed in this analysis has unearthed important 
structural oppositions that might otherwise have been left unnoticed. The capital 
composition principle of social differentiation may be more pivotal than previously 
presumed. 
 
Moreover, as both the capital volume and compositional principles of social 
differentiation seem to be so prominent, the patterns found have important affinities 
with Rosenlund’s (2000c, 2002a, 2009a) statistical analyses of cultural consumption 
in Stavanger. Although the nature of the interview data employed in the present 
analysis does not allow for testing the ‘significance’ of the patterns found in a 
statistical sense, much less for empirical generalisation to a wider population (e.g. all 
the inhabitants in Stavanger), the fact that these findings are tangent to Rosenlund’s 
analyses of survey data lends support to the claim that both what the people of 
Stavanger consume, as well as how they perceive, appreciate and appropriate their 
cultural products of choice, follow class lines. Viewed together, these analyses 
suggest that there are homologies between the symbolic space and the social space, 
and that these correspondences are reflected in the classificatory practices of social 
actors. The social distribution of tastes is, indeed, classed. 
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It remains, however, to discuss the social genesis of these socially differentiated 
classificatory practices. So far I have merely superimposed a phenomenology on a 
social topology, as it were. True, we have seen important structural affinities between 
the interviewees’ positions in the social space and their classificatory practices, but 
how do the mental structures relate to the external structures of society? In what ways 
can the former be said to structure the latter, as the Bourdieusian homology argument 
suggests?  
 
4.4.2 Class habitus 
One of the key building blocks in Bourdieu’s theory of practice is habitus. Following 
his Durkheimian heritage, Bourdieu (1996b: 1) holds that there exists a 
correspondence between social structures and mental structures, i.e. between the 
objective divisions of the social world and the subjective principles of ‘vision and 
divisions’ that social actors apply to it. Moreover, he holds that the two are 
structurally homologous because they are genetically linked, implying that the latter 
is an ‘embodiment’ of the former. However, the notion of habitus is disputed (e.g. 
Alexander, 1995; Lahire, 2003, 2004; Bennett et al, 2009). The most serious 
objection to the usefulness of the term is its ‘deterministic’ and ‘tautological’ 
implications. However, it might be fruitful to analytically distinguish between 
individual habitus and class habitus, and thus derive separate empirical questions 
from each theoretical construct (Flemmen, 2010). One might ask whether there is an 
internal coherence within a given actor’s schemes of perception and appreciation, and 
whether social actors located closely in the social space tend to be endowed with 
similar dispositions. In short, the former has to do with intra-individual coherence 
within a social actor’s schemes of perception and appreciation, and the latter has to 
do with the inter-individual coherence between groups of social actors located in 
proximity in the social space. 
 
As regards the question of intra-individual coherence, Lahire (2008; see also Bennett 
et al, 2009) holds that individual cultural taste profiles are often composed of 
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‘dissonant’ or heterogeneous elements, meaning, for instance, that a given social 
actor may have one way of appreciating one form of cultural goods (say, television), 
a second way of appreciating a second form (say, literature), and so on. Thus, Lahire 
calls into question the usefulness of the notion of habitus and its depiction of 
dispositions as unitarily transposable and durable. However, while Lahire should be 
credited for highlighting the danger of taking intra-individual homogeneity as given 
and thus employing Bourdieusian notions such as habitus in uncritical ways, such 
‘dissonance’ is hardly detectable in the present empirical case. On the contrary, the 
interviewees are strikingly coherent in their classifications of a wide variety of goods, 
even types of goods they are less familiar with. For example, the interviewees 
characterised by the intellectual mode of consumption are on the lookout for 
‘challenging’ and ‘new’ experiences through their cultural consumption, whether this 
is through books, movies, plays or the visual arts. And even if a given interviewee in 
this category may be less familiar with one field of consumption – say, the visual arts 
– s/he does not, however, relate to such cultural goods in a completely different 
manner, but continues to seek intellectual challenges when s/he encounters paintings, 
installations or other visual works of art. This is not to say that the interviewee 
appreciates the visual arts in exactly the same way as s/he appreciates literature, but it 
does mean that there are important affinities in the ways in which s/he relates to the 
two. In other words, the empirical data supports the idea that classificatory schemes 
are transposable from one field of consumption to another.100  
 
Related to the discussion about the ‘whats’ and ‘hows’ of cultural consumption, I 
would thus argue that what may seem like heterogeneous ‘dissonance’ at the level of 
opus operatum due to a given interviewee’s ‘eclectic’ taste for a wide range of goods 
(both between and within cultural domains and genres) is revealed as highly 
                                              
100 According to Bourdieu (1990b: 53), the habitus is also ’durable’, meaning that the schemes of 
perception and appreciation tend to be similar throughout a given social agent’s trajectory. In other 
words, the ways in which a given social agent perceive, appreciate and appropriate cultural products 
is likely to be similar as time goes by. As the nature of the empirical data does not allow for a 
diachronic analysis, this empirical question is outside the scope of this thesis. 
 160
homogenous and coherent at the level of modus operandi, as these goods – 
notwithstanding their difference in form and content – are appropriated in a similar 
manner. In other words, eclecticism and hybridisation are at the heart of the modus 
operandi of certain social actors, which, far from revealing ‘dissonance’, instead 
suggests that an inclination for aesthetical transgression is itself inscribed in the 
habitus of these actors. Thus, there is nothing contradictory in the idea that people’s 
preferences and tastes are structured by their socially constituted habitus, while 
exhibiting preferences for a variety of cultural goods.  
 
As regards inter-individual coherence, we have seen that the categories are distributed 
systematically according to the structures of the social space. Each category of 
interviewees is characterised by a distinct mode of appropriating goods which marks 
them off from interviewees in the other categories. Moreover, as the interviewees 
within each of the four categories are located in proximity in the social space – which 
implies that there are affinities between the interviewees’ classificatory practices and 
their class positions – this lends support to the idea of class habitus. This does not, 
however, mean that the interviewees are endowed with the exact same schemes of 
perception and appreciation, but rather that each individual system of dispositions is a 
structural variant of the others in the category, expressing the uniqueness of its 
position within a sector of the social space. According to Bourdieu (1984: 170), the 
social space represents the social and economic conditions under which the capacity 
to differentiate between and appreciate cultural goods is constituted. This does not 
necessarily imply that the interviewees have consciously adjusted their aspirations 
according to their chances of obtaining certain cultural goods, nor that they would 
have craved something else if they had had the means to acquire and/or appreciate 
them (cf. Elster, 1981, 1985). Rather, it suggests that the possibilities and 
impossibilities are already inscribed in the objective social and economic conditions 
associated with different positions in the social space. Thus, social actors do not 
directly react to objective conditions of existence; rather they react to these conditions 
as apprehended through the socially constituted schemes that organise their 
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perceptions. Social actors are, in other words, predisposed to certain modes of 
practice due to prior and on-going conditioning. 
 
The propensity to distinguish, classify and allow these conceptual distinctions to 
influence one’s consumption choices is, indeed, more prominent among the capital-
rich interviewees in the sample. Notwithstanding their differences in the types of 
goods to which they are drawn, they share the capacity and the willingness to 
classify, which clearly sets them apart from the other interviewees. Moreover, these 
interviewees have a propensity to appreciate a given good as an end in itself, i.e. non-
instrumentally, which resembles Bourdieu’s description of the ‘pure gaze’ and the 
‘aesthetic disposition’, meaning 
 
the capacity to consider, in and for themselves, as form rather than function, not only 
the works designated for such appreciation, i.e., legitimate works of art, but 
everything in the world, including cultural objects which are not yet consecrated – 
such as, at one time primitive arts, or, nowadays, popular photography or kitsch – and 
natural objects. (Bourdieu, 1984: 3)  
 
Inclined to move towards goods which do not (yet) bear the label of ‘commonness’, 
these interviewees are endowed with a ‘sense of distinction’ and a ‘feel for the game’. 
While there are variations in the extent to which they subjectively acknowledge 
taking part in such a ‘game’ (some playfully and reflexively self-analyse their 
competitive distinguishing strategies, while others resolutely refuse to take part in 
such games), the capital-rich interviewees share the capacity and propensity to seek 
out goods which they perceive as ‘rare’, ‘challenging’ and ‘refined’. 
 
Due to a synchronic research design, this analysis cannot directly point to changes in 
preferences for goods over time. Yet the ways in which these interviewees classify 
goods indicate that goods once valorised may cease to attract their interest as time 
goes by. For instance, if a rare good becomes accessible to a wider group of people, 
the specialness and individuality of this will decrease accordingly, and it thus loses its 
value as a mark of social distinction. The ‘popular’ and the ‘common’ are often 
 162
frowned upon by interviewees located in the upper sectors of the social space, if not 
shunned completely. Moreover, if these people perceive that ‘the wrong kinds of 
people’ are adopting their cultural styles, they are quick to move away; the Hopper 
painting is hidden in the basement and PH lamps and Arne Jacobsen chairs will 
definitely not be bought. While such goods might once have functioned as marks of 
social distinction, inflationary processes have rendered them ‘too obvious’ in the 
minds of interviewees endowed with a feel for the game. This process, referred to by 
Bourdieu (1984: 481) as a competitive ‘paperchase’, in effect implies a steady 
inflation in the symbolic value of goods. Thus, for social actors to ensure distinctive 
stylistic gaps between themselves and others, new goods and new practices must be 
appropriated. It is, however, important to highlight that changing preferences for 
goods over time do not imply that consumption choices are subjectively intended as 
the pursuit of social distinction. On the contrary, those endowed with a feel for the 
game are drawn, as if by instinct, towards goods that interest them and, by the same 
token, away from those that do not.  
 
Conversely, interviewees located in the lower sectors of the social space, i.e. those 
poorly endowed with capital of either form, not only betray a strikingly lower ability 
and/or willingness to distinguish between goods, some of them even explicitly reject 
such classificatory practices and dis-identify with people perceived as preoccupied 
with such matters. They want no part in the game of cultural distinctions. The ways in 
which these interviewees classify goods do, as opposed to those located in the upper 
sectors of the social space, indicate a strikingly instrumental orientation towards both 
cultural and material goods. The goods are appropriated as a means to an end. Their 
taste orientations resemble what Bourdieu (1984: 4) refers to as a ‘popular aesthetic’, 
meaning ‘the affirmation of a continuity between art and life, which implies the 
subordination of form to function.’ Insofar as the different modes of consumption can 
be analysed in terms of position-takings within a field of cultural consumption, and 
that the capacity to differentiate and classify is differentially distributed according to 
the structures of this field, one could argue that those who refuse to take part in the 
game deny themselves what is already denied to them. As noted by Bourdieu,  
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The most improbable practices are […] excluded, as unthinkable, by a kind of 
immediate submission to the order that inclines agents to make a virtue of necessity, 
that is, to refuse what is anyway denied and to will the inevitable. (Bourdieu, 1990b: 
54)  
 
While this version of a ‘sour grapes’ argument admittedly remains speculative at this 
point in the analysis, it will be further discussed in the two subsequent chapters, 
where the interviewees’ classifications of other people’s tastes will be scrutinised. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
There are rather clear differences between qualitatively different modes of 
appropriating cultural goods to be found in the interview data, and these seem linked 
to the interviewees’ positions in the local social space, i.e. in the relative distribution 
of different species of capital. Coupled with Rosenlund’s (2000c, 2002a, 2009a) 
statistical analyses of cultural practices and tastes in Stavanger, these findings 
indicate that both what social actors consume and participate in, as well as how they 
appropriate and appreciate goods, follow systematic patterns. Different tastes and 
lifestyles are clearly linked to the relation between social actors’ volume of and 
composition of different species of capital. I have argued that these findings lend 
support to the general sociological idea that social actors located in similar positions 
in the social space tend to be endowed with similar dispositions and embodied 
practical senses, or what one might call class habitus, which, in turn, generate similar 
practices and tastes which differ systematically from those of social actors located 
elsewhere in the social space. The analysis lends support to the argument that the 
further away from ‘necessity’ social actors are situated (i.e. the more capital they are 
endowed with), the more likely they are to exhibit a ‘feel for the game’ of cultural 
distinctions. 
 
While these findings are tangent to those of Rosenlund, they also expand on and in a 
sense move beyond them. Based on the assumption that there might be discrepancies 
between cultural practices at the level of opus operatum and those at the level of 
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modus operandi, Rosenlund’s analyses may thus be problematized. While there may 
be a connection between what social actors consume and how they consume their 
cultural products of choice, this is not necessarily so. A given object may be 
apprehended in several different ways, and conversely, different objects may be 
apprehended in similar ways. Treating the symbolic meaning of a given cultural good 
as fixed is thus highly problematical. Accordingly, the patterns found in Rosenlund’s 
analyses may not be as clear-cut symbolically as they appear in the results of the 
MCA. On the one hand, cultural goods shown to be differentially distributed may not 
be perceived as such by social actors, and statistical oppositions may not necessarily 
constitute antagonistic tastes that are held with any notable commitment by the 
cultural consumers themselves. On the other hand, cultural goods shown to be 
statistically ‘common’ may nevertheless be perceived differently by social actors 
located in different sectors of the social space, implying differences not easily 
captured by survey data. 
 
Given the systematic differences represented by the four categories of taste 
orientations constructed above, it would seem reasonable to claim that the analytical 
decoupling of the ‘whats’ and ‘hows’ of cultural consumption has revealed the two 
are not directly related. Goods are apprehended in qualitatively different manners by 
interviewees located in different sectors of the social space, practices that may be 
shown to be ‘common’ in a statistical sense may not be that common after all. What 
at first sight may seem like a cultural ‘common ground’ is – when the ways in which 
the cultural goods are appropriated are taken into account – revealed as highly 
differentiated. For instance, the act of attending a performance of the play The Wild 
Duck might not, in itself, have a fixed meaning attached to it, as person A might 
appreciate it in a qualitatively different manner than person B. Thus, differences at 
the level of modus operandi might imply that the symbolic space is even more 
differentiated than an analysis at the level of opus operatum might suggest. Echoing 
scholars such as Clarke (1975), Hebdige (1979), Bourdieu (1984), Fiske (1989), and 
Holt (1997), this analysis has thus highlighted the importance of taking the ways in 
which cultural products are appropriated into account.  
  165
While the arguments here do not contradict those of Rosenlund, this point is 
nevertheless important, as other researchers – in particular adherents of the omnivore 
thesis – tend to pitch empirical evidence of a seemingly increasing cultural common 
ground against the Bourdieusian homology argument. A fundamental premise in the 
omnivore thesis is that the more social actors located in the upper sectors of the social 
space tend to like or do the same things as people located elsewhere, the less 
distinctive their lifestyles and tastes. But, as we have seen, liking the same things 
does not necessarily indicate similar tastes. On the contrary, when common cultural 
goods are appropriated in a different manner, this can even make a given practice 
more distinctive. The present empirical findings thus cast serious doubt upon the 
validity of the claims of Chan and Goldthorpe (2005, 2007b, 2007c, 2007d), as it 
would be highly misleading to assume that univorousness (i.e. the propensity to 
like/participate in strictly ‘high-brow’ cultural forms) equals distinctive tastes, and 
that omnivorousness (i.e. the propensity to straddle the divide between ‘highbrow’, 
‘middlebrow’ and ‘lowbrow’ cultural forms) equals somewhat indistinctive or 
‘blurred’ tastes. Thus, claims about the declining significance of a classed distribution 
of lifestyles and tastes would, in this empirical case, be virtually ungrounded. 
 
There are, however, different stances among the proponents of the omnivore thesis, 
and not everyone depicts omnivorousness as tantamount to indistinct cultural tastes. 
In Peterson and Kern’s article from 1996, it is noted that: 
 
As we understand the meaning of omnivorous taste, it does not signify that the 
omnivore likes everything indiscriminately. Rather, it signifies an openness to 
appreciating everything. In this sense it is antithetical to snobbishness, which is based 
fundamentally on rigid rules of exclusion. […] While by definition hostile to 
snobbish closure […], omnivorousness does not imply an indifference to distinctions. 
Rather its emergence may suggest the formulation of new rules governing symbolic 
boundaries. (Peterson and Kern, 1996: 904) 
 
Thus, Peterson and Kern (see also Peterson, 1992; Peterson and Simkus, 1992; 
Bryson, 1996; Tampubolon, 2008; Warde et al, 2007) suggest that the eclecticism 
associated with the omnivore figure is a new embodiment of class domination in that 
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it implies a capacity to reflect and absorb previously opposed elements of cultural 
taste. However, such claims are still caught up in the erroneous idea that the socially 
distinguished cultural consumer in the Bourdieusian sense is an exclusive ‘snob’ who 
shuns everything popular. Thus, cultural eclecticism is depicted as something 
fundamentally new and mistakenly contrast it to the practice of the ‘cultural avant-
garde’, whose eclecticism and cultural jamming were, in fact, held to be part of its 
distinguishing characteristics (Bourdieu, 1984: 282ff). The main problem with this 
kind of reasoning is that cultural eclecticism is depicted as something that 
reconfigures and challenges ‘old’ principles of taste distribution. Though eclecticism 
may have become increasingly prominent recently, there is nothing about it that 
contradicts the homology argument, as long as the ways in which cultural goods are 
perceived, appreciated and appropriated are distributed according to the structures of 
the social space. Given the empirical findings in this analysis, the opposition between 
the omnivore argument and the homology argument would, in this case at least, be 
false. Thus, to exclusively focus on the fact that social actors located in the upper 
sector of the social space exhibit ‘broad’ tastes that tend to straddle the divide 
between the sociologist’s pre-constructed categories of taste cultures, would indeed 
result in a reductive view which would draw attention away from important 
differentiating processes.  
 
While cultural eclecticism deserves empirical scrutiny, my contention – in line with 
the arguments forwarded by Savage and Gayo (2011), Atkinson (2011) and Rimmer 
(2012) – is that this would best be performed without the notion of omnivorousness. 
And while social actors’ pursuit of exclusiveness in one sense maintains a permanent 
revolution in tastes (evident, for instance, in the ever-changing tides of fashion), the 
underlying structural oppositions between different cultural tastes may remain intact, 
as this implies a securing of a steadfast difference vis-à-vis social actors less 
successful in such pursuits. Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose. The crucial 
question regarding the social distribution of tastes should thus not be whether taste 
differentials take on the exact same forms across contexts, but whether there are 
affinities in the ways these are structured. So though goods sociologists usually depict 
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as ‘highbrow culture’ may be less consumed and/or less valorised in present day 
Stavanger than in Bourdieu’s France in the 1960s and 1970s, the social distribution of 
tastes is still highly classed. And though it may be interesting to scrutinise the social 
trajectories of certain cultural goods in different social contexts, this would imply a 
highly reductive view if the litmus test for assessing the homology thesis was whether 
or not cultural goods once predominantly distributed in certain sectors of the social 
space, in a certain country, at a certain point in time, still function as markers of 
social distinction. 
 
However, as regards the overarching discussion of class, status and closure outlined 
in Chapter 1, the empirical findings pointing to a systematic and ‘classed’ distribution 
of cultural tastes are not in themselves sufficient to make claims about group 
formation and power differentials. Cultural differentiation does not necessarily imply 
social closure, let alone relations of domination between groups of social actors 
located in different sectors of the social space. As the divisions drawn in this chapter 
are primarily based on patterns of cultural consumption – and not social estimations 
of honour and prestige associated with specific lifestyles and tastes – the categories 
employed are, at this stage in the analysis, to be considered only as distributive 
groupings. True, social actors like different things and they like the same things 
differently, but this does not necessarily mean that such differences serve as the basis 
for social exclusion and the formation of more or less esteemed social collectives.  
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5.1 Introduction 
Previous research on social stratification in Stavanger and other Norwegian cities has 
suggested that a classed marital endogamy and tendencies for residential segregation 
facilitate a demographic clustering of individuals into more or less amorphous 
communal groups (e.g. Hansen, 1995; Rosenlund, 2000c, 2009a, 2011; Ljunggren, 
2010; Ljunggren and Andersen, 2012). Although there are reasons to suspect that a 
classed distribution of cultural tastes and lifestyles is an important factor in the 
structuring of how such social relationships coincide, there have been relatively few 
attempts to empirically assess how such processes develop. As previously noted, the 
assumption that lifestyle differentiation will inevitably lead to social closure is 
problematical. So even though the previous chapter has shown that the interviewees 
express explicit and at times quite harsh and condescending descriptions of certain 
lifestyles and cultural practices, this does not necessarily mean that they will avoid 
interaction with the bearers of such cultural tastes. As Lahire has pointed out: ‘there 
is nothing contradictory in the idea that someone might dislike something whilst 
believing that others are perfectly within their rights to like it’ (Lahire, 2008: 183). In 
the following two chapters the question of social closure and the formation of more or 
less exclusive status groups on the basis of subjective evaluations of other people’s 
lifestyles will be addressed.  
 
As accounted for in Chapter 2, social closure may result from both formalised and 
non-formalised social relationships. Viewed as ideal types, formalised closure is 
comprised of objective boundaries in terms of property, credentials and certificates 
legally sanctioned by the state (see for instance Parkin, 1979; Collins, 1979); 
meanwhile, non-formalised closure is comprised of crystallised boundaries created by 
social actors’ choice of friends and partners, exclusive social networks, residential 
segregation, preferences as regards leisure activities and so forth (see for instance 
Bourdieu, 1984; Lamont, 1992; Hansen, 1995; Bottero, 2005). While the latter type 
of closure may be no less ‘real’ than the former, it is not secured to the same extent 
by legal and institutional backing. Whereas the exclusiveness of, say, medical doctors 
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or other members of numerus clausus professions is legally secured by educational 
qualifications, the exclusiveness of bearers of certain cultural tastes and lifestyles is, 
by contrast, not formalised in the same way: hence it is far more dependent on 
subjective evaluations of esteem, honour and prestige. Moreover, as the exclusiveness 
of certain lifestyles is potentially kept under the continuous threat of inflation due to 
outsiders’ adopting these lifestyles, it is all the more dependent on social actors’ 
subjective boundary drawing and closure strategies. While these two types of social 
closure may be empirically entwined, they nevertheless represent an important 
analytical distinction. Indeed, if an argument concerning the exclusionary effects of 
lifestyle differentials is to be plausible, it needs to be demonstrated that these 
differentials bring about social closure in their own right, meaning that they are not 
merely epiphenomena of other stratifying processes. It is thus an important empirical 
endeavour to map out the ways in which social actors actually classify, evaluate and 
estimate others people’s tastes and lifestyles.  
 
Based on the assumption that the ways in which people classify, evaluate and 
estimate other people’s lifestyles are indicative of elective affinities and processes of 
group inclusion and exclusion, I ask whether, and if so how, such symbolic boundary 
drawing amounts to social closure. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, different 
cultural tastes are distributed both according to the capital volume principle and the 
capital composition principle of social differentiation. The composition principle was 
particularly prevalent in the upper sectors of the social space, i.e. among the capital-
rich interviewees in the sample. This line of division is by far the most prominent 
when it comes to explicit classifications of other people in derogatory or 
condescending terms. The kind of boundary drawing directed ‘vertically’ in the social 
space will be treated in Chapter 6. This chapter, however, is concerned with the kind 
of boundary work directed ‘horizontally’ in the social space, i.e. dis-identifications 
and mutual classifications of disapproval among people located in the cultural and 
economic fractions of the upper sectors of the social space. 
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First of all, I map out mutual antipathies between the class fractions and discuss the 
ways in which aesthetical and moral criteria of evaluation are manifested in the 
interviewees’ evaluations of other people’s lifestyles. I then chart the interviewees’ 
‘sense of their place’ in Stavanger’s urban areas. Finally, the significance of the 
capital composition principle of social differentiation will be discussed in relation to 
strategies of social closure.  
 
5.2 Mutual antagonism 
Echoing previous research on symbolic boundary drawing in Norway (Skarpenes, 
2007; Skarpenes and Sakslind, 2010; Fagerheim, 2008; Hansen, 2012) the 
interviewees in the present empirical case are generally somewhat reluctant to talk 
condescendingly about other people’s tastes and lifestyles perceived as different from 
their own. While they certainly express an awareness of difference, they typically 
express certain reservations before or after uttering their antipathies (‘I’m not saying 
that my taste is better than theirs, but…’; ‘Oh, that was an awful thing to say’). 
However, there is an important exception to this general picture. While the 
interviewees are typically reluctant to talk condescendingly about people perceived as 
somewhat unsuccessfully adopting, or erroneously practising, lifestyles similar to 
their own – exemplified by the CEO cautiously talking about the ‘cheap’ holiday 
habits of the less economically fortunate, or the art professor prudently expressing a 
certain distance to the ‘vulgar’ reading habits of the less educated – it seems they are 
much less cautious when it comes to expressing antipathies towards lifestyles and 
practices perceived as alien to their own, especially when such practices are 
associated with types of people perceived as representatives of ‘the elite’. 
 
Put in somewhat simplified terms, those richly endowed with cultural capital express 
an aversion to the lifestyles and practices of those richly endowed with economic 
capital, and vice versa. Indeed, it is striking how the capital composition principle is 
manifested in the interviewees’ derogatory classifications and evaluations of other 
people’s tastes. Among those endowed with relatively more cultural than economic 
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capital, those depicted as ‘the others’ usually means ‘the economic elite’, ‘the 
privileged’, ‘the upper class’ and the like; whereas those endowed with relatively 
more economic than cultural capital depict ‘the others’ as ‘the cultural elite’, ‘the 
cultured people’, ‘the intellectual snobs’ and so forth. While they draw on remarkably 
similar classificatory repertoires in depicting ‘the others’ as representatives of ‘the 
elite’, they typically have different conceptions of what constitutes such elites.  
 
5.2.1 The cultural fraction versus the economic fraction 
The most explicitly expressed aversions to other peoples’ lifestyles and tastes are 
found among the interviewees located in the cultural fraction of the upper sectors of 
the social space. We have already seen how the academics, teachers and cultural 
producers elaborately expressed their likes and dislikes of cultural goods in the 
previous chapter, and they express their aversions to other cultural consumers in a 
similar vein. The ultimate target for their aversions is those who lead expensive 
lifestyles rendered possible by the booming oil industry: 
 
V: How would you compare your way of life to other people in Stavanger? 
I: This is a crude generalisation, because everyone’s not like this… But there is a 
certain tendency here in Stavanger… Stavanger is very nouveau riche because of the 
oil industry. And I get this feeling that many people are very preoccupied with 
money. […] Money is the main driving force, in a sense. You can tell by all the status 
symbols you see popping up everywhere. You’re supposed to have the coolest car, 
the latest gadgets and the most expensive furniture. And it all adds up to these 
dreadful, empty apartments where everything is painted white. You know, with the 
most expensive stereos, the most expensive sofas… But they’re totally devoid of 
substance. […] So I guess I’m sort of on the outside of the sphere of all the 
Stavangerians who are driven by money. You know, the urge to earn money, at any 
expense, and show it off too.    
 (Theodor, head of cultural enterprise, mid 40s) 
 
Endowed with a self-conscious perception of themselves as ‘intellectuals’, ‘artists’ 
and ‘cultural producers’, several interviewees report feeling marginalised in an 
environment perceived as inhabited and dominated by cultural consumers 
conspicuously displaying lifestyles, tastes and values alien to their own:  
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Well, being an out-of-towner originally, the biggest culture-shock that hit me when I 
moved here was all the private wealth. […] You get the impression that there is a big 
divide between those who fall through and those who strive for bigger gardens, 
houses and cars. Period. There’s nothing in between. 
 (Jonas, head of cultural enterprise, mid 30s) 
 
This town is characterised by this individualised attitude that reveals itself first and 
foremost through the ballot box. It’s very blue and conservative. And that symbolises 
what people want for this town and the region. I guess it’s because of the huge 
business community here. It’s overflowing with money. The wealth is just enormous. 
[…] People are getting more and more vain. There are less limits to showing off your 
riches than elsewhere. It can be seen in the fleets of cars and all the huge villas. 
People want it big. 
(Elias, high school teacher, early 30s) 
 
The interviewees regard Stavanger as pervaded by ‘egoistic’ and ‘individualistic’ 
values, represented by right-wing political attitudes, a striving for material luxury and 
a conspicuous display of expensive status symbols. Apparently, the practitioners of 
such lifestyles are viewed as somewhat dubious types of people who make an 
inappropriate mark on their surroundings. Moreover, several interviewees report that 
the city lacks a ‘proper intelligentsia’, and those identifying as ‘intellectuals’ feel 
alienated in what is perceived as a rather hostile and cold environment. What is 
missing, they would say, is people endowed with ‘sufficient cultural competence’: 
 
From my point of view, there are very few people who are endowed with sufficient 
cultural competence. There’s more money than cultural competence in this town. […] 
In the old days, we had people like Kjølv Egeland.101 We had people who were well-
informed and well-versed in all cultural fields. They were all-rounders, so to speak. 
And they were endowed with proper cultural judgement. Now there are very few 
people of that type. 
 (Sofia, academic, mid 60s) 
 
We live in the oil capital of Norway, as they say. And that has made Stavanger 
awfully rich. The housing expenses are enormous. I mean, it’s really expensive to 
live. And the population is affected in several ways by the oil business and the 
development in that regard. First of all, there are lots of practical people here, people 
who either work out in the oil fields, or people who make a living by producing 
                                              
101 Norwegian politician representing the Labour Party. Egeland served as Minister of Education and 
Church Affairs in the years 1976-1979. 
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something for the oil industry. It’s all very practical. That’s the main focus here, and 
it affects politics and the ways things are done. You know, ‘How can we fix this? 
How do we arrange it all in a practical way?’ And people demand to see concrete 
results. It’s all dominated by the engineering spirit, economists and that sort of 
competence. ‘How do we extract the oil in the best possible way? And how do we 
distribute the wealth in the best possible way?’[…] What Stavanger lacks, are those 
who complicate matters, who resist and throw spanners into the works, so to speak. 
People who prevent everything from being oiled and clean. There are hardly any 
philosophers, social scientists or humanists here. Well, there are some, of course. 
But, generally, the population is too homogenous and too characterized by clean-cut, 
sporty types of people.  
 (Thomas, journalist, early 40s) 
 
While Thomas is quick to point out that he is a ‘supporter of diversity’ and that the 
people working in oil-related businesses perform a function in the local environment, 
the problem is that the philosophers, humanists and social scientists are somewhat 
suppressed by the homogeneity of the economists and engineers of the oil industry. 
Moreover, one of the most troublesome repercussions of the oil industry which is 
expressed is the expensive consumer culture it has introduced:   
 
V: We were talking about private wealth and consumption… Are there any 
consumption styles you disapprove of? 
I: Yes, indeed! We talked about clothes earlier, and my impression is that there are 
lots of people in this town who…  I mean, there are clothing stores in this town that 
couldn’t have been located elsewhere. The prices are beyond imagination. And there 
are circles where stuff like that is valued, appreciated and recognised. It gives status. 
And that’s why stores like that are viable. They have lots of customers. And it’s all 
because people can afford it. There are insane amounts of money floating around, and 
there are hardly any barriers for going out flashing your new 18 000 kroner fur coat. 
You can do it and people will admire you for it. You stand out from the crowd you’ll 
get recognised. And obviously it’s important for some. […] There’s a lot of money 
here, and people want to show it. 
 (Sara, journalist, mid 40s) 
 
While few, if any, problematise private economic wealth in itself, there are certainly 
many opinions about how ‘the rich’ spend their money. ‘Flashy’, ‘vain’, ‘vulgar’ and 
‘shallow’ are the terms commonly used to classify the lifestyles of the rich:     
 
There is obviously a flourishing of private wealth in this region. And it’s very flashy. 
These people want to show their riches off.  […] Why do people have to drive around 
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in these big cars, these SUVs? It’s just a status marker. It’s just to show off. Bah! All 
these nice houses with the right furniture, the right lamps and God knows what… 
 (Oscar, academic, mid 30s) 
 
V: You mentioned something earlier about vulgar behaviour. What did you mean by 
that? 
I: Well, like I said earlier, it’s all about the discreet charm of the bourgeoisie, or, 
rather, the lack of it. You know, a type of rowdy and conspicuous display of wealth 
that you see a lot of in this town. For instance, I don’t like the boat race they arrange 
here every year. That Formula 1 boat race in Vågen. That’s just tacky. […] People 
with styled, greasy hair, gold VISA cards and loud personalities, ploughing their way 
through crowds. It’s not a pretty sight.  
 (Thomas, journalist, early 40s) 
 
Wittily referring to the Luis Buñuel 1972 film Le Charme Discret de la Bourgeoisie, 
Thomas conceives of the ‘loudness of the bourgeoisie’ – the exact opposite of a 
‘discreet charm’ – as representing a lack of character. Indeed, Stavanger’s 
economically privileged are repeatedly depicted as ‘indiscreet’, ‘flashy’, ‘rowdy’, 
‘loud’ and the like. Moreover, they are thought to live ‘superficial’, ‘inauthentic’ and 
‘empty’ lives. Such perceived inauthenticity is especially linked to the consumption 
of material goods considered to be ‘unnecessary’, an expression of ‘superficiality’: 
 
I: There are lots of people here in Stavanger with lots of money, and they build 
houses, and these houses are so trendy, you cannot believe it. […] The latest fad is to 
build architect designed houses. And there’s this particular firm called 
Husgalleriet,102 they’ve got these packages. They’ll draw your house, build it, 
everything… […] And this architect who draws for them, Tommie Wilhelmsen, his 
credo is that houses are supposed to be entertaining. That’s his word, ‘entertaining’. 
You know, it’s supposed to be fun to live in a house. And it’s all so incredibly 
shallow, a very superficial idea of what a home is supposed to be. Because for me, a 
home is a place where you live with your husband and your children, and you try to 
accomplish a worthy life together. But this firm and this architect… It’s all about 
superficial stuff, you know, lots of glass so that people can see what’s going on from 
the outside. And a single orchid in the window, if you catch my drift? Very shallow. 
It’s like ‘Look at us! This is where we live!’ 
V: What kinds of people live in such houses? 
I: I don’t know such people. 
V: But do you have an idea of what kinds of people they are? 
                                              
102 Local real estate developers. 
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I: Well, I guess they’re the kind of people that like things that I don’t like. People 
who build huge cabins up in the mountains, and who barely visit them. And when 
they do, they drive their fancy snowmobiles… Or they go to fancy beaches for their 
summer holidays. Or maybe that’s untrendy now? Well, I guess they attend safaris in 
Africa. Or whatever destination fashion dictates. I read somewhere that safaris were 
the hottest thing right now. [Laughs.] 
 (Sofia, academic, mid 60s) 
 
Despite her own enthusiasm for ‘minimalism’ and ‘functionalism’ in architecture and 
interior design, Sofia sarcastically utters her contempt for the appropriation by the 
‘rich’ of such styles. Apparently, such people are viewed as appreciating their wealth 
in the wrong manner. This suggests that she is aware of different modes of 
appreciating goods, and that ‘wrong’ ways of appreciating the ‘right’ goods elicit 
feelings of resentment and contempt. This point is also evident in the way in which 
Theodor talks about ‘spoiled brats’ appropriating his clothing brand of choice, Fred 
Perry: 
 
V: We were talking about this particular brand you like, Fred Perry, and that it once 
was associated with the mod culture103 that you had affiliations with in your youth… 
But now that it’s been popularised… Can you elaborate on your thoughts in that 
regard? 
I: It used to really bother me. […] You know, there’s a certain logic to it. If a group 
of people have their own clothing style, their own little secret codes that they are all 
share and recognise… Their own identity, in a way… And if it suddenly becomes 
commercialised, then it’s extremely annoying. This is how I used to think, anyway. It 
doesn’t bother me that much anymore. Well... In some respects it still does, I guess. 
There’s this certain type of people… […] Extremely annoying kind of people… Uh, 
this is probably very prejudiced and generalising, but there are these daddy’s boys, 
you know, with their bandanas, dyed hair, rowdy, all over the place… Rich, spoiled 
little brats, full of daddy’s cash… Taking up space… And they’re wearing Fred Perry 
shirts. When I see that, I have to admit, it hurts a little. […] But of course, the Fred 
Perry company just wants to make money like all companies, and I’ve just found a 
shirt that I like. And it’s like that with all trends and fads, they move like waves. So 
even if there’s a certain Fred Perry fad going on right now, I know it will disappear 
again someday, and then we can have this for ourselves. [Laughs.] Sometimes, when 
I see strangers on the street, you know, people of my generation wearing the same 
uniform… We still give a friendly nod when we pass each other. [Laughs.] We know 
what it’s all about. 
                                              
103 Mod (from ‘modernist’) is a subculture that originated in London in the late 1950s (see for 
instance Hebdige, 1979). 
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 (Theodor, head of cultural enterprise, mid 40s) 
 
While this type of boundary work is related to specific stylistic codes within certain 
subcultures in which this particular interviewee was involved in his youth – and thus 
perhaps constitutes what Thornton (1995) has dubbed ‘subcultural capital’ – the 
classificatory practice nevertheless implies an aversion to ‘wrong’ people adopting 
the ‘right’ styles. Again, the ‘rich’ seem to spoil things by appropriating ‘his’ brand 
of choice in combination with a type of obvious loudness alien to those who more 
discreetly display a familiarity with the history, and the right appropriation, of the 
styles in question. Apparently, these people share an understanding of similar stylistic 
codes and know each other by ‘the look’, and they can clearly spot ‘phoneys a mile 
off’. Although there are quite a few examples of boundary work linked to ‘wrong’ 
ways of appreciating material goods, this is also salient in terms of cultural goods 
such as music: 
 
On Thursdays, when the local symphony orchestra do their weekly performances, the 
concert hall is packed. And the reason for this, I believe, is that it functions as a scene 
for those who want to be in the know. And I’m pretty sure that most of the people 
going there don’t actually love Mahler, but they still go there. […] I think it’s a little 
pathetic. But then again, if it means that Stavanger Symphony Orchestra gets the 
income they need, and in that way can make music that I enjoy, and do performances 
I ‘d like to attend, then it’s fine by me, I guess. […] But of course, I find those people 
rather ridiculous. But, you know, who am I to judge?   
 (Sara, journalist, mid 40s) 
 
The recurring theme is that ‘the rich’ do not really like this sort of culture; they attend 
concerts, exhibitions and the like ‘just to be seen with the right crowd’. What may be 
inferred from the excerpts above is that discreetness and subtleness – the very 
opposite of loudness and flashiness – are considered a virtue. Lifestyles perceived as 
conspicuous displays of wealth are thus deemed ‘not a pretty sight’, connoting 
aesthetical flaws, inauthenticity and pretentiousness by the economically fortunate. 
Indeed, this lends further support to the claim made earlier about the importance of 
mapping out different modes of consumption. In the previous chapter I pointed out 
that scholars associated with the omnivore thesis erroneously presuppose that the 
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consumption of similar cultural goods conveys similar tastes. However, different 
modes of consumption are related, but not reducible, to the consumption of the goods 
themselves. The important thing is the manners in which the goods are perceived, 
appreciated and appropriated. Indeed, the fact that such perceived differences are 
salient in the evaluative repertoires of the interviewees casts further doubt on the 
soundness of the notion of the cultural omnivore. 
 
The boundary work directed against the lifestyles of conspicuous consumers is not 
only conducted on aesthetical grounds, but it is also tightly connected to moral 
criteria of evaluation. The loudness and flashiness of wealthy consumers are often 
linked to character flaws such as ‘vanity’, exhibiting a ‘shallow inner life’, or more 
generally, a ‘lack of values’: 
 
When I visit someone’s home for the first time, I’m a bit cheeky. Because as soon as 
I get the chance, I check their music collection, I look at their bookshelves, I look at 
the pictures on their walls. Things like that. And my impression is that it says a lot 
about the people living there. And sometimes I’m shocked. For instance, I read this 
column in Dagens Næringsliv104 where they ask people from the business community 
about the books they read. And I find it unbelievable that many of these people say 
stuff like ‘No, I haven’t read a book in twenty years.’ How is that possible? I just 
cannot understand people like that. And football players saying they’ve never read a 
book in their life. You know, what are their lives all about? I mean, you cannot play 
football all your life. You’ve got to have certain values in your life. And I believe 
culture and art can help provide people with values in life. It gives you perspectives, 
points of view, something to think about, something to challenge you. […] If you 
haven’t got a single picture on your wall, if you don’t own a single book, if you’ve 
hardly got a record collection… But you‘ve got the most expensive furniture, the 
newest car, and you treat yourself to the most expensive holidays… Then maybe 
you’re so preoccupied with making money that it sort of becomes your only value in 
life.  […] Some of these people even pass this on to their children. I’ve seen children 
in kindergarten wearing the most expensive clothes the market can offer. That’s sheer 
stupidity! I guess I can understand why people stay clear of H&M, because they 
produce clothes that don’t last. But children grow out of their clothes in like half a 
year, anyway. Then why do these people buy a 3000 kroner dress for a three year old 
girl? It’s foolish. It’s as if the parents attempt to mirror themselves in the children. 
You know, ‘Look at how successful we are!’ I find that really disturbing. […] It’s 
important to have values in life. Values, that’s a key word.   
 (Theodor, head of cultural enterprise, mid 40s) 
                                              
104 Norwegian newspaper. 
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There is a striking entwinement of moral and aesthetical criteria of evaluation in this 
quote. Being interested in literature, music and the fine arts himself, Theodor is quick 
to evaluate people based on their cultural tastes. Moreover, people who do not share 
his enthusiasm for certain cultural forms – exemplified by CEOs and football players 
who never read – are not only perceived as lacking important values in life; they are 
also perceived as bearers of lifestyles representing immorality. As we can see, the 
values associated with excessive luxury – exemplified by buying a 3000 kroner dress 
for a three year old girl – are deemed to be ‘sheer stupidity’. Indeed, a perceived link 
between vanity and a dubious morality is a recurring theme whenever the 
interviewees located in the cultural fraction classify the clothing styles of the rich: 
 
V: You say that your clothing style is discreet and that you despise vanity. What is a 
vain clothing style? 
I: Well, I’d say clothes that draw attention… That would be classified as vain. […] A 
vain clothing style, that’s associated with people who scream for attention through 
their clothes.  […] But not only clothes, it’s the whole character… Hairstyle, colours, 
the superficial… […] Primarily it has something to do with personality. People who 
crave attention, yearn to be seen to a much greater extent that I do personally. And 
they allow themselves to dress in a loud kind of way. […] And I don’t particularly 
like that kind of people. For instance, I don’t like women who dress in a loud, 
conspicuous way. Either whether it’s the expensive type, or whether it’s the cheap 
type. I guess they’re meant to draw attention. And I don’t find that attractive. […] It 
betrays a certain character, a certain type. 
V: If you meet a person dressed like that, what sort of associations do you get? 
I: Well, my first thought would be that this person is self-absorbed. This is a person 
who begs for attention. And I guess there will come a nagging feeling that this person 
is covering up a superficial inner life.  
 (Elias, high school teacher, early 30s) 
 
 
I don’t like that kind of flashy clothing style, especially if it is the expensive type. I 
don’t care for that. What I don’t understand is why it has to be so expensive. […] I 
catch myself thinking ‘Are you compensating for something?’ I mean, their attempts 
to dress to impress don’t impress me. Because, deep down, I think these people are 
trying to impress others. And there are lots of girls and women in Stavanger who 
spend insane amounts of money on clothes. And I get a bit annoyed by it all. […]  To 
be honest, I don’t like people who are vain, even though I’m a bit vain myself. But 
you shouldn’t be vain in an obvious kind of way. You have to be discreet about it. 
[Laughs.] 
 (Sara, journalist, mid 50s) 
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Although Sara jokingly admits that she is somewhat vain herself, this quote 
nevertheless indicates that virtues such as modesty, decency and propriety, or rather 
peoples’ lack thereof, are decisive in the boundary work directed against the 
economically privileged. Notwithstanding the importance of aesthetics in the 
evaluations of other people’s cultural consumption, there is also apparently an 
important moral distinction between being ‘stylish’ and simply being ‘vain’. As soon 
as attempts to ‘stand out’ are perceived as exaggerated and/or too expensive, they are 
clearly frowned upon and associated with a certain dubious morality. 
 
The interviewees in the cultural fraction thus cultivate a rather clear depiction of the 
‘rich’ as people endowed with both aesthetical and moral character flaws. People 
perceived as such are considered to be types with whom they would rather not 
associate.     
 
5.2.2 The economic fraction versus the cultural fraction  
Those endowed with relatively more economic than cultural capital also demonstrate 
contempt for the ‘pretentious’ lifestyles of those whom they conceive of as ‘the 
cultural elite’. The lifestyles of the cultural elite are also considered to make a mark 
on their surroundings in Stavanger. In recent years, the term ‘the cultural elite’ has 
been widely used in Norwegian popular language and public debates, and its 
connotations might be peculiarly ‘Norwegian’ compared to other national contexts. 
Based on a study of how the term has been used in Norwegian newspapers in the last 
three decades, Haarr and Krogstad (2011) argue that the meaning has changed over 
time; it has been increasingly deployed to denote something negative, unpleasant and 
undesirable. Moreover, they argue that in contrast to France – a country where 
‘elevated’ cultural tastes are traditionally admired – there is little or no respect for the 
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cultural elite in Norway. While this claim may be overstated,105 there are quite a few 
examples of derogatory uses of the term to be found in the interview data: 
 
V: You used the term cultural elite earlier. What do you mean by that? 
I: The cultural elite is characterised by a formal cultural education. And they take 
pride and ascribe status to it. And they’ve got a relatively high influence on politics 
and those who are in charge of granting funds to cultural projects, projects which 
appeal more to their narrow taste, and not to the taste of the majority. But that’s just 
an objective description. If I allow myself to judge… […] Well, they represent a 
certain kind of taste in music and film, and they represent a certain kind of 
manner.[…] But they also represent power, in a sense. They like to convey this image 
of underground culture, and of being oppressed, so they can attend these protest 
marches and torchlight processions, and all sorts of… I guess they’re attracted to this 
’68 Che Guevara kind of romanticism. The political engagement is long gone, but the 
whole image is still there. […] But the thing is, they represent mainstream culture 
and the established cultural life in ways they don’t dare to admit. 
 (Lucas, lawyer, early 30s) 
 
The lifestyles of the cultural elite seem associated with a somewhat obsolete left-wing 
counter-culture, while the cultural elite itself is assumed to represent ‘power’ and ‘the 
established cultural life’. What seems to elicit most resentment is the fact that both 
cultural producers and the consumers of certain cultural forms receive state funding. 
For those unfamiliar with and/or uninterested in such culture, it is simply 
incomprehensible why the state hands out money to artists and their ‘faithful 
acolytes’. The term ‘cultural elite’ does not, however, always refer to the same group 
of people. Sometimes it refers to practitioners of ‘high culture’, sometimes to 
‘snobbish’ people in general, sometimes to cultural producers, sometimes to people 
possessing influence in the political sphere and sometimes to politicians themselves: 
 
The cultural elite, that’s the people who run this town. The political authority, and 
people employed by the local government. That’s the cultural elite. They run the 
show. I guess the private sector can have its say to a certain degree. But they’re… 
Usually, cultural events need financial funding. And the narrower they are, the more 
funding they need. And then there’s the political system that funds it. Normally. 
There are some private contributors, but there are very few events that base their 
                                              
105 As we will see in Chapter 7, there are several signs of admiration of the tastes and lifestyles of 
what the interviewees conceive of as the cultural elite. 
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funding on sponsorship. So the cultural elite, that’s the political authorities. They set 
the agenda. They decide who will get funding and who will not. 
 (Wilhelm, manager, oil company, early 40s) 
 
Notwithstanding the various connotations the term ‘cultural elite’ may have for 
different people, the feelings of resentment for those who are conceived of as 
consumers or producers of ‘elevated’ or ‘high’ culture belonging to certain social 
cliques are fairly widespread, especially among those located in the economic 
fractions of the social space. Interestingly, the boundary work directed against what is 
perceived as the ‘snobbish’ lifestyles of the cultural elite is entwined with morality in 
similar ways as the boundary work directed against ‘the rich’: 
 
V: You used the term snobbish earlier on. Do you meet people you consider to be 
snobbish here in Stavanger? 
I: Oh yes, I do. And I totally resent it. You know, especially if they’ve got this 
attitude that their taste is superior to that of others. […] I totally disagree with that 
type of thinking. When it comes to snobbery… I guess it has something to do with a 
need to show off based on buying art objects, and the ways people relate to art. […] 
For me, it’s more important to be honest about your taste than trying to fit into this or 
that social circle, you know, because it’s only acceptable to put these particular 
paintings on your wall, or to attend these particular classical music concerts, just 
because they’re supposed to be more refined or something. I think that’s stupid. […] 
So I guess there’s a lot of that attitude around. […] But for me, that’s wrong. 
 (Johan, CEO, mid 50s) 
 
It is, however, not always clear whether ‘cultural snobbery’ refers to specific 
‘elevated’ cultural preferences and tastes, or to a perceived ‘better-than-you’ attitude 
among the cultural consumers displaying such preferences. It nevertheless seems as 
though the latter is often inferred from the former, and what is perceived as ‘strange’ 
or ‘weird’ is interpreted as a pretentious and dubious search for ‘specialness’ by the 
cultural elite: 
 
I: I attended this play once. I can’t even remember the name of it. It was really 
hopeless. […] And when it was all over, some people thought it was absolutely 
fabulous, but the rest of the crowd thought it was horrible. 
V: And you were in the second category? 
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I: Yes, indeed I was. I guess twenty per cent thought it was amazing. It was like…. It 
was so peculiar and strange that there were, of course, some people who had to find it 
interesting. But common, simple men like myself, found it totally meaningless. 
V: What about the other twenty per cent, those who liked it? What are your thoughts 
on them? 
I: Well, I’m not really sure whether they liked it because they were obliged to like it. 
You know, because they are supposed to be refined, and if not, they’d lose their 
differentness. Either that, or it was because they actually are different from people 
like me, you know, that they are built differently than I am. Either way, I don’t get it. 
But, you know, luckily there are different opinions on everything. But still…. I mean, 
that play was so weird. Way too weird. I guess I’m more of this average, simple guy 
who doesn’t need such high society entertainment. And it really puzzles me… You 
know, why people don’t like the same things as I do. [Laughs.] That people don’t like 
watching sports on telly. I don’t get it! 
 (Wilhelm, manager, oil company, early 40s) 
 
Implicitly, the ordinariness of ‘the average guy’ is held to be more honourable than 
the pretentious efforts of the cultural consumer who seeks out ‘high-society 
entertainment’ for the sake of standing out from the crowd. Just as we saw how 
interviewees in the cultural fraction perceived the ‘rich’ as flashy and pretentious, the 
interviewees in the economic fraction perceive the ‘cultural elite’ as endowed with 
equally dubious motives; their cultural consumption is associated with ‘trying too 
hard’ or spending too much time ‘being cultivated’. 
 
As we have seen, there is indeed mutual antagonism between two qualitatively 
different taste cultures in the interview data. The differences found along the capital 
composition axis of the social space in the previous chapter are reflected in the 
interviewees’ classifications of other people’s lifestyles and tastes. Moreover, 
regardless of the targets of such distaste, the perception of ‘the others’ seems to be 
linked to a lack of moral character. Morality is clearly entwined in the evaluation of 
the aesthetic aspects of lifestyles and consumption preferences. The fact that morality 
seems to be prominent in the evaluative repertoires of the interviewees does not, 
however, indicate that it renders the aesthetic aspects somewhat less relevant, or less 
‘salient’, as suggested by Lamont (1992) in her analysis of boundary drawing by 
French and American upper-middle class men. On the contrary, in this case at least, it 
seems a more reasonable interpretation that aesthetical aversions are reinforced by 
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moral ones. Although it might be fruitful for analytical purposes to distinguish 
between different ideal types of evaluative repertoires, this would arguably result in a 
flawed analysis if these were taken a priori to be competing or mutually exclusive, 
rather than complementary components of the interviewees’ repertoires of evaluation. 
While the interview schedule was not constructed to generate data on moral issues 
per se, questions about cultural consumption often led to conversations about moral 
matters. As we have seen, lifestyles and tastes are often perceived as linked to moral 
stances and/or political convictions. Moreover, as indicated by Rosenlund (2000c, 
2009a), moral-political stances are differentially distributed in tandem with cultural 
tastes, which would suggest additional support to the claim that morality and 
aesthetics are mutually entwined in the constitution of different lifestyles and the 
perceptions thereof. 
 
In the previous chapter I applied the notion of habitus to analyse the interviewees’ 
classificatory practices. In line with Bourdieu’s (1984, 1990b) homology argument, I 
argued that a correspondence exists between social structures and mental structures; 
i.e. a correspondence between the interviewees’ positions in the social space and the 
subjective principles of vision and divisions that social actors apply in their 
comprehension of different cultural goods. More specifically, I argued that people are 
endowed with socially structured schemes of perception and appreciation, which 
generate rather coherent classificatory practices. In this chapter we have seen the 
ways in which interviewees located in two fractions of the upper sectors of the social 
space classify each other in equally derogatory terms. As summarised in Table 2, the 
interviewees’ classifications of other people’s tastes follow a similar pattern. 
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 The cultural fraction 
(as classified by the economic 
fraction) 
The economic fraction 
(as classified by the cultural 
fraction) 
Referred to as The cultural elite, the cultivated 
people, the cultural snobs, the 
intellectual snobs, the artsy types 
The rich people, the filthy rich, the 
economic elite, the bourgeoisie, the 
people with money, high society, 
the oil people 
Lifestyles of 
distaste 
Preferences for cultural goods 
perceived as ‘weird’, cultivating 
esoteric knowledge 
Spending too much money on 
material goods, appreciating 
cultural goods in a manner 
perceived as ‘inauthentic’  
Ascribed 
characteristics 
Conspicuous, trying too hard to 
stand out from the crowd, 
pretentious, elitist 
Vain, conspicuous, shallow, leading 
empty lives, self-centred, vulgar, 
loud, a lack of taste 
 
Table 2: Mutual antagonism 
 
Focusing here on the upper sector of the social space, there is a rather clear division 
between the two fractions in terms of subjective evaluations of social esteem. 
Although there are interesting similarities as regards morality, there are evidently two 
different taste cultures prevalent in the two fractions; one in which the conspicuous 
consumption of cultural goods is deemed dubious, and one in which the conspicuous 
consumption of material goods is judged in equally derogatory terms. Each fraction 
cultivates a shared belief, a common code, for what is considered good and bad taste, 
and these beliefs are quite distinctive from those common in the other fraction. As 
there are striking inter-individual coherences within the fractions, this lends further 
support to the idea of class habitus, meaning that each individual system of 
dispositions is a structural variant of the dispositions of other social actors located in 
similar social positions. As we shall see in the next section, the divisions in the social 
space also translate into divisions in physical space.  
 
5.3 A sense of one’s place 
The mutual antagonism mapped out above indicates that the interviewees are very 
much aware of the differences between the tastes and lifestyles of ‘their kinds of 
people’ and the lifestyles of ‘others’. They seem endowed with a social ‘sense of 
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one’s place’, as well as a ‘sense of other people’s place’ (Goffman, 1959; Bourdieu, 
1984: 471; 1990a: 128), i.e. they are endowed with a sense of belonging to certain 
social groups, and by the same token, a sense of not belonging to other social groups. 
Moreover, the antipathies and sympathies towards practitioners of certain lifestyles 
and tastes are also expressed in a highly specific, geographical sense. As shown by 
Rosenlund (2011) and Ljunggren and Andersen (2012) in their studies of residential 
segregation in the Stavanger area, the capital composition principle of social 
differentiation is pivotal in understanding the residential patterns of the population, as 
those class fractions endowed with relatively more cultural than economic capital 
tend to reside in different parts of town than their counterparts endowed with 
diametrically opposed capital portfolios. 
 
When asked where they feel comfortable, and which places they would rather avoid, 
the interviewees’ responses in the present empirical case follow a similar pattern. 
Expressing an explicit aversion to settling down and moving around in certain 
neighbourhoods in Stavanger is especially prevalent among the interviewees in the 
cultural fraction. Perhaps unsurprisingly, they express a clear aversion to places 
associated with the ‘flashy’ lifestyles of the materially privileged:  
 
I’ve noticed that the rich people are influenced by the functionalist trend when they 
build their houses nowadays. But you can also see these ugly, oversized houses, 
which I believe is an expression of too much money and too little taste. It’s 
grotesque! You know, just outside of town… […] They’ve built these houses down 
by the shoreline. Unbelievably ugly, blown out of proportions… Conspicuous quasi-
castles with towers… It looks terrible! And that’s what I mean by too little taste and 
too much money. I could never live among such people. 
 (Philip, high school teacher, early 40s) 
 
Echoing the point made above about the entwinement of aesthetic and moral criteria 
of evaluation, such entwinement is also reflected in the ways in which the 
interviewees classify certain areas of Stavanger. Some of these areas are not only 
associated with bad taste, but also with inhabitants of an unpleasant and sinister type: 
 
 
  189
V: Are there places in Stavanger where you wouldn’t want to live? 
I: There are some parts of the city that I am prejudiced against, of course. Like 
Eiganes, especially the upper part. I wouldn’t be comfortable there. I guess I couldn’t 
afford to live there anyway, because it’s ridiculously expensive. It’s been like that for 
ages. Eiganes was the refined, posh place to live. And it’s still like that. But I’m 
convinced that you can find just as nice villas, and just as nice gardens, elsewhere in 
Stavanger. And it’s cheaper too.  […] I’m also quite charmed by Old Stavanger. […] 
But I’ve heard so many horrible stories about the people living there and how they 
treat each other. Extremely uptight people… If you happen to put a nail in your wall 
the wrong way, your neighbour will complain to the residents’ association. Stuff like 
that. Neighbours glaring at each other, complaining… You know, really competitive. 
You’re supposed to be better than others… Bah! […] So I guess Old Stavanger is out 
of the question too. 
 (Theodor, head of cultural enterprise, early 40s) 
 
Certain areas seem associated with a type of person with whom the cultural fraction 
does not feel at ease. Eiganes is often cited as eliciting distaste; historically, this area 
was the domicile of the commercial bourgeoisie, and today it still has Stavanger’s 
most expensive housing prices. However, while some places are classified as 
unsuitable for habitation due to the presence of ‘flashy rich people’, other places are 
desirable, yet out of reach because of the housing prices: 
 
Våland looks really nice. Beautiful detached houses and nice, quiet streets. But of 
course, I could never move there. It’s too expensive. Plain and simple. It’s more or 
less reserved for the oil people. 
 (Andrea, consultant, public sector, early 30s) 
 
Arguably this aversion to certain areas is sometimes a case of ‘sour grapes’, and it 
may say more about what people can afford than an actual aversion to the people 
living there. Evidently, however, the interviewees associate specific places with 
certain kinds of people. These associations seem to be decisive in terms of the ways 
in which they navigate Stavanger’s urban areas. Indeed, explicit boundary drawing is 
clearly evident when the interviewees talk about cafés, restaurants, bars and other 
public places in or near the town centre. The interviewees report seeking out places 
where they can find ‘their own kinds of people’, while avoiding places associated 
with ‘the others’. Among the cultural fraction the places where they feel 
‘comfortable’ or ‘at home’ are bars and cafés such as Cementen, Bøker og Børst, 
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Sting, Gnu and Tau Scene. The places where they do not feel at ease are those 
associated with the flashiness of ‘the rich’, such as Taket, Javel and Hall Toll: 
 
V: Where would you never go? 
I: I never go to these places where people go out to dance. […] Hall Toll, Javel. 
Night clubs like that. […] If I was going to be a bit prejudiced, I’d say the people 
going there are interested in stuff that I care nothing about. 
V: What kinds of people go to Hall Toll? 
I: Real estate agents. People like that. 
V: Why are they not your kind of people? 
I: They don’t share my cultural preferences. They’ve got different views of things. 
[…] They’re interested in posh addresses, clothes, cars… [Laughs.] I could just go on 
with these prejudices.  
(Elias, high school teacher, early 30s) 
 
V: Are there places you’d never go to?  
I: Yes, there are. I look at the clientele, the people who work there, how they look, 
what kind of music they play there. And places like Hall Toll… That’s the place for 
people who want to be seen, where people are on stage. […] And I don’t like that 
kind of stuff. I mean, if I want a night out, I want to feel comfortable. I want to get 
along with people and listen to good music. I’d never go to a place where I know I 
wouldn’t enjoy myself. […] It’s the whole setting. You know, the glasses of 
champagne, people goggling. It’s like: ‘Who is that? Did she see me? Look at those 
people over there! Should we move closer?’ You know what I mean? That way of 
socialising, it’s alien to me. I’d feel like a stranger in such places. It has got to be a 
comfortable atmosphere. […] And I can easily tell whether or not I’d feel 
comfortable. And it all boils down to the clientele. 
(Theodor, head of cultural enterprise, early 40s) 
 
These interviewees seem to avoid certain places to avoid being exposed to the kinds 
of people with whom they do not want to associate. Even places that it might seem 
logical to seek out because of cultural interests are avoided because they are regarded 
as ruined by the presence of the wrong kinds of people: 
 
I’d never go to a performance by the Stavanger Symphony Orchestra at the concert 
hall, mostly because of the clientele. It’s typically high society, people from Eiganes, 
you know, the gentleman’s club type of thing. The few times I’ve been there it’s all 
about… They sit there dozing off while their wives watch the show. And then the 
gentlemen discuss the shipping rates during the breaks. This high-society type of 
stuff. […] But that doesn’t mean that I don’t like classical music. If I’m in Berlin or 
somewhere like that, I can attend performances of classical works. I really enjoy that. 
[…] But here [in Stavanger] there are too many people who go there just because 
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they are obliged to, just to show people that they belong to the right kind of group. 
[…] Usually, when I attend concerts, there are predominantly people who aren’t 
interested in what’s going on on the stage at all. The last concert I attended was 
Farmers Market106 at the opening night of MaiJazz.107 And I reckon five per cent 
were there to listen to the band and actually found it interesting. The rest attended 
because it took place at Stavanger Konserthus. 
(Oscar, academic, mid 30s) 
 
We can thus clearly see how taste-related criteria are linked to the ways in which 
these people navigate their environment. But to every rule there is an exception, and 
the interviewees in the cultural fraction do not always avoid places associated with 
unpleasant rich people. There are also those who seek out places ironically, somewhat 
facetiously playing at anthropologists studying alien tribes: 
 
I: Sometimes it’s fun to go out on these excursions. Just to observe, a bit like 
anthropologists. And it can be quite fun to observe what kinds of people exist out 
there. Because one can grow tired of going to the same places and meeting the same 
people all the time.  […] And there’s a bar here in Stavanger. It’s called Broremann 
Bar. I went there a couple of times with two friends of mine. It was all right at first, 
but after a while we noticed that the people there were a bit different from us. And I 
had brought a friend of mine from out of town. He had made some smart investments 
lately. […] And he knows these financial types. Anyway, he took us to this bar... And 
he said: ‘Yeah, this is that kind of place... It’s for the filthy rich.’ […] And then 
suddenly all these women started hitting on him. You know, flirting. Then he said: 
‘These are all gold diggers. These are the kinds of girls who only hit on people with 
lots of money.’ Anyway, we sat down with them and they said: ‘So what do you do 
for a living?’ At the time I worked for this youth organization. My other friend is a 
teacher. And they went: ‘What the hell are you doing here?!’ But for my friend from 
out of town it was the other way around. They were really flirting with him. I guess 
this has a lot to do with the oil business here. 
V: What do you think of this? 
I: Well, in hindsight… […] At the time I was just blown way. But now I think it’s 
stupid. At the time I didn’t really know that this was a place like that. But I remember 
we didn’t feel at home. Anyway, we went there one more time. We thought: ‘Well, 
we’re totally out of place, so let’s make fools out of ourselves.’ You know, we were a 
bit drunk and wanted to make a point. And we said to the bartender: ‘We want that 
Mojaito stuff.’ Then he said: ”What?! Do you mean Mojito?’ And we were like: 
‘Yeah, yeah. Give us some of that Mosquito!’ And then we sat there grinning and got 
lots of herbs from the drink on our teeth on purpose. [Laughs.] 
 (Philip, high school teacher, early 40s)  
                                              
106 Norwegian jazz/folk band. 
107 Annual jazz festival. 
 192
The playful mode of appropriation discussed earlier seems at work here, and the 
distanced and somewhat ironic manner in which this interviewee visits the hostile 
territory of ‘the others’ is evident. While in one sense he seems to be seeking out 
interaction with such people, this does not indicate reconciliation. On the contrary, 
being exposed to the clientele at Broremann Bar seems to reinforce his perception of 
difference and strengthen his aversion to them. However, while this interviewee 
clearly does not approve of the bar and the people there, the irony and playfulness 
might not necessarily reveal feelings of superiority. Arguably, there are some feelings 
of deference and a sense of inferiority to be found. I shall return to this point in 
Chapter 7. 
 
The interviewees in the economic fraction express a similar aversion to areas 
perceived as inhabited and frequented by the cultural fraction. But they are not as 
specific in their expressed aversion to living in certain areas inhabited by the ‘cultural 
elite’, perhaps because there are few residential areas regarded as dominated by such 
people. In navigating the centre of town, however, the aversion is equally harsh. In 
accordance with the mutual antagonism discussed above, the economic fraction seeks 
out the very places which the cultural fraction deems undesirable, while avoiding 
places frequented by people perceived as not their kind: 
 
V: What kind of places do you steer clear of? 
I: I never go to Cementen. 
V: How come? 
I: It’s the same mechanism I told you about earlier, about the choice of cars… These 
same mechanisms apply to my choice of bars. When I go out, I go to places where 
it’s likely I’ll find my kind of people, people that I know. Because that’s why one 
goes to bars, right? To socialise. Besides, I know no one at Cementen.  
V: Like you said earlier… You associate things… What kinds of people go to 
Cementen? 
I: Uh, people interested in literature? Definitely not bankers. I guess I’m too 
conservative. I go to places where people wear blue suits. [Laughs.] 
 
 (Georg, banker, late 40s) 
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Typical places eliciting distaste include bars and cafés such as Tau scene, Checkpoint 
Charlie, Folken, Cementen and Bøker og Børst, the very same places where the 
cultural fraction report feeling at home. Indeed, it is the distinct presence of ‘quasi-
intellectuals’, ‘artists’, ‘socialists’ and rather ‘scruffy’ people that makes the 
economic fraction feel uncomfortable:  
 
I’m not comfortable at places like Cementen and the crowd that hangs around there, 
if you know what I mean? They represent this kind of coarse, socialist kind of 
mentality. […] They’ve got their own taste in music, they’ve got their own manners, 
their own political affiliation. And it adds up to  a concept, or an image, that doesn’t 
appeal to me. […] But it’s not just Cementen. You find such people at Folken, don’t 
you? And at Tau Scene, I guess. […] It’s the whole… Dirty and shabby premises, 
dirty and shabby people. [Laughs.] That’s not my cup of tea. I want it orderly and 
glamorous. More Sinatra and cocktails, if you catch my drift? […] I like kitsch, but I 
like my kitsch glamorous. At Cementen you get this kind of working class kitsch. 
Lamps from the Salvation Army, pictures of gypsy women. It’s all too Norwegian, a 
type of worn-out Norwegian social realism. The kind of kitsch I like is glamorous. 
You know, James Bond, Frank Sinatra. It represents the upper class and a glamorous 
life. Not a filthy Cementen life where people smell of sweat and cheap red wine. It’s 
totally… I resent it. And this ideal of looking scruffy… No, I guess I’m at the other 
end of the scale. 
 (Lucas, lawyer, early 30s) 
 
Furthering the argument about the importance of mapping out different modes of 
consumption, we can see how the appropriation of ‘kitsch’ by the clientele at 
Cementen is deemed inappropriate. It is not the proper, ‘glamorous upper-class 
kitsch’ associated with Sinatra and Bond, but rather a ‘scruffy working-class kitsch’ 
associated with body odour and cheap red wine. Clearly, it is judged to be entirely 
wrong and the interviewee stays away from it. Moreover, the purportedly obsolete 
left-wing counterculture and the intellectual snobbery associated with places like 
Cementen, Gnu and Bøker og Børst also make some of the interviewees feel 
uncomfortable: 
 
V: Are there places you’d never go? Where you’d never find your kind of people? 
I: I’ve been a couple of times to this place called Cementen and the other place next 
to it. It’s horrible! I can tell you, not a single person of my type would go there. I 
guess that’s the place where I’d be least comfortable in the whole of Stavanger.  
V: What makes it horrible? 
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I: There’s a type of clientele that I don’t relate to.  […] I might be wrong, but these 
people… That’s the type of people who went to Kongsgård108 when they were young, 
which means that they have strong opinions on everything in life. […] And it’s not 
the kind of people I’d have a chat with. It’s not the kind of people that sit next to me 
at football matches at Viking stadion,109 if you catch my drift? 
V: Who are those people you sit next to there? In what ways do they differ from the 
people at Cementen? 
I: […] The people at Cementen, they think they know all there is to know about life. 
It’s obviously important to them to have strong opinions, to tell people about them, 
and, you know, show them off. When I chat with people… I don’t go out to talk 
about politics, global warming and that kind of stuff.  I go out to meet friends and 
talk about the old days, yesterday’s football match… You know, the ordinary, 
everyday type of things. […] And these people… I remember from my school days… 
Those who went to Kongsgård, they were different. They were sort of put together 
differently. And people like me, who went to Svithun…110 We weren’t these 
protesters… You know, this anti-nuclear weapons type of people […] You know 
what I mean, right? In my youth they all wore these scarfs to show solidarity with 
Palestine, and thought they knew everything, which they might, of course, actually 
do. By all means. But I don’t want to hear it. I don’t bother discussing such matters 
with them.  
 (Wilhelm, manager, oil company, early 40s) 
 
Trying to avoid interaction with ‘intellectual snobs’ is not restricted to bars, cafés and 
restaurants; it is also evident at other public places, such as art centres and galleries. 
While some of the economic fraction report occasionally visiting establishments such 
as Stavanger Konserthus and Rogaland Teater,111 they report feeling uncomfortable 
among the clientele there:  
 
V: Do you attend performances at Rogaland Teater? 
I: I haven’t so for years. […] The whole concept of plays bores me. The few times 
I’ve been to a play, I’ve been really bored. […] I guess it has something to do with 
the clientele there too. There are all these women and their husbands that sort of tag 
along after them. And they’ve got their glasses of wine and a self-image of being 
really refined. […] You know, in their Uno of Denmark dresses, this big earring in 
one ear, asymmetrical haircut and designer glasses. […] As you can tell, I’m full of 
prejudices. […] These people help sustain a type of culture that I despise. […] Bah! 
They’re repulsive!  
(Lucas, lawyer, early 30s) 
                                              
108 Local upper secondary school, also known as Stavanger Katedralskole. 
109 Local football stadium, home of the football club Viking. 
110 Local upper secondary school, also known as St. Svithun skole. 
111 Local residence showcasing performing arts. 
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It is evident from all these quotes that sympathies and antipathies towards the 
presence of certain kinds of people are of decisive importance in determining where 
the interviewees feel ‘at home’, or by the same token, ‘out of place’. Although these 
processes may be more or less intuitive and pre-reflexive, some degree of choice is 
nonetheless involved. Insofar as there are objective possibilities for settling down in 
certain areas, or entering certain establishments in the local milieu, it seems the 
interviewees subjectively choose their movements in the Stavanger area with great 
care.  
 
Informed by a Bourdieusian theoretical framework, Savage et al (2005a) view 
‘elective belonging’ as a core feature of contemporary attachment to place. The 
notion of elective belonging involves choosing a place to live and moving among 
people of one’s own kind, with the result that having local friends becomes an 
endorsement of one’s place of residence. This does not necessarily imply an 
attachment to a fixed community rooted in specific places, but rather belonging in the 
sense that the place becomes valuable to the individual: 
 
[E]lective belonging is critically dependent on people’s relational sense of place, 
their ability to relate their area of residence against other possible areas, so that the 
meaning of place is critically judged in terms of its relational meanings. (Savage et 
al, 2005a: 29) 
 
Moreover, Savage et al (2005a: 80) argue that those who have an account of why 
they live in a place, and can relate their residency to their choices and circumstances, 
are those who feel most ‘at home’. As the boundary drawing scrutinised in this 
chapter is performed by interviewees located in the upper sectors of the social space, 
i.e. those endowed with high overall volumes of capitals, this might explain why they 
express the most specific and elaborate sympathies and antipathies towards certain 
places. Compared to those interviewees less endowed with resources of various 
kinds, these people have greater opportunities to choose their place of residence, or 
more generally, their movements in physical space. Indeed, the notion of elective 
belonging presupposes the ability to choose, and there are thus reasons to believe that 
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this ability increases proportionally with the endowment of resources, especially 
economic capital. Given the tremendous rise in the economic wealth of the top 
echelons of Norwegian society lately (Hansen, 2011), there are reasons to believe that 
the differential distribution of such abilities will increasingly make its mark on 
elective belonging. This may have several effects. As the purchasing power of the top 
echelons increases, housing prices in certain areas tend to increase proportionally, 
thus excluding those who cannot afford them. Moreover, insofar as the increased 
wealth is spent in ways perceived as ‘flashy’ by others, it will – judging from the 
interviewees’ classificatory practices – increase the feelings of resentment in groups 
for whom expensive lifestyles are alien, and thus reinforce the symbolic boundaries 
between groups. Thus, cultural factors (i.e. socially conditioned modes of perception) 
may help reinforce social divisions that are already structured by economic factors.   
 
 The cultural fraction 
(as classified by the economic 
fraction) 
The economic fraction 
(as classified by the economic 
fraction) 
Associated living 
areas of distaste 
Storhaug, downtown area Eiganes, Gamle Stavanger, Madla, 
Stokka, Våland 
Associated 
establishments of 
distaste 
Cementen, Tau Scene, Checkpoint 
Charlie, Folken, Rogaland Teater 
Hall Toll, Broremann Bar, Javel, 
Taket, Tango, Stavanger 
Konserthus 
 
Table 3: Places of distaste 
 
As summarised in Table 3, the mutual antagonism between the cultural and the 
economic fraction manifests itself in both a social and geographical ‘sense of one’s 
place’, as people navigate the local milieu by seeking out interaction with their peers 
while avoiding interaction with ‘the others’ due to taste-related criteria. As noted by 
Bourdieu (1996a: 12) social space tends to retranslate itself into physical space. In the 
case of residential areas in Stavanger, Rosenlund (2011) and Ljunggren and Andersen 
(2012) have shown that different class fractions tend to reside in different areas of 
town. While the geographical divisions do not follow a clear-cut pattern between, for 
instance, the east and west sides of town – as for instance demonstrated by Ljunggren 
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(2010) in the case of Oslo – there are nevertheless clear signs of residential 
segregation corresponding to the structures of the social space. Moreover, as we have 
seen in this analysis, people choose their movements in Stavanger with great care, 
seeking out places where they feel at home, while avoiding places where they feel 
‘out of place’. However, these patterns should not be overemphasised, as there are 
several ‘mixed’ neighbourhoods in Stavanger, and as is evident in the interviews, the 
interviewees do occasionally seek out places that are not frequented only by their 
own kind. The divisions in physical space are far from absolute. But then again, even 
though the two fractions may occasionally rub shoulders, the empirical findings 
suggest that an awareness of difference remains intact and that encounters between 
the fractions may even reinforce their feelings of contempt. 
 
5.4 Usurpationary closure strategies 
At the beginning of this chapter I addressed the question of whether the structured 
differences in tastes and lifestyles mapped out in the previous chapter are involved in 
processes of social closure and the formation of more or less exclusive status groups. 
Though social closure may take formalised forms through the workings for instance 
of private property and educational credentials, I have argued that it may also take 
non-formalised forms through the workings of perceived lifestyle differentials which 
may give rise to feelings of resentment and contempt, leading social actors to avoid 
social interaction. By the same token, similarity breeds connection, and the 
judgement of other people’s tastes may thus lead to elective affinities in structuring 
patterns of marriage, friendship, co-membership and other types of relationships. In 
this chapter we have seen that a lifestyle-related antagonism is very much present in 
the ways in which interviewees classify other peoples’ practices and tastes. On the 
one hand, those endowed with a preponderance of cultural capital express antipathies 
towards what is perceived as the ‘conspicuous’ lifestyles of the ‘rich’, and on the 
other hand, those endowed with a preponderance of economic capital express 
antipathies towards what is perceived as ‘snobbish’ cultural consumption by the ‘the 
cultural elite’. Notwithstanding their similar moral distaste for conspicuousness and 
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snobbism, it is apparent that the two fractions have opposing views of ‘honourable’ 
styles of life. As noted by Bourdieu, tastes are often constituted in opposition to the 
choices of the groups closest in the social space:  
 
[T]he different fractions of the dominant class distinguish themselves precisely 
through that which makes them members of the class as a whole, namely the type of 
capital which is the source of their privilege and the different manners of asserting 
their distinction which are linked to it. (Bourdieu, 1984: 258) 
 
Thus, the empirical findings presented in this chapter lend additional support to the 
argument made in the previous chapter: the capital composition principle of social 
differentiation is pivotal in understanding the differential distribution of lifestyles in 
Stavanger, especially in the upper sectors of the social space. Indeed, as the two 
fractions classify each other in equally derogatory terms, the empirical findings 
suggest that lifestyle differences are perceived as significant as regards who they 
would and would not want to associate with. 
 
According to Parkin (1979: 45, 74) there are basically two strategies to ensure social 
closure. ‘Exclusionary closure’ is the use of power in a ‘downward’ direction by 
groups of privileged social actors in order to exclude other groups from access to 
rewards. ‘Usurpationary closure’ on the other hand is the use of power in an ‘upward’ 
direction by groups of non-privileged and subordinate social actors with the aim of 
biting into the resources and benefits accruing to the dominant groups. In fact, Weber 
(1946: 188) depicted usurpation as the ‘normal origin of almost all status honour.’ At 
the heart of usurpationary closure strategies, then, is the endeavour to impose 
different criteria of evaluation in opposition to a perceived presence of an ‘unjust’ 
distribution of social esteem. In this sense, the ‘horizontal’ boundary work scrutinised 
in this chapter – mutual classifications of disapproval between interviewees located in 
different fractions of the upper sectors of the social space – can be viewed as such 
usurpationary closure strategies. 
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However, the interviewees themselves do not necessarily perceive their antipathies 
and disapproval as closure strategies or as efforts to bite into the benefits accruing to 
others. On the contrary, the ways in which the interviewees classify ‘the others’ 
indicate that they instead attempt to avoid and distance themselves from what is 
perceived as an undesired arms-race for status and prestige among types of people 
with whom they would rather not associate. Although crystal clear about their 
demarcation against people practising lifestyles perceived as alien to their own, they 
do not perceive themselves as fighting a war, as it were. In their view, they are just 
minding their own business; ‘unpretentious’, ‘down-to-earth’, ‘just like the next guy’. 
This self-perception is fairly widespread across the divide between the two fractions. 
However, the fact that social actors do not view themselves and their peers as 
elevated or ‘better than the next guy’ is not by any means an indicator of an absence 
of social closure. On the contrary, social actors may not necessarily consciously aim 
at revolutionising the differential distribution of social esteem, but the effects of their 
boundary work manifested in their day-to-day activities may still result in a 
modification of it. Insofar as social actors choose friends, spouses and partners with 
similar lifestyles while avoiding those who practise lifestyles alien to their own – as 
the classificatory practices of the interviewees indicate – ‘real’ groups will be formed 
on the basis of such choices. Indeed, empirical studies of marital endogamy (Hansen, 
1995) and residential segregation (Rosenlund, 2000c, 2009a, 2011; Ljunggren, 2010; 
Ljunggren and Andersen, 2012) in Norway have suggested that the capital 
composition principle of social differentiation is pivotal in understanding such 
processes. In other words, status evaluations express themselves indirectly thorough 
elective affinities. Regardless of how ‘amorphous’ such status groups may be, the 
empirical findings nevertheless indicate that the mutual horizontal boundary drawing 
manifested in the upper sectors of the social space has ‘real’ effects in terms of social 
closure. The structural oppositions manifested in the correspondences between the 
social space and the symbolic space do not exist only ‘on paper’, but seem to translate 
into ‘real’ perceptions of difference, which in turn translate into ‘real’ boundaries 
between groups of social actors. 
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This finding resembles Savage et al’s (2005a; see also Devine, 1992; Erickson, 1996; 
Longhurst et al, 2001) description of Britons emphasizing their ‘ordinariness’ in 
constructing their social identities: ‘we’ are the ordinary people, whereas ‘they’ are 
pretentious social climbers shamelessly trying to stand out from the crowd. But the 
fact remains that what is conceived of as ‘normal’, ‘natural’ and ‘ordinary’ is not at 
all widespread. On the contrary, different conceptions of ordinariness seem to be 
differentially distributed according to the structures of the social space, in tandem 
with the distribution of different lifestyles and tastes. According to Bourdieu’s 
argument about the functioning of the habitus, ‘each taste feels itself to be natural – 
and so it almost is, being a habitus – which amounts to rejecting others as unnatural 
and therefore vicious’ (Bourdieu, 1984: 56). In this way, the interviewees seem to 
take the naturalness of their own tastes for granted. This naturalness is then used as a 
yardstick against which ‘the others’ are judged. Expanding on the argument in the 
previous chapter, different conditions of existence – represented by different sectors 
in the social space – structure different sets of pre-reflexive schemes of perception, or 
habitus, through which people view themselves and others. And as the perceptions of 
similarities and differences seem to be tightly linked to whom they want to/do not 
want to associate with, processes of social closure may take place without social 
actors’ acknowledgement of taking part in a struggle for recognition and social 
esteem. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
In line with the spatial metaphor of social stratification, this chapter has been devoted 
to scrutinising the horizontal boundary drawing between interviewees located in two 
fractions of the upper sector of the local social space in Stavanger. In line with the 
significance of the capital composition principle of social differentiation pointed out 
in Chapter 4, I have discussed the ways in which differences in lifestyles and tastes 
amount to social closure and the formation of status groups. The argument put 
forward in this chapter can be summarised as follows. First, the ways in which the 
interviewees classify and evaluate the cultural tastes and lifestyles of others indicate 
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that there is a mutual lifestyle-related antagonism between the cultural and the 
economic fraction. Second, the ways in which these fractions classify each other are 
related to both aesthetic and moral criteria of evaluation, and I have argued that these 
criteria work in tandem and mutually reinforce one another in constituting aversions 
to what is perceived as ‘dishonourable’ lifestyles in other groups. Third, this mutual 
antagonism is manifested in both an abstract and a concrete ‘sense of one’s place’, as 
people navigate physical space by seeking out interaction with their peers while 
avoiding interaction with ‘the others’ due to taste-related criteria.  Finally, I have 
argued that the process whereby people seek out interaction with those perceived as 
similar to themselves, while avoiding interaction with those who are dissimilar, leads 
to social closure. As people form more or less amorphous groups based on moral-
aesthetical criteria of evaluation, they wittingly or not contribute to an imposition of 
different criteria of evaluation in opposition to a perceived presence of an unjust 
distribution of social esteem. Thus, the structural oppositions existing ‘on paper’ 
translate into ‘real’ social boundaries. 
 
In sum, the findings reported in this chapter hint at the co-existence of two main taste 
hierarchies: one tied to consumption of cultural goods and the other to consumption 
of material goods. However, at this stage in the analysis we have only viewed social 
estimation of lifestyles indirectly, i.e. thorough focusing on the interviewees’ 
negative depictions of practices and attitudes alien to their own. Thus, we have yet to 
see how the interviewees evaluate practices which resemble to their own. It is to the 
‘vertical’ dimension of boundary drawing we now turn. 
 
 
 
  
  
   
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6 
VERTICAL BOUNDARY DRAWING 
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6.1 Introduction 
By combining and expanding on Lamont’s (1992) notion of symbolic boundaries and 
Parkin’s (1979) distinction between different types of closure strategies, the 
formation of status groups can be viewed as the result of boundary drawing in both 
usurpationary and exclusionary terms. While the two ideal types of closure strategies 
may be entwined on an empirical level, they nevertheless represent an important 
analytical distinction, as boundary drawing in usurpationary terms does not 
necessarily imply monopolisation of social esteem. Indeed, as we saw in the previous 
chapter, the analysis pointed to attempts to impose alternative criteria of evaluation in 
opposition to the perceived presence of an unjust distribution of esteem in other 
groups. Interviewees perceive themselves as ‘normal’ or ‘average’, and the aversions 
they express, according to their own subjective sense of their place in the social 
world, are directed against those conceived of as ‘the elite’, ‘the powerful’ and so 
forth. The form of boundary drawing analysed in the previous chapter can – if viewed 
isolated – be read as endeavours fuelled by egalitarian sentiments to eradicate or 
compress existing status hierarchies – a de-monopolisation of social esteem, as it 
were. As Lamont’s (1992) analytical strategies imply, and as explicitly advanced by 
Skarpenes (2007; see also Skarpenes and Sakslind, 2010), the mobilisation of moral 
sentiments against a perceived snobbishness in other groups has ‘modifying’ 
implications for the stratifying impact of lifestyle differentials. 
 
However, while boundary drawing in usurpationary terms against perceived ‘elitism’ 
and ‘snobbery’ in other groups may be the most salient form in the interview data, it 
is not the only one. In this chapter I shall scrutinise exclusionary boundary drawing. 
In this regard I shall particularly focus on boundary work directed ‘downwards’; i.e. 
derogatory classifications expressed by interviewees located in the upper sectors of 
the social space. These classifications pertain to the supposedly ‘vulgar’ lifestyles of 
‘lower-class’ people. I ask whether, and if so in what ways, such boundary drawing 
amounts to processes of monopolisation and the formation of more or less exclusive 
status groups. 
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First of all, I map out the ways in which the interviewees located in the upper sectors 
of the social space classify those perceived as less fortunate and/or practitioners of 
lifestyles alien to their own. I focus on boundary drawing related to the consumption 
of both cultural and material goods. Second, I scrutinise the ways in which the 
interviewees located in the lower sectors of the social space classify people perceived 
as more resourceful and practising lifestyles that are out-of-reach and/or conceived of 
as unthinkable to engage in. I focus on how the interviewees react to the denigration 
of their evaluators and I discuss how the mobilisation of moral sentiments may 
function as a form of usurpationary closure strategies and as a form of self-exclusion. 
 
6.2 Boundary drawing ‘from above’ 
6.2.1 Education, knowledgeability and cultural consumption 
The relationship between educational achievement and class background is well-
documented. Even in social democratic countries such as Norway these patterns 
prevail, despite extensive democratic reforms implemented to provide broad access to 
the school system, including higher education (Andersen and Hansen, 2012). Insofar 
as the education system values and awards certain forms of knowledge and modes of 
scholastic practices at the expense of others, pupils and students attuned to the 
explicit and implicit criteria of this system will enjoy success at the expense of those 
less attuned. It thus makes sense to conceptualise this process in terms of an unequal 
distribution of ‘embodied cultural capital’ which facilitates the accumulation of 
‘institutionalised cultural capital’, which in turn affects the life-chances of possessors 
vis-à-vis non-possessors of such resources (see Bourdieu, 1986; Bourdieu and 
Passeron, 1990). In other words, the differential distribution of educational success 
and, hence, the attainment of educational qualifications, amount to processes of 
formalised closure in the sense that the value of such qualifications are institutionally 
secured by the state. 
 
Moreover, studies of friendship and marriage patterns have shown that Norwegians – 
like people in most Western countries – tend to rub shoulders, reside and marry 
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within social circles endowed with similar types and amounts of educational 
qualifications as themselves (Hansen, 1995; Ljunggren, 2010; Ljunggren and 
Andersen, 2012), which may be interpreted as signs of processes amounting to non-
formalised closure. There are reasons to suspect that the formation of more or less 
exclusive status groups is related to the unequal distribution of educational 
qualifications. However, such processes are not necessarily based on subjective 
evaluations of attributes related to education and/or knowledgeability, nor do the 
highly educated necessarily employ certain standards against which other people are 
judged as more or less eligible for social interaction. Indeed, Norwegian scholars 
have emphasised that egalitarian values, anti-intellectualist sentiments and 
democratic institutions have important ‘modifying’ implications for the stratifying 
effects of education and knowledge (Skarpenes and Sakslind, 2010; see also Lauglo, 
1995; Skirbekk, 2002; Telhaug et al, 2006). As highly educated Norwegians are 
found to be reluctant to explicitly demarcate themselves from others based on 
educational and knowledge-related criteria, it is argued that Norway is quite different 
from other countries, in the sense that egalitarian values ‘modify other forms of 
evaluation and judgement’, which, in turn, render the notion of social status rather 
different in a Norwegian context (Skarpenes and Sakslind, 2010: 237). 
 
Contrary to these findings, however, quite a few interviewees – especially among the 
highly educated interviewees in the sample – not only report that they valorise 
scholastic knowledge and education as virtues in themselves; they also explicitly 
demarcate themselves from people whom they perceive as ‘less educated’, ‘less 
intelligent’ and even as ‘dumber’ than themselves and the people with whom they 
associate: 
 
V: Can you describe what kinds of people you like, or what kinds of qualities you 
appreciate when meeting other people? 
I: People have to be intelligent, interesting and entertaining. Oh my God, there are so 
many boring people out there. […] When I’m at dinner parties, for instance, I’m very 
careful about where I sit down. I don’t want to be bored to death by unintelligent and 
dumb people. […] I want to be surrounded by people who are smart and 
knowledgeable. […] 
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V: Would you say that it’s important for you for people to be interested in cultural 
matters? 
I: Well, of course. […] It would be horrible to be stranded on a desert island with a 
welder who only cares about smoking roll-ups and talking about the latest titty mail 
he has received from his friends […] There’s got to be some kind of substance to 
people’s interests. […] That’s why I hate the real-estate agent type. Such people lack 
substance too. […] They’ve always wanted a nice car and a high income and to wear 
a suit at work, but they’ve never had the ambition or the ability to get a proper 
education. […] So they study a bit at BI,112 mistakenly believing that sort of 
education represents a substance that entitles their image. I guess you can tell by the 
way I talk that I’m a university educated arrogant prick. But I still believe it’s true. If 
you look behind my snobbery, you’ll see that I’m right. They lack the ability to think 
logically. And the ability to do that… I value that. And you won’t find that among 
these uppish real estate agents.   
 (Lucas, lawyer, early 30s) 
 
V: You mentioned earlier something about boyfriends and education. Can you 
elaborate on that? 
I: Well, I could never have a boyfriend that didn’t have a proper education. There 
was this guy, he was a carpenter. Apparently, he was in love with me. I guess he was 
sweet, but I mean, he had tattoos all over his body, and this Pantera113 shirt… 
Obviously, it didn’t work out. […] And then there was this other guy. […] I’d be 
embarrassed to be seen with him. I guess he had some form of education. Well, not 
really an education. I mean, he studied in Australia. […] But he somehow managed 
to get some qualifications, a bachelor’s degree from what I call a summer university 
in Australia. […] And he was like… He talked about reggae music and he had this 
notion that if more people would listen to reggae and smoke marijuana, the world 
wound be a better place. Oh, my God! […] Then he went through these phases… 
You know, ‘What’s the meaning of life? Let’s do a little research on that.’ […] I 
mean, people who try to be very intellectual, but who are not, and just talk some 
mumbo-jumbo because they’ve smoked too much weed… That’s just embarrassing. 
[…] I’d be embarrassed if that was my boyfriend.  
 (Nora, lawyer, mid 30s) 
 
As university-educated lawyers, both Lucas and Nora identify with people whom 
they consider ‘intelligent’ and ‘knowledgeable’. They also explicitly dis-identify with 
people regarded as ‘boring’, or just plain ‘dumb’. The boundary drawing expressed in 
these quotes implies that it is not only those lacking a formal education who are 
disfavoured. Both the degree studied for at BI, and the degree studied for at a 
                                              
112 BI Norwegian Business School is the largest business school in Norway. 
113 American heavy metal band.  
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‘summer university’ in Australia, are clearly frowned upon. In other words, the 
intellectual abilities of people employed in manual occupations, as well as those of 
more adjacent groups in terms of objective positions in the social space, are 
questioned. 
 
As the quotes above indicate, the interviewees seem to value rational modes of 
thinking. Indeed, the ability to reason ’critically’ and ‘independently’ is cherished by 
many interviewees, and lacking such abilities is often perceived as undesirable. In 
many cases this implies that the ‘religiously minded’ and those ‘pandering to 
religion’ are considered to have dubious mind-sets. This is not, however, the case 
with Philip who, despite his university degree, reports an interest in religious matters. 
Nevertheless, knowledgeability and critically reflecting on one’s own spirituality are 
emphasised:  
 
V: What types of qualities do you value in others, and what types of qualities do you 
find less attractive? 
I: […] I guess it’s all about getting along, to be on the same page, so to speak. And a 
lot of it has to with humour. If people have a good sense of humour, that’s a good 
sign. […] I guess, in the end, one ends up relating to people who are very much like 
oneself. But in my experience, people don’t necessarily have to have the same set of 
opinions. For instance, I’ve got this interest in religion. […] But this new age type of 
mumbo jumbo… It’s kind of easy to make fun of, because there’s a lot of foolish 
stuff going on in such circles. […] Their thoughts are unclear, in a sense. And there’s 
way too little humour in such circles. And it can get too moralistic and way too 
serious. I mean, it’s unheard of to joke about spiritual matters. […] And they lack 
knowledge when it comes to science. They’ve got this enemy image of both science 
and Christianity, even though they haven’t got the slightest clue what either are really 
about. I know this, because I frequented such circles when I was young. But I 
gradually left, because we didn’t really get along. […] So now I’d rather hang out 
with types of people that haven’t got a slightest interest in religious matters. […] 
That’s not how I choose my friends. […] The kind of people I get along with… There 
has got to be a certain amount of knowledge, intelligence and humour.  
 (Philip, secondary school teacher, early 40s) 
 
In addition to Philip’s valorisation of knowledge and intelligence, he emphasises 
people’s sense of humour. Indeed, lacking the ability to relate to religious issues 
somewhat humorously is partly why Philip has drifted away from the ‘new age’ 
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milieu he once frequented. Thus, religiosity or spirituality per se are not deemed 
‘unintelligent’; rather, it is the ways in which people relate to such matters that is 
important. More generally, the connection between knowledge, intelligence and a 
good sense of humour is emphasised by several highly educated interviewees. As 
they themselves prefer ‘intelligent comedy’, they deem people who prefer more 
‘immediate’ forms of comedy as having a ‘bad sense of humour’. Indeed, 
encountering such people is depicted as a ‘horrible’ experience:   
 
V: If I understand you correctly, you appreciate people who have a sense of humour, 
who get irony and can appreciate that form of humour. Do you ever meet people who 
haven’t got this way of relating to things, who don’t master the art of irony, so to 
speak? 
I: Yeah, that happens all the time. This feeling of not being connected, in a sense. 
When I meet new people, I can tell within a couple of minutes whether we can 
connect or not. If they get the references I hint at. For instance, I’ll say this or that, 
and you’ll immediately understand whether it was meant ironically or not. And I’m 
really taken aback by people are not able to do that at all. […] The kind of people I 
can relate to… We have this frame of reference, we’re used to relating to irony… 
We’re similar in that regard. And I find it really hard to communicate with people 
who aren’t able to do that, and who haven’t got a slightest clue about what I’m 
saying. 
V: What kinds of people is that? 
I: […] It’s a type of people who are very earnest and heartfelt in a way. […] Which in 
a sense is the opposite of relating to things in a distanced and, if you like, ironic way. 
[…] 
V: How do you relate to… 
I: …people with a bad sense of humour? Well, to be around those kinds of people is 
of course horrible. No doubt about it. [Laughs.] I guess the people that I perceive as 
having a bad sense of humour are the people who think they’ve got a good sense of 
humour themselves. […] I reckon the worst nightmare would be to deal with Kristian 
Valen114 twenty-four hours a day. You know, people who too obviously try to be 
funny all the time. I don’t like it when I watch comedy on TV, and I don’t like it 
when I meet people face to face.  
 (Jonas, head of cultural enterprise, mid 30s) 
 
V: The type of sexualised humour you talked about earlier… […] What’s your 
opinion about the types of people that find that kind of humour funny? 
                                              
114 Norwegian comedian. 
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I: Well, it’s obviously a type of people who doesn’t share my preferences. But I guess 
I don’t know that many people of that sort. […] I guess such preferences reflect what 
you’re like deep inside. For instance what people joke about at parties. People can be 
so daft. […] I like my comedy a bit more intelligent. It shouldn’t be so obviously 
funny. It has to be subtle and clever. That’s far more interesting. 
 (Sara, journalist, mid 40s) 
 
What I have referred to earlier as an intellectual mode of consumption implies a 
distanced and sober celebration of ‘art for art’s sake’ and a distinct intellectualised 
and aesthetical orientation in all of one’s choices, from the fine arts and literature, to 
the more quotidian choices of clothing, food and furniture. Such interviewees seek 
‘new experiences’ through their cultural consumption, and they typically demand that 
cultural goods ‘challenge’ them intellectually. As we can see from these quotes, 
cultural consumers who are perceived as complacent and who even cherish ‘bad’ 
forms of comedy are deemed to be people with whom these interviewees would 
rather not associate. This finding resonates well with Friedman and Kuipers’ (2011) 
inquiry into comedy preferences in the Netherlands and the UK: they concluded that 
‘there is something fundamental about what makes people laugh.’  
 
So far we have seen that education and knowledgeability are important evaluative 
criteria in themselves. Moreover, lacking scholastic abilities is associated with ‘vices’ 
such as being unintelligent, the exaggerated use of illegal drugs, pandering to 
religion, a bad sense of humour and so forth. Evaluative criteria related to education 
and knowledgeability are, however, especially salient concerning politics and the 
ability to critically reflect on societal processes: 
 
I’ve got no problem meeting people who are different from me. But if I am to spend 
my ‘valuable time’, I’d rather seek out people who are a bit like me. Or people who 
are interesting, people who want to talk about what interests me and people who can 
teach me something new. Say, if I meet this person, and I realise that I’d have to 
spend two hours explaining my views… […] You know, because we’re so different, 
either politically or… Then it wouldn’t be much fun. I’d just stand there biting my lip 
trying not to start bawling. I mean, that’s not interesting to me. 
 (Theodor, head of cultural enterprise, mid 40s) 
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V: You mentioned elitism earlier? 
I: I’m elitist.  
V: Yeah? 
I: And a snob. […] I’m marked by having spent considerable time at the university 
and frequenting what the Progress Party115 would classify as the cultural elite.  […] I 
demand that the people I’m surrounded by are conscious about themselves, their 
surroundings and society at large. I expect them to be able to discuss politics, and 
Bob Dylan’s discography, for that matter. […] If people aren’t interested in such 
matters… I mean, what’s the classical definition of an idiot? It’s people who don’t 
care about politics. And it doesn’t have to be… I mean, I don’t follow election 
campaigns that closely myself. […] But I’m socially minded in general. And if I am 
supposed to communicate with others, I expect to talk about more interesting stuff 
than gardening, doing up houses, and what the kids said at the kindergarten 
yesterday. I mean, I want to talk about more than just private stuff.     
 (Thomas, journalist, early 40s) 
 
As we can see from these quotes, people who are perceived as exclusively 
preoccupied with commonplace activities such as gardening and doing up their 
houses are deemed rather uninteresting. Indeed, if it proves to be the case that these 
people do not care about politics and/or lack the ability to reflect on what is going on 
in their surroundings, they are deemed ‘idiots’. Apparently assuming that such people 
will shun him for his interest in political and aesthetical issues, Thomas rather self-
ironically identifies with the ‘cultural elite’. As noted in the previous chapter, this 
term is widely used both in popular language and public debates, and it has been 
increasingly deployed to denote something negative, unpleasant and undesirable 
(Haarr and Krogstad, 2011). Another interesting point is that Thomas links such anti-
elitist sentiments with the Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet), currently the second-
largest political party in the Norwegian Parliament. As the highly educated 
interviewees mostly adhere to left-wing politics, the Progress Party often elicits their 
distaste.116 Its politics is depicted as ‘right-wing’ or ‘populist’ by these interviewees, 
and judging from the ways in which they classify people adhering to its politics, the 
                                              
115 Norwegian political party which identifies as ‘conservative liberal’ and ‘libertarian’ 
(http://www.frp.no/filestore/Introduction_To_The_Progress_Party.pdf). 
116 This finding resonates well with Flemmen’s (2012a) analysis of a systematic heterogeneity with 
regards to political attitudes and party adherence within the Norwegian service class: respondents in 
the cultural fractions tend to exhibit leftist political adherence, while respondents in the economic 
fractions tend to exhibit rightist adherence. 
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Progress Party rouses rather strong antipathies. Some interviewees even report that 
they try to prevent their children from affiliating with the Progress Party’s politics: 
 
I want my children to become socially minded, and not egoists that dream of fat 
salaries and expensive cars. And I have forbidden my children to ever vote for the 
Progress Party. [Laughs.] […] So there are limitations to the democracy in my 
family. I mean, they can do whatever they want. But they’re going to have to justify 
and give good reasons for their choices. But voting for the Progress Party, there’s no 
way you can justify that. If that happens, the family will fall apart. Then they can just 
kiss their mother goodbye.  
 (Freja, head of cultural enterprise, mid 40s) 
 
Being accused of a dubious morality (e.g. ‘racism’, ‘homophobia’, ‘egoism’), as well 
as aesthetical flaws (e.g. ‘vulgarity’, ‘gaudiness’), people adhering to the politics of 
the Progress Party are often deemed ‘unintelligent’, ‘feeble-minded’ and ‘dumb’. 
Furthering the discussion in the previous chapter about the importance of analysing 
the entwinement of different repertoires of evaluation as mutually constituting or 
reinforcing, rather than mutually exclusive or competing, the depiction of people 
adhering to the politics of the Progress Party perhaps represents the entwinement of 
evaluative repertoires par excellence. The link between ignorance and a dubious 
morality is particularly clear: 
 
I’m so sick of stupid people. And now I’m going generalise a bit… This boastful 
Progress Party style… You know, most of the people supporting their politics… […] 
They throw out hopeless statements like ‘that bloody socialist government’. And I’m 
like: ‘What?! What does that even mean?’ Some people are so hopelessly ignorant. 
And I find that really disturbing. When people make such bold statements without the 
slightest clue about what they’re talking about, I get provoked. Usually I manage to 
bite my lip, but when such statements become racist, as they tend to do, I feel it’s my 
responsibility to speak out against it. Because if we don’t, it’ll never end.  
(Sara, journalist, mid 40s) 
 
However, while the Progress Party’s voters are negatively depicted by many of the 
highly educated interviewees in the sample, not all of them do so. Lucas maintains 
that as long as people are knowledgeable and can discuss political issues, it does not 
matter which stances they have. Nevertheless, this underscores the point that 
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intelligence and knowledgeability are important yardsticks against which others are 
judged:   
 
I like knowledgeable and intelligent people. I don’t care if they adhere to the left or to 
the right in politics. I’ve had the most exciting conversations with communists and all 
sorts of riff-raff. But my conversation partners have to be intelligent and 
knowledgeable. I really like to discuss. I come from a family that always had these 
political discussions, for instance at family dinners. There was a nice balance 
between discussing and quarrelling.  
(Lucas, lawyer, early 30s) 
 
Evaluative criteria related to education and knowledgeability are also linked to 
aesthetics and the ability to appreciate works of art, literature, music and so forth. As 
established in the previous chapter, interviewees located in the cultural fraction of the 
upper sector of the social space draw sharp symbolic boundaries between their peers 
and people practising what they conceive of as a dubious combination of ‘too much 
money and too little taste’. While derogatory classifications of people perceived as 
having fewer monetary resources are somewhat less frequent, in the interview data 
there are nevertheless several demarcations against the ways in which ‘common 
people’ embrace ‘popular’ entertainment forms. A recurring phrase is that the average 
Stavangerian has ‘no idea’ of aesthetics. Indeed, if such people do happen to attend a 
cultural event or gathering, they are presumed to be ‘lost’ and there only ‘for the sake 
of being there’: 
 
I: I think it’s great that people like Jon Fosse117 come to town. But I guess ninety-nine 
per cent of the people attending his plays have no idea about what it’s all about. They 
just tag along because there’s something happening. It’s the same people who attend 
the international volleyball tournament. ‘Wow, something’s happening. We’ve got to 
be a part of this big thing.’ […] 
V: What kinds of people go to events with that sort of approach? 
I: Uh, I guess they’re all local patriots. People who define themselves as… It’s the 
same people who attend the Gladmat festival118 and think it’s all marvellous.   
 (Oscar, academic, mid 30s) 
                                              
117 Norwegian author and playwright.  
118 Local food festival. 
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Here in Stavanger, there’s this consumer culture that I find problematic. […] The 
funniest example I can think of is these big rock concerts that take place at the 
stadium from time to time. And this one time REM119 played, and it’s remarkable 
how many people gathered to see this band. It was pretty obvious that most of them 
didn’t really have a relationship to this band, much less followed their career from the 
late eighties and onwards. Anyway, this friend of mine overheard this conversation 
between some people. I guess it was some old friends or neighbours or something… 
And when the show was over, they said something like this: ‘See you all next year!’ 
You know, regardless of who’s on stage. It’s more like ‘Oh, there’s a concert at the 
stadium, I guess we’ll have to go’. While this is just a small example, I believe it’s an 
expression of an extremely homogenous, consensus oriented and very provincial 
approach to culture. ‘We’ll tag along as long as there’s something happening, 
regardless of the content of it.’ 
 (Jonas, head of cultural enterprise, mid 30s) 
 
As most of the highly educated interviewees report a distinct commitment to their 
consumption of cultural goods, people who do not share their enthusiasm are often 
regarded as rather ‘dull’. While some interviewees point out that shared cultural 
tastes are not mandatory criteria in order to befriend other people, too great a distance 
from their own preferences is viewed with suspicion. This is the case with Sara, who 
simply cannot understand how people can stand ‘mass-produced, generic music’, 
such as Swedish dansband: 
 
V: You say that you get provoked by certain kinds of popular music… Or by people 
who blindly buy into it. Can you elaborate?  
I: Yeah, I get a little provoked by the fact that it’s so easy to sell things, you know, 
garbage that is so easy to make. And the reason I get provoked, I guess, is that people 
don’t really demand enough from the producers. I guess it says a lot that ten years 
ago Sputnik120 was the most popular artist in Norway. But I guess we just have to 
reconcile ourselves with the fact that that’s how it is. Even today, we’ve got this 
dansband crap. It’s really popular and totally meaningless. I guess I have to get used 
to the thought that there are a lot of people who find it exciting. […] I try not to be 
prejudiced, but… When I meet people that I cannot connect with and on top of that 
they all have a taste in music that is so far off from everything that I like, it’s sort of 
an affirmation that we don’t have much in common, if you know what I mean? 
 (Sara, journalist, mid 40s) 
 
                                              
119 American rock band. 
120 Norwegian country artist and truck-driver, also known as Knut T. Storbukås. 
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So while bad taste in music does not absolutely disqualify others from social 
interaction, Sara maintains that it often serves as a confirmation that she probably will 
not have much in common with such people. Bad taste in music is a sign, or an 
indicator, of something more. Indeed, such associations are recurrently made by 
many interviewees. A lack of interest in music, literature, the visual arts, or more 
generally, aesthetics, is often associated with ‘squares without a clue’: 
 
I can be quite judgemental. You know, if you had this painting on your wall that I 
didn’t like, I’d sort of judge you and I’d think that you weren’t really interested in the 
visual arts or that you were a square who didn’t have a clue. [Laughs.] […] If I’d 
walked into a stranger’s home, and this person had three IKEA pictures on the walls, 
I’m sure I’d also find cheap, generic books from some book club on the shelves. I’d 
have thought that they weren’t really interested in culture, and that they’d probably 
be more interested in football or something. You know, living these square nine-to-
five lives. […] I guess I’d find it quite sad, really. […] My friends are interested in 
music, art, clothing styles… Well, most of them anyway. The others… We call them 
the sheep [Laughs.] Well, that’s how we liked to think in our youth. But I’ve found 
that the world is not that simple. You know, it’s not just us against the sheep. But 
still, none of my friends live square lives and have IKEA pictures on their walls. And 
when I walk into someone’s homes and see that type of thing, I still have these 
thoughts. 
 (Julia, artist and illustrator, late 20s) 
 
To summarise, many interviewees – typically highly educated people with 
backgrounds from the social sciences, the humanities or law – draw boundaries 
between themselves and others based on evaluative criteria related to education, 
scholastic knowledge and aesthetical preferences. Such criteria are, indeed, salient 
parts of the evaluative repertoires of quite a few of the interviewees. Although such 
boundary drawing may not be morally justifiable in terms of explicitly expressing 
them in certain social situations – an issue I shall return to in the next chapter – the 
empirical findings suggest that education, scholastic knowledge and aesthetics are 
important as regards those with whom they would or would not like to associate.  
 
The interviewees who draw boundaries based on criteria related to education, 
scholastic knowledge and aesthetics are – with few exceptions – situated in the 
cultural fraction of the upper sectors of the social space. Those located in the 
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economic fraction are, by contrast, either indifferent to such issues, or – as we saw in 
the previous chapter – they explicitly shun what they conceive of as ‘cultural 
snobbery’ and ‘elitism’. So while not all the interviewees located in the upper sectors 
of the social space draw on such criteria of evaluation, many do. As most of them are 
both highly educated and employed in occupations linked to knowledge production 
(academics and journalists) or cultural production (artists and people employed in 
cultural enterprises), the exclusiveness of their knowledge, or more generally, the 
distinctiveness of their practices, is presumably a stake in the struggle in their 
professional careers. In other words, the value of their assets is largely determined by 
the successfulness of their closure strategies vis-à-vis other producers of knowledge 
and/or cultural goods. Conversely, the interviewees located in the economic fraction 
of the upper sectors of the social space seldom report any interest in scholastic 
culture, either in their professional or their private lives. And if they do, their tastes 
are not held with much commitment; they typically attend plays and musical 
performances because their line of work requires it (e.g. ‘I have to attend because I 
have to entertain my clients’). Thus, it would be highly surprising if these 
interviewees drew boundaries in the same way as their counterparts endowed with 
diametrically opposed capital portfolios. 
 
Furthering the claim about the importance of emphasising the capital composition 
principle of social differentiation in order to understand boundary work directed 
‘downwards’, there is not necessarily a contradiction between the fact that 
interviewees located in the cultural fraction shun the ‘flashiness’ of the economically 
privileged, while drawing sharp boundaries between themselves and others based on 
knowledge-related criteria. As noted by Sayer, 
 
[i]t is possible for people to be egalitarian in their views about wealth, both wanting a 
more equal distribution and resisting the tendency to value people for their wealth, 
and yet valuing qualities, such as being educated […], so that they discriminate 
among others in a highly inegalitarian way, selecting out those who are ‘able to talk 
seriously about things’. (Sayer, 2005: 199) 
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As noted in the previous chapter, interviewees located in the two fractions of the 
upper sectors of the social space employ different criteria of evaluation in depicting 
themselves in opposition to the lifestyles of their counterparts. So while the highly 
educated interviewees located in the cultural fraction might completely reject what 
they conceive of as the ‘conspicuous’ and ‘snobbish’ material consumption of the 
rich, they might not necessarily refrain from judging others based on criteria related 
to education and knowledgeability. Indeed, as educational qualifications and esoteric 
knowledge cannot be inherited in the same way as, for instance, money and property 
(Bourdieu, 1986), successful closure strategies related to education and 
knowledgeability are perhaps one of the few ways in which the highly educated can 
secure their exclusiveness and social esteem. Following Bourdieu’s line of reasoning, 
the social reproduction of the highly educated depends to a large extent on the 
transmission of embodied cultural capital, which in turn may be converted into 
educational qualifications and advantages on the labour market (Bourdieu and 
Passeron, 1990). According to Bourdieu, such closure strategies are reinforced and 
even concealed by a ‘euphemisation’ of language. Thanks to classification schemes 
produced by sciences such as psychology and biology, a misrecognised ‘racism of 
intelligence’ is made possible:  
 
Educational classification is a euphemized version of social classification, a social 
classification which has become natural and absolute, having been censored and 
alchemically transmuted in such a way that class differences turn into differences of 
nature. […] In educational classification, a social classification is legitimized and 
given the sanction of science. (Bourdieu, 1993: 178) 
 
Thus, acquired scholastic skills may, under the guise of terms such as ‘intelligence’, 
‘talent’ and ‘giftedness’, help to conceal closure processes. Put in Weberian terms, 
the racism of intelligence is the means through which the highly educated – wittingly 
or not – produce a ‘theodicy of their own privilege’. In this way, institutionally 
recognised classification schemes function as perceptual categories through which 
people comprehend the social world, including their perceptions of themselves and 
others. Such classifications do not only amount to processes of formalised closure, in 
the sense of those who are found worthy of attaining qualifications, diplomas and 
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titles in the education system; but as the analysis above indicates, they also amount to 
processes of non-formalised closure, in the sense that more or less exclusive status 
groups are formed on their basis.  
 
6.2.2 Material consumption 
The connection between class, status and material consumption has regrettably not 
been scrutinised to the same extent as the consumption of cultural goods, though 
there are some exceptions (see for instance Veblen, 1967; Bourdieu, 1984; De Graaf, 
1991; Lamont, 1992; Holt, 1998; Rosenlund, 2000c; Katz-Gerro, 2003; Van Eijck 
and Van Oosterhout, 2005; Prieur et al, 2008; Daloz, 2010). While the importance of 
education and the mastery of scholastic culture should not be underestimated, there 
are reasons to suspect that this is not the only means though which more or less 
exclusive status groups are formed. Indeed, as Weber (1978: 342) points out in his 
discussion of the notion of social closure, ‘it does not matter which characteristic is 
chosen in the individual case: whatever suggests itself most easily is seized upon’. 
Moreover, while he notes that status honour normally stands in ‘sharp contrast to the 
pretensions of sheer property,’ he nevertheless points out that ‘the possibility of a 
style of life expected for members of a status group is usually conditioned 
economically’ (Weber, 1946: 180). 
 
As established in Chapter 4, what I termed the luxurious mode of consumption is 
particularly prevalent among the economically privileged interviewees. While tastes 
for material goods do overlap somewhat between the cultural and the economic 
fractions of the upper sectors of the social space, the interviewees located in the latter 
typically have greater means to fulfil their worldly and sensual desires. The luxurious 
mode of consumption is characterised by preferences for expensive and exclusive 
material goods such as motor vehicles, clothing, wines and trips to ‘exotic’ parts of 
the world. Moreover, these interviewees are far more concerned with consumer 
brands than the other interviewees in the sample, and they typically shun brands that 
have connotations to something ‘cheap’ and ‘generic’. Such classificatory distinctions 
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are also reflected in their demarcations against people perceived as exhibiting ‘poor’ 
consumption styles. Everything from consumption of cars, boats and sporting 
equipment, to food, wines and other beverages is exposed to judgement. Interestingly, 
interviewees located in the cultural fraction of the upper sectors of the social space – 
many of whom we saw demarcating themselves from the ‘conspicuous’ consumption 
styles of the ‘rich people’ in the previous chapter – also draw boundaries in similar 
ways. Explicit boundary work is particularly salient when it comes to looks, 
appearances and clothing styles: 
 
V: Can you describe a woman of your age who’s completely off in her clothing style? 
I: Well, she wears skirts which are far too short, shows far too much cleavage, and 
she… Well, generally, people who don’t wear enough clothes look stupid. You 
know, regardless of how good a figure you have, if you show too much skin, that’s 
not nice at all. It’s just trashy. There are a lot of women who dress like that. But the 
worst thing is people at my age who show too much skin. Especially if they should 
have left more to the imagination, if you catch my drift? 
 (Sara, journalist, mid 40s) 
 
V: Do you observe other women and their clothing styles? Do you catch yourself 
thinking that others have bad taste in clothes?  
I: Yes, indeed I do. […] Some people wear these raggedy, old clothes… I guess 
that’s more about having no taste at all rather than having bad taste. I guess they’re 
just not interested in that kind of stuff. But of course, some people are poor and I 
guess they have to prioritise what they spend their money on. But on the other hand, 
clothes are really cheap these days, and I guess most people are able to treat 
themselves from time to time. And you don’t have to choose the most expensive 
stuff. There’s a good range for all purses. Other people just don’t have a clue. 
They’re just not capable of putting together a nice outfit. But still they have this self-
image of being really well-dressed. But in reality, the clothes don’t fit them at all. Yet 
others wear clothes that are made for people who are a lot younger than them. But I 
guess the ultimate expression of bad taste is people wearing these sweatsuits.  
V: Who wears such clothes? 
I: You know what? I almost think they belong to a lower class. […] I guess I’d think 
that this person was a bit simple-minded.  
 (Pia, lawyer, late 40s) 
 
There are two typical figures of distaste recurring in the data; one who is depicted as 
‘trashy’, ‘vulgar’, ‘loud’ and ‘cheap’, and a second who is not so much defined by the 
presence of bad taste as a lack of good taste. These types seem to apply to males and 
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females alike. The former type is often associated with an inappropriate promiscuity, 
particularly when females are depicted, and adjectives such as ‘slutty’ are not 
unusual. The latter type does not elicit contempt to the same degree, but is 
nevertheless viewed with suspicion. Both are typically associated with ‘lower’ and 
‘simple’ types, and as we can see above, Pia even depicts such people as belonging to 
a ‘lower class’. However, it is not just the ‘lower-class types’ that elicit some 
interviewees’ contempt. Remembering Lucas’ conception of real estate agents as 
lacking in intellectual capacities, such people also seem to be lacking sartorially:  
 
These real-estate types, they walk around in their suits, without representing any kind 
of substance or style. They’re betrayed by their poorly done Windsor knot. […] You 
can spot them easily. You can tell by the suit, the way that it’s cut… This is a suit 
bought in Norway. And they probably think it can be passed off as a Gucci, an 
Armani, or a Boss suit, maybe even a tailor-made suit, but the cut betrays that it has 
been bought at Dressmann or H&M. And by all means, wearing a suit from H&M is 
not necessarily bad. I’ve even got one myself. But I don’t try to pass it off as 
anything else. […] And you can spot them by the way they style their hair, their 
glasses… They always buy these designer glasses to draw attention. And then there’s 
this giveaway that never fails: the shoes. I’ve always based my reasoning on the 
axiom that people wearing two-tone shoes are either Americans or mafia bosses, and 
that you should be sceptical of both. [Laughs.] People may have nice suits, but if they 
ruin it all by wearing Bianco121 shoes, they expose themselves as what they really 
are; they don’t have the money or the taste to buy proper shoes.  
 (Lucas, lawyer, early 30s) 
 
The boundary drawing against people who lack sartorial taste is not just linked to 
brands and the exclusiveness of the garments in question: it seems knowledge and a 
sense of aesthetics are equally important. Indeed, as the quote above indicates, 
donning the ‘right’ suit in combination with the ‘wrong’ shoes or a badly knotted tie 
is taken to reveal pretentiousness and a lack of taste. In addition, a knowledge of what 
is fashionable and what is ‘out’ also seems to be of importance. Theodor, who reports 
being ‘style-conscious without buying into every new fad’, is nevertheless well-
informed about the dictates of fashion, and he is quite observant about what other 
people wear:  
                                              
121 Franchise shoe store.  
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I find the latest fad quite amusing. […] All the bright colours that are supposed be 
mixed in creative ways. Lots of pink, green, blue… You know, all at once. I kind of 
like it, because it reminds me of the eighties. But still, this type of fashion peaked in 
Stockholm two years ago. And eventually, mediated by H&M, this fad has arrived in 
Stavanger. And I find this amusing. Because the people wearing such clothes don’t 
necessarily know that this fashion is two years old.  
 (Theodor, head of cultural enterprise, mid 40s) 
 
This boundary drawing in terms of other people’s clothing styles is also linked to 
knowledge about situational aspects; i.e. where and when (not) to dress in certain 
ways. Indeed, being either ‘overdressed’ or ‘underdressed’ for the occasion is 
considered inappropriate by several interviewees. Henrik is particularly concerned 
about people ‘underdressing’, both when eating out at restaurants and meeting others 
in work-related settings: 
 
 V: Do you catch yourself thinking that other people are badly dressed, that they 
exhibit bad clothing styles? 
 I: It does happen, especially if people look scruffy. You know, dirty clothes, or 
clothes that don’t suit the occasion. For instance at restaurants. I mean, you should be 
properly dressed for such occasions. And in work-related settings too… I mean, there 
are ways you just can’t dress. […] But the worst thing is being scruffy, if you know 
what I mean? […] I guess these things change. Nowadays, people wear jeans and 
casual clothes at work. It wasn’t like that before. […] And it’s not necessarily a 
development I like. […] When you meet new people, you have to have manners, and 
that goes for clothing too. […] It has something to do with respect for others. 
 (Henrik, economist, early 60s) 
 
While looks, appearances and clothing styles are the most salient features eliciting 
explicit contempt among the resourceful interviewees, other features are also present 
in the interview data. As noted in Chapter 4, quite a few interviewees are interested in 
food, wine and drinks and they report spending considerable time and money on 
buying, preparing and consuming such goods. They also have opinions about those 
who do not share their interests: 
 
When it comes to food, I don’t care about time or money. People are very concerned 
about these two things and I really don’t get it. It’s supposed to be as cheap as 
possible, and it’s supposed to be made as quickly as possible. I find that quite 
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strange, because when people buy a new car, they don’t think twice about spending 
thousands. But when it comes to things you put into your body… You know, things 
that really affect how the body works. When it comes to these things, people are 
really stingy. I’ve never understood that. I come from a family that is very conscious 
about food. I’m raised thinking you shouldn’t care about the cost of food, and you 
shouldn’t care about the time it takes to prepare it. You should eat what you feel like 
and what you enjoy.  
 (Emil, musician and social worker, late 30s) 
 
Others are more cautious in their depictions of other people’s culinary tastes. Johan 
reports an awareness that his privileged economic situation means that he can take 
pleasure in types of food and drinks that most people cannot afford. It nevertheless 
puzzles him that people can stand ‘poor quality wines’:  
 
V: Have you ever considered… That your preferences are different from other 
people’s preferences? Is that something you think about? 
I: Well, yeah. […] And I can have a hard time understanding other people’s tastes, or 
the lack of it. Well, I can understand that I’m privileged and have had the chance to 
experience a wider range of things. But when it comes to wine, for instance… When 
people are served really bad quality wine, and they think it tastes good, then I can tell 
that they’ve never really tasted the good stuff. And I really have a hard time 
understanding how people can enjoy something that is sour or just plain bad. 
 (Johan, CEO, mid 50s) 
 
More generally, people perceived as ‘unhealthy’ and/or ‘lacking taste’ in quality food 
and drinks, are often viewed with suspicion by those who value such goods. 
Consumers of ‘fast food’ and ‘junk’ are portrayed as particularly suspect. Indeed, 
people whose diets are largely based on the popular ready-made Pizza Grandiosa and 
hamburgers from restaurant chains such as McDonald’s and Burger King are 
associated with dubious character traits, such as a ‘lack of self-control’ and 
‘ignorance’ about nutrition. When probed, the interviewees associate such lifestyles 
with overeating, obesity, or more generally, ‘unhealthiness’. Thus, these 
classifications also imply moral judgements of people who do not seem to care 
properly about their own health. Again, such derogatory classifications are aimed at 
the ‘lower-class’ types. 
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Derogatory classifications of other people’s consumption styles are also related to a 
perceived conformity, whether in terms of clothing style, interior design, or one’s 
choice of motor vehicle. Consumers who ‘buy what everyone else buys’, who ‘follow 
the latest fads’, and who thus ‘lack individual taste’, are viewed with suspicion. 
Valorising ‘individuality’ and ‘exclusivity’ themselves, the conformity of others 
seems to puzzle many resourceful interviewees: 
 
V: How would you never furnish your home? 
I: I guess most people… There are basically two types. Either it looks the same as it 
does everywhere, or it’s not nice at all. In earlier times, I guess most people were in 
the last category. Nowadays, there are more people in the former category. It’s really 
nice and all, but the problem is that it’s so similar to everyone else’s homes. When I 
see such homes, I’m thinking: ‘Why don’t you make a little effort to do it differently? 
Can’t you at least acquire one single item that has character?’ […] Most people have 
nice homes nowadays, because people earn more and can afford to buy stuff. And 
most people buy their stuff at IKEA. And things at IKEA can be nice, you know, 
individual bits and pieces. But if you buy everything at IKEA, it’s just… […] I’m not 
saying it’s ugly, I’m just saying it’s boring.  
 (Nora, lawyer, mid 30s) 
 
There’s one thing that has always puzzled me… Why do all people drive around in 
the same type of car? Why do all people drive a Volkswagen Passat? Haven’t they 
got their own taste? Every other family man in Stavanger drives around in a Passat. I 
just don’t get it.  
(Wilhelm, manager in oil company, early 40s) 
 
Boundary drawing related to other people’s material consumption is clearly 
manifested in the interview data. Just as we saw how interviewees deploy criteria 
related to education, scholastic knowledge and aesthetics in their depiction of ‘the 
lower types’, the judgement of such people’s material consumption choices is equally 
harsh. While the former way of evaluating others is quite distinct in terms of the 
capital profiles of the classifiers, the latter is not linked to the capital composition 
principle of social differentiation in the same way. Those who classify the material 
consumption of ‘the lower-class’ in derogatory terms are dispersed across the divide 
between the cultural and economic fraction of the upper sectors of the social space. 
While interviewees located in the economic fraction typically report spending more 
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money on material goods compared to those located in the cultural fraction, those 
located in both fractions similarly express aversions to the lower-class types’ lack of 
taste in material goods. And while interviewees located in the two fractions might 
view each other with mutual contempt, they nevertheless seem to agree that people 
betraying ‘vulgar’, ‘loud’, ‘rowdy’ and ‘cheap’ tastes and lifestyles are not those with 
whom they would wish to associate.  
 
6.2.3 A sense of one’s place 
In the previous chapter it was established that the mutual taste-related antagonism 
between the cultural and the economic fractions of the upper sectors of the social 
space manifests itself in a highly concrete ‘sense of one’s place’, as people navigate 
physical space by seeking out interaction with their peers while avoiding ‘the others’. 
This way of navigating physical space is not, however, restricted to the antagonism 
between cultural and economic capital. The interviewees located in the upper sectors 
of the social space report avoiding certain neighbourhoods and establishments such as 
restaurants, cafés and bars due to the somewhat unpleasant presence of people 
perceived as representatives of the ‘lower types’ alluded to earlier. Places of distaste 
include certain areas located in urban districts such as Hundvåg, Varden, Storhaug 
and Tjensvoll. As most of these areas are depicted as dominated by huge apartment 
buildings located in rather ‘unattractive surroundings’, several interviewees report 
that they avoid even going to, let alone settling down, in such ‘concrete jungles’:   
 
V: Where would you never settle down here in Stavanger? 
I: Not in the area around Varden, where there’s only apartment blocks. A concrete 
jungle, as they say. […] You know, these project blocks for people on social benefits. 
I could never live there.  
 (Thomas, journalist, early 40s)  
 
I would never live down by those apartment blocks near Varden […] First of all, I 
don’t like that type of building, the architecture. I have to live in a detached house, 
where there’s freedom, where I’ve got my own garden. […] I mean, those apartment 
blocks give me the creeps. It’s terribly impersonal. And sometimes I walk past them 
when I’m on my evening walks... It’s really eerie. There are probably thousands of 
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people living there, but you don’t see a living soul out in the streets. It’s terribly 
impersonal and eerie.  
 (Theodor, head of cultural enterprise, early 40s) 
 
While the aversions expressed to such neighbourhoods are linked to perceived 
aesthetical and architectural flaws in the physical features of the buildings and their 
surroundings, this is often entwined with derogatory depictions of the types of people 
inhabiting these neighbourhoods. They are often categorised as ‘people living on 
social security benefits’, ‘drug addicts’ and ‘criminals’: 
 
Down at Terje Vigens road, for instance… Or Terje Blue Light road, as people call it. 
People use bed sheets as curtains. Lots of noise at night-time, police cars driving back 
and forth. Families that I wouldn’t have as my neighbours, if you know what I mean? 
 (Klara, pre-school teacher, late 30s) 
 
It is not, however, just the perceived presence of people causing harm and disorder 
that makes the resourceful interviewees say that they shun certain neighbourhoods. 
Some interviewees report avoiding areas associated with ‘squares’. This is the case 
with Philip, who reports feeling ‘claustrophobic’ in areas inhabited by ‘down-to-
earth’ types of people: 
 
V: You were referring earlier to down-to-earth kinds of people who only care about 
their lawns. Can you elaborate? 
I: […] I feel really claustrophobic walking such streets. […] It might just be my 
prejudices, but if an area is dominated by that type of people… I don’t know… It’s 
this down-to-earth way of life that I have trouble relating to.  [….] All kinds of 
ordinary attitudes and opinions, people without the ability to think abstractly. Very 
limited worldviews and interests in political matters.[…] I guess people have become 
like that because they’re surrounded by that type of people, you know, because all 
their neighbours are like that. To me, it appears very down-to-earth. I imagine this is 
the way it was in the fifties. Extremely claustrophobic. I keep getting reminded of 
this quote by this Islamic revolutionary, Sayyid Qutb.122 […] When he travelled 
around in the United States, what struck him most was that people were obsessed 
with their lawns. You know, this suburban way of life, people spending their time 
mowing their lawns… And he found this empty and meaningless. And this quote, 
‘obsessed by their lawns’, that’s a bit like what I think too when I see such places. 
                                              
122 Egyptian author and poet, member of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in the 1950s and 1960s. 
  227
You know, this type of milieu where everything is down-to-earth, people without a 
sense of humour and without an interest for the world outside their neighbourhoods. 
 (Philip, high school teacher, early 40s) 
 
These interviewees also report avoiding establishments such as shops, restaurants and 
cafés in Stavanger’s urban areas. As several of them appreciate expensive ‘high-
quality’ food and drinks, establishments such as McDonald’s and Burger King 
offering ‘generic junk-food’, as well as kebab shops and types of restaurants 
associated with ‘low-quality’ and ‘fattening’ food, are avoided. Even establishments 
serving food and drinks that satisfy the interviewees’ requirements are avoided due to 
the perceived presence of types of people with whom they do not feel at ease:  
  
V: Do you have any criteria when it comes to restaurants, cafés and bars? 
I: It has to be nice. There’s got to be some kind of style to it. And I have to relate to 
the staff in a comfortable way. Restaurants like TGI Friday’s in Bergen… I hate 
those! It’s the same with certain pizza parlours in this town. You know, when the 
waitresses are so exaggeratedly friendly that they almost sit down beside you to chat, 
you know, as if we were pals. I mean, if that happens I’ll leave immediately, even 
though I really like pizza. […] 
V: Are there other places than pizza parlours you steer clear of? Where you don’t 
feel comfortable? 
I: Yeah, places where working-class people go, if you know what I mean? Places like 
Crazy Piano. I don’t know if that place even exists anymore. And this place that was 
called Gossip once. I think it’s Inside now. Places filled with manual workers. 
There’s no snobbery to it. They’re just not my type of people. I can’t relate to them. 
We have nothing in common to talk about. And I guess they can’t relate to people 
like me either. […] It’s much more fun to seek out places where there are people with 
similar occupations, people with similar backgrounds, where we have things to talk 
about, the same kind of humour and interests and stuff like that.  
 (Lucas, lawyer, early 30s) 
 
V: Are there places in Stavanger you steer clear of? 
I: Well, I’ve only been to places like Hexagon like three times in my whole life. I just 
don’t feel like going to those places. Big places with lots of really drunk people. […] 
Chevy’s and all these pubs. I don’t feel at home at such places.  
V: What kinds of people go to such places? 
I: […] I guess they live lives totally different from mine. I guess uneducated people 
without any academic background whatsoever.  
 (Mikkel, manager, oil firm, mid 30s) 
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As we can see, the interviewees’ evaluation of both staff and clientele is decisive in 
whether they seek out establishments such as restaurants, cafés and bars. Indeed, if 
the staff lack discreetness and act in ‘overly friendly ways’ and the clientele fail to 
match his interests, Lucas will stay away from pizza restaurants and other 
establishments. In similar ways, Mikkel does not ‘feel at home’ at certain bars. Both 
associate such places with ‘the working-class’ and ‘the less educated’. Recurring 
places of distaste for these interviewees include bars and nightclubs such as Inside, 
Dicken’s, Corvetten, Crazy Piano, Kobra and Beverly Hills Fun Pub. The clientele at 
such places is associated with ‘unhealthy’ drinking habits, ’rowdy’ behaviour, as well 
as promiscuity and ‘desperate mating strategies’: 
 
I don’t like places like Dicken’s, Corvetten and places like that. […] My prejudices 
tell me that mainly drunks go there. People sitting by the bar and complaining to the 
bartender, telling their whole life story. That’s what I imagine. […] And then there 
are these meat markets where people have these desperate mating strategies just 
before closing time. It just doesn’t appeal to me.  
 (Emil, musician and social worker, late 30s) 
 
You won’t find me at Beverly Hills Fun Pub and places like that, where you’ll find 
the worst aspects of Norwegian drinking culture. Drunk people behaving rather 
inelegantly. It’s almost dangerous to go there. It’s too noisy, too many drunk people 
and too loud music. I guess I sound like a sixty-seven year old, but I never went there 
when I was nineteen either. I’ve never felt comfortable there.  
V: What kinds of people go there? 
I: [Laughs.] I’m so glad that this is an anonymous interview. Well, there aren’t many 
professors going to Beverly Hills Fun Pub. I can tell you that much. There are people 
with gelled hair, fashionable clothes. People who have never put a foot at a 
university. […] Very noisy personalities. I like people who are laid back. Not the 
noisy types.   
 (Thomas, journalist, early 40s) 
 
To summarise, sympathies and antipathies towards the perceived presence of certain 
kinds of people are of decisive importance in terms of where the interviewees feel ‘at 
home’ or ‘out of place’. Most of the interviewees located in the upper sectors of the 
social space report avoiding neighbourhoods and establishments such as shops, cafés, 
restaurants and bars due to the presence of a ‘lower-class’ type of person perceived as 
having lifestyles, tastes and types of behaviour alien to their own. They are often 
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depicted as ‘the working-class’, ‘the lower-class’, ‘the uneducated’ and the like. 
While some interviewees report that they enjoy ‘mixed’ crowds and neighbourhoods 
– some even report that they occasionally ‘go slumming it’ at bars and restaurants – 
there seem to be limits as to how different from themselves other people can be 
before they choose to stay away. As noted in the previous chapter, resourceful people 
have a greater possibility to choose their place of residence, or more generally, their 
movements in physical space. Indeed, as discussed earlier, the notion of ‘elective 
belonging’ (Savage et al, 2005a) presupposes the ability to choose, and there are 
reasons to believe that this ability increases proportionally with the endowment of 
resources, particularly economic capital, due for instance to housing prices. In other 
words, the differential distribution of resources manifests itself in both a social and 
geographical ‘sense of one’s place’, as people navigate the local milieu by seeking 
out interaction with their peers while avoiding ‘the others’. Indeed, this finding lends 
further support to Rosenlund’s (2009a, 2011) assertion that there exist structural 
homologies between social, mental and spatial structures in Stavanger.  
 
6.2.4 Monopolisation and exclusionary strategies  
At the heart of exclusionary closure strategies is the attempt by a group of social 
actors to establish exclusiveness and distance from outsiders: this in turn allows 
members to assert and defend their claims to esteem and prestige (Scott, 1996: 32; 
Bottero, 2005: 43). Thus, exclusionary closure strategies are tightly connected to 
processes of monopolisation, i.e. the ways in which a group of social actors gains 
control and exclusive possession of resources, which may be both material and 
symbolic. Among Weberians the term is used broadly, not only to refer to market 
concentration and imperfect competition in the economic sphere, but as is evident in 
Weber’s discussion of the social sphere, it also refers to the differential distribution of 
status honour (Weber, 1946: 186ff). In this regard, monopolisation involves the 
identification of certain specific attributes of lifestyles as the basis for exclusion so 
that a limited circle of those deemed ‘eligible’ can attain exclusive access to 
resources of various kinds.  
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 ‘The lower-class types’ 
(as classified by the interviewees in the 
upper sectors of the social space) 
Referred to as The lower-class, the working-class, workers, the uneducated, 
the less educated, the poor, the lower types, the common 
people 
Lifestyles rousing 
distaste 
Consumption of ‘cheap’ and ‘daft’ popular culture, inexpensive 
or ordinary material consumption choices, unhealthy food and 
beverage consumption, dubious moral-political values and 
attitudes, promiscuity 
Ascribed characteristics Unintelligent, dumb, daft, vulgar, trashy, loud, rowdy, cheap, 
scruffy, ordinary, down-to-earth, square 
Geographical areas 
rousing distaste 
Tasta, Hundvåg, Storhaug, Tjensvoll, Varden 
Associated 
establishments rousing 
distaste 
Hexagon, Beverly Hills Fun Pub, Chevy’s, Corvetten, Dicken’s, 
Inside, Corvetten, Crazy Piano, Kobra 
 
Table 4: Condescending classifications of the 'lower-class types' 
 
As summarised in Table 4, interviewees located in the upper sectors of the social 
space express aversions to ‘poor’ consumption styles and tastes in a ‘lower-class 
type’ of person. More specifically, we have seen that they deem practitioners of 
certain lifestyles as unimaginable as friends or life companions. There is also 
considerable evidence that interaction with such people is intentionally avoided. 
While they rarely make explicit claims of superiority based on their lifestyles and 
tastes, the ways in which they classify and evaluate the practices and tastes of ‘lower’ 
cultural consumers indicate that these are deemed ‘less honourable’, to put it in 
Weberian terms. In other words, the evaluation of others involves the identification of 
certain specific attributes of lifestyles which serves as a basis for group exclusion. As 
we have seen, judgements are involved based on characteristics linked to education, 
knowledgeability, aesthetics, material consumption choices, as well as moral and 
political convictions. These findings resonate well with studies of residential 
segregation, marital homogamy and friendship patterns in Stavanger and other 
Norwegian cities (e.g. Hansen, 1995; Rosenlund, 2009a, 2011; Ljunggren, 2010; 
Ljunggren and Andersen, 2012), which all point to processes pertinent to elective 
affinities and differential association. People tend to rub shoulders, marry and settle 
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down with people similar to themselves; by the same token, they tend to avoid social 
interaction with people who are dissimilar. While these studies have pointed to such 
tendencies based on survey and census data, the present analysis has provided further 
empirical evidence due to its data on subjective boundary drawing expressed. We 
might thus with some degree of confidence conclude that more or less exclusive 
status groups are formed based on positive or negative evaluations of lifestyles and 
tastes.  
 
So while the boundary drawing analysed in the previous chapter may – if viewed in 
isolation – be interpreted as endeavours fuelled by egalitarian values to eradicate or 
compress existing status hierarchies, or at least endeavours to demonopolise the 
power to define the dominant principles of social esteem, the findings in this chapter 
complicate the matters. In the previous chapter we saw that the interviewees located 
in the two fractions of the upper sectors of the social space express mutual aversions 
to a perceived self-assertiveness of ‘the others’. In this chapter we have seen that 
these interviewees also demarcate themselves from the lifestyles and tastes of a 
‘lower type’ of person. While they typically draw boundaries in usurpationary terms 
in demarcating themselves from people perceived as members of ‘the elite’ (as 
opposed to the perceived ‘normality’ of themselves and the people with whom they 
associate) – they typically draw boundaries in exclusionary terms when demarcating 
themselves from the ‘poor’ consumption styles and tastes amongst a ‘lower type’ of 
person. Thus, the two types of closure strategies are by no means mutually exclusive 
on an empirical level. On the contrary, the very same interviewees demarcate 
themselves from the lifestyles and tastes of those perceived as both ‘above’ and 
‘below’ themselves in the social hierarchy. Parkin’s (1979: 89ff) notion of ‘dual 
closure’ captures this point neatly: according to him, social actors seldom draw only 
on one type of closure strategy, but frequently resort to both usurpationary and 
exclusionary strategies.  
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This leads us back to the issue of morality and its relatedness to the stratifying impact 
of lifestyles and tastes. As implied in the analytical strategies of Lamont (1992; see 
also Skarpenes, 2007; Skarpenes and Sakslind, 2010), the relative salience of ‘moral 
boundary drawing’ vis-à-vis ‘cultural boundary drawing’ among social actors (e.g. 
judging others for their lack of kindness as opposed to judging them for their lack of 
taste for modernist poetry) means that the former may ‘outweigh’ or ‘modify’ the 
stratifying impact of the latter, or vice versa. However, as previously argued in 
Chapter 2, deploying an analytical strategy which a priori presumes a ‘zero-sum’ 
relationship between different evaluative repertoires is highly questionable. As 
repeatedly demonstrated in this analysis – and perhaps quintessentially shown in the 
case of the highly educated interviewees’ depiction of people adhering to the politics 
of the Progress Party – moral and aesthetical criteria of evaluation are tightly 
entwined. In other words, the people classified are judged for aesthetical as well as 
moral flaws, and this indicates a reinforcing rather than a modifying relationship 
between the two. Moreover, the perceived social standing of the types of people 
classified vis-à-vis the perceived social standing of the classifiers themselves is also 
of decisive importance. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, the interviewees 
predominantly refer to moral criteria of evaluation in drawing boundaries in 
usurpationary terms (e.g. by linking the perceived conspicuousness of ‘the elite’ to a 
dubious morality). By contrast, as we have seen in this chapter, the very same 
interviewees predominantly refer to aesthetical criteria in drawing boundaries in 
exclusionary terms (e.g. by depicting ‘the lower types’ as lacking a taste for quality 
wines or the fine arts). In other words, the classifiers draw on both repertoires of 
evaluation, and which repertoire is most salient seems to depend on the perceived 
characteristics of the people who are classified, and not whether the classifiers 
themselves are predominantly ‘moral’ or ‘aesthetical’ in their boundary work 
orientations. 
 
The conception of morality itself also seems to be differentially distributed, in the 
sense that what is conceived of as morally dubious seems to vary between the 
fractions. While interviewees located in the cultural fraction and the economic 
  233
fraction draw on similar moral vocabularies to depict practices rousing their distaste 
(e.g. ‘conspicuous’, ‘self-assertive’, ‘flashy’), we have seen that such terms may refer 
to wholly different practices. On the one hand, interviewees in the cultural fraction 
may believe that visiting art galleries and attending plays are the most natural things 
in the world, yet interviewees in the economic fraction will depict them as ‘flashy’ 
and ‘attention-seeking’ for doing so. On the other hand, the interviewees in the 
economic fraction may not think twice about driving SUVs or donning expensive 
jewellery, yet interviewees in the cultural fraction will depict them in the same terms 
for doing so. Scrutinising only the content of the evaluative vocabularies without 
taking the people or practices to which the classifications refer into account may thus 
be highly misleading. Of course, this does not mean that morality has no significance 
in the formation of status groups. On the contrary, we have seen that it plays a highly 
important role. The point is, however, that the interview data do not lend support to 
Lamont’s (1992) contention that morality has a modifying effect on taste-related 
boundary drawing.  
 
6.3 Boundary drawing ‘from below’ 
The analysis so far has been exclusively concerned with the classificatory practices 
directed ‘downwards’ from the point of view of interviewees located in the upper 
sectors of the social space. We shall now turn to boundary drawing ‘from below’, 
meaning the classificatory practices of interviewees located in the lower sectors of the 
social space. In this regard, I shall particularly focus on boundary drawing directed 
‘upwards’. 
 
6.3.1 Morality and a sense of dignity 
As established in Chapter 4, the tastes and lifestyles of the interviewees located in the 
lower sectors of the social space are largely characterised by what I termed the 
practical mode of consumption. They express a distinctly instrumental orientation to 
culture, implying their shunning cultural goods which are ‘too complicated’, as well 
as ‘overly expensive’ or ‘unnecessarily fancy’ material goods. Unless cultural goods 
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provide them with immediate satisfaction in terms of entertainment, comfort or 
practical knowledge, they do not see any point in craving them. Moreover, they are 
by far the least endowed with the propensity to classify; some of them even explicitly 
reject classificatory practices, and statements such as ‘I don’t want to waste my time 
being opinionated about these things’ are common. 
 
Regarding classifying other people’s lifestyles and tastes, the story is more or less the 
same. While they do express an awareness of difference between themselves and 
those practising lifestyles alien to their own, the usual response is that they ‘don’t 
care’ about such differences and that they would rather adhere to a ‘live and let live’ 
approach. When probed on their perception of differences, some do, however, 
express aversions, both to people practising expensive lifestyles and those engaging 
in ‘high culture’:  
 
V: Do you ever think about how other people spend their money?  
I: Well, yeah. I observe all these rich people and how they spend their money. They 
just shop for the sake of shopping. I just don’t understand why they need all the stuff 
they buy. I know of people who spend like 100 000 a month just shopping. I don’t 
see the point in doing that. But I guess when you start doing that, it’s difficult to stop. 
[…] It’s just squandering. They’ve got boats, cars, houses, cabins… […] For 
instance, I know of this family with two kids… How on earth do they have time to 
enjoy all the stuff they buy? They never use their boat. They just own it for the sake 
of owning it. […] People like that don’t even have the time to maintain the things 
they own. They hire people to do that. They hire people to paint their house, mow 
their lawns and clean the windows. They don’t have time for it, because they spend 
their time earning money so that they can buy even more stuff.  
 (Martin, carpenter, late 40s) 
 
 V: You mentioned something about rich people earlier. I didn’t really catch what you 
said. 
I: Rich people… They live their privileged lives. I’m not saying that everyone is like 
that, but many of them are. They typically enjoy high culture and they drink their 
champagne. […] But in a sense it’s just funny. People who have been lucky… You 
know, people who have landed on the right side of things, and for that reason think 
they’re better than others lower down on the social ladder. It’s extremely narrow-
minded to think like that. 
 (David, electrician, mid 20s) 
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Although most of these interviewees report that they might enjoy material goods such 
as cars, boats and summerhouses themselves, what is perceived as ‘excessive luxury’ 
and ‘squandering’ is clearly frowned upon and often linked to a dubious morality. In 
this regard, the boundary drawing is quite similar to the aversion expressed by the 
interviewees located in the cultural fraction of the upper sectors of the social space. 
Indeed, flashiness and self-assertion through the consumption of material goods is 
viewed with particular suspicion. However, most of the interviewees located in the 
lower sectors report that they do not have a problem with consumers of cultural goods 
or expensive material goods as long as such people do not ‘look down on them’ for 
not wanting to conform to their lifestyles and tastes. Such is the case with Eva, who 
expresses scepticism of what she perceives as the dubious propensity of the rich to 
denigrate those who do not care about expensive clothing brands: 
 
I: I don’t care if the rich are interested in branded clothes. But I find it disturbing if 
that’s the only kind of clothes they wear, and if they also look down on others for not 
doing so. […] They think they’re high above people who don’t wear the same brands 
they do. […] I remember when I went to school, there were two kinds of people; 
those who wore branded clothes and those who didn’t. And it signalised your rank in 
the group.  
V: Is that something you experience nowadays? That others look down on you… Not 
necessarily because of clothing, but… 
I: …because of education and stuff like that? Yeah, I guess so. Not where I work 
right now. But it was like that at a place I worked earlier. […] But I guess there are a 
lot of people who experience that. I guess it depends on what kind of work you do. I 
know this guy. He’s a rubbish man. I remember he and I went someplace together… 
And all the time he had to emphasise that he was able to do more than collecting 
rubbish. I guess he felt that others were looking down on him for being a rubbish 
man. But you know, society would have collapsed if it weren’t for people like that. 
Not everyone can be doctors, lawyers and such, if you know what I mean? [...] It’s 
the personality that counts, not your bloody occupation!  
 (Eva, secretary, mid 40s) 
 
The contention that occupational prestige, education, money, the possession of goods, 
or the mastery of certain lifestyles ‘do not count’ in the calculation of human worth is 
a recurring theme expressed by these interviewees. Instead, moral qualities such as 
being kind, caring, respectful and thoughtful seem to be the most important – and in 
some cases the only – criteria against which others are judged. If others break with 
 236
these standards, sharp boundaries are drawn, especially if they are perceived as rich 
and/or powerful, such as bosses or superiors at work:     
 
V: Have you ever felt uncomfortable having different preferences than other people? 
I: I guess. Sometimes I get the impression that I can’t talk about certain stuff in front 
of others. It feels kind of unnatural, in a way. For instance… I worked at this place a 
couple of years ago. […] And I often had my surfboard and my skateboard in the 
back of my car. And one day my boss asked me: ‘What are you doing after work?’ 
And I was like: ‘Uh, I guess I’m going to ride my skateboard.’ And then he said: ‘Oh 
my God! What if our customers find out?’ And I was like: ‘So what? They probably 
have hobbies too. What’s the problem?’ […] 
V: How did you react to that situation? 
I: I found it stupid. It was almost a parody. Because later that day, when we were all 
eating lunch, he said he had to leave early, because he was going to have a look at 
these motorbikes, you know, trail bikes or something. […] And then he came back 
twenty minutes later with this new bike, a 20 000 impulse buy. And then he started 
driving like a madman. […] I mean, here was the boss of our company, on one 
wheel, full speed ahead, driving down stairs and everything. And this guy has the 
nerve to complain about my skateboard! […] This guy was obviously unable to put 
himself in my shoes. He was totally narrow-minded. He knew what he liked and his 
views of things became the norm somehow. 
 (David, electrician, mid 20s)  
 
While most of these interviewees seem to be concerned about the morality of 
resourceful others, they seldom report feeling inferior or expressing any deference to 
such people. And while they do report unpleasant experiences related to other 
people’s judgements of them, they seem rather immune to the denigration of their 
evaluators:  
 
V: You said something earlier about people frowning upon other people’s choices. 
How would you react if people frowned upon you going to Ayia Napa for your 
holidays? 
I: I couldn’t care less. It’s not my style to care what others think about what I do, if 
you see what I mean? 
 (Jon, electrician, mid 20s) 
 
V: Have you ever felt uncomfortable about having different preferences than other 
people? Or, you know, being different from others in general? 
I: Yeah. […] Just the other day, at work, I had to clean up some popcorn that 
someone had spilled all over the floor. And then this man came walking by. […] You 
know, wearing a leather coat, shiny shoes and a cane. He almost looked like a baron. 
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And a couple of ladies by his side too. And then said to me: ‘I can see you’re 
cleaning up. That’s good!’ You know, just to snipe at the working class. I said to 
him: ‘Yeah, somebody’s got to do it.’ It was really funny. And a bit peculiar.  
V: How did you react to it? 
I: Well, at the time what I really wanted was a stick with barbed wire instead of the 
broom. 
 (Lars, security guard, mid 20s) 
 
A certain tension is, however, traceable in the ways in which these interviewees talk 
about others. On the one hand, they do not express any ‘goodwill’ or the desire to 
acquire tastes for goods they do not like. Nor do they express any explicit deference 
to or endorsement of the consumers of these goods. On the contrary, they draw on 
moral criteria of evaluation in depicting themselves as different from such people. On 
the other hand, the moral boundaries drawn against people perceived as flashy and 
self-assertive may also indicate feelings of inferiority. In other words, the moral 
indignation expressed against flashiness might indirectly imply a need to maintain a 
sense of dignity and self-worth. As noted by Skeggs (1997) in her study of working-
class women in the UK, there is a certain ambivalence implied by these women’s 
attempts to dis-identify with other people’s classifications of them. Skilbrei (2005) 
has found similar signs of ambivalence amongst Norwegian working-class women. 
Dis-identifications might, in other words, simultaneously imply both resistance and 
subjection to what Bourdieu (1977, 1991b) has termed ‘symbolic violence’.123 
 
6.3.2 A sense of one’s place 
Just as the interviewees in the upper sectors of the social space had a ‘sense of one’s 
place’ both in an abstract and a concrete spatial sense, the interviewees in the lower 
sectors also feel ‘out of place’ in certain settings: 
 
V: Do you like plays? Have you attended plays at Rogaland Teater? 
                                              
123 I shall return to the notion of symbolic violence in the next chapter. 
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I: No, Rogaland Teater is for the posh people. And Stavanger Konserthus too. It’s 
just the posh people who go there. […] 
V: Who are the posh people? 
I: That’s west-end people, the refined people, often older than I am. I guess there’s 
other people there too, but that’s the impression I get. And I guess a lot of people 
have that impression. […] 
V: So you steer clear of such places? 
I: Yeah, I don’t feel at home because it’s for people in suits and ties and the whole 
package. I’ve got a suit back home, and I like wearing it. But at places like that you 
have to dress in a particular way, you know, to blend in with high society. And I 
think that’s wrong. You should be allowed to dress as you like. Except for showing 
up naked. [Laughs.] 
V: Do you feel uncomfortable on such occasions? At places where you have to dress 
in certain ways? 
I: Yeah. Especially when you have to play this role that you’re not used to, or dress in 
ways you’re not used to. […] I guess other people feel like this too. At parties at 
work, for instance, I can clearly spot the ones who aren’t used to wearing suits. And I 
guess you look out of place. You easily get labelled. […] And that can make people 
feel uncomfortable.  
 (Lars, security guard, mid 20s) 
 
Places where the interviewees located in the lower sectors of the social space report 
feeling out of place, and/or depict as unthinkable to visit, include Rogaland Teater, 
Stavanger Konserthus, art galleries, ‘fancy’ nightclubs such as Taket and Hall Toll, as 
well as ‘posh’ restaurants such as Tango, Renaa and Bølgen & Moi. Besides avoiding 
such places due to a lack of interest in scholastic culture and/or due to money matters, 
such places are also associated with kinds of people with whom they would rather not 
associate: 
 
V: Are there places in Stavanger you’d never go to? 
I: Hall Toll.  
V: How come? 
I: I don’t like the thought of being stopped at the door and being told that you’re not 
welcome. You know, just for wearing a hoody. It’s ridiculous. Stigmatising some 
while laying out these red carpets for others. You know, five hundred people in a 
queue outside, just waiting to get in, and these types from certain circles walk past 
them all, just by whispering a secret password to the doorkeeper. That kind of place 
is not for me. No way.  
V: What kind of circles are we talking about here? 
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I: Well, I don’t know. […] I just don’t want anything to do with them. […] I guess 
the people going there are these daddy’s boys who are out to hit on daddy’s girls. The 
gold-digger type. […] It’s the kind of people that I don’t get along with.  
(David, electrician, mid 20s) 
 
Conversely, the places where they do feel at home are bars such as Beverly Hills Fun 
Pub, Hexagon and Dicken’s, as well as kebab shops and restaurants such as 
McDonald’s, Burger King and Peppe’s Pizza – in other words, the very places the 
interviewees located in the upper sectors of the social space report avoiding due to the 
presence of a rather ‘uninteresting’ and somewhat dubious ‘lower type’ of person. 
The contempt thus seems to be mutual and social interaction is more or less 
intentionally avoided due to a perceived mismatch in lifestyles and tastes. 
 
6.3.3 Usurpation and self-exclusion 
As summarised in Table 5, interviewees located in the lower sectors of the social 
space express aversions to a perceived lifestyle-related snobbery among resourceful 
others, and they almost exclusively allude to moral standards of evaluation in 
depicting practitioners of certain lifestyles as rather suspect. In this regard, their 
boundary work is quite similar to that scrutinised by Lamont in her study of morality 
amongst American and French working-class men: 
 
Morality is generally at the center of these worker’s worlds. They find their self-
worth in their ability to discipline themselves and conduct responsible yet caring lives 
to ensure order for themselves and others. These moral standards function as an 
alternative to economic definitions of success and offer them a way to maintain 
dignity and to make sense of their lives […]. Workers use these standards to define 
who they are and, just as important, who they are not. Hence they draw the line that 
delimits an imagined community of “people like me” who share the same sacred 
values. (Lamont, 2000: 2ff, my emphasis) 
 
In one sense, then, the moral boundaries drawn against people perceived as 
conspicuously consuming both expensive material goods and intellectually 
challenging cultural goods might be conceived of as usurpationary closure strategies, 
i.e. endeavours to impose alternative criteria of evaluation in opposition to the 
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perceived presence of an unjust distribution of esteem. Moreover, by distancing 
themselves from and avoiding people and places associated with lifestyles, tastes and 
moralities alien to their own – or, by the same token, sticking to ‘people like us’ – 
more or less amorphous counter-groups are formed.  
 
 ‘The upper-class types’ 
(as classified by the interviewees in the 
lower sectors of the social space) 
Referred to as The rich, the upper-class, high society, the posh people, the 
refined, people in high places, the snobs, west-end people 
Lifestyles rousing 
distaste 
Consumption of ‘unnecessary’ material goods and ‘high 
culture’, membership in ‘exclusive’ social circles 
 
Ascribed characteristics Uppish, snobbish, self-assertive 
Geographical areas 
rousing distaste 
Eigenes, Madla, Stokka 
Associated 
establishments rousing 
distaste 
Stavanger Konserthus, Rogaland Teater, Hall toll, Taket, 
Renaa, Bølgen & Moi 
 
Table 5: Condescending classifications of the 'upper-class types' 
  
Portraying themselves in opposition to people perceived as practising conspicuous 
lifestyles by alluding to moral standards, this may maintain dignity, self-worth and 
esteem within their own social milieu. However, refusing to participate in such 
lifestyles and/or associate with their practitioners arguably comes at a price. As noted 
by Willis (1977) in his study of the process by which ‘working-class kids get working 
class jobs’, pupils reproduce themselves and remain working-class through their own 
culture of resistance to school and scholastic knowledge. Their ‘countercultural’ 
rebellion, opposition to authority and their refusal to submit to the requirements of a 
curriculum that supposedly encourages social mobility through attaining educational 
qualifications disqualify them from the opportunity to access middle-class jobs. 
Along the same lines, Bourdieu (1984: ch. 7; 1990b: 54ff) argues that deprived 
people’s refusals to associate with resourceful others and their lifestyles may be 
interpreted as something akin to sentiments of ‘sour grapes’, since what is 
subjectively perceived as unthinkable is objectively out-of-reach in the first place. In 
other words, not having, or having had, monetary resources to buy expensive goods, 
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and/or not having the basic knowledge and frames of reference necessary to 
appreciate certain cultural goods, render such goods both objectively inaccessible 
and, through the workings of their class habitus, subjectively undesirable. In this way, 
people deprived of cultural and/or economic resources make a virtue out of necessity 
in shunning what is out-of-reach. Engaging in alien lifestyles and/or associating with 
their practitioners thus become rather ‘unnatural’, with the effect that they would 
rather keep to people like themselves. 
 
As regards the formation of status groups, people who refuse to partake in expensive 
and/or intellectually demanding lifestyles are thus in a sense doubly excluded. On the 
one hand, they exclude themselves from entering certain social milieux. On the other, 
they are ‘denied’ access to such milieux in the first place because they are – as we 
have seen earlier in this chapter – perceived as ‘boring’, ‘unintelligent’ and ‘lacking 
taste’. While it could be argued that this is not exclusion per se, since these people do 
not wish to frequent such milieux and even speak disparagingly of people who do, 
such refusals nevertheless imply processes pertaining to the maintenance and 
reproduction of socially structured elective affinities. So while they may certainly 
maintain a sense of dignity, self-worth and esteem within their own status group, they 
indirectly close themselves off from certain opportunities in this process. 
 
Though such refusals may function as usurpationary closure strategies, their 
consequences are rather different from the ones depicted in the previous chapter. In 
the case of those endowed with high amounts of cultural capital and relatively less 
economic capital, their refusals to associate with people practising expensive 
lifestyles might on the one hand exclude them from certain privileges implied by 
frequenting such milieux (e.g. exclusive social networks, job opportunities and know-
how as regards the accumulation of economic capital). On the other hand, they can 
resort to the privileges implied by their stock of institutionalised cultural capital, such 
as exclusive access to certain sectors on the labour market. Conversely, refusing to 
associate with people practising intellectually demanding lifestyles by those endowed 
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with high amounts of economic capital and relatively less cultural capital, might 
exclude them from certain privileges exclusively possessed by those endowed with 
high amounts of cultural capital, yet they can resort to the privileges implied by their 
stocks of economic capital. Those endowed with low amounts of both forms of 
capital, by contrast, can only resort to their morality, dignity and the recognition of 
their peers. While they might undoubtedly lead fulfilling lives according to their own 
standards, their life-chances are nevertheless quite different from those located in the 
upper sectors of the social space, whose privileges are institutionally safeguarded. 
 
6.4 Conclusion 
At the outset of this chapter I addressed the question of whether, and if so how, 
‘vertical’ boundary drawing amounts to processes of social closure and the formation 
of more or less exclusive status groups. The empirical findings can be briefly 
summarised as follows. First, quite a few interviewees – predominantly located in the 
cultural fraction of the upper sectors of the social space – demarcate themselves from 
others based on evaluative criteria related to education, scholastic knowledgeability 
and aesthetics. Second, interviewees located in the upper sectors of the social space – 
predominantly in the economic fraction, but also in the cultural fraction – also draw 
symbolic boundaries against the ‘poor’ material consumption styles of a ‘lower type’ 
of person. Third, interviewees located in the lower sectors mobilise moral sentiments 
against the perceived self-assertive conspicuousness of consumers of both cultural 
and material goods. 
 
Based on the assumption that the classifications of approval and disapproval which 
interviewees make vis-à-vis other social actors indicate processes of group inclusion 
and exclusion, I argue that the patterns of vertical boundary drawing scrutinised in 
this chapter, as well as the horizontal boundary drawing from the previous chapter, 
lend further support to the Bourdieusian homology thesis as outlined in Chapter 2. 
More specifically, the structures of the social space do not only correspond to a 
differential distribution of lifestyles and cultural tastes as established in Chapter 4, 
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but they also correspond to a differentiated estimation of social esteem related to 
these lifestyle differences. Moreover, as the interviewees report navigating 
Stavanger’s urban areas by seeking out interaction with their peers while avoiding 
interaction with ‘the others’ due to lifestyle-related criteria, the structural oppositions 
existing ‘on paper’ seem to translate into social boundaries that are reflected in 
geographical space.  
 
I would thus argue that we can see the contours of two main hierarchical status 
structures in Stavanger: one tied to education, scholastic knowledge and consumption 
of cultural goods, and another to money and the consumption of material goods. As 
the social distribution of lifestyles, as well the boundary drawing expressed on the 
basis of subjectively perceived lifestyle differences, systematically correspond to the 
structures of the social space, it seems reasonable to claim that class relations 
manifest themselves through status group formation. Moreover, as the entrance into 
these groups seem to be limited and subjected to conditions, formalised closure 
processes tied to the exclusive possession of institutionally recognised resources (i.e. 
cultural and economic capital) seems to be reinforced by non-formalised closure 
processes. This reinforcement may be conceived of as a ‘Matthew effect’ – the 
process through which social advantages lead to further advantages (see Merton, 
1968; Rigney, 2010).124 Indeed, as noted by Parkin (2002: 96ff), the relationship 
between resources and social esteem is a two-way street; sometimes esteem flows 
from the possession of resources, and sometimes it is more like a springboard to 
gaining such possessions. Thus, the class-status nexus can be viewed as a mutually 
reinforcing dual system which constitutes asymmetrical power relations between 
groups of social actors endowed with high and low volumes of capitals, as well as 
between groups of social actors with a preponderance of either cultural or economic 
capital.  
                                              
124 The term Matthew effect refers to a verse in the Gospel of Matthew (13:12), which observes that 
‘[w]hoever has will be given more, and he will have an abundance. Whoever does not have, even 
what he has will be taken from him.’ 
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7.1 Introduction 
Given the classed hierarchical status structures pointed to in the previous chapter, as 
well as processes through which a classed mastery of certain lifestyles is consolidated 
into advantages and privileges – for instance through the Norwegian educational 
system  (e.g. Andersen and Hansen, 2012) – it is reasonable to claim that the class-
status nexus amounts to an unequal distribution of life-chances. In other words, it 
seems the classed distribution of lifestyles is pertinent to asymmetrical power 
relations. However, while this observation seems viable from a sociological point of 
view, the notion of hierarchy seems to unsettle most of the interviewees, regardless of 
their positions in the social space. This chapter addresses the question of how the 
legitimacy of power relations, linked to lifestyle differences and status hierarchies, is 
bestowed. It hinges upon a theoretical-methodological debate concerning the 
applicability of Bourdieu’s (1984) model of ‘symbolic domination’ in contexts 
different from those it was originally designed to comprehend. The crux of 
Bourdieu’s argument is that power differentials arising from an unequal distribution 
of capitals can be ‘misrecognised’ by social actors, meaning that power relations are 
not perceived for what they objectively are, but in a form which renders them 
legitimate in the eyes of the beholder. Legitimacy in this sense does not imply that the 
power relations are acknowledged and accepted by dominant and subordinate actors 
alike. On the contrary, it results from a misconception of the ‘real’ cause of 
asymmetric power relations, which, according to Bourdieu, is the unequal distribution 
of capitals. The legitimacy of power relations is secured because the question of 
legitimacy is not raised. Power relations are naturalised and taken for granted and 
thus remain in the realm of doxa. 
 
Several scholars, however, have contended that Bourdieu’s model of symbolic 
domination does not apply outside of France, and especially not in a Norwegian 
context (see for instance Danielsen, 1998; Skarpenes, 2007; Skarpenes and Sakslind, 
2008, 2010). A recurrent objection is that egalitarian values deeply embedded in 
social democratic Norway ‘modify’ the stratifying effects of lifestyle differentials 
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compared to countries like France, with its highly centralised state apparatus, 
remnants of an aristocratic past, its valorisation of pageantry and so forth. Indeed, it is 
argued that Norway is an exceptional case, in the sense that ‘elitist’ or ‘snobbish’ 
practices and attitudes elicit suspiciousness and even contempt. Further, it is argued 
that egalitarian values have negative consequences for both the currency of certain 
cultural practices and the legitimacy of taste hierarchies.  
 
The debate about the applicability of Bourdieu’s model of symbolic domination 
highlights an important issue relevant in understanding the present empirical case. 
The pressing question is whether, and if so in which ways, differences in tastes and 
lifestyles amount to relations of legitimate domination, despite the explicit 
mobilisation of sentiments against ‘elitism’, ‘snobbery’ and ‘self-assertion’. 
Throughout the previous chapters it has been established that the ways in which the 
interviewees classify other people’s lifestyles and tastes are indicative of social 
closure and the formation of more or less exclusive status groups. However, as has 
been alluded to, many interviewees are reluctant to express their aversions explicitly. 
Although all the interviewees express an awareness of difference, many utter certain 
reservations before expressing their antipathies, and derogatory classifications of 
other people’s lifestyles are often followed by self-conscious moral considerations. A 
certain tension seems to exist in the interview data. On the one hand, different tastes 
and lifestyles are differentially distributed among interviewees endowed with 
different capital portfolios, and these differences are salient when the interviewees 
classify and differentiate between their ‘own’ types of people, and the types of people 
with whom they would rather not associate. On the other hand, the very same 
interviewees reject self-assertion, and when classifying others in derogatory terms, 
most of them express mixed feelings about this. It is to the significance of such moral 
ambiguity we will turn. 
 
The analysis proceeds as follows. First of all, I discuss how the interviewees’ 
reluctance to assert themselves is linked to moral sentiments. I then move on to 
  249
discuss how the symbolic value of practices is produced. Finally, I discuss the 
seemingly paradoxical coexistence of egalitarian values, and hierarchical relations of 
power, status and prestige. 
 
7.2 Morally suspect self-assertion 
A recurring feature in the interviewees’ boundary drawing is linked to moral 
aversions to practices and attitudes perceived as ‘conspicuous’, ‘self-assertive’ and 
‘snobbish’. Although there are important differences in what types of practices are 
classified as such, there seems to be widespread tacit agreement that other people’s 
self-assertion is somewhat suspicious and not justifiable in moral terms. Moreover, 
very few interviewees claim superiority based on their own lifestyles and tastes; 
indeed, they recurrently reflect upon how their own preferences and tastes may be 
perceived negatively by others. In this regard, there seems to be widespread 
awareness of the danger of being perceived as ‘snobbish’. This applies to consumers 
of material and cultural goods alike: 
 
V: You mentioned earlier that you are privileged. Have you ever experienced other 
people being opinionated about the way you spend your money? Is this something 
you think about?  
I: My income is far higher than average. And I’ve got lots of stocks and other assets. 
And I’ve got the opportunity to do whatever I want, and spend money on whatever I 
want. And in that sense, I’m privileged. […] But for one, I never show off. And 
second, I never boast of my riches. Or, you know, talk about it. So I try to avoid 
people becoming kind of envious. And that’s something I think about, that people 
easily get envious.  
 (Johan, CEO, mid 50s) 
 
V: You have used the term snob several times. Doing the work you do… Have people 
made remarks in that regard? 
I: Like I said earlier, this old-fashioned… This divide between high culture and 
popular culture…  Traditionally, the consumption of high culture has been associated 
with snobbish or elitist attitudes. But in my view, the term should be reserved for 
people who exhibit a kind of unsympathetic attitude towards people who like popular 
culture. […] You know, people who don’t show any kind of accommodating attitude 
towards others. I mean, we all have our different tastes. And I truly believe there 
should be room for everyone, for every taste. But that doesn’t mean I have to seek 
out every kind of… Well, I consider myself open and curious. But still, there are lots 
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of things I don’t like. So I guess some people would call me a snob. But I hope 
people don’t do that, because I don’t feel like a snob.   
 (Olivia, head of cultural enterprise, late 40s) 
 
A recurring theme in the interview data is that being labelled ‘snobbish’ or ‘elitist’ is 
undesirable and something with which the interviewees dis-identify. This finding 
resonates well with a study conducted by Haarr and Krogstad (2011) who have 
pointed to an increased frequency of anti-elitist sentiments in Norwegian newspapers 
lately. Many interviewees report preferences and tastes they fear others will perceive 
as snobbish, and this seems to unsettle quite a few of them. As we can see in the 
quotes above, there is an awareness of anti-snobbish sentiments, and the interviewees 
point out that they do not want to rouse negative attention, envy and the like. The 
notion of snobbishness is ambiguous, however, and it is not always clear whether the 
interviewees are referring to specific ‘elevated’ preferences and tastes, to a perceived 
‘better-than-you’ attitude among cultural consumers conspicuously displaying such 
preferences, or to a combination of both. As we can see, Olivia is aware of this 
ambiguity, and she tries to separate the two meanings of the term by pointing out that 
an ‘old-fashioned’ way of depicting things implies that the consumption of ‘high 
culture’ is directly associated with ‘snobbish’ and ‘elitist’ attitudes. However, she 
also says that the term ‘snob’ should be reserved for people who refuse to exhibit an 
‘accommodating attitude’ towards consumers of popular culture. Although she is not 
particularly interested popular culture herself, she maintains that she is no snob 
because of her openness, and hopes accordingly that other people do not perceive her 
as such. Peter reasons along the same lines:  
 
V: We’ve been talking about things you like and things you don’t like. Have you ever 
been confronted by others because of your tastes? Have people made remarks?  
I: I don’t think people perceive me as a cultural snob, no.  
V: Do you consider yourself a snob? 
I: No, I wouldn’t classify myself as a snob. But I guess I have quite specific and, 
according to some, peculiar preferences. But that doesn’t make me a snob in the 
sense that… Well, I guess I’m snobbish in the sense that I pick and choose things I 
like, and steer clear of other things. In that sense I might be a bit snobbish. […] But 
still I’m very… I’ve got this relativistic approach to culture. Even if I don’t like Ole 
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Ivars125 personally, I have no problem understanding that others like that sort of thing 
and take pleasure in it. 
 (Peter, cultural worker, mid 30s) 
 
Peter argues that his ‘relativistic’ view of culture implies that he ‘understands’ why 
other people might like musical acts such as Ole Ivars, even though he himself is not 
particularly interested in such music. This view, he holds, prevents him from being 
labelled a snob. Similar self-perceptions are widespread among interviewees who 
report specific preferences and tastes, but who also are aware of the danger of being 
perceived as snobs because of their preferences. However, not all interviewees are 
able to evade the thought of being perceived as snobs by others – and some even 
consider themselves to be snobs: 
 
V: You mentioned earlier that you detest snobbery. Can you elaborate? 
I: Yes, I do. But, you know, I guess I’m a bit snobbish myself. And I’m sort of… I’m 
a bit afraid to admit it. […] I don’t want to be a snob, but in a sense I am. […] There 
are certain things I don’t want to be associated with. […] For instance, what I do 
leisure-wise. I’m a bit snobbish when it comes to… We’ve got this old sailboat. You 
know, this really old boat. […] I don’t want to be associated with a soulless plastic 
boat. You know, I catch myself thinking like this all the time. I want a sailboat, not a 
motor boat. I want a nice cabin, not a caravan. Things like that. […] So I catch 
myself looking down on other people’s choices. To be honest, I do.  
 (Freja, head of cultural enterprise, mid 40s) 
 
Some interviewees even express feelings of regret: for example, upwardly-mobile 
Nora who keeps in touch with her old childhood friends, but regards them as 
ineligible as romantic partners:  
 
V: You were joking earlier about you being a snob… 
I: Well, no. I mean yes. Well, I have to admit… You know, these old friends of mine 
from [name of residential area126]… I’ve known them all my life and I really like 
them. I really do. But none of them could be my boyfriend. And it shames me to 
admit that, because if you ask me why, it’s because they haven’t got a proper 
                                              
125 Norwegian musical act associated with the dansband genre. Both Ole Ivars and the dansband 
genre as a whole are recurrently classified as ‘bad taste’ among several interviewees. 
126 Nora notes at a different point in the interview that this part of town is ‘rather seedy’. 
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education, they haven’t got proper jobs, they aren’t interesting in that way. […] And 
thinking like that, that’s snobbery. And that makes me a snob. And that’s sad. It’s sad 
to admit that, because if I really loved these guys, I wouldn’t give a damn about these 
things.  
 (Nora, lawyer, mid 30s) 
 
Others report avoiding certain forms of ‘conspicuous’ consumption and retreat to 
more ‘discreet’ styles to avoid unwanted negative attention. Henrik, for example, 
drives a top model SAAB, a car that can be as expensive as a Mercedes-Benz or a 
BMW, but which he thinks will attract considerably less attention, thus hoping to 
avoid the ‘snob effect’:  
 
V: If you were to buy a new car, what kind of car would you definitely not buy? 
I: I don’t want a BMW or a Mercedes. […] 
V: What is it about these cars that make them less attractive to you? 
I: The snob effect. [Laughs.] 
V: In what way? 
I: Well, people can buy whatever they want, but I won’t buy such cars myself. That’s 
my opinion. If others want to, that’s fine by me. Go ahead, but it’s not for me.  
 (Henrik, economist, early 60s) 
 
To summarise, many interviewees – especially those who express specific and 
elaborate cultural preferences – report an awareness of the danger of being perceived 
as ‘snobbish’ by others. This applies to the consumers of cultural and material goods 
alike. Most of the interviewees do not want to be perceived by others as elitist or 
snobbish, and they tend to dis-identify with such terms. The interviewees who do 
report a perceived danger of being regarded as a snob, hope to evade this by 
maintaining a discreet profile and by alluding to moral qualities such as ‘openness’, 
‘respect’ and ‘understanding’. Moreover, most of the interviewees are reluctant to 
claim superiority for themselves, and very few are willing to justify themselves with 
references to elevated aesthetics and esoteric knowledge, or argue that their tastes are 
‘better’ than those of others. The recurring phrase when probed is that their tastes are 
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‘different, but not better’. Thus, there seems to be widespread tacit agreement that 
taste-related self-assertion is morally suspect and should be avoided. 
 
The story so far undoubtedly bears resemblances to the findings reported by 
Skarpenes (2007); asserting oneself and/or explicitly disparaging other people’s tastes 
seem to be considered morally inappropriate by interviewees located in the uppers 
sectors of the social space, even though – as the previous chapters have shown – they 
do draw lifestyle-related boundaries between their types of people and ‘the others’. 
As Skarpenes (2007: 552) argues, judging others on aesthetical grounds implicitly 
means judging others on moral grounds. This, I would argue, is a plausible 
explanation for the interviewees’ self-reflexive reservations and moral considerations 
before expressing their derogatory classifications. However, a low degree of moral 
justifiability as regards self-assertion and the denigration of others does not mean that 
taste hierarchies do not exist; nor does it mean that mastering certain lifestyles cannot 
produce advantages and privileges. As argued in Chapter 2, there is not necessarily a 
connection between the form and content of justifications and the legitimacy of 
power relations linked to lifestyle differentials, as these power relations might be 
naturalised and taken for granted.  
 
7.3 The production of symbolic value 
Bourdieu (1984) asserts that certain lifestyles and cultural practices can function as 
symbolic capital (1) insofar as the mastery of such lifestyles is unequally distributed; 
and (2) insofar as such mastery is sought-after and/or produces deference in the eyes 
of non-practitioners. In other words, the possession of symbolic capital implies 
esteem and prestige outside the limited circles of the practitioners of the lifestyles in 
question. In what follows I shall discuss two ways in which symbolic value 
production is evident in the interview data, despite the prevalence of anti-elitist 
egalitarian sentiments. The first has to do with the interviewees’ perceptions of other 
practitioners of lifestyles in which they themselves engage, but which they have not 
yet fully mastered; the second has to do with lifestyles the interviewees perceive as 
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alien and even morally dubious, but which nevertheless produce a kind of implicit 
deference.  
 
7.3.1 Feelings of inferiority 
In the interview data there are seemingly few signs of explicit deference to other 
people’s lifestyles. However, scrutinising deference empirically is difficult, and it is 
debateable whether qualitative interviews are suitable tools with which to study such 
matters in the first place. If the interviewees do esteem and endorse practitioners of 
lifestyles they do not master, teasing this out without rousing feelings of inferiority or 
shame in the interview situation is arguably quite a challenge. This would imply 
important ethical as well as epistemological considerations. Nevertheless, having to 
tease out such estimations in the first place is in itself an interesting empirical finding. 
An indication of why explicit endorsements of other people’s tastes occur rarely in 
the interview data might be found in the following quote, which is fairly typical in 
this regard: 
 
V: You said something earlier about people in Stavanger who wear certain kinds of 
expensive clothes. Can you elaborate?  
I: Well, I often get this impression that they’ve bought their way into a certain style. 
[…] But it might just be me being envious. It’s a bit like, ‘I would love to have that 
jacket, but I cannot afford it’. I guess it’s often like that, but I don’t dare admit it. […] 
But on the other hand, I don’t want to be like these wanna-be-rich people. […] You 
know, the type of people that strive to identify with the people with real money. And 
there are lots of people in that category in this town. People who make too much 
effort to fit in… I mean, they forget all about what really matters in life. To me it 
seems really stressful. They want the best there is, but they’ve only got half the 
wages of the people they want to be associated with. I call them nouveau riche 
people from Sandnes.127 [Laughs.] 
 (Marianne, manager, small firm, late 40s) 
 
                                              
127 According to population figures, neighbouring town Sandnes is half the size of Stavanger. People 
residing in Sandnes and further south (e.g. Bryne, Klepp, Nærbø, Egersund) are recurrently classified 
in derogatory terms by the interviewees (e.g. ‘peasants’, ‘provincials’, ‘simpletons’).   
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Marianne is torn between aspiring to adopt expensive lifestyles on the one hand, and 
a dis-identification with the pretentiousness and social climbing of the ‘wanna-be-
rich’ on the other. Although she reports spending money on expensive material 
goods, she cannot buy ‘whatever she desires’. And even if she could, she might risk 
falling into the category of those who ‘make too much effort’ to fit in with ‘the 
people with real money’. An aversion to pretentiousness and inauthenticity is a 
recurring feature – either implicitly or explicitly – in the interviewees’ boundary 
drawing towards people with whom they do not want to associate. In this particular 
case, deferring to the clothing styles of the rich would indirectly mean that Marianne 
would be a part of the ‘nouveau riche’ category which she strongly dislikes. One 
could thus argue that outright admiration of, and deference to, other people’s 
lifestyles would imply some form of self-reproach, in the sense that one would be 
admitting to aspiring to being something one is not (Sayer, 2005: 174). In other 
words, there might be several pre-reflexive defence mechanisms at work which 
prevent such self-disparagement.  
 
Nevertheless, there are several clear signs of deference in the interview data, despite 
the general tendency of interviewees to mobilise a sense of worthiness or dignity in 
the face of unattainable lifestyles. Interestingly, these are typically found among 
upwardly-mobile interviewees who report feelings of inferiority related to their 
lifestyles and tastes earlier in their lives:  
 
V: Have you ever experienced feeling uncomfortable because of your taste when you 
meet others? You know, thinking that your taste is not good enough? […]  
I: Yeah, I see what you mean. Well, not really. Or… I guess I did when I was 
younger. But I guess it has something to do with maturity and the development of 
your self-image. When you’re past your forties like me, then it’s… You know, you 
are who you are. […] You strive your whole life to find out who you are, who you 
like and what you like. And style is either something you’ve got, or something that 
you haven’t got. But it can change over time. You develop a taste for something new. 
You see things you haven’t seen before that suddenly appeal to you. So there is a 
development, in a sense. And with time, you grow confident. What you like is good 
enough.  
V: In your younger days, what made you feel uncomfortable? 
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I: I guess it had to do with a fear of not being advanced enough, if you know what I 
mean? You know, not getting stuff, not understanding what other people understand. 
You know, lagging behind in that way. […] But I have to say, this is something that I 
haven’t reflected on for a long time. I guess it’s more often that people perceive 
me… That they feel inferior in my presence, even if I don’t intend to make them feel 
like that. 
 (Sara, journalist, mid 40s) 
 
At times I’ve felt uncomfortable and inferior, but that’s a long time ago. Now I’m a 
grown man and I’ve developed a fairly grandiose self-image. [Laughs.] But when I 
was young, it was a problem for me. I came from this little place called [rural area], a 
place pervaded by this peasant culture. […] And when I moved to Stavanger, I 
sought out these advanced places and scenes, and I was kind of different from the 
others. I wasn’t really accepted at first. And I felt like an idiot for coming from [name 
of rural area], liking the wrong kind of music, wearing the wrong kind of clothes… 
You know, having the wrong manners. So there was definitely a feeling of inferiority 
because of my cultural preferences.  
 (Thomas, journalist, early 40s) 
 
Although these interviewees point out that they do not feel any embarrassment or 
inferiority related to their current tastes, they do report having had such unpleasant 
feelings earlier. As upwardly-mobile people – as well as geographically mobile in the 
case of Thomas – they have had to break with their familiar milieu and acquire new 
forms of knowledge and new ways of relating to cultural goods along the way. 
Having arrived at their current social positions after long university educations, they 
may retrospectively make fun of themselves for having once felt awkward and 
inferior. However, the path to arriving at this point has not always been easy: Sara 
has been worried about not being ‘advanced enough’ and ‘failing to comprehend’; 
similarly, Thomas reports having felt ‘like an idiot’ for listening to the ‘wrong’ kinds 
of music and wearing ‘wrong’ kinds of clothes. The unpleasantness they report, 
which is associated with ‘not fitting in’ in new social milieux, bears important 
resemblances to the self-reflexive accounts of some upwardly-mobile Scandinavians 
(see for instance Sveen, 2001; Solvang, 2002; Ambjörnsson, 2005; Seljestad, 2006). 
A recurrent feature in such accounts is the fear of betraying the ideals of the groups 
one ‘leaves behind’, and a fear of not fitting in with the new social milieux. 
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Fitting in is not always an ideal, however. At several points during the interview 
August is eager to point out that he does not follow the perceived norm of his fellow 
economists in keeping up-to-date with ‘gadgets’ and other kinds of ‘fancy stuff’. But 
he admits that his refusal comes at a price: 
 
To be honest… I once owned this car… Well, it’s not that long ago. I drove around in 
my father’s old car, a Hyundai Accent. I felt like I only needed the old man’s hat. 
And I noticed… Other drivers couldn’t bear to drive behind my car. They had to 
overtake and speed past me. So when people tried to overtake, I gave it some gas. 
[Laughs.] And I also had this Skoda once. And the old Skodas were not like Skodas 
are now. And I had this uncomfortable feeling. My wife didn’t care, but I felt really 
uncomfortable. […] And I guess there are other things too. For instance, I don’t own 
one of those flatscreen TVs. It can be painful when you start reflecting on these 
things. [Laughs.] 
 (August, economist, late 50s) 
  
Although August somewhat jokingly reports that it is ‘painful’ reflecting too much on 
not conforming to other people’s tastes, this quote indicates that other people’s 
opinions of him are taken into account. In similar ways, Nora reflects on her 
experiences of becoming a lawyer and having to cope with other lawyers’ estimations 
of her:  
 
I: Typically, when I’m out eating with people from work, everyone drinks wine 
except me. I cling to my beer. And all the others are like: ‘Come on! Can’t you at 
least try?’ And I guess some of them think that I drink beer just to show everyone 
that I’m not like the others. You know, to show that I’m from [name of residential 
area] or whatever. But really, that’s not why I drink beer. It just tastes better. And I 
don’t want to sit there drinking wine just to fit in. But they think I do it to prove 
something. But I don’t care. And I guess according to them I like to watch football 
and do that kind of stuff just to prove something. But that’s not why I do it. I 
genuinely like it. But I think others think I do it to prove that I’m not like all the 
others who have studied law. 
V: What’s your opinion? Are you like all the others who have studied law? 
I: Well… Luckily, there are different types of people who study law. But still… I 
remember the two first weeks at law school… I must admit, I thought it was going to 
be hell. I mean, all the girls wore pearl earrings and these sweaters with small bears 
printed on them. […] And I wore tons of black make-up and my hair was a mess. I 
thought, ‘This is going to be hell!’. […] If you generalise a bit, the people who study 
law… Law students are a particular kind of breed. We all are. We begin to talk in the 
same manner. It’s very fascinating. […] People who study law are, in general, more 
well-dressed than most people. They wear these shirts, and they speak more 
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refined… But me, personally, I don’t speak that refined. Definitely not. And my 
clothes… Well, I’m wearing nice clothes right now, but that’s because I came 
straight from the court house. But I mean… Yeah, I’m a bit different than the rest of 
them. […] And from time to time people make remarks about how I do things at 
work. I don’t know if the remarks are meant positively or negatively, but people 
make remarks. But I think that’s a good thing, because the others are so bloody 
boring. And I hope I’m not as boring as they are.  
 (Nora, lawyer, mid 30s) 
 
While Nora regards herself as different from most lawyers, taking pride in not being 
‘boring’ like the others, her account bears traces of awkwardness. By drinking beer at 
work-related social gatherings – and not wine like the others – she is confronted with 
her difference in somewhat unpleasant ways. By not conforming to the group 
standard she is accused of conspicuously demonstrating her difference. Indeed, the 
dilemma of wanting to be different yet fit in is a recurring theme in several self-
reflexive accounts. As noted by Bourdieu (1984), there are two possible strategies for 
newcomers to the game of distinction; either striving for assimilation with the taste of 
dominant groups (evident, for instance, in the ‘hyper-correctness’ of the petite 
bourgeoisie), or explicit dissimilation from such tastes (as evident in the strategies of 
the cultural avant-garde). Regardless of whether one strives to ‘fit in’ or ‘stand out’, 
it seems a certain amount of labour is required, especially among upwardly-mobile 
people navigating unfamiliar social terrains. While social mobility may certainly 
bring about pleasantness in terms of economic and symbolic rewards, the interview 
data suggest that it may also be associated with feelings of inferiority and insecurity. 
 
The uneasiness expressed highlights the importance of what Bourdieu (1984: 170; 
1990b: 62) refers to as the diachronic aspect of the conditioning of class habitus. 
While the primary conditioning or the habitus (i.e. exposure to social and economic 
conditions of existence during a social actor’s early years) continues to structure 
people’s conduct throughout their lives, the embodied history inscribed in the habitus 
is not written in stone. Indeed, intra-generational social mobility implies exposure to 
new and different conditions as time goes by, which implies that the mobile actor has 
to adapt to a new habitat, as it were. A secondary conditioning of the habitus may 
  259
produce structures which are somewhat at odds with the primary structures, thus 
constituting what Bourdieu (2004a) refers to as habitus clivé – a cleft or split set of 
embodied dispositions. In other words, the embodied history inscribed in the habitus 
can be a source of ‘misadaption as well as adaption, revolt as well as resignation’ 
(Bourdieu, 1990b: 62). At any rate, the negative feelings associated with not fully 
mastering lifestyles valorised in the social groups one attempts to gain entry to, 
indicate that such mastery constitutes deference in the eyes of would-be members. 
 
7.3.2 Ressentiment 
Signs of deference are also traceable in the ways in which the interviewees talk about 
the tastes and lifestyles of those far removed from their own social milieu. Although 
we have seen that practices perceived as ‘conspicuous’, ‘flashy’ and ‘snobbish’ 
produce moral disparagement, there is a certain tension between admiration and 
aversion apparent in the interview data. There are important signs of admiration and 
deference to be found in the ways in which the interviewees classify others. Theodor, 
who repeatedly expresses contempt for ‘the rich’ and their ‘lack of values’, 
nevertheless reports feeling ‘inferior’ among such people:   
 
V: Have you ever found yourself in situations where you feel uncomfortable? You 
know, where you feel uncomfortable for being different, where you’re not among 
your own type of people? 
I: I’ve always had this problem with this sort of chit-chat setting. […] You know, 
situations where you are forced to meet people you don’t have much in common 
with, and you’re obliged to be there for like three hours. […] So there have been 
some situations where I haven’t felt one hundred per cent at home. For instance at 
these events the local government invite me to from time to time, where all these 
important financial types are present. […] I’ve often declined these invitations. I 
guess it’s flattering to be invited by the mayor. You know, these neat invitations with 
official imprints and all. Actually, my secretary was shocked the other day when I 
declined to meet the royal family at one of these gatherings. But I was like, ‘Why 
would I want to do that?’ I saw no point in going there. […] It’s not always easy, or 
interesting for that matter, to talk to people I can’t relate to. Because they’re 
interested in completely different things than I am, and there are other norms and 
terminologies and all sorts of things that I’m not used to. […] 
V: Do you feel uncomfortable in such situations? Do you feel inferior in a way? 
I: Yes, I’ve had problems with feeling inferior before. But it’s better now. I have 
worked to improve myself. [Laughs.] […] But of course, it’s much easier in 
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situations where I’m in control. You know, this is my area of expertise, these are my 
people, this is just fun. I’m much more cautious when I’m in unfamiliar social 
settings. […]  
V: What kinds of settings are uncomfortable?  
I: You know, the cocktail party type of thing. From time to time I have to tag along 
with my wife to these work-related gatherings, where there are all these bankers and 
that kind of people. Places where I’m the alien. […] I guess I’m more comfortable on 
the inside of things, not being the one that’s on the outside of the circle.  
 (Theodor, head of cultural enterprise, early 40s) 
 
Accordingly, interviewees expressing aversions to the conspicuous lifestyles and 
moral values of certain types of people does not necessarily imply they feel superior 
to such people. On the contrary, they may even express deference to and envy of the 
practitioners of such lifestyles: 
 
When I see all these people who spend unbelievable amounts of money on clothes 
and appearances… I tend to get envious, because they can afford it, and I cannot. But 
I also think that these people spend way too much time and money on these things. 
[…] It’s alien to me. You know, I don’t know that many people working in the oil 
business. […] The people I know work in the public sector. Moneywise, we’re way 
below others in Stavanger, especially the oil people. Many people earn a lot of 
money. The standard of living is high. And being an out-of-towner originally, I tend 
to notice these things. There’s a lot of money floating around, and I notice it affects 
people. It affects me too. I want to go shopping in all these fancy shops. There are 
lots of really cool clothes, and I get attracted to the whole thing. But then again, I 
think that’s a bad thing, because it preoccupies people. People are more concerned 
about buying stuff than getting to know others. […] But the most serious problem is 
that its affects me. I also want nice clothes! 
 (Andrea, consultant, public sector, early 30s) 
 
While Andrea tries not to let the materialistic lifestyles of the rich influence her, she 
admits they do. Apparently, there is a tension between an aversion to the expensive 
lifestyles of ‘the others’ on the one hand, and a somewhat shameful confession that 
she also wants to take part in these. A recurring tendency is for the interviewees to 
reflect self-consciously on their own feelings of envy after expressing antipathies. 
Among the interviewees located in the cultural fractions of the social space, this 
tension is most apparent when it comes to money and expensive goods. Similarly, the 
interviewees in the economic fractions self-consciously reflect on their lack of 
cultivation when comparing themselves to others: 
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Sometimes I wonder about other people’s taste in music. […] I can’t understand the 
code. You know, what makes people like the things they do. […] I thought about this 
yesterday. I was at this church concert, and some of the people attending were just 
out of their minds. They clapped their hands like madmen. […] And then I got this 
feeling: What do they hear that I don’t hear? I can’t seem to find that… Well, I guess 
I understand the liking part, because I probably clap my hands just as enthusiastically 
when I hear music that I like. And the music I like… Those people probably think, 
‘What the hell? This guy has to be an idiot for liking this’. […] I can understand that 
people get involved and that they lose themselves in a way. But what I cannot 
understand is what kind of mechanisms make some people like this, and others that. I 
don’t know if it’s something they’ve developed when they were really young, if it’s 
the culture they’ve been brought up with, if it’s the kind of parents they’ve had, or 
the education they’ve had, or… I have no idea. But it’s got to be something. 
 (Wilhelm, manager, oil company, early 40s) 
 
Notwithstanding Wilhelm’s attempt at a sociological analysis of cultural 
differentiation, it is apparent that encountering people from different backgrounds 
and with different abilities evokes mixed feelings. Just as the interviewees in cultural 
fractions both resent and envy the expensive lifestyles of the rich, the interviewees in 
the economic fractions reflect upon the difference between themselves and others 
with similar awe and deference: 
 
V: Have you ever experienced feeling uncomfortable meeting other people with 
different tastes than yours?  
I: Yes, it can be uncomfortable, in the sense that… You know, you get a bit hesitant, 
and you try to find themes or issues that you both can relate to. […] For instance, 
when I meet people who have read a lot of books… I know that I’m unable to 
appreciate the same things as they do, because they’re probably more… They’re not 
the kind of entertainment junkie that I am. They probably read books in a totally 
different way than I do. And meeting such people can sometimes be a bit 
uncomfortable. […] And to be honest, I wish I had this interest in a wider range of 
culture. For instance, I wish I had the ability to appreciate the use of language in 
books. You know, like people who can sit for hours pondering on one sentence. […] 
But we’re all different in that regard. And at some point I became what I call an 
entertainment junkie, and I‘m not as involved in cultural issues in the way some other 
people are. And sometimes that can be uncomfortable, knowing that you don’t get the 
same type of stimuli from high culture, the way other people do. And I… Well, I 
won’t say that I feel left out, because there are lots of other areas that I’m in control 
of. But I guess there are people who feel embarrassed because they don’t get high 
culture. And instead they talk down about it, because they don’t get it. […] I guess 
it’s because people see no use in it. […] An opera, for instance, because it makes no 
sense to them. 
 (Mikkel, manager, oil company, mid 30s) 
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Despite the aversion expressed, there does seem to be at least some mutual deference 
between the fractions. In the case of interviewees located in the cultural fractions, 
they shun the conspicuousness of material luxury, yet report feelings of envy for not 
being endowed with similar amounts of economic resources. Conversely, the 
interviewees in the economic fractions dislike the conspicuousness of elevated 
cultural tastes and esoteric knowledge, yet report envy of the ability to appreciate 
certain cultural forms.  
 
The ambivalence, or the apparent contradiction, between aversion and admiration can 
be conceived of in terms of ‘ressentiment’ (not to be confused with the term 
‘resentment’). The term was originally coined by Kierkegaard (1978; see also Sartre, 
1956; Scheler, 1961; Weber, 1966; Nietzsche, 2003), and refers to a sense of hostility 
directed at what is perceived as the cause of people’s frustrations. The sense of 
weakness or inferiority in the face of this ‘cause’ generates a morality which attacks 
or denies the perceived source of one’s frustration. As noted by Bourdieu,  
 
Ressentiment […] is the sentiment of the person who transforms a sociologically 
mutilated being – I am poor, I am black, I am woman, I am powerless – into a model 
of human existence, an elective accomplishment of freedom and a devoir-être, an 
ought-to-be, a fatum, built upon an unconscious fascination with the dominant. 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 212)  
 
In other words, ressentiment is a reassignment of the pain that accompanies a sense of 
inferiority onto an external scapegoat. The social actor creates an enemy image, or a 
cause that can be blamed for one’s own inferiority. Thus, people perceive themselves 
as thwarted not by their own failures, but by something external. As is evident from 
the interview quotes above, there is an apparent contradiction between feelings of 
hostility roused by a perceived conspicuousness and ‘better-than-you’ attitude among 
other groups, and an admiration of the lifestyles practised by the objects of 
ressentiment. Although the notion of ressentiment admittedly implies a problematic 
projection of motives onto the interviewees, it nevertheless highlights the 
ambivalence between admiration and aversion apparent in the interview data. More 
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importantly, it indicates that boundary drawing and expressed aversions do not entail 
a devaluation of the symbolic value of the practices in question. On the contrary, the 
quotes above indicate that the aversions expressed by non-practitioners indirectly 
entail admiration, and thus the production of symbolic value. Accordingly, the 
mobilisation of egalitarian sentiments against elitism and snobbery does not 
necessarily indicate an eradication of taste hierarchies. This is not, however, to say 
that egalitarian values are not without their consequences. 
 
7.4. Under the moral radar 
Based on extensive anthropological fieldwork, Gullestad (1984, 1985, 1992) has 
argued that there is a ‘code of modesty’ prevailing in Norwegian society. While 
Norwegians – like most people – are hungry for recognition and have certain needs to 
‘show what they are good for’, there are few legitimate means by which to express 
being different from or better than others. There is in other words a dilemma between 
aspirations to prestige, esteem and honour on the one hand, and internalised moral 
guidelines cherishing equality as sameness on the other.128 According to Gullestad 
(1992: 103ff), a recurrent solution to this dilemma is an ‘under-communication of 
success’ among the successful. The Norwegian code of conduct thus demands that a 
person is self-effacing, not boastful, not forward, and one should not ‘blow one’s own 
trumpet’. In effect, this means that successful people cannot lay claim to prestige 
themselves, and in some cases they even have to be ‘nicer’ than everybody else, in 
that they have to downplay their successfulness. As noted by Daloz (2007, 2010) 
such informal codes of conduct discourage feelings of superiority and can typically 
be seen among members of various social elites. These codes are particularly 
                                              
128 Gullestad (1992: 184ff) notes that the English term ‘equality’ is often translated into the 
Norwegian term likhet, which literally means ‘alikeness’ or ‘sameness’. This is, however, one of at 
least three other possible translations of ‘equality’: likeverd (‘same or equal value’), likeberettigelse 
(‘same or equal right’) and likestilling (‘same or equal status’; often used to denote equality between 
genders). Following de Tocqueville’s (1969) distinction between the idea of ‘equality’ and the idea 
of ‘similarity’ or ‘identity’, Gullestad’s point is that these two ideas are tightly entwined in the 
Norwegian context. Whereas ‘equality’ in the US means ‘equal opportunity’ (i.e. to become 
different), likhet in Norway emphasizes similarity in processes of social life as well as similarity in 
terms of economic resources, prestige, political power, etc.   
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prevalent in political representatives, who cultivate an image of ‘conspicuous 
modesty’. In other words, certain ways of acting are more or less strategically 
employed to monitor self-presentation in front-stage situations (Barnes, 1954; 
Goffman, 1959). According to Daloz’ comparative inquiries, such under-
communication of esteem is hardly found outside Scandinavian countries. 
 
There are some interesting resemblances in the interview data to the points put 
forward by Gullestad and Daloz. As we have seen throughout the previous chapters, 
self-assertion is deemed inappropriate and morally dubious across the social space. 
Based on the discussion so far, it could thus be argued that a code of modesty is 
tacitly accepted and taken for granted by most of the interviewees. There is, however, 
a certain resistance to this moral code to be found. Some interviewees even explicitly 
challenge the idea of equality as sameness, and they refuse to acknowledge such 
codes of modesty:  
 
V: Do you ever restrict your consumption of goods? You know… ‘What will the 
neighbours say’ type of thing? 
I: No, never. When I was a little boy… You know, my parents had this small 
business. […] And the Law of Jante was extremely powerful where I grew up. So my 
parents were always very cautious about doing things, especially when it came to 
buying stuff. It was like, ‘No, no! We can’t buy a new car, because people might 
dislike it, at it can affect who will buy stuff from us.’ So I remember from very early 
on, I told myself never to let other people make decisions for me. I have to make my 
own decisions and stand for them. And I have abided by that rule. If I let other people 
influence my choices, it would be wrong.  […] So I never let others’ expectations of 
what to do or not to do influence my choices in life.  
 (Johan, CEO, mid 50s) 
 
V: Have you ever experienced other people being opinionated about the way you 
spend your money? 
I: Sometimes. 
V: How do you feel about that? 
I: Luckily, from when I was very little, I haven’t cared much about what other people 
think of me. Let them have their opinions. I don’t waste energy on thinking about 
other people’s opinions. You know, if you have something on your mind, tell me. I’d 
rather have people tell it to me straight, than have people walking around with their 
secret opinions.    
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 (Pia, lawyer, late 40s) 
 
A recurring theme typical among interviewees located in the upper sectors of the 
social space is an expressed aversion to ‘The Law of Jante’, a popular saying 
referring to the novel A Fugitive Crosses His Tracks (1936 [1933]) by Aksel 
Sandemose. Generally, the Law of Jante refers to negative depictions of individual 
success and achievement, or a mentality emphasising the collective while 
discouraging those who stand out as achievers. Several interviewees reflexively point 
out that they perceive their environment as pervaded by such a mentality, while 
explicitly disavowing this mentality themselves. As we can see in the quotes above, 
the Law of Jante is associated with letting others influence and/or discourage the 
consumption of expensive material goods. The aversion to the Law of Jante is also 
prevalent among consumers of cultural goods and those who value esoteric 
knowledge:  
 
I don’t want to be bored to death by dumb people. And saying that some people are 
dumber than others, that’s not allowed in this country. Because everybody’s 
supposed to be the same. But that’s rubbish! Some people are dumber than others. 
[Laughs.] And I want to be surrounded by smart, knowledgeable and intelligent 
people. […] I mean, a book can be judged by its cover. And the older I get, the more 
I rid myself of all the things that have been so instilled in me at school and at home… 
You know, this notion that you shouldn’t judge others because of their looks or 
whatever. But I mean, I do. And I don’t think it’s wrong. 
 (Lucas, lawyer, early 30s) 
 
V: We’ve talked quite a bit about your preferences in literature, visual art and so on. 
And if I’ve understood you correctly, you’re very clear about what you like and what 
you dislike.  
I: Oh, yes. It’s like that all the time. I’m very judgemental and prejudiced. […] But I 
believe that prejudices, they are there for a reason. And it has somehow become 
morally suspect, but I don’t take that kind of moral sentiments very seriously. […] 
Apparently, there are many people who find me arrogant because of it. And guess I 
am in a sense.  
V: These moral sentiments and their relation to aesthetics… 
I: It all started with functionalism. I mean, when functionalism came along, it wiped 
away everything that was considered to be immoral. […] They wiped away 
ornamentation, painted every wall white… Well, they sort of cleaned it all up and 
made it all nice and orderly. […] And this notion that ornamentation is morally 
reprehensible… That notion stuck with me for a long time in my younger days. But 
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when I grew older, I learnt that things are not necessarily like that. […] And I really 
believe that learning new stuff, acquiring knowledge about aesthetics for instance, 
that’s what makes life worth living.  
 (Sofia, academic, mid 60s) 
 
There is thus an awareness of an anti-elitist mentality stipulating that one cannot 
claim that certain tastes or certain forms of knowledge are ‘better’ than others. While 
there are quite a few interviewees who seem rather unsettled by claiming superiority 
based on their tastes and lifestyles, there are some who reject this mentality, explicitly 
refusing to acknowledge it or let it discourage their worldview. Lucas points out that 
despite attempts by his family and the school system to discourage him from ‘judging 
a book by its cover’, he reserves his right to deem others ‘dumb’. Similarly, Sofia 
refuses to let other people’s perception of her as ‘arrogant’ discourage her 
‘prejudgment’. On the contrary, she historicises the deeming of aesthetic judgements 
as morally dubious, and maintains her belief that gaining a knowledge of aesthetics is 
‘what makes life worth living’. However, such reflexive refusals do not necessarily 
imply that these people will act however they please: 
 
V: We were talking earlier about you being labelled as a member of the cultural 
elite… 
I: Well, I guess I am. But still, I’ve been very careful to appear indistinct and, you 
know, hard to pin down. And it’s all about positioning, of course. There’s a 
difference between what I personally think or feel, and the professional role I play, so 
to speak. In a town like Stavanger, to appear elitist equals death. I mean, if I am to 
appear in public, I won’t show any elitist tendencies… Well, not that I am elitist, but 
I am very careful about expressing myself in ways that don’t appear too academic, 
too elitist or too high cultural… And that’s also because Stavanger is a schizophrenic 
town. On the one hand, people strive to acquire elite status through the consumption 
of high culture. […] On the other hand, this is a town where all forms of snobbery 
and elitist attitudes are sanctioned very hard. […] So in my professional role, this is 
something I am very conscious about. For instance, I’ve had a fair share of media 
coverage lately, especially in the local newspaper. You know, because of [the work I 
do]. And just the other day, they printed this fairly long interview. And I think it was 
more important to the paper-reading Stavangerian that they got to know that I play 
football in my spare time, rather than [the work I do]. […] But I mean, this is my 
professional role. As a private citizen… I’m not afraid to wave my flag and tell 
people what I like and don’t like, if you know what I mean? Not at all. But it all 
depends on the situation. And sometimes it can be difficult, because it’s not always 
that obvious whether I am somewhere in an official capacity, or if I am, you know, 
just me.  
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 (Jonas, head of cultural enterprise, mid 30s) 
 
Thus, Jonas compartmentalises different roles. Although he sees no problem in 
‘waving his flag’ (i.e. expressing his tastes) as a private citizen, he is careful not to 
act in ‘elitist ways’ as a professional in the public sphere. As he regards Stavanger as 
a ‘schizophrenic’ town that is characterised by people who strive to become 
cultivated, yet one where cultural elitism and snobbery are strongly discouraged, he 
reports that he reflexively considers and monitors his public appearances. So while 
several interviewees do not acknowledge the Law of Jante personally, they 
nevertheless find it appropriate to ‘keep their heads down’ in order to avoid negative 
attention from those who do not share their views. 
 
Although arguably they are under the spell of egalitarian ideals of sameness like any 
other Norwegian, there is an important difference: they are endowed with a certain 
reflexivity enabling them to monitor their presentation of self when required by the 
situation. More specifically, following Goffman’s (1959) distinction between ‘the 
front stage’ and ‘the back stage’, this reflexivity implies a social competence which 
endows its holders with the ability to differentiate between different types of 
situations requiring different modes of impression management. As these 
interviewees are aware of anti-elitist sentiments which may result in unwanted 
negative attention on themselves or the groups they represent, they under-
communicate their differences vis-à-vis their perceived audiences when enacting their 
roles as professionals in the public sphere. Expanding on Goffman’s dramaturgical 
metaphor, it might be suggested that the reflexive monitoring of appearances in 
different contexts reflects a form of ‘role distance’, or an expressed separateness 
between oneself and one’s putative role (Goffman, 1961: 83ff). Translated into 
Bourdieusian terms, these interviewees are endowed with an ‘illusio’, or a ‘feel for 
the game’, which enables them to comprehend and consider when and where it is 
(in)appropriate to act in certain ways. This suggests that it might be socially 
profitable to underplay differences and cultivate an image of ‘conspicuous modesty’ 
in certain situations (Daloz, 2007). 
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However, while some people may more or less calculatedly employ such strategies to 
avoid rousing hostility in the public eye, the successful enactment of these strategies 
is not necessarily the result of consciously or ‘cynically’ pursued goals of wanting to 
deceive the public. But it does imply a capacity to monitor one’s presentation of self 
in ways that suit the situation. This capacity may, in turn, prove to be socially 
profitable, regardless of its motivation. Indeed, there are several indications of the 
effective under-communication of esteem to be found in the interview data: 
 
V: This type you were talking about… People who look down on others… Is that 
something you experience a lot here in Stavanger? 
I: Well, I guess. In certain circles it’s like that. But I mean, I don’t have friends in 
high places. I don’t know these people. But my impression is that such circles are 
fairly… It’s like ‘we’re the boys, we stick together.’ So I guess there are such 
tendencies, here as in Oslo and other places. But everyone’s not like that. My 
neighbour, he’s a CEO and earns insane amounts of money. But still, he’s the 
sweetest guy in the world. I guess if you had walked into him on the street, you 
wouldn’t have noticed that he’s got this fancy job, lots of money… Well, I guess you 
could tell in some respects. Anyway, there are these other types that have to 
emphasise their fancy titles. I noticed that at this other place I worked earlier. It was 
really important to them what kind of titles they had and what kinds of people they 
knew.   
 (Eva, secretary, mid 40s) 
 
V: Where do you fit into all of this? These people you were referring to [‘posh 
people’]… Do you feel comfortable in their company? 
I: Yes and no. It depends on what kinds of people they are. It’s all about how they 
relate to other people. […] Sometimes I can get along with people who are 
preoccupied with their fancy concerts, white tablecloths and champagne glasses. But 
they have to be nice and treat you in a decent manner. […] For instance, the parents 
at this pre-school… It’s a fairly homogenous group. […] You can tell by the types of 
cars parking outside. You know, Audi, Mercedes, all sorts of… […] And you can tell 
by the clothes they wear. But then again, who are these people, really? And who are 
we to judge and say stuff like, ‘Oh, they’ve got this high cultural manner, they think 
they’re better than us’ and that kind of crap? When I hear such things, I get really 
sad, because they are people with feelings too. And most of the parents in this pre-
school, they always give a helping hand, they have faith in the work we do and they 
show it every day. And all people should be treated equally. Just because they wear 
fancy suits, drive Mercedes, have nice houses and work as CEOs, lawyers and 
doctors… Who are we to judge them? And it really pisses me off when people start 
rambling on about such people. They are nice people who deserve respect.  
 (Klara, pre-school teacher, late 30s) 
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While both interviewees regard ‘snobbish’ and ‘self-assertive’ people as morally 
dubious at other points in the interviews, the quotes indicate that neither the 
consumption of expensive material goods, nor the consumption of ‘high culture’, is 
necessarily problematic. Eva’s neighbour is ‘the loveliest man in the world’ despite 
his earning ‘insane amounts of money’ as a CEO. The suit-wearing, Mercedes-
driving parents at the pre-school where Klara works are still the ‘first to give a 
helping hand’ when it is needed and thus they ‘deserve respect’. It even makes Klara 
angry and sad when people dislike such types only for being rich and successful. 
Thus, practising esoteric or exclusive lifestyles is in itself not perceived as 
problematic, if the practitioners act within the limits of what is morally justifiable. 
Throughout the previous chapters we have seen that it is seldom the possession of 
money, education, knowledge, or the mastery of certain lifestyles to which the 
interviewees express aversions. Rather, it is only when people are perceived as 
conspicuous or self-assertive about such matters that hostility is evoked. In other 
words, as long as practitioners of lifestyles which could potentially produce suspicion 
(1) do not assert themselves on the basis of practising these lifestyles in ways 
perceived as morally reprehensible by non-practitioners; and (2) exhibit 
accommodating and jovial attitudes towards others, it seems they are provided with 
an extraordinary endorsement in the eyes of non-practitioners. In other words, one 
might be esteemed for practising lifestyles associated with high amounts of cultural 
and/or economic capital even in a society that cultivates equality as sameness, 
provided that one is able to operate under the moral radar of egalitarianism and 
combine the practice of such lifestyles with an explicit display of moral qualities such 
as kindness, caring, modesty, unselfishness and so forth. 
 
7.5 An egalitarian paradox? 
Despite the hostility to snobbery and self-assertion, the mastery of certain lifestyles 
and tastes can produce deference and endorsement in the eyes of non-practitioners. 
Thus, simply rejecting Bourdieu’s model of symbolic domination is by no means 
warranted (cf. Skarpenes, 2007). On the contrary, and in accordance with the 
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Bourdieusian framework, I would argue that it is the morality of the upper classes 
that is brought into the field of opinion, and not their esteem per se. While the 
egalitarian sentiments directed against elitism and snobbery might very well be 
considered an effective position-taking which draws attention to how certain groups 
handle their social esteem, these sentiments do not challenge the taste hierarchies 
which bestow recognition on these groups. Nor do these sentiments infringe on the 
production of symbolic value of esteemed practices. While certain practices are 
rejected as ‘not for the likes of us’ by non-practitioners, this nevertheless entails a 
confirmation of a tacit understanding that the lifestyles of the upper classes are more 
esteemed. Indeed, such tacit understandings are part and parcel of what Bourdieu 
(1984, 1991b) refers to as ‘symbolic violence’; subordinate actors apprehend the 
social world through perceptual categories conditioned by their positions in the social 
space. However, what such position-takings might have helped to accomplish is a 
rather widespread suspicion of elitism and snobbery, in the sense that it is not morally 
justifiable to explicitly claim superiority on the basis of the mastery of esteemed 
tastes and lifestyles.  
 
Thus, insofar as practitioners of expensive and/or intellectually demanding lifestyles 
are provided with an extraordinary endorsement by non-practitioners due to 
tactfulness and expressed jovial attitudes, this implies that it is not necessarily taste 
hierarchies as such that are brought into question by such sentiments. Rather, it is first 
and foremost the immorality of self-assertion that is the point of contention. Thus, 
egalitarian values are compatible with taste hierarchies. Indeed, as asserted by 
Gullestad (1992: ch. VIII), the egalitarian ideology implied in the valuation of 
equality as sameness somewhat paradoxically conceals, and even helps to maintain, 
the hierarchical structures of society. According to Gullestad, Norwegians have 
adopted an interactional style whereby sameness between the participants of an 
encounter is emphasised, while differences are tactfully concealed. This does not 
imply actual sameness, but rather a way of under-communicating differences. When 
equality as sameness is not possible, people avoid each other. Yet the idea of 
sameness is sustained by such avoidance strategies. As people avoid others because 
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they are ‘too different’, and seek out others still because they are ‘alike’, egalitarian 
ideals tend to be exclusively applied between members of the same rank. Thus, there 
exists a somewhat false belief that most people are ‘ordinary people’, a belief which 
is in fact a generalisation based on the lifestyles and attitudes of the group with which 
one associates. Other categories are exceptions to that rule. In the process of striving 
for sameness, people indirectly erect symbolic boundaries between themselves and 
people who are not considered the same. Such boundaries are not primarily 
established to shut people out, but first and foremost to protect and preserve a social 
identity which is defined within a reference group. Thus, Gullestad argues that there 
are ‘more discrepancies both within the ideologies themselves and between ideology 
and social life than Norwegians are generally aware of and willing to recognize’ 
(Gullestad, 1992: 100). 
 
Several of Gullestad’s points are transferable to the present empirical case. First, 
inferring from the ways in which the interviewees classify others, there is 
considerable evidence of avoidance strategies. As discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, the 
interviewees express aversions to the tastes and lifestyles of others, and such 
aversions even manifest themselves in a highly concrete ‘sense of one’s place’, as 
people navigate physical space by seeking out interaction with those like them while 
avoiding interaction with ‘the others’ based on taste-related criteria. Second, we have 
seen that different conceptions of ‘ordinariness’ are differentially distributed in 
tandem with the distribution of different lifestyles and tastes. Leaning on Bourdieu’s 
argument about the functioning of the habitus, I have argued that the interviewees 
take the naturalness of their own tastes for granted. This naturalness is, in turn, used 
as a yardstick against which ‘the others’ are judged. Finally, as we have seen in this 
chapter, egalitarian ideals of sameness are very much present in the interviewees’ 
accounts. Even those who disavow such ideals are influenced by them, in the sense 
that they monitor their appearances in certain ‘front stage’ situations in order not to 
rouse negative sentiments when they are in the public eye. 
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Following Gullestad’s line of reasoning I would thus argue that egalitarian ideals of 
sameness, along with a classed distribution of different conceptions of ordinariness, 
contribute to a misrecognition of power relations. If resourceful people go about their 
business tactfully and avoid rousing anti-snobbish sentiments, it seems they can be 
left in peace without having to worry about their eliciting the suspicion of groups of 
less resourceful people. Thus, processes of non-formalised closure (i.e. crystallised 
social boundaries given rise to by social actors’ choice of friends and partners, 
exclusive social networks, residential segregation, preferences as regards leisure 
activities, etc.) are driven underground into covert, informal codes of exclusion. 
While it is outside the scope of this thesis to speculate on the consequences of the 
formation of status groups, it might nevertheless be suggested that their formation 
serves as a basis for exclusion so that a limited circle of those deemed eligible can 
achieve monopolies of resources of various kinds. Moreover, as noted by Parkin 
(2002: 96ff), the relationship between resources and social esteem is a two-way 
street; sometimes social esteem flows from the possession of resources, and 
sometimes it is more like a springboard to the attainment of such possessions. Insofar 
as such processes remain covert, they will not be questioned, and they can thus 
prevail largely unnoticed. In other words, as long as resourceful people keep their 
heads down, patterns of inter-marriage, informal friendships and residential clustering 
seem to be perceived as rather ‘innocent’ by outsiders, even though such patterns 
amount to processes of social closure.  
 
Thus, this study indicates that egalitarian ideals of sameness veil the ‘real’ causes of 
social closure and the production of inequality, in the sense that such processes 
prevail largely unquestioned (save perhaps for some leftist politicians and conflict-
oriented sociologists). In this way, the mastery of certain lifestyles does not only 
imply what Murphy (1988: 136) refers to as ‘power to profit from’, in the sense that 
the practitioners are endowed with the capacity to convert this mastery into other 
forms of resources (such as money, educational qualifications, advantages on the 
labour market and membership of exclusive social networks); it might also imply 
‘power over’ in the sense that less resourceful social actors tacitly accept the unequal 
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distribution of such capacities. Thus, egalitarian values might somewhat 
paradoxically coexist with, and even help to maintain, relations of legitimate 
domination, in the sense that groups of subordinate social actors comply to a 
differential distribution of power which does not benefit their life-chances (see Lukes, 
2005: 83ff). 
 
One should, however, be careful not to essentialise ‘Norwegianness’, and Gullestad’s 
account might very well be criticised for sweeping claims about ‘Norwegian 
exceptionalism’. In a recent study, for instance, van Eijk (2012) demonstrates similar 
egalitarian sentiments in the Netherlands. Nevertheless, there are reasons to believe 
that there are important differences between countries in this regard. Indeed, 
furthering the argument about applying a Bourdieu-inspired framework in a relational 
rather than in a substantialist mode of analysis, this chapter has demonstrated the 
importance of not using the peculiarities of the French case as a litmus test to assess 
the characteristics of power relations and the legitimacy which bestows them in other 
empirical cases. The fruitfulness of cross-national comparisons notwithstanding, it is 
important to highlight that power relations linked to a differential distribution of 
social esteem may express themselves in highly different ways in different national 
contexts, without this necessarily implying that their structural underpinnings are 
radically different. Indeed, as noted by Weber in his discussion of the relationship 
between class and status, the ways in which American and German ‘chiefs’ enact 
their roles vis-à-vis their ‘clerks’ are strikingly different, even though the social 
distance between the ‘chiefs’ and the ‘clerks’ in the two countries are homologous:    
 
Both propertied and propertyless people can belong to the same status group, and 
frequently they do with very tangible consequences. This ‘equality’ of social esteem 
may, however, in the long run become quite precarious. The ‘equality’ of status 
among the American ‘gentlemen’, for instance, is expressed by the fact that outside 
the subordination determined by the different functions of ‘business’, it would be 
considered strictly repugnant – whether the old tradition still prevails – if even the 
richest ‘chief’, while playing billiards or card in the club in the evening, would not 
treat his ‘clerk’ as in every sense fully his equal in birthright. It would be repugnant if 
the American ‘chief’ would bestow upon his ‘clerk’ the condescending ‘benevolence’ 
marking a distinction of ‘position’, which the German chief can never dissever from 
his attitude. This is one of the reasons why in America the German ‘clubby-ness’ has 
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never been able to attain the attraction that the American clubs have. (Weber, 1946: 
187) 
 
7.6 Conclusion 
Given the classed distribution of tastes and the systematic boundary drawing 
accounted for in previous chapters, this chapter has addressed the question of how 
differences in tastes and lifestyles amount to relations of legitimate domination in 
Stavanger. Taking the debate about the applicability of Bourdieu’s model of symbolic 
domination in contexts outside of France as a point of departure, this chapter has 
discussed the apparent contradiction between egalitarian values on the one hand, and 
hierarchical relations of power, status and prestige on the other. The argument put 
forward can be summarised as follows. First, it has been established that taste-related 
self-assertion is deemed morally suspect by most of the interviewees, which among 
other things implies that those who report specific and elaborate cultural preferences 
are somewhat unsettled by being associated with cultural snobbery and elitist 
attitudes. Second, it has been asserted that despite the widespread refusals to 
acknowledge other people’s superiority, there is still considerable empirical evidence 
of deference and endorsement to be found in the interview data. Thus, I have 
forwarded the argument that certain lifestyles and tastes function as symbolic capital 
outside the limited circles of those who possess mastery of the lifestyles in question. 
Third, I have asserted that the suspiciousness produced by anti-elitist sentiments may 
be eluded, provided that practitioners of expensive/and or intellectually demanding 
lifestyles ‘keep their heads down’ (i.e. act tactfully, modestly, respectfully, etc.). 
Thus, joviality and under-communication of difference might be the egalitarian 
version of noblesse oblige. Finally, leaning on the works of the Norwegian 
anthropologist Marianne Gullestad, I have argued that egalitarian ideals of sameness 
imply a misrecognition of asymmetric power relations. Insofar as processes of social 
closure prevail largely unquestioned, asymmetric power relations are provided with a 
kind of legitimacy they would not otherwise have. Thus, egalitarian values somewhat 
paradoxically coexist with relations of legitimate domination. 
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8.1 A summary of findings 
This thesis has investigated processes of social closure based on lifestyle differences, 
in particular differences in people’s consumption preferences and aesthetical tastes. It 
has accentuated three interrelated aspects of what I call a class-status nexus – the 
social distribution of lifestyle differentials; the formation of status groups on the basis 
of lifestyle affinities; and relations of domination and subordination. Drawing on data 
generated by qualitative in-depth interviews with forty-six Stavangerians hailing from 
different classes and class fractions, the findings can be briefly summarised as 
follows: 
 
First, the analysis points to structural affinities between class positions and different 
cultural tastes. Based on the assumption that the ways in which people classify 
various cultural goods are indicative of their modes of perceiving, appropriating and 
appreciating these goods, I have mapped out different sets of more or less unified 
taste orientations. I have pointed to four main modes of consumption prominent in the 
empirical data: the intellectual mode, the luxurious mode, the educational mode and 
the practical mode of consumption. The most striking differences concern whether 
goods are appropriated and appreciated as a means to an end, i.e. instrumentally; or 
when goods are appropriated and appreciated as ends in themselves, i.e. in a 
disinterested or non-instrumental manner. These differences are clearly linked to the 
interviewees’ positions in the local social space, i.e. in the relative distribution of 
different species of capital. Coupled with Rosenlund’s (2000c, 2002a, 2009a) 
analyses of cultural practices and tastes in Stavanger, these findings indicate that both 
what types of goods Stavangerians consume, as well as how they appropriate and 
appreciate these cultural goods, are structured in systematic ways; the social 
distribution of different consumption preferences and aesthetical tastes is clearly 
linked to the local class structure. I have thus argued that these findings support the 
general sociological idea that social actors in similar class positions tend to be 
endowed with similar dispositions and embodied practical senses – or class habitus – 
which, in turn, generate similar practices and tastes which differ systematically from 
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those of social actors situated elsewhere in the class structure. The empirical findings 
indicate that the social distribution of lifestyles in present day Stavanger is classed. 
 
Second, the analysis lends support to the idea that this classed distribution of 
lifestyles amounts to the formation of more or less exclusive status groups. Based on 
the assumption that the ways in which people classify, evaluate and estimate other 
people’s lifestyles are indicative of elective affinities and processes of group 
inclusion and exclusion, I have identified two main types of symbolic boundary 
drawing which correspond to the structures of the local social space. What I have 
referred to as horizontal and vertical boundary drawing indicate more or less explicit 
lifestyle-related antagonisms between groups of social actors located in different 
sectors of the social space. More specifically, entwinements of aesthetical and moral 
criteria of evaluation are used by interviewees to systematically demarcate ‘us’ from 
‘them’. These findings indicate that the structures of the social space not only 
correspond to a differential distribution of lifestyles; they also manifest themselves in 
socially differentiated estimations of lifestyle differences. As lifestyle differences are 
subjectively perceived and recognised as significant by the interviewees, Bourdieu’s 
(1984: 6) dictum that ‘taste classifies the classifier’ seems to be supported. Moreover, 
previous studies of closure processes in Stavanger and other Norwegian cities have 
suggested that a classed marital endogamy and tendencies for residential segregation 
facilitate a demographic clustering of individuals into communal groups (Hansen, 
1995; Rosenlund, 2009a, 2011; Ljunggren and Andersen, 2012). The current findings 
indicate that perceived lifestyle differences are important factors in the structuring of 
how such social relationships coincide.  
 
Finally, the analysis suggests that socially recognised lifestyle differences express 
relations of domination and subordination. Insofar as (1) a classed distribution of 
lifestyles amounts to non-formalised social closure, implying monopolisation of 
social esteem and prestige accruing to privileged groups; (2) social esteem can be 
consolidated into institutionally secured privileges and advantages, for instance in the 
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educational system or on the labour market; and (3) this differential distribution of 
privileges and advantages is tacitly accepted or taken for granted by the non-
privileged, the current analysis suggests that privileged groups have power over less 
privileged groups. Tacit perceptions of the order or things – or doxa – imply that 
closure processes and the unequal distribution of advantages and privileges are rarely 
questioned. While the analysis certainly points to an extensive mobilisation of 
egalitarian sentiments against the perceived ‘elitism’, ‘vanity’ and ‘conspicuousness’ 
implied in other people’s lifestyles, such classifications are exclusively directed 
against people who are regarded as ‘showing off’ in somewhat ‘inauthentic’ ways, 
and/or perceived as thinking they are ‘better than others’ based on morally dubious 
grounds. The unequal distribution of privileges and advantages is, however, rarely 
problematised. On the contrary, if privileged others are perceived as acting in morally 
acceptable ways (i.e. not ‘showing off’ their riches), they are provided with an 
extraordinary endorsement in the eyes of the non-privileged. Thus, the analysis 
suggests that if the privileged act under the ‘moral radar’ of egalitarian sentiments, 
closure processes are misrecognised, and this implies relations of legitimate 
domination in the Bourdieusian sense of the term.  
 
8.2 Contributions and future challenges 
This thesis has contributed to contemporary sociological debates on class, status and 
social closure, both on a substantial and on a theoretical-methodological level. 
Substantially, it has expanded on a body of research on class and cultural life in 
Stavanger, in particular the work of Lennart Rosenlund. It lends firm support to his 
assertion that the distribution of lifestyles is structured by the capital volume and the 
capital composition principle of social differentiation. It has also generated additional 
insights about classed perceptions and classifications, which both supplement and 
expand on Rosenlund’s studies. More generally, the present analysis points to an 
enduring significance of class in the structuring of social inequalities, in the sense that 
the social and economic conditions implied in different class positions fundamentally 
affect the ways in which people perceive, think and act in the social world. 
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Furthermore, these classed modes of conduct amount to social closure, meaning that 
groups of social actors, intentionally or otherwise, monopolise advantages and 
privileges by restricting the opportunities of groups of outsiders.  
 
These findings contradict the supposed ‘death of class’ in contemporary Western 
societies. While structural changes might certainly have affected class relations – for 
instance in and through a marked decline in subjective ‘class consciousness’ and 
‘class awareness’ – this does not imply a ‘capitalism without classes’ as scholars such 
as Beck (1992), Giddens (1991) and Bauman (2001) posit. On the contrary, despite 
changes related to a decline in industrial production, a rise in the production of 
services, deregulation of labour markets, a decline in the political impact of labour 
unions, rising levels of education and income, and in some countries an expansion of 
the welfare state, it seems class relations have enduring influences on the structuring 
of both ‘objective’ social inequalities and the constitution of subjective self-identities. 
In this study the significance of class has been demonstrated by pointing to a classed 
structuring of lifestyle differentials which in turn leads to processes of social closure. 
So while the structuring of subjectivities and cultural identities might not always be 
expressed in class terms by social actors themselves, the expressed demarcations and 
symbolic boundary drawing nevertheless seem to be systematically structured by 
underlying class relations. Other studies investigating such processes demonstrate 
similar tendencies. These include studies of Denmark (Prieur et al, 2008; Skjøtt-
Larsen, 2008; Faber et al, 2012), Finland (Kahma and Toikka, 2012), the UK (Le 
Roux et al, 2008; Bennett et al, 2009; Atkinson, 2010), France (Lebaron et al, 2011) 
and Croatia (Cvetiþanin and Popescu, 2011). All these studies point to the need for a 
concept of class that is not restricted to people’s subjective awareness of class 
processes, or the realisation of classes as political agencies. While historical changes 
might have proven Marx and Engels’ (1967) prophesies about the rise of the working 
class as a revolutionary historical agent wrong, the notion of class itself should not be 
confused with certain scholars’ one-sided depiction of it. Particularly dubious are 
arguments heralding the coming of a new historical epoch of modernity in which the 
notion of class is rendered obsolete as far as the analysis of structured subjectivities is 
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concerned. The notion of class employed in the current analysis is, by contrast, rather 
different than that of the proponents of such assertions. 
 
On a theoretical-methodological level, this thesis has demonstrated the applicability 
of Bourdieu’s conceptual framework to a different research object. Following 
Bourdieu’s (1984, 1990b) insistence on applying his conceptual and methodological 
tools in a ‘relational’ mode of analysis, I have endeavoured to ‘distil’ crucial 
theoretical-methodological insights from his empirical work to map out lifestyle 
differentials and closure processes in present day Stavanger. Thus, my concern has 
not been to map out similarities with, or differences from, the form and content of 
specific lifestyle properties pertinent to class divides in Bourdieu’s France in the 
1960s and 1970s – a task which seems to preoccupy a range of researchers today. 
While it would be interesting to make substantial comparisons in time and space, this 
is, I argue, not a prerequisite in order to apply Bourdieu’s analytical framework. In 
other words, Bourdieu can be evoked without engaging in discussions about ‘the 
peculiarities of the French’. More generally, I suggest that the current application of 
an extended Bourdieu-inspired analytical framework can contribute to a further 
development of what has come to be known as ‘cultural class analysis’, meaning a 
type of class analysis which is not restricted to the economic and political spheres of 
society, but which also encompasses the cultural sphere (see for instance Savage, 
2003; Bottero, 2005). While the application of Bourdieu’s work is already at the 
forefront of this development, the present study can be seen as contributing with the 
following theoretical-methodological clarifications and elaborations: 
 
First of all, this study demonstrates the importance of analysing the empirical 
entwinement of class and status relations. While it might be fruitful to distinguish 
between the two on a conceptual level in order to analytically accentuate different 
aspects of the social world, one runs the risk of viewing class and status as two 
ontologically separate mechanisms that manifest themselves in autonomous ways. 
Indeed, this view is forwarded by Chan and Goldthorpe (2004, 2007a; Chan, 2010b) 
 282
as an explicit critique of Bourdieu-inspired analyses. This would, however, be an 
erroneous path to follow, as it fails to grasp the ways in which economic and cultural 
factors are entwined in the structuring of societal inequalities. It would be more 
fruitful to view the two as a class-status nexus and map out the ways in which the two 
are interrelated. In this thesis I have provided a reading of Bourdieu’s work as an 
attempt to expand on Weber’s ideal-typical and schematic conceptual distinctions by 
providing a viable model of the ways in which relations of class and status are 
entwined in contemporary societies. While this reading of Bourdieu’s work is 
consistent with several other scholars’ applications of it (e.g. Prieur et al, 2008; Le 
Roux et al, 2008; Lebaron et al, 2011), it also breaks with those who subsume the 
notion of class to notions of culture, identity and subjective self-perceptions. The 
application of Bourdieu’s conceptual framework does not in other words guarantee a 
sound framework for investigating the class-status nexus. To reiterate a crucial point 
forwarded by Crompton and Scott (2005), the focus on cultural issues in class 
analysis should not override or obscure other issues related to class and its structuring 
of social inequalities. There is, in other words, the impending danger of sociological 
reductionism implied by ‘taking culture too seriously’. Endeavouring to map out 
homologies between a social space, a symbolic space and a space of class habitus can 
remedy this potential problem, as it recognises the analytical distinction between 
‘economic’ and ‘cultural’ factors, while viewing them as empirically interrelated.  
 
Second, this thesis has demonstrated the importance of a reorientation back to 
Bourdieu’s original concern with social actors’ modus operandi, i.e. the scrutiny of 
lifestyle differences in and through the application of the notion of habitus. In 
mapping out the classed distribution of different modes of consumption, it has 
challenged a body of research associated with the notion of the ‘cultural omnivore’ 
and the preoccupation with social actors’ opus operatum, which in effect implies a 
one-sided focus on the observable outcomes of cultural practices. An extended focus 
on the ‘hows’, and not just the ‘whats’, of cultural consumption has rendered possible 
the view that a given cultural good might be perceived, appreciated and appropriated 
in different ways by different social actors. It has thus challenged the questionable 
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assumption that the prominence of ‘broad’, ‘open’ or ‘eclectic’ cultural tastes – 
typically measured in terms of survey respondents’ volume or composition of 
preferences for cultural goods – necessarily implies a decline in or a marked 
reconfiguration of cultural hierarchies. I have suggested that the notion of the cultural 
omnivore functions as an unfortunate ‘red herring’ in drawing attention away from 
important differentiating processes. While it is not possible to empirically assess the 
structures of the habitus directly, I have, by scrutinising social actors’ classifications 
of cultural goods and other people’s consumption styles, endeavoured to map out 
fine-grained cultural distinctions. Thus, this study has also demonstrated the 
usefulness of qualitative in-depth interviews in assessing research questions regarding 
the social distribution of lifestyles. 
 
Third, the analysis has demonstrated the importance of broadening the scope of what 
constitutes lifestyle differentials. While the social distribution of the consumption of 
‘legitimate’ cultural goods (i.e. certain forms of literature, theatre and music) is 
undoubtedly important in this regard, there is an unfortunate tendency within the 
research field to become fixated on such differences at the expense of other forms of 
lifestyle differentiation. As Scott (2002: 33ff) points out, Weber’s original notion of 
Lebensstil denotes the totality of a group’s existence: its whole way of life. 
Bourdieu’s analyses were also concerned with a wide range of lifestyle properties, 
and not just the universe of ‘legitimate culture’. There is in other words no viable 
reason why the mapping of lifestyle differentials should be restricted to the 
assessment of the social distribution of the consumption of a limited set of cultural 
goods. In this analysis I have employed a wide notion of cultural consumption in 
focusing on the consumption of both cultural and material goods, as well as a wide 
range of leisure activities. I have also brought attention to moral issues and the ways 
in which they are implied in the class-status nexus. While I do not argue that I have 
provided an exhaustive account of these issues, I have demonstrated the importance 
of not reducing lifestyle differentiation to a limited universe of cultural goods. 
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Fourth, the present inquiry has demonstrated the fruitfulness of analytically 
accentuating different aspects of the class-status nexus. In this regard, I have focused 
on three interrelated aspects – the classed distribution of lifestyles, the formation of 
status groups on the basis of lifestyle differences, and asymmetrical power relations 
arising from such differences. While I do not suggest that these aspects represent the 
totality of the class-status nexus, the point is that they are not analytically reducible to 
each other. For instance, a classed distribution of lifestyles might in principle exist 
without social actors subjectively perceiving such differences, much less recognising 
them as significant as regards with whom they do or do not want to associate socially. 
Conversely, social actors might in principle form social collectives based on 
perceived lifestyle differences without the existence of a classed distribution of 
lifestyles. Thus, there is the risk of erroneously drawing conclusions about one aspect 
of the class-status nexus on the basis of empirical scrutiny of another aspect of it. 
This study can be read as an inceptive endeavour to analytically break down the 
various aspects of the class-status nexus while recognising the connections between 
them.  
 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, this thesis has demonstrated the applicability 
of social closure as an overarching concept in the study of lifestyle differentiation. 
While several scholars have pointed to affiliations between Weberian closure theory 
and the work of Bourdieu (e.g. Honneth, 1986; Murphy, 1988; Manza, 1992; Hansen, 
1995), there have been remarkably few attempts to cross-fertilise the two in empirical 
studies. One aspect in which such cross-fertilisation can prove particularly fruitful 
concerns the analysis of the ways in which the mastery of particular lifestyles is 
consolidated into assets producing advantages and privileges. While the notion of 
social closure is already implicit in the Bourdieusian notion of capital, as it denotes 
scarce resources that constitute exclusive advantages for their possessors in social 
life, contemporary usage of the term appears vague and mainly unsubstantiated. More 
specifically, if we are to accept Prieur and Savage’s (2011) reasonable assertion that 
cultural capital is to be understood in ‘relative’ rather than in ‘absolute’ terms, this 
implies that what constitutes socially valorised cultural practices cannot be defined a 
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priori, as the ‘rules of the game’ within social fields are always subject to change due 
to on-going struggles over the principles for social recognition. In other words, the 
social distribution of cultural capital cannot simply be measured by studying the 
distributional pervasiveness of a predefined set of ‘highbrow culture’. The question 
remains, however, how one is to empirically assess the production of symbolic value 
of cultural practices. According to a relative understanding of the term, all cultural 
practices can, in principle, function as cultural capital. Nevertheless, evoking the 
notion of cultural capital requires one to be able to point to social boundaries between 
practitioners and non-practitioners of cultural practices, meaning advantages for the 
former at the expense of the latter. As scrutinising the social distribution of lifestyles 
cannot, in itself, point to such boundaries, further empirical assessment is required. In 
this regard, I have suggested a crucial analytical distinction between formalised and 
non-formalised closure. In this way, it is possible to distinguish between social 
closure that is legally and institutionally secured on the one hand, and social closure 
that is dependent on more or less explicit boundary drawing on a subjective level on 
the other. Particularly focusing on the latter type, I have reworked Lamont’s (1992) 
notion of symbolic boundaries and analysed how people use a combination of 
different evaluative criteria in distinguishing themselves and their peers from other 
groups. While recognising that social closure cannot be conceptually reduced to 
symbolic boundary drawing, I have nevertheless demonstrated that it constitutes one 
important aspect of it. 
 
Indeed, if cultural class analysis is to aim to do more than merely identifying different 
types of cultural consumers, it is time to expand its scope. In a research field where 
many scholars have one-sidedly concerned themselves with taste distribution and 
rather fruitless debates about the significance of the cultural omnivore, my contention 
is that the time has come to focus to a greater extent on issues of social closure and 
power differentials arising from the cultural sphere. While this thesis has not 
established a normative point of view, it has pointed to closure processes which are 
likely to significantly affect people’s life-chances. These processes seem to be largely 
misrecognised by the people who have undergone in-depth interviews in this study. It 
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would be unfortunate if sociologists were to continue to do the same. To borrow a 
phrase from Lamont (1992: 192): ‘Only by recognizing the impact of cultural style on 
inequality is it possible to attempt to overcome its effects.’ 
 
(De Berg et al, 2008; Flemmen, 2012a; Gelder, 2005; Rolness, 1992; Sontag, 1966; 
Skeggs, 2004; Featherstone, 2007; Chan et al, 2011; Kuipers, 2006; Lahire, 2011; 
Friedman, 2012; Furre, 1900; Ryle, 1971; Silva et al, 2009; Greenberg, 1961; Elias, 
1998; Adorno, 2001; Blumer, 1969) 
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APPENDIX 1: Authorization from Norwegian Social Science 
Data Service  
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APPENDIX 2: MCA – Contributions of active categories 
 
 
Label  
Relative 
Weight 
(%) 
Squared 
distance to 
origin      
Axis  1 Axis  2 Axis  3 Axis  4 Axis  5
OCCUPATION
Worker/Operator, u 0,474 20,11670 3,96 0,02 2,87 0,02 0,18
Worker/Operator, f 2,368 3,22333 1,13 2,59 0,14 0,08 6,13
CEO 0,908 10,01740 3,38 2,85 0,18 0,49 0,38
Employee, leading position 1,626 5,15049 6,20 1,87 0,06 4,37 0,02
Employee, other 1,792 4,58150 0,08 0,53 1,27 0,01 2,13
Self-employed 0,458 20,84480 0,03 0,13 0,15 0,00 2,21
Pupil/Student/Apprentice 0,450 21,22810 1,07 0,34 16,13 2,61 0,99
Pensioner 0,923 9,82906 1,19 0,45 2,43 3,39 1,88
TOTAL 8,998 17,04 8,76 23,23 10,97 13,93
MANAGER
Does not manage others 5,201 0,92261 1,26 2,87 0,02 0,01 0,00
Manages 1-9 2,099 3,76316 1,30 3,30 0,00 2,42 2,77
Manages 10-49 0,884 10,31250 5,51 0,81 0,93 0,00 1,19
TOTAL 8,185 8,08 6,98 0,95 2,42 3,96
PUBLIC/PRIVATE
Public, state 1,460 5,84865 0,04 5,62 1,84 0,09 0,50
Public, municipality/county 1,989 4,02778 0,33 8,67 0,15 1,87 1,64
Private 4,530 1,20732 0,09 9,95 0,64 2,93 0,05
TOTAL 7,979 0,46 24,24 2,63 4,90 2,18
VALUE OF CAR
Does not own a car 0,552 17,10000 1,85 1,50 2,26 0,82 0,69
Value below kr 100.000 2,194 3,55755 0,86 2,57 0,24 0,34 0,22
Value kr 100.000-199.999 2,155 3,64103 0,29 0,03 1,69 0,41 0,36
Value kr 200.000-299.999 1,894 4,27917 0,07 0,48 0,13 0,36 0,37
Value kr 300.000-499.999 1,847 4,41453 1,58 1,32 0,52 0,23 0,69
Value above kr 500.000 0,766 12,06190 2,21 2,18 2,64 0,69 0,71
TOTAL 9,408 6,85 8,07 7,48 2,86 3,03
VALUE OF BOAT
Does not own a boat 6,322 0,58177 1,57 0,44 0,00 6,66 0,19
Value below kr 100.000 1,760 4,68161 0,97 0,15 0,91 8,50 2,37
Value kr 100.000-199.999 0,418 22,90570 1,37 0,21 0,00 5,32 0,03
Value kr 200.000-299.999 0,292 33,24320 0,30 0,78 0,09 0,40 1,02
Value kr 300.000-499.999 0,324 29,90240 0,91 0,08 5,00 0,88 4,28
Value above kr 500.000 0,197 49,68000 1,07 0,23 0,01 0,11 0,07
TOTAL 9,313 6,18 1,89 6,01 21,86 7,95
VALUE OF SECOND HOME
Does not own a second home 5,927 0,68708 1,77 1,14 0,15 8,01 0,13
Value below kr 500.000 0,631 14,83750 0,01 0,03 0,61 0,00 0,39
Value kr 500.000-999.999 0,663 14,08330 0,01 0,01 2,26 1,84 1,16
Value kr 1.000.000-1.499.999 0,513 18,49230 0,00 0,58 2,23 2,40 0,28
Value kr 1.500.000-1.999.999 0,450 21,22810 0,74 0,79 0,01 2,04 0,19
Value kr 2.000.000-2.999.999 0,560 16,84510 1,51 1,11 0,56 3,76 0,02
Value above kr 3.000.000 0,545 17,36230 5,83 0,53 2,50 4,72 1,63
TOTAL 9,290 9,87 4,19 8,31 22,77 3,81
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OCCUPATION OF FATHER
Worker/Operator, u 1,444 5,92350 2,61 0,41 7,71 0,91 7,24
Worker/Operator, f 2,328 3,29492 1,02 1,63 0,12 1,02 6,06
CEO 0,939 9,64706 0,94 1,72 3,93 0,02 0,05
Employee, leading position 1,965 4,08835 3,12 0,28 2,13 0,42 1,74
Employee, other 0,773 11,92860 0,44 0,35 0,08 1,72 0,49
Self-employed 1,397 6,15819 0,30 0,05 0,32 3,07 0,28
TOTAL 8,848 8,41 4,42 14,29 7,15 15,87
EDUCATION OF FATHER
Basic level 2,360 3,23746 1,94 0,97 11,13 1,94 5,47
High school 2,983 2,35185 0,35 2,18 0,22 0,27 6,80
University, short 2,573 2,88650 1,68 1,42 3,44 3,21 1,17
University, long 1,215 7,22727 2,81 3,91 2,23 1,06 1,56
TOTAL 9,132 6,78 8,48 17,02 6,49 14,99
EDUCATION OF RESPONDENT
Basic level 0,521 18,19700 4,40 0,01 9,01 4,35 6,34
High school, humanities/health 0,671 13,90590 1,65 0,42 1,30 0,23 0,07
High school, mercantile 0,647 14,45120 1,60 1,84 0,42 0,41 0,12
High school, vocational 0,876 10,41440 2,17 3,00 0,37 0,05 10,68
High school, general 0,631 14,83750 1,78 0,87 0,09 0,07 1,53
Univ.short, humanities/health 1,736 4,75909 0,00 5,16 2,06 0,33 0,33
Univ.short, economy 0,773 11,92860 0,56 2,24 0,27 2,68 3,32
Univ.short, technical 0,939 9,64706 0,67 4,54 0,53 1,25 0,46
Univ.long, humanities/health 1,602 5,24138 2,87 8,13 1,14 3,32 1,52
Univ.long, economy/law 0,418 22,90570 2,27 0,01 0,02 0,27 0,28
Univ.long, technical 0,742 12,47870 2,98 0,11 0,05 1,39 0,06
TOTAL 9,558 20,96 26,31 15,25 14,35 24,72
EDUCATION OF BEST FRIEND
Basic level 0,552 17,10000 3,07 0,27 0,37 0,73 3,01
High school 2,494 3,00949 5,49 2,77 3,42 1,55 2,55
University, short 3,512 1,84719 0,48 0,01 0,84 3,79 2,51
University, long 2,936 2,40591 6,33 3,61 0,20 0,16 1,50
TOTAL 9,495 15,37 6,65 4,82 6,23 9,57
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APPENDIX 3: MCA – Coordinates of active categories  
 
  
Label  
Relative 
Weight 
(%) 
Squared 
distance to 
origin      
Axis  1 Axis  2 Axis  3 Axis  4 Axis  5
OCCUPATION
Worker/Operator, f 0,474 20,11670 -1,34 -0,08 0,99 0,08 -0,24
Worker/Operator, f 2,368 3,22333 -0,32 0,45 -0,10 0,07 0,62
CEO 0,908 10,01740 0,90 -0,77 -0,18 -0,29 -0,25
Employee, leading position 1,626 5,15049 0,91 -0,46 -0,07 0,64 0,05
Employee, other 1,792 4,58150 0,10 0,24 -0,34 0,03 -0,42
Self-employed 0,458 20,84480 -0,13 -0,23 0,23 -0,01 0,84
Pupil/Student/Apprentice 0,450 21,22810 -0,72 0,38 2,40 -0,95 -0,57
Pensioner 0,923 9,82906 -0,53 -0,30 -0,65 -0,75 -0,55
MANAGER
Does not manage others 5,201 0,92261 -0,23 0,32 0,02 0,01 0,01
Manages 1-9 2,099 3,76316 0,37 -0,54 0,02 0,42 0,44
Manages 10-49 0,884 10,31250 1,16 -0,42 -0,41 0,01 -0,44
PUBLIC/PRIVATE
Public, state 1,460 5,84865 0,08 0,85 -0,45 0,10 -0,22
Public, municipality/county 1,989 4,02778 0,19 0,90 -0,11 -0,38 0,35
Private 4,530 1,20732 0,06 -0,64 0,15 0,32 0,04
VALUE OF CAR
Does not own a car 0,552 17,10000 -0,85 0,71 0,81 0,48 -0,43
Value below kr 100.000 2,194 3,55755 -0,29 0,47 -0,13 0,16 0,12
Value kr 100.000-199.999 2,155 3,64103 -0,17 0,05 -0,35 0,17 -0,16
Value kr 200.000-299.999 1,894 4,27917 0,09 -0,22 0,11 -0,17 0,17
Value kr 300.000-499.999 1,847 4,41453 0,43 -0,37 -0,21 -0,14 0,23
Value above kr 500.000 0,766 12,06190 0,79 -0,73 0,74 -0,37 -0,37
VALUE OF BOAT
Does not own a boat 6,322 0,58177 -0,23 0,11 0,00 0,40 -0,07
Value below kr 100.000 1,760 4,68161 0,35 -0,12 -0,29 -0,86 0,44
Value kr 100.000-199.999 0,418 22,90570 0,84 -0,31 -0,01 -1,40 0,10
Value kr 200.000-299.999 0,292 33,24320 0,47 -0,71 0,22 -0,46 0,71
Value kr 300.000-499.999 0,324 29,90240 0,78 -0,22 1,57 -0,65 -1,39
Value above kr 500.000 0,197 49,68000 1,08 -0,47 -0,08 0,29 -0,23
VALUE OF SECOND HOME
Does not own a second home 5,927 0,68708 -0,25 0,19 0,06 0,46 -0,06
Value below kr 500.000 0,631 14,83750 0,06 -0,09 -0,39 0,01 0,30
Value kr 500.000-999.999 0,663 14,08330 0,06 -0,06 -0,74 -0,65 0,51
Value kr 1.000.000-1.499.999 0,513 18,49230 0,02 -0,46 -0,83 -0,85 0,28
Value kr 1.500.000-1.999.999 0,450 21,22810 0,59 -0,58 -0,06 -0,84 0,25
Value kr 2.000.000-2.999.999 0,560 16,84510 0,76 -0,61 0,40 -1,02 -0,07
Value above kr 3.000.000 0,545 17,36230 1,52 -0,43 0,86 -1,16 -0,66
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OCCUPATION OF FATHER
Worker/operator, u 1,444 5,92350 -0,62 -0,23 -0,92 -0,31 -0,86
Worker/operator, f 2,328 3,29492 -0,31 -0,36 -0,09 0,26 0,62
CEO 0,939 9,64706 0,47 0,59 0,82 -0,06 0,09
Employee, leading position 1,965 4,08835 0,59 0,16 0,42 0,18 -0,36
Employee, other 0,773 11,92860 0,35 0,29 -0,13 0,59 0,30
Self-employed 1,397 6,15819 -0,21 -0,08 -0,19 -0,58 0,17
EDUCATION OF FATHER
Basic level 2,360 3,23746 -0,42 -0,28 -0,87 -0,36 -0,58
High school 2,983 2,35185 -0,16 -0,37 0,11 0,12 0,58
University, short 2,573 2,88650 0,38 0,32 0,46 0,44 -0,26
University, long 1,215 7,22727 0,71 0,78 0,54 -0,37 0,43
EDUCATION OF RESPONDENT
Basic level 0,521 18,19700 -1,35 0,05 1,67 -1,14 -1,33
High school, humanities/health 0,671 13,90590 -0,73 0,34 0,56 -0,23 0,12
High school, mercantile 0,647 14,45120 -0,73 -0,73 -0,32 -0,31 -0,17
High school, vocational 0,876 10,41440 -0,73 -0,80 0,26 0,09 1,33
High school, general 0,631 14,83750 -0,78 -0,51 0,15 -0,13 0,60
Univ.short, humanities/health 1,736 4,75909 0,01 0,75 -0,44 0,17 -0,17
Univ.short, economy 0,773 11,92860 0,40 -0,74 0,24 0,73 -0,79
Univ.short, technical 0,939 9,64706 0,39 -0,95 -0,30 0,45 -0,27
Univ.long, humanities/health 1,602 5,24138 0,62 0,98 -0,34 -0,57 0,37
Univ.long, economy/law 0,418 22,90570 1,08 0,05 0,08 0,32 -0,31
Univ.long, technical 0,742 12,47870 0,93 -0,16 0,10 0,54 -0,11
EDUCATION OF BEST FRIEND
Basic level 0,552 17,10000 -1,10 -0,30 -0,33 -0,45 -0,89
High school 2,494 3,00949 -0,69 -0,46 0,47 -0,31 0,39
University, short 3,512 1,84719 0,17 -0,02 -0,20 0,41 -0,32
University, long 2,936 2,40591 0,68 0,48 -0,10 -0,09 0,27
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APPENDIX 4: List of interviewees  
Pseudonym Occupation Age Capital 
volume 
Cultural 
capital 
Economic 
capital 
Andrea Public sector consultant Early 30s + + - 
Anna Manager, oil company  Early 50s + - + 
August Economist Late 50s + + - 
Aurora Pre-school assistant Mid 30s - + - 
Daniel Pre-school teacher Late 50s - + - 
David Technician Mid 20s - - + 
Elias Secondary school teacher Early 30s + + - 
Elisabeth Nurse Late 20s - + - 
Ella Shop-keeper Mid 30s - - + 
Emil Musician/social worker Late 30s - + - 
Emma Nurse Early 60s - + - 
Eva Secretary Mid 40s - - + 
Freja Head of cultural enterprise Mid 40s + + - 
Georg Banker Late 40s + - + 
Helene Medical doctor Late 20s + + - 
Henrik Economist Early 60s + - + 
Johan CEO Mid 50s + - + 
Jon Electrician Mid 20s - - + 
Jonas Head of cultural enterprise Mid 30s + + - 
Julia Artist/illustrator  Late 20s - + - 
Klara Pre-school teacher Late 30s - + - 
Kristian  Dentist Late 30s + + - 
Lars Security guard Mid 20s - + - 
Lea Medical doctor  Mid 30s - + - 
Lucas Lawyer Early 30s + - + 
Maria Primary school teacher Early 40s - + - 
Marianne Manager, small firm Late 40s - - + 
Marta Manager, small firm Mid 30s + - + 
Martin Carpenter Late 40s - + - 
Mikkel Manager, oil company Early 40s + - + 
Nora Lawyer Mid 30s + + - 
Oda Manager, small firm Late 30s + - + 
Oscar Academic Mid 30s + + - 
Oliver Musician Mid 30s - + - 
Olivia Head of cultural enterprise Late 40s + + - 
Patrick Construction worker Mid 40s - + - 
Peter Cultural worker Mid 30s + + - 
Pia Lawyer Late 40s + - + 
Philip Secondary school teacher Mid 30s - + - 
Robert Electrician Mid 20s - - + 
Sara Journalist Mid 40s + + - 
Sebastian Politician Late 30s - - + 
Sofia Academic Mid 60s + + - 
Theodor Head of cultural enterprise Mid 40s + + - 
Thomas Journalist Early 40s + + - 
Wilhelm Manager, oil company Early 40s + - + 
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Projection of interviewees onto the cloud of individuals, fac.plane 1-2 
 
  
Capital volume + 
Cult.cap. + 
Econ. cap - 
Econ. cap + 
Cult.cap. - 
Capital volume - 
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APPENDIX 5: Interview schedule 
How do you spend your spare-time? What do you like to do? 
Are you a member of any clubs, organisations, associations or the likes? 
 
What’s your opinion on Stavanger’s cultural life? 
Are you satisfied with what Stavanger has to offer? What could be better? 
Did you attend any events arranged by Stavanger2008? What did you (not) like? 
 
What kind of music do you listen to? 
Do you have any favourite artists? 
Are there any types of music you don’t like? 
Do you attend concerts? What kinds? How often? 
Are there any types of concerts you’d never attend? 
Do you play any instruments yourself? 
 
Do you go to the movies? How often? 
Are there any particular films you are interested in? 
Are there any types of films you’d never watch? 
Do you like to watch TV? How often? What types of programmes? 
Are there any types of programmes or channels you steer clear of? 
Do you like comedy? What types? 
Are there any comedy shows you disapprove of? 
What is bad humour to you? 
 
Do you listen to the radio? How often? 
Are there any particular channels or programmes you prefer? 
Are there any types of radio shows you dislike?  
 
Do you like to read books? How often? 
What types of books do you prefer?  
Are there any types of books you’d never read? 
Do you read newspapers? Which ones? 
Are there any newspapers you’d never read? 
Do you read other types of reading matters (magazines, etc.)? 
 
Do you like plays?  
Are there any particular types of plays you like? 
Are there any types of plays you dislike? 
Do you attend plays at Rogaland Teater? How often? 
 
Do you like visual art? What kinds? 
Are there any types of visual art you dislike? 
Do you have pictures on your walls at home? What kinds? 
Are there any types of pictures you wouldn’t put on your walls? 
Do you attend art exhibitions? How often? 
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Do you work out or exercise? 
Are there types of sports or activities you’d never do? 
Do you like to watch sports on TV? 
Are there types of sports that don’t interest you? 
 
Can you describe what kind of clothes you like to wear? 
Are there any types of clothes you’d never wear? 
Where do you buy your clothes? 
Are there any clothing stores you’d never go to buy clothes? 
Would you say that you follow fashion? Why (not)? 
 
Do you own a car? What type? 
What is important to you when you buy a new car? 
Are there any types of cars you’d never buy?  
 
How would you describe your home? 
Do you have particular preferences when you decorate your home? 
Where do you buy furniture? 
Are there places you’d never buy furniture? 
What kind of home would you not feel comfortable living in? 
 
What kind of food do you like? 
Are there any types of food you dislike? 
Do you like to cook? What sort of dishes do you like to make? 
Where do you buy food? Are there any particular shops you like/dislike? 
What do you prefer to drink? 
Are there any types of beverages you never drink? 
 
Do you eat out? How often? 
Are there any particular restaurants or cafés you like here in Stavanger? 
Are there any restaurants or cafés you’d never go to? 
What kinds of people go there? 
Do you go to bars? How often? 
Are there particular bars you’d never go to? 
What kinds of people go there? 
 
Do you ever notice that your tastes and preferences are different from that of others? 
Would you say that it is important to you that the people with whom you socialise 
have similar preferences and tastes as you? 
Do you ever catch yourself thinking that other people have strange preferences or bad 
tastes? What is bad taste to you? 
Have you ever felt uncomfortable for having different tastes than others? 
 
Would you say that you like to live in Stavanger? What is good/bad about living 
here? 
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If you were to move, in what part of town would you like live?  
Are there parts of town you’d never consider moving to? 
How do you spend your holidays? 
Are there any destinations you prefer going to? 
Are there places you’d never go for holidays? 
 
How do you spend your money after the bills are paid? 
How much money would you say you spend each month? 
Would you say that money is important to you? 
Do you ever catch yourself thinking about how other people spend their money? 
Do you ever experience others being opinionated about how you spend your money? 
 
How would you compare your way of life to others in Stavanger? In what ways are 
you (dis)similar to others? 
What types of people do you get along with? What qualities do you value in others? 
What types of people don’t you get along with? What is it about such people you 
don’t like? 
Do you have kids? 
Are there any particular values you want to transfer to your children? 
Are you interested in politics? Are there any political issues you feel more strongly 
about than others? 
If it was Election Day tomorrow, which party would you vote for? 
Are there any political parties you would never vote for? 
Stavanger is often referred to as the Oil Capital of Norway. In your opinion, what is 
good/bad about the oil business in Stavanger? 
 
Age? 
Place of residence? 
Original place of residence? 
Line of work? 
Occupational sector? 
Educational level? 
Educational type? 
Mother’s education and line of work? 
Father’s education and line of work? 
Education of best friend? 
Household income? 
Value of home? 
Value of second home?  
Value of car? 
Value of boat? 
Number of books at home? 
Frequency of theatre visits last year? 
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